

JOHN NEMEC

THE UBIQUITOUS
ŚIVA



*Somānanda's Śivadṛṣṭi and
His Tantric Interlocutors*

The Ubiquitous Śiva



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Interlocutors

John Nemeč



The Ubiquitous Śiva

SOMĀNANDA'S ŚIVADRṢṬI AND HIS
TANTRIC INTERLOCUTORS

John Nemeč

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{ ABBREVIATIONS }

A	<i>Aṣṭādhyāyī</i> of Pāṇini
BrSūBhā	<i>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</i> of Śaṅkara
ĪPK	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāṅkārikā</i> of Utpaladeva
ĪPṬ	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāṅtikā</i> , also called the <i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti</i> , of Utpaladeva
ĪPV	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsīni</i> of Abhinavagupta
ĪPVṛ	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāṅkārikāvṛti</i> of Utpaladeva
ĪPVV	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarsīni</i> of Abhinavagupta
IsMEO	Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente
JAOS	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
JGJRI	<i>Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute</i>
KSTS	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
KT	<i>Kiraṇa Tantra</i>
KVṛ	<i>Kiraṇavṛti</i> of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha
MBh	<i>Mahābhārata</i>
MM	<i>Mahārthamañjari</i> of Maheśvarānanda
MMP	<i>Mahārthamañjariparimala</i> of Maheśvarānanda
MŚV	<i>Mālinīślokaṅkārikā</i> of Abhinavagupta
NAK	Nepal Archives Kathmandu
NGMPP	Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project
NP	<i>Nareśvaraparikṣā</i> of Sadyojyoti
NŚ	<i>Nitiśataka</i> of Bhartṛhari
PS	<i>Paramārthasāra</i> of Abhinavagupta
PT	<i>Parātrimśikātantra</i>
PTV	<i>Parātrimśikāvivarāṇa</i> of Abhinavagupta
PTVi	<i>Parātrimśikāvivṛti</i> of Somānanda
PV	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> of Dharmakīrti
RT	<i>Rājatarāṅgiṇī</i> of Kalhaṇa
ŚāVi	<i>Śāktavijñāna</i> , attributed to Somānanda
ŚD	<i>Śivadr̥ṣṭi</i> of Somānanda
ŚDhāSam	<i>Śabdadhātusamikṣā</i> of Bhartṛhari
ŚDVṛ	<i>Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛti</i> , also called the <i>Padasaṅgati</i> , of Utpaladeva
SpKā	<i>Spandakārikā</i> of Vasugupta (or Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa)
SpKāVṛ	<i>Spandakārikāvṛti</i> of Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa
SpNir	<i>Spandanirṇaya</i> of Kṣemarāja
SpVi	<i>Spandavivṛti</i> of Rājānaka Rāma
SpSam	<i>Spandasam̐doha</i> of Kṣemarāja

ŚSt	<i>Śivastotrāvali</i> of Utpaladeva
ŚSū	<i>Śivasūtra</i>
ŚSūVā	<i>Śivasūtravārttika</i> of Bhāskara
ST	<i>Siddhitrayī</i> of Utpaladeva
TĀ	<i>Tāntrāloka</i> of Abhinavagupta
TAK	<i>Tāntrikābhidhānakośa</i>
TĀV	<i>Tāntrālokaviveka</i> of Jayaratha
TGSt	<i>Tattvagarbhasotra</i> of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna
TST	<i>Tantrasadbhāvanātantra</i>
VBh	<i>Vijñānabhairava</i>
VP	<i>Vākyapadīya</i> of Bhartṛhari
VPP	<i>Vākyapadīyapaddhati</i> of Vṛṣabhadeva
VPVṛ	<i>Vākyapadīyavṛtti</i> of one Harivṛṣabha
YājSmṛ	<i>Yājñavalkya-smṛti</i>
YS	<i>Yogasūtra</i> of Patañjali

The Ubiquitous Śiva

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{ PART I }

Introduction to the Translation

1. Introduction

By the end of the eighth century, and possibly as early as the late seventh century,¹ the beginnings of a rich and diverse post-scriptural tradition of philosophical, yogic, and ritual exegesis that was based in, but reached beyond, the confines of the myriad scriptural sources of the esoteric Śaiva tantras had emerged in the Indian sub-continent.² The Brahmins who authored these works sought to interpret and explain the vast canon of tantric scripture through the production of a wide array of reflections on those esoteric scriptures. These post-scriptural works served a variety of ends. Some sought primarily to engage mainstream Hindu and Buddhist philosophical schools; others sought to codify and explain yogic practice; still others constructed philosophical expressions of the religious principles of scripture; and, finally, some sought to explain tantric ritual by mapping the proper manner of its performance and by offering theoretical explanations to account for its efficacy, meaning, and significance. Along the way, the post-scriptural authors regularly departed significantly from the focus of their sources by marginalizing the culture of visionary experience found in the tantric scriptures in preference of teachings more

¹The earlier date points to the writings of Sadyojyotiś and Br̥haspati, the earliest of the known post-scriptural authors of the Śaiva Siddhānta. There is no evidence that these authors were Kashmiri, however.

²The reader should note that I use the term “post-scriptural” only to describe works that define themselves as having been composed subsequent to scripture. The term should not be understood to suggest that post-scriptural works postdate the entire corpus of Śaiva tantric scripture, as many scriptural sources postdate one or another of the “post-scriptural” works (though of course a given post-scriptural work can only refer, directly or implicitly, to historically antecedent scriptural sources).

closely associated with liberating gnosis (*jñāna*), which could reasonably be expected to find greater support in mainstream social circles.³

A landmark in the development of the post-scriptural writings may be identified with the composition of the *Śivadṛṣṭi* (ŚD) by one Somānanda (fl. c. 900–950), the Brahmin and Śākta Śaiva tāntrika who is the subject of the present book. Living and writing in Kashmir, then a major center of tantrism,⁴ Somānanda not only founded the highly influential Pratyabhijñā school, the philosophical tradition most commonly associated with “Kashmiri Shaivism,”⁵ but he was also a pioneer of the post-scriptural Trika, a tradition of exegesis that is closely tied to the writings of the great polymath Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025),⁶ Somānanda’s great-grand-disciple through a preceptorial lineage passing from Somānanda through Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) and Lakṣmaṇagupta (fl. c. 950–1000) to Abhinavagupta himself.

With the production of his ŚD was born a dramatic, and new, interpretation of the nature of the divine, and the relationship of the divine to the manifested universe in which humans struggle to navigate their way through *saṃsāra*, the world of transmigration. Not only was Somānanda’s vision among the very first tantric post-scriptural expressions of a philosophical non-dualism, but it was a radical form of non-dualism that imagined and articulated, in vivid terms, the presence of an active, engaged God—Śiva—who personally and directly enacted the activities of the universe. Śiva was said both to embody the very nature of all the various agents found in the universe and to perform through them the innumerable human and other acts occurring in the world as we know it. The work, then, as we shall see, was strictly and thoroughly pantheistic. It denied the existence of any difference whatsoever in the nature of Śiva, the universe, and the agents acting within it. This view was developed, moreover, via the innovation of a theory that conceptualized, in a novel manner, the universe as a flow of power (*śakti*) that was controlled by Śiva himself. And while

³See Sanderson 2007¹: 241.

⁴The Kashmir Valley was host to a great tantric tradition with significant social standing and influence from as early as the ninth century, and both of the two main subgroups of post-scriptural, tantric Śaiva authors—the dualist Śaiva Siddhānta, on the one hand, and the various branches of the non-dual, rather more goddess-centered “Śākta Śaiva” traditions, on the other—were active by the beginning of the tenth century. Indeed, both the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta and the non-dual Trika must have been known in the court of Cippaṭa-Jayāpīḍa as early as the beginning of the ninth century. See Sanderson 2007¹: 425.

⁵This term is a misnomer, being both overly specific geographically and overly general doctrinally. See Dyczkowski 1987: 222–223, fn. 12.

⁶Sanderson goes so far as to identify Abhinavagupta’s Trika-influenced exegesis with the Trika post-scriptural school, for which see Sanderson 2007¹: 371. This formulation leaves out, however, the Trika exegesis of Somānanda, in particular his lost *Parātrīṃśīkāvīrti* (PTVi), which is a Trika post-scriptural work that predates Abhinavagupta, although in Sanderson’s defense the work is only known through the surviving quotations of it that are preserved in Abhinavagupta’s *Parātrīṃśīkāvivarāṇa* (PTV).

many of the unique philosophical and theological contributions of the ŚD did not find their way into the long tradition of Kashmiri tantric philosophy subsequent to and based on Somānanda's work, the text and its author indisputably served to inspire a long tradition of tantric non-dualism, one that proved to have a pan-Indian appeal and influence that extends from the Kashmir Valley of the tenth century to contemporary times.

2. About This Book

Despite the significance of the ŚD in the history of Śaiva post-scriptural writing, the text, as well as its author, remains something of an enigma, as the ŚD has in the main found itself neglected by detailed study. In particular, no complete and unbroken translation of the work exists, despite the publication of an edition of the work in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (KSTS) some three-quarters of a century ago, in 1934. One suspects that the reasons for this neglect are various, and stem in part from the fact that the Pratyabhijñā captured the attention of modern scholarship first in the form of the study of Abhinavagupta, whose exegetical and philosophical writings gained notoriety both for their synthetic and encyclopedic brilliance, but also because the author was well known for his writings on aesthetics, through which not just a few scholars gained awareness of the tantric philosophical and yogic writings in question.⁷

It may also be traced to the fact that the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikās* (ĪPK), a work of Somānanda's immediate disciple Utpaladeva, coupled with that author's pair of auto-commentaries, the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikāvṛtti* (ĪPVṛ) and the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-tikā* or *-vivṛti* (ĪPT), essentially supplanted the philosophy of the ŚD and gained acceptance as the normative expression of Pratyabhijñā philosophy from a relatively early date.⁸

Finally, the scholarly accounts of the Pratyabhijñā available in the secondary literature—and the paucity of writing dedicated to the study of the ŚD—mirror a practice found in the writings of the historical authors of the Pratyabhijñā: the references to Somānanda in the literature are severely limited and conceptually circumscribed, for the ŚD is quoted in a relatively sparing, decidedly selective and, when it comes to making

⁷An example may be found in the writings of K. C. Pandey and K. A. S. Iyer, who focused on Abhinavagupta rather than the authors who preceded him in the lineage of the Pratyabhijñā. See, e.g., Pandey [1963] 2000; Iyer and Pandey 1986. Alexis Sanderson also came to know Abhinavagupta's tantric self through that author's writings on aesthetics, to offer a second example. See Sanderson 2007²: 93.

⁸Chatterji was the first to notice the eclipse of the ŚD by the writings of Utpaladeva, a point that Gnoli reiterated. See Chatterji [1914] 1986: 146–147; and Gnoli 1957: 16. Even reference to the school as the Pratyabhijñā stems from Utpaladeva's use of this term in his ĪPK, about which see ĪPK, ed. Torella 1994: xx. Cited hereafter as Torella 1994.

philosophical arguments, superficial manner.⁹ Somānanda's magnum opus, then, holds a curious place in the history of post-scriptural thought. As the first work of the Pratyabhijñā, the ŚD may be identified as the root text of an influential and important philosophical tradition. Yet the work is poorly understood and rarely read by contemporary scholars or students of Hindu tantrism, just as it was quickly passed over in preference to the ĪPK in the history of the tradition itself.

More than the mere privilege of chronological primacy distinguishes the ŚD for sustained analysis, however, as its mere status as the original work of the Pratyabhijñā hardly suffices fully to justify its study. And the present volume is neither directed nor justified by any wish to discover the "original" or "true" form of Pratyabhijñā philosophy.¹⁰ Rather, the present book is shaped by the following pair of principles. First, a close study of the ŚD can shed light on a single moment in the intellectual history of Kashmir. Written at the turn of the tenth century, the ŚD was a pioneering work of non-dual tantric philosophy. It offered a novel philosophical vision, one that differed in important ways from the relatively few post-scriptural tantric works that existed in Somānanda's time. A study of the ŚD therefore helps to illuminate a formative moment in the development of tantric thought in Kashmir.

Second, a thoroughgoing study of the ŚD, when read next to the other, subsequent writings in the history of the Pratyabhijñā, will aid our understanding of how the tradition developed and changed over time. A comparison of the writings of the various authors of the Pratyabhijñā reveals the fact that these authors each made unique philosophical contributions, even if all the authors of the Pratyabhijñā subscribed to a common set of essential tenets and a shared spirit of the tradition. Attention to such diachronic developments in Pratyabhijñā thought will therefore help us to understand how this school of thought incorporated the individual perspectives of the particular authors who represented it. In other words, a close reading of the ŚD gives important insight into the development of a tradition that self-consciously understood its authors to furnish

⁹The quotations of the work may be said to be superficial because they almost exclusively quote Somānanda's expression of commonly held principles of the Pratyabhijñā. The ideas that may be identified as particular to the ŚD are rarely invoked in the various quotations of the text. These quotations are found, for the most part, in selections from the first chapter of the work, though the seventh chapter is also quoted with some frequency. I say this on the basis of a survey of the quotations found in the Spanda literature and in Abhinavagupta's works, in particular the *Parātrīṃśikāvivarāṇa* (PTV), the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini* (ĪPV) and *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivrtivimarśini* (ĪPVV).

¹⁰Being first confers on a given work or author neither an intrinsic significance nor an innate authority that, a priori, supersedes the authors and works that follow in the tradition or traditions in question. One therefore must look to other reasons to justify the study of materials situated, as is the ŚD, at the beginning of a long and important intellectual tradition.

historically situated treatises on the nature of the world of transmigration and the path to spiritual liberation.

Based on this pair of guiding principles, the present work looks in two directions. It looks, first, to the contemporaneous traditions of tantric post-scriptural writings in order to understand the intellectual context in which Somānanda wrote, thereby allowing one to identify the particular contributions the author made to the history of tantric post-scriptural writing. And, second, it looks to the writings of Somānanda's disciple, Utpaladeva—not only to his commentary on the ŚD, the *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti* (ŚDVṛ), a.k.a. the *Padasaṅgati*,¹¹ but also to his ĪPK and ĪPVṛ—to begin to chart the ways in which the ideas presented in the ŚD were taken up by the later Pratyabhijñā authors.

The particular challenges associated with such a study are various, though they are not unique to the study of Śaiva post-scriptural materials. First, the usual problems associated with textual transmission occur, and these must be solved by an examination of manuscript sources. Although the published KSTS edition of the ŚD offers a solid foundation on which to build one's understanding of Somānanda's masterwork, we have examined six additional manuscripts that were not consulted for that edition. In doing so, numerous divergences between the readings of these manuscripts and the KSTS edition became readily evident. More important, some of these variants have helped to solve textual riddles in the published edition, where occasional passages appear in a nearly incomprehensible form, in unidiomatic Sanskrit, or merely in awkward grammatical constructions. For the readings of the six manuscripts may sometimes be shown to be more complete or more accurate than the ones found in the KSTS edition. (We regularly note *all* the readings of all the manuscripts and of the KSTS edition, however, so that those who read Sanskrit can come to their own conclusions regarding what Somānanda might have written.) This is to say that to access Somānanda's thought requires us to pay attention to the manuscripts that have transmitted his ŚD to us over time.

¹¹Utpaladeva refers to the text by this name in the opening verses of his commentary: *vibhramākaraśaṅgīnena svaputrenāsmi coditaḥ / padmānandābhīdhānena tathā sabrahmacāriṇā. iśvara-pratyabhijñāktavistare gurunirmite / śivadṛṣṭīprakaraṇe karomi padasaṅgatiṃ*. That this is probably the title of the commentary as Utpaladeva labeled it is further corroborated by Maheśvarānanda's reference to it by the same name in his auto-commentary (the *Parimala*) on his own *Mahārthamañjarī*, on, e.g., his commentary on verse 32. See Mukunda Rāma Śāstrī, ed., *The Mahārthamañjarī of Maheśvarānanda with Commentary of the Author*, KSTS 11 (Pune: Aryabhushan Press, 1918): 75. (I am grateful to Professor Harunaga Isaacson for referring me to this source in a personal communication of December 2004.) I nevertheless refer to the text, for the sake of convenience, as the ŚDVṛ in the present volume, this being the commonly accepted name of the work both in scholarly circles and in the colophons of the extant manuscript tradition.

A second challenge relates to the manner in which Somānanda's thought has been understood and interpreted in the secondary literature. Simply, the ŚD has regularly been read through the lens of the ĪPK and its commentaries, because of which a nearly perfectly synchronic presentation of Pratyabhijñā thought has dominated our understanding of the school's philosophy to date. Thus, for example, Gnoli suggested that "the doctrine set out in the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* does not differ from the theories established by Utpaladeva in his [*Īśvarapratyabhijñā*]-*kārikās*," a statement that has essentially remained unchallenged in the more than five decades since it was made. This is so despite the fact that it is true only with regard to the spirit of the authors' works and not with regard to Somānanda's and Utpaladeva's individual formulations of Pratyabhijñā philosophy.¹²

In an effort judiciously to disaggregate our understanding of Somānanda's Pratyabhijñā from that of his more renowned disciple, the present work therefore includes an unbroken translation of the accompanying passages of Utpaladeva's ŚDVṛ, none of which have been translated into any European or Indian language prior to the present rendering. It also includes a critical analysis of the similarities and differences between the writings of the two authors, the latter spoken of primarily in terms of Somānanda's unique contributions. The full history of the development of the Pratyabhijñā remains to be written, however, for although extensive reference is made to the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ in the present analysis of the differences between the writings of Utpaladeva and Somānanda, the ways in which and degree to which Abhinavagupta and those who follow him in the lineage of the Pratyabhijñā adopt the ideas of one or the other of the

¹²See Gnoli 1957: 17. Torella 1994: xx notably recognizes that the ĪPK contains "important novelties, not so much in the basic doctrine as in the far more aware and acute determination of the aims proposed, the ways of attaining them and the ambit addressed." Though he acknowledges innovations in the writings of Utpaladeva, he neither identifies the ideas of Somānanda that are essentially dropped by Utpaladeva nor recognizes those that are reinstated, in some degree, in Abhinavagupta's oeuvre. Torella should not be faulted on this point, however, for his excellent introduction is meant to contextualize his translation of Utpaladeva's ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, and thus neither the writings of Somānanda nor of Abhinavagupta were his primary concern.

Dyczkowski, before him, identified a novel concept in Utpaladeva's writings, namely, that of the notion of an absolute ego that grounds the individual, limited ego of the bound individual. In doing so, he recognized that Somānanda, contra Utpaladeva, wished not to establish any internal subject-object dichotomy, but instead posited the existence of a single active agent, Śiva. This idea is linked to the notion of reflective awareness (*vīmarśa*) and the absence of a fully formed conception of such reflective awareness in the ŚD (see sections 5 and 6, below). As such, Dyczkowski recognized an important element of innovation in the writings of Utpaladeva. See Dyczkowski [1990] 2004: 29–49, esp. 40, and Dyczkowski 1992¹: 42. Despite the contributions of this pair of scholars, however, no comprehensive diachronic treatment of the Pratyabhijñā yet exists, and Somānanda's unique contributions have not been thoroughly examined prior to the present study.

two authors remains something of an open question, one that demands a full-length study.¹³

Finally, a third challenge to understanding the ŚD and its place in Indian intellectual history arises from the very nature of the work itself. A famously difficult text,¹⁴ the ŚD taxes the knowledge of its readers by addressing a wide range of topics and opposing schools of thought. The lack, moreover, of any extant commentary after the middle of the fourth chapter (of seven) of the work renders the task of interpreting these passages rather more challenging than it might have been.¹⁵ To address every issue of concern to Somānanda, then, would require one to treat a range of issues associated with the gamut of philosophical and tantric schools extant in Somānanda's day, all through the medium of that author's complex, terse, and relatively inaccessible verse.

Given the diversity of themes and opposing schools with which Somānanda deals, I have chosen to treat the matters at hand serially rather than simultaneously. The editorial decision here employed is one of identifying and selecting the peculiarly tantric expressions of the ŚD, and in so doing treating the particular arguments that Somānanda directed toward his tantric interlocutors. These are found primarily in the first three chapters of the work, all of which are offered herein in an unbroken, annotated translation, along with (as already mentioned) an unbroken translation of the corresponding portions of the ŚDVṛ. Now, although the materials found in the subsequent three chapters of the text are in many ways related to those of the first three—they answer a series of concerns mentioned or implied in the first part of the text—they also address a set of issues that bring Somānanda into substantial contact with the philosophical writings of various mainstream, as opposed to tantric, philosophical schools, notably the philosophy of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins

¹³This, indeed, is a subject I intend to take up in a future research project, one that will both examine the Pratyabhijñā diachronically and in relation to contemporaneous schools of thought in the Kashmir Valley. Suffice it to say here, for the moment, that Abhinavagupta adroitly synchronizes and synthesizes the writings of Somānanda and Utpaladeva in a brilliant grand narrative of Pratyabhijñā philosophy that sweeps up—or so it feels—elements of any and every contemporaneous tantric and philosophical tradition known in the Kashmir Valley in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries. The reader should note that no writings of Utpaladeva's disciple Lakṣmaṇagupta are here mentioned, simply because nothing from him has come down to us.

¹⁴See, e.g., Torella 1994: xiv, who describes the ŚD as a "difficult, discordant but fascinating work;" and Muller-Ortega 1989: 44, who suggests that it is "a very difficult text in seven chapters that has yet to be translated satisfactorily."

¹⁵Gnoli 1957: 16, for example, suggests that "without the help of a commentary, the reading of the other three chapters [of the ŚD, for which no commentary survives] is an extremely difficult, not to say hopeless, undertaking."

and the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti in particular.¹⁶ The seventh and last chapter, in turn, deals with tantric religious practices, and it will be discussed in some detail in what follows. The reader should therefore understand the present volume to constitute the first installment of a larger project—namely, the production of a complete edition and annotated translation of the ŚD in seven chapters, along with all of the extant passages of the ŚDVṛ.

In the course of examining Somānanda's interaction with his tantric interlocutors, I address three issues in the remainder of the present Introduction. First, I examine the substance of the arguments of the ŚD, and in doing so I demonstrate the ways in which the ŚD articulates a monism that is strictly pantheistic. Somānanda repeatedly shows himself to be emphatically opposed to the conception of any difference whatsoever between Śiva and the universe he creates, so much so that he repeatedly argues that any and every entity found in the world is fully equal to Śiva himself. Central to this notion is Somānanda's striking and sweeping theory that Śiva's power of will (*icchā*) precedes and shapes all cognitions and actions, be they those of humans or other beings who are subjected to the rounds of transmigration and rebirth, of the various apparently inanimate objects and entities that populate the universe, down to the mundane pot, or even of Śiva himself.

Second, I detail Somānanda's interaction with the various tantric schools, texts, and authors of his day, including the dualist Śaiva Siddhāntins, the Spanda School, the Krama, and the Trika. (I also discuss in passing the two mainstream philosophical schools with which one must be familiar in order fully to understand the selections of the ŚD and ŚDVṛ

¹⁶Thus, ŚD 4 explains how "everything is of the nature of Śiva" (see ŚD 4.1ab: *athedāniṃ pravak-tavyaṃ yathā sarvaṃ śivātmakam*), the treatment of a matter the author promised to address in ŚD 1.45cd-46ab, but it does so in a manner that shows cognizance of and draws heavily from the Vijñānavādins, as it addresses a number of issues presented by Dharmakīrti. ŚD 5 explains how a unitary Śiva may be divided, again with an eye primarily on the same Buddhist schools and authors. Finally, ŚD 6 explains how the same Śiva-nature is omnipresent, this on the basis of the identification of agent of action and power, but the arguments found herein contrast the author's position with those of various strains of the Vedānta, the Pāñcarātrikas, the philosophy of the *Bhagavadgītā*, the Jains, the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika schools, again the Vijñānavādins, as well as the realist Buddhists, and even the materialist Cārvākas.

The degree to which Somānanda responds to Dharmakīrti and the Buddhist epistemologists in particular, as opposed to the Buddhist Vijñānavādins, remains, moreover, a subject for further consideration. Torella (1994: xxii, fn. 28; cf. Torella 1992) has already noted some points of contact with the philosophy of the Buddhist epistemologists in the ŚD, including the famous quotation of *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) 3.282 in ŚD 1.45cd-46ab, as well as reference to PV 3.354 in ŚD 6.39. He further notes reference to the ideas of the Buddhist epistemologists in ŚD 4.81a (reference to *svalakṣaṇas*), 6.76c (*apoha*), 5.55a (*svārthānumāna*), and 5.61c (*parānumāna*). My hypothesis, to be examined in greater detail in a future study, is that contact with the philosophy of the Buddhist epistemologists is demonstrably more extensive than even this in the ŚD, with the fourth and sixth chapters showing the pervasive influence thereof, this over and above the more general influence of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins on the ŚD.

here offered, those of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins and the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti in particular, and the Hindu grammarians as represented by the writings of Bhartṛhari.) Such a study is indispensable to understanding Somānanda's text, for while it has been known for some time that the ŚD shows itself to be close, in particular, to the Trika, as well as the Krama, the full contours of these interactions have yet to be mapped. This lacuna in the scholarly literature may be seen most notably with the influence of the Trika *Vijñānabhairava* (VBh) on the ŚD, an influence felt most palpably in the seventh chapter, but also throughout the text, which often echoes the VBh in articulating its pantheism. I also include a summary examination of the Trika and other technical terminology found in the ŚD, this as an accompaniment to an analysis of the differences between the ŚD, on the one hand, and the ĪPK, ĪPVṛ, and ŚDVṛ of Somānanda's disciple and commentator, Utpaladeva, on the other.

The latter's monism differs in significant ways from that of his teacher. In particular, I argue that the monism of the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ involves a panentheism that recognizes the identity of Śiva with the universe he creates, but at the same time reserves a transcendent place for the creator god. For, contra Somānanda's pantheistic ŚD, Utpaladeva allows for a form of Śiva that in some sense stands simultaneously apart from the universe he creates. Along the way Utpaladeva also marginalizes Somānanda's concept of divine will, a philosophical tenet that, although it is a hallmark of the ŚD, is essentially erased from the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ.

Third, I will argue that the ŚD was directed toward an audience of insiders, as opposed to the wider learned community to which the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ are directed, just as Somānanda's interlocutors are themselves primarily, though not exclusively, his fellow tāntrikas and the tantric scriptures with which they engage. Most important, in this regard, are the extended and vociferous arguments Somānanda puts forward to oppose the philosophy of the grammarians in the second chapter of the ŚD. These famous arguments have perplexed modern scholars, who could not understand why Somānanda would attack a school and an author so readily embraced by his immediate disciple, Utpaladeva. I will show that Somānanda's arguments against Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadiya* (VP) and the commentary on the first chapter (*kāṇḍa*) of that work, the *Vākyapadiyavṛtti* (VPVṛ), are linked to his repudiation of a Śākta tantric school that invoked the grammarians to justify the view that the goddess, and not Śiva, is supreme.

The remainder of the Introduction to the Translation is divided into four parts. In the first part (sections 3 and 4), I survey Somānanda's writings and discuss his biography. Following this is a detailed study of Somānanda's philosophical vision and a comparison of it with Utpaladeva's Pratyabhijñā (sections 5, 6, 7, and 8). Included in this part is an

examination of the differences between the writings of Somānanda and Utpaladeva, which is divided into two subsections. The first subsection maps the ways in which Utpaladeva's ĪPK and ĪPVṛ diverge from the ŚD. The second subsection examines the divergences between the ŚD and the ŚDVṛ, which are characterized primarily by a difference in terminology: Utpaladeva borrows substantially in his ŚDVṛ not only from the nomenclature of the Hindu grammarians but also from that of the Buddhist idealists and the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti in particular, while Somānanda's ŚD does not. Also included is the aforementioned study of the use of Trika and other technical terminology by Somānanda and Utpaladeva, followed by a detailed examination of the influence of the VBh on Somānanda's work.

Next, I examine Somānanda's interaction with contemporaneous tantric schools in sections 9–14. In section 9, I identify the various tantric post-scriptural schools that existed in Kashmir in Somānanda's day and consider the degree to which these traditions were developed at this early moment in the history of the production of tantric post-scriptural works. This is followed by five sections, each dealing with one of the various tantric or philosophical schools with which Somānanda engaged: the Spanda, the Krama, the Śaiva Siddhānta, the Grammarians, and the goddess-centered Śākta school. After a concluding section (section 15), a fourth and final part of the Introduction describes the manuscripts consulted for the critical edition of the ŚD and ŚDVṛ (section 16); explains the relationship of the manuscripts and the editorial process I used in developing the critical edition (section 17); and describes the various problems encountered and strategies used in crafting the translation (section 18).

Finally, a word should here be said about the various ways in which the reader may wish to engage the present volume. If it is true that this book addresses a number of issues in the study of tantric post-scriptural writing and employs a number of methods to access the materials in question—including the production of a critical edition of the relevant passages of the ŚD and ŚDVṛ, an annotated translation of the same, and a critical study of the ideas represented in the text and commentary—it is similarly true that each reader will approach the work with his or her peculiar interests and concerns. The nonspecialist reader should know that this volume is constructed in a manner that is meant to meet his or her needs and interests. The translation, as will be discussed in more detail below (section 18), is written so as to appeal to the general reader, and many of the notes to the text are included further to explain the ideas espoused by Somānanda and his commentator.

The scholar of Sanskrit may wish frequently to consult the critical edition of the work while reading the translation, as he or she will likely wish to take in the textual and historical arguments and references made in

the present Introduction and in the various notes to the translation. The nonspecialist reader may wish instead merely to glance at the portions of the Introduction relevant to his or her interests—such as those that deal with Somānanda’s philosophical ideas, for instance—and, perhaps, focus attention on the translations included herein. It is therefore my hope and intention that the nonspecialist reader will be able to make use of the translations without being distracted by the rather more technical textual and historical arguments and notes found in this volume, while, simultaneously, the Sanskritist and the scholar of premodern South Asian religions alike will find all the relevant historical and textual detail herein sufficiently and properly to locate the ŚD and its author in the history of tantric Śaivism and in the wider history of premodern Indian religions.

Somānanda's Works and His Biography

3. The Author and His Works

Although the lineage of Pratyabhijñā authors who concern us¹⁷ has been known since the publication of Pandey's landmark and eponymous study of the great Kashmiri polymath, *Abhinavagupta*,¹⁸ and although the historical dates of the authors in question have since been established beyond any reasonable dispute,¹⁹ the motivations that inspired the works of Somānanda and his successor, Utpaladeva, remain a subject worthy of further consideration and analysis. In particular, questions arise as to what purpose or purposes the authors of the Śaiva post-scriptural literature meant their texts to serve, and in particular what Somānanda might have intended for his ŚD.

Two leading tantric studies scholars have already articulated, in broad terms, their respective views of the general purpose of the mass of Śaiva post-scriptural

¹⁷As noted above, we here propose only to study the philosophy of Somānanda as seen in the ŚD, comparing and contrasting with the works of his disciple, Utpaladeva, principally his ŚDVṛ and ĪPK and ĪPVṛ. Reference to Abhinavagupta's work will be made en passant, while the writings of Pratyabhijñā authors who follow Abhinavagupta, such as Kṣemarāja, will not enter into the present discussion. As such, reference to the "Pratyabhijñā" in the present work should be taken to refer to the philosophical writings of Somānanda, Utpaladeva, and Abhinavagupta, which are found in the ŚD and ŚDVṛ, the ĪPK, and the four commentaries thereon, the two auto-commentaries of Utpaladeva (namely, the ĪPVṛ and ĪPT, the latter of which is lost excepting in fragments published in recent years by Torella), and the ĪPV and ĪPVV of Abhinavagupta.

¹⁸See Pandey [1963] 2000: 160; Kupetz 1972: 24; and Sanderson 1990: 163.

¹⁹There exists more or less a consensus on the dates of Somānanda's textual production. Pandey writes that Somānanda wrote "in the 9th century A.D." (Pandey [1963] 2000: 20); Bhattacharyya places Somānanda "at end of the ninth century" (Bhattacharyya 1999: 64), as does Rastogi (Rastogi 1979: 92); Torella places Somānanda between 875/900 and 925/950 (Torella 1994: xii). Finally, Sanderson's date, accepted in the present study (along with his dating of the other authors of the Pratyabhijñā), is slightly later than the others, as he places Somānanda in the early tenth century, flourishing from circa 900–950 (Sanderson 1990: 158). The explanation for these dates is offered in Sanderson 2007¹: 411ff.

literature. Torella, for one, has suggested that the emergence of a work of exegesis—exegesis being defined as “the reformulation of [the] teaching [of the scriptures] and the organizing and hierarchizing of their contents”—requires by the very nature of such a work that the author took “the decision to emerge in the open, to escape from the dimension of a restricted circle of adepts.” For Torella, this is a decision that the Śākta Śaiva authors made in order “to offer [Śākta Śaiva works and the traditions they represent] implicitly as an alternative to the dominant Śaiva Siddhānta, or at least to establish [themselves] as a non-extraneous element (or rather as an element which, though not intended to constitute the whole, was able to give it its ultimate significance).”²⁰ Sanderson similarly postulates the existence of a single telos for all of the post-scriptural writings. He argues that the Brahmins who wrote the works in question emphasized liberating knowledge over visionary experience in their writings, and he claims that the choice of this emphasis stemmed directly “from the nature of the commentators’ social milieu, which is one of Śaiva brahmins eager to consolidate their religion on the level of high culture.”²¹ Thus, for Sanderson it is the authors’ social context that explains their interest in philosophical discourse.

Together this pair of theses identifies the general parameters in which and by which the post-scriptural authors operated, as it is indisputable that the various Śaiva post-scriptural writings allowed their authors to “emerge in the open,” as Torella argues, and “to consolidate their religion on the level of high culture,” as Sanderson argues. In comparing the ŚD to the ĪPK, however, one identifies more specifically the individual authors’ intended audiences, as well as the particular strategies each author employs in conceptualizing their tradition in terms that were chosen to reach a wider audience in a language that touched the register of high culture. This is to say that, in the case of Somānanda’s ŚD and Utpaladeva’s ĪPK, one discerns distinct authorial strategies, ends, and intended audiences for each of the two authors’ works.

With regard to the ŚD, the work was written primarily for an audience of initiates. A number of Somānanda’s editorial choices in the composition of the work, particularly when compared with the decisions taken by Utpaladeva in composing his ĪPK, clearly show that Somānanda was not interested in making the work accessible to any but those who were already familiar with the contents, or at least the spirit, of the scriptural sources on which the ŚD unarguably draws. A brief consideration of the larger oeuvre of works he is said to have composed further points to the idea that Somānanda was not overly concerned with reaching the noninitiate, even if he wished to establish his particular interpretation of the scriptures as an alternative to those of competing tantric schools, such as the Śaiva Siddhānta.

²⁰See Torella 1994: xiii

²¹See Sanderson 2007¹: 241.

It is notable that all of the works, other than the ŚD, that were written by or have been attributed to Somānanda invariably either gloss tantric scripture or address matters of concern primarily to the initiate and practitioner. Thus, what survives of Somānanda's commentary on the *Parātriṃśikātantra*, the *Parātriṃśikāvivṛti* (PTVi), which comes to us only in the form of quotations found in Abhinavagupta's *Parātriṃśikāvivarāṇa* (PTV), largely addresses matters concerning yoga practice and in particular the alphabetical mysticism that the scripture invokes. This suggests that the text was written for an audience of practitioners more than, say, a general court audience of noninitiates, unless, of course, the Trika Śaiva scripture he glossed was put into general circulation.²² Similarly, whether or not one accepts that the Somānanda who authored the ŚD also wrote the work entitled the *Śāktavijñāna* (ŚāVi)—I, like most scholars, strongly doubt this identification²³—the contents of that work exclusively address matters of concern primarily to the practitioner of esoteric forms of yoga. This is so because all that is contained in this short work (it being of only thirty verses) is a description of thirteen stages of yogic ascent, beginning at the *sthāna* (i.e., the navel), that the author says may be found in “all the Trika learned works.”²⁴ Finally, some have suggested that Somānanda wrote an auto-commentary on his own ŚD, but such a work probably never existed.²⁵

²²Although we do not know the full contents of the PTVi, as a work of exegesis that directly glosses a scriptural source unlikely to have seen wide circulation, it was likely meant primarily for an audience of initiates. This text has been translated and published by Jaideva Singh (1988). Citations of Somānanda's *Vivṛti* may be found at PTV ad PT 1 (*pañcavidhakṛtyataparabhagavadbhairava-bhañṭārakasya prathamaśāktaspaṇḍasamanantaram; bhagavatyā ratasthāyāḥ praśna iti paraikamayave 'pi tanmayamahadantarālābhiprāyena; and abijam śuddhaśivarūpam*); PTV ad PT 2 (*hr̥dy ayo gamaṇam jñānam*); and, presumably, PTV ad PT 5–9ab: *akārah śiva ityuktas thakārah śaktir ucyate*. The source of this last verse is less clear, for while Abhinavagupta attributes it to Somānanda, he does so without making any reference to the latter's *Vivṛti*. In all other quotations, by contrast, Abhinavagupta regularly refers to one “Somānandapāda” and his “*Vivṛti*” (this either by reference to Somānanda's *nijavivṛti* or, in one place, *svavivṛti*), but he does not refer to the title of any text in this last instance.

²³The reasons for doubting the identity of the author of the ŚāVi with that of the ŚD are as follows. First, the ŚāVi speaks of “all the Trika learned works” (ŚāVi 3: *iti trayodaśavidhaṃ śāktam vijñānam uttamam / sarveṣu trikaśāstreṣu sūcitam śambhunā svayam*), a term that seems to presuppose the existence of a post-scriptural tradition that, aside from Somānanda's contributions, does not emerge before writings of Abhinavagupta, some half a century after Somānanda lived. Second, I find it difficult to countenance the identity of the two authors given the degree to which the ŚD engages in tantric ideas, for if the thirteen stages of ascent of the Śākta knowledges outlined in the ŚāVi (see note 24, below) were truly Somānanda's, one would think he would have described them or at least hinted at their presence in the ŚD, which engages tantric ideas and terminology, but nothing vaguely of the sort appears explicitly or implicitly anywhere in the ŚD. Cf. Torella (1994: xiv); Pandey [1963] 2000: 160–162; and Pandit 1997: 178–179.

²⁴See note 23, above. The thirteen stages, which appear in no other scriptural or post-scriptural source, to my knowledge, are as follows: (1) *sthāna*, (2) *praveśa*, (3) *rūpa*, (4) *lakṣa*, (5) *lakṣaṇa*, (6) *utthāpana*, (7) *bodha*, (8) *cakraviśrāma*, (9) *bhūmikāgamana*, (10) *antāvasthā*, (11) *viśrāma*, (12) *pariṇāma*, and (13) *āgamana*.

²⁵On the purported existence of this auto-commentary, see Chatterji [1914] 1986: 145. Cf. Pandey [1963] 2000: 162. (Chatterji, contra Pandey's reference to a *Śivadṛṣṭivivṛti*, reports the title of the text as the *Śivadṛṣṭivivṛti*.) There is little evidence of the existence of the work, however. No mention or quotation

Even if it did, any consideration of the intended audience of such an auto-commentary could only lead one back to a consideration of the text it is said to have glossed, as the two surely would not have been meant to have been read in mutual isolation. In sum, this is not the body of literature one would expect to come from the hand of an author who wished to reach a wider audience of noninitiates.²⁶

To turn to the contents of the ŚD itself, it first goes without saying that the founder of the Pratyabhijñā is by definition the author of that text, the only work attributed to Somānanda (aside from the ŚāVi) that survives in full. It may be reiterated that the work engages its subject matter through the liberal use of tantric terminology, principally that of the Trika but also occasionally the Spanda, as will be discussed below. One also senses the influence of the Krama in the work, even if no distinctly Krama formulations can be identified therein.²⁷ The clear and pervasive presence of such tantric influences stands in direct contrast to the structure and content of Utpaladeva's ĪPK, which I argue has a larger, court audience in view.

Torella has already noted that Utpaladeva uses only logic in the first two sections of the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ (which make up three-quarters of the entire work), where the commonly accepted language of public debate dominates the author's style, only then to yield to scripture in the third section (of four).²⁸ It is important

of it is found in the primary literature, whether by Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, Kṣemarāja, Jayaratha, or Somānanda himself. Indeed, those who thought Somānanda wrote such a commentary refer only to one source that makes reference to what could be construed as an auto-commentary called the *Vṛtti* or *Vivṛti*. This reference to the auto-commentary, if it exists, is found in the manuscript sources in the colophon to the autobiographical portion appended to the end of the ŚD, wherein it is said that the passage in question may be found in the "Vṛtti." (It is Chatterji who reports having seen this reference in several unnamed manuscript sources; see Chatterji [1914] 1986: 151, fn. 1. I myself have one manuscript that includes in it the text of the autobiography and nothing more, attributing the passage in question to the "Śivadṛṣṭivivṛti," for which see note 45, below.) What is lacking, however, is any definite reference to Somānanda as the author of a [Śivadṛṣṭi-]vṛtti (or vivṛti). All that we have is a passage that uses the first-person voice in describing Somānanda's life, a passage that some manuscripts tell us is contained in a commentary called the *vṛtti* or *vivṛti*. Indeed, the rumors of the very existence of this work seem to have arisen with Chatterji's report of the existence of the work, this, I believe, solely on the basis of the manuscript colophons to this autobiography. In a word, I am as skeptical as Stein 1894: xliii was uncertain that the autobiography is a part of an auto-commentary written by Somānanda.

²⁶This may be illustrated by way of contrast, with a decidedly brief mention of a pair of Utpaladeva's writings other than the ĪPK and related commentaries, which clearly were composed in a manner that allowed them to serve precisely this end: first, the devotional hymns of the *Śivastotrāvalī*, still sung by Kashmiri pandits today, speak in the language of the scriptures but in a manner that is generally accessible, and popular; second, the *Īśvarasiddhi*, which convincingly speaks in the language of the mainstream Naiyāyikas, offers a treatment of philosophical concerns that is utterly accessible to the learned scholar of that orthodox philosophical school. See Torella 1994: xxi.

²⁷Thus, I agree with Torella (1994: xiv) that the ŚD is close to the Trika and the Krama, though rather more significantly the former than the latter, about which I will say more, below. (See sections 7, 8, and 11.)

²⁸See Torella 1994: xx and xxx.

further to note that this approach is precisely the opposite of Somānanda's: the ŚD opens with an invocatory verse praising Śiva as one who has penetrated Somānanda's very form (*asmadrūpasamāviṣṭa*)—the language of possession is here used!—and immediately following is a description of Śiva's process of manifestation that is thoroughly steeped in Trika tantric terminology and expressed in the language of theology rather than philosophy. The ŚD does give way to a more philosophical style of analysis in the second and subsequent chapters of the work, excepting the seventh chapter and, to some extent, the third; but Somānanda is steadily willing, even in these subsequent chapters, to evoke a rather more scriptural flavor in his writing than is Utpaladeva. Indeed, he is famous for his use of "mixed registers," i.e., the alternate use of philosophical and tantric terminology, juxtaposed with the occasional burst of emotion or humor.²⁹ Also noteworthy is the fact that Somānanda addresses a range of concerns that are peculiar to Śākta Śaiva scripture and exegesis—and to his own scripturally based ideas in particular. This practice stands in direct contrast to that of Utpaladeva in his ĪPK, where he arguably only addresses scriptural matters that are already readily comprehensible to those who are familiar with the teachings of the Śaiva Siddhānta. And in many instances Utpaladeva uses language that is even more generally shared by the full range of Indian philosophical schools.³⁰

The third chapter of the ŚD is also telling in this regard, for it contains a sustained argument against the position of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, a Śākta opponent. This surely cannot be the tactic of an author who wished to reach the non-initiate: to quibble with an opponent who subscribes to a closely related, esoteric tantric point of view is not a likely path for reaching a wider audience. Moreover, this approach again stands in contrast to that of Utpaladeva, who withheld any criticism of his tantric counterparts, Bhartṛhari and the Hindu grammarians, and even, for the most part, the realist and dualist Hindu Naiyāyikas. Instead, Utpaladeva chose to prosecute a sustained argument against the Buddhist epistemologists.³¹ Finally, even the second chapter of the ŚD, being the most philosophical chapter of the ŚD given its thoroughly logical

²⁹The expression here quoted is Torella's, for which see Torella 1994: xx.

³⁰Consider the various issues Utpaladeva addresses in the third *adhikāra* of the ĪPK, the chapter dedicated to scriptural matters. These include: a thoroughgoing treatment of the thirty-six *tattvas* (ĪPK 3.1); the relationship of the adept and the Lord, spoken of in terms of the Trimūrti (ĪPK 3.2.1); *māyā* (ĪPK 3.2.2); *paśu* and *pati* (ĪPK 3.2.3); the *malas* (ĪPK 3.2.4–5 and 3.2.10–11); reference to the *puruṣa* in the state of *kaivalya* (ĪPK 3.2.6; cf. Torella 1994: 199, fn. 10); the various categories of subjects (Vijñānakevalas, etc.) (ĪPK 3.2.7–9); the three states of wakefulness (ĪPK 3.2.15–18); and the vital breaths (ĪPK 3.2.19–20). "Possession" or penetration by the divine is mentioned in one place (ĪPK 3.2.12 and the *Vṛtti* thereon). In fact, little more than Utpaladeva's understanding of the existence of four levels of subjective awareness (for which see ĪPK 3.2.11–14; cf. ĪPK 4.1–3) appears in the third *adhikāra* that would not already be known to one who had not gained initiation into more than the practices of the Śaiva Siddhānta, and in many instances even less than this initiation would be needed to acquire full cognizance of the ideas and issues presented in the section in question.

³¹See Torella 1994: xxi–xxvii.

analysis of Bhartṛhari's grammatical philosophy, makes a number of references to Śaiva Siddhānta scriptural sources and, more important, to a peculiarly tantric interpretation of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyaṣādhya* (VP). As such, it could not have been directed primarily at an audience that was not familiar with these traditions.

Now, the ŚD is unlike a great number of the tantric post-scriptural works that have come down to us. Many of these texts appear in the form of direct exegesis—commentaries that gloss scriptural sources—and many of the Kashmiri post-scriptural works, even when appearing in the form of hymns or other sorts of freestanding compositions, regularly cleave closely to the particular scriptural sources that they aim to elucidate. At the other extreme is the ĪPK, which is constructed essentially as a work of pure philosophy, even if it accounts for soteriology (as do so many Indian philosophical works)³² and is admittedly “based on a scriptural back-ground.”³³ The ŚD, by contrast, appears as a work that carries the flavor of the tantras more or less throughout, but does so for the most part without tying itself too closely to any particular scriptural source. This approach, then, is more or less in line with the apparent strategy of the two root texts of the Spanda School, the *Spandakārikās* (SpKā) and the *Śivasūtras* (ŚSū). The concern here, then, is to distinguish Somānanda's ŚD from the sort of works that closely follow and meticulously gloss scripture, on the one hand, and from the rather more intentionally philosophical ĪPK, on the other, while simultaneously recognizing the differences between the ŚD and the root texts of the Spanda School that we have just mentioned. In doing so, we will be able more clearly to identify Somānanda's strategy in writing the text.

To that end, if Abhinavagupta may be said to exhibit virtually all the tendencies of a scholastic commentator, in his ĪPV and ĪPVV, at least,³⁴ Somānanda does not show the inclination (or, perhaps, the capacity) to aspire to the encyclopedic heights of Abhinavagupta's works, even if there are flashes in the ŚD of the sort of synthesis found in the ĪPV and ĪPVV. On the other hand, the ŚD is

³²On this notion, see, e.g., Dyczkowski 1987: 33.

³³This is Torella's expression, for which see Torella 1994: xx.

³⁴I would indeed suggest that Abhinavagupta holds a unique place in the Pratyabhijñā lineage, for unlike the writings of Somānanda or Utpaladeva, his ĪPV and ĪPVV closely fit with José Cabezón's definition of “scholasticism,” described as follows. Such works reflect: (1) a strong sense of tradition; (2) a concern with language, meaning a concern with both scripture and the mode of expression; (3) “proliferativity,” or “the tendency to textual and analytical inclusivity”; (4) “completeness and compactness: the belief that the tradition overlooks nothing and contains nothing that is unessential”; (5) “epistemological accessibility of the world: the belief that the universe is basically intelligible”; (6) “systematicity,” or order in exposition; (7) rationalism, defined as “the commitment to reasoned argument and non-contradiction”; and, finally, (8) “self-reflexivity: the tendency to objectify and to critically analyze first-order practices.” Abhinavagupta exhibits all these tendencies, with a pair of caveats regarding the last two: regarding “rationalism,” Abhinavagupta follows the principle to the point, but he also tends toward mystical expressions and interpretations; and, regarding the last, he is not always entirely explicit in his analysis of the “rules, principles, and problems related to the act of exegesis,” though he exhibits an implicit understanding of these issues. See Cabezón 1998: 1–19, esp. 4–6.

rather more philosophically oriented than the more yogically and/or mystically inclined SpKā and ŚSū, while being simultaneously more theologically oriented and colored by scripture than the ĪPK. Yet one would be hard-pressed to describe the ŚD as a work of systematic theology, as the text is synthetic in nature, drawing from numerous streams of thought. More important, it does not articulate a philosophy that corresponds, even loosely, to a single scriptural vision, as one would expect of a systematic theology. It rather constructs a unique philosophical vision, if not *de novo* then with a largely indirect and thus circumscribed contact with the scriptural sources (though it must hastily be added that the work owes a great deal to the Trika VBh, as indicated above and as will be discussed below).

Defined as it is here in relation to the various other post-scriptural writings, and in relation to the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ in particular, it is therefore most appropriate to describe the ŚD as a sort of philosophical theology that is based on what is, overall, an admittedly indeterminate body of scriptural sources.³⁵ The ŚD addresses philosophical issues, as the very title of the work suggests,³⁶ yet it does not shy away from the theological register. And Somānanda is concerned at least occasionally to show that his philosophy accords with the declarations of scripture.³⁷ At the same time, it is clearly not what we might call a work of yoga philosophy, as both the SpKā and the ŚSū might be labeled, because it is rather more inclined to engage epistemological and ontological questions than to address matters associated with mystical or other cultivated forms of experience.

Although this, or any, label is of limited analytical value, it is important to recognize the rather wide range of qualities, preferences, and apparent authorial strategies that may be identified in the diverse body of Śaiva post-scriptural literature. In doing so, what becomes apparent is that the ŚD was probably intended for a philosophically oriented audience, but one that was primarily made up of tantric initiates, or for potential initiates who would be predisposed to the scriptural tone and high, if mixed, register of the work. This supposition is confirmed by Utpaladeva, who tells the reader in the opening verses to his ŚDVṛ

³⁵This lack of defined contact with scripture precludes any classification of the work as one of eisegesis, in my view, as it is difficult to determine the body of literature on which Somānanda would be said to have based his ideas. The one clear exception to the otherwise vague appearance of scripture in the ŚD is the extensive contact with the VBh that is exhibited in the text, as will be discussed below. If one were to choose to define the ŚD as a work of eisegesis, it is likely one would have to do so with respect to this text.

³⁶Chatterji [1914] 1986: 144–145 has suggested that one should understand the title of the work, Śivadṛṣṭi, to refer to a Śaiva *darśana* or philosophy. It is also possible that the title should be understood (as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* compound) to refer to the “seeing” or even the “mind’s eye” of Śiva, referring to the process of cognition that is described in the text as belonging equally to Śiva, the creator of the universe, and to the apparently individual and limited agents who populate that universe as microcosmic forms of Śiva himself. See “Somānanda’s ‘Settled Opinion’ (*siddhānta*),” below (section 5), for a further discussion of the philosophy of the ŚD.

³⁷See, e.g., ŚD 3.63–68ab and ŚD 3.95cd–96ab.

that he wrote the work at the behest of his son and his fellow student, though the details discussed therein were already explained in his ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, a statement that stands in direct contrast to the opening verse of the ĪPK, where Utpaladeva suggests he wrote the work in order to help “all people” achieve the same state of elevated awareness as he did.³⁸

Finally, a last piece of evidence supporting the notion that the ŚD was intended for an audience of initiates is found in the way the text deals with the various orthodox Brahminical schools of thought. The arguments against these schools are often given in a telegraphic and doxographical form, and as such the ŚD treats most of the orthodox schools serially and only briefly. It wishes only to show that none of the orthodox schools sufficiently account for the unity of all existence. The tone and style of these passages, then, read something like notes for the insider, rather than the sustained and rather more nuanced analysis one would expect for a work that in any way was intended to convert the outsider to the author's point of view.³⁹

One may therefore speculate that Somānanda wished to communicate his particular philosophical insights to those who wished to interrogate and synthesize the ideas that their own scriptural sources evoked. The ŚD simultaneously helped the same audience to develop a greater appreciation of the potential objections that other tantric (and, perhaps, nontantric) practitioners might raise against their own view, as it helped to equip them to respond to such challenges. (One must note, however, that no tantric or nontantric critiques of the ŚD may be found in the extant primary literature.) It further seems unlikely that those who would have studied the ŚD would have readily offered Somānanda's text to the wider community of learned Brahmins, be they members of the court's inner circle or otherwise, initiates in the dualist Śaiva Siddhānta or merely adherents of the more orthodox schools of Brahminical thought, either in an attempt to curry favor among the Kashmiri elite or to cultivate respectability for their particular brand of tantrism.

4. Somānanda's Biography and Autobiography

If Somānanda was not particularly interested in reaching the noninitiate, this should not be taken to suggest that he was not a person of standing in the elite and learned social circles often associated with the royal court. Indeed, Somānanda seems to have been recognized as a person of significance by the king, as he is referred to by the royally conferred title Bhaṭṭaśrī in Utpaladeva's

³⁸See ĪPK 1.1.1 and the commentary thereon. Utpaladeva refers to his desire to help all people with *janasyāpy upakāram icchan*, the particle (*api*) serving to emphasize the inclusiveness of the collective singular noun *jana*, as the commentary indicates by glossing with *imam akhilaṃ*.

³⁹This is an approach that stands in direct contrast to the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, which were clearly written with the intent of winning over a wider audience.

auto-commentary on the ĪPK.⁴⁰ Some concern for, or perhaps even intimacy with, the goings on of the royal court also appears within the verses of the ŚD itself, where Somānanda invokes the king as an example of a sovereign possessed of an unrestrained will. It must be cautioned, however, that the king is not always presented in an entirely positive light in the ŚD, as he is in one place held responsible for surreptitiously alloying gold coins that are then circulated at an overpriced value, a practice that, intriguingly, very likely took place in Kashmir in Somānanda's day.⁴¹ On the basis of this admittedly sparse evidence, then, one may surmise that Somānanda was close to the court but was not particularly enamored by it. And if this is so, it would be for good reason, for if the *Rājatarāṅginī* (RT) is any guide to historical realities, the Kashmir Valley of the period in question was one of extreme political turmoil, as "the kings at that time could nohow secure a long reign, and resembled the bubbles produced [in the water] by a downpour of rain on a dull day," as Kalhaṇa described it.⁴²

Another noteworthy resource for contextualizing the author's work is an autobiographical passage, supposedly written by Somānanda himself and appended to the ŚD. While it is both rather short and somewhat lacking of historical detail, the passage nevertheless reveals at least something of the author's place in the world. It is suggested there that Somānanda was a Brahmin whose great-great-grandfather, Saṃgamāditya, was the first in his family line to settle in Kashmir. The passage also reflects the Śaiva orientation of the author, for the Tryambaka mentioned in the text as the founder of Somānanda's familial lineage is

⁴⁰See ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.16. One may know that the title is royally conferred by the fact that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's contemporaneously set play, the *Āgamaḍambara*, illustrates it as such. See Sanderson 2007: 241, fn. 33.

⁴¹Reference to the king who alloys gold coins is made on ŚD 4.10-11ab. It is noteworthy that this sort of behavior was shunned in the RT (5.171-176), though reference there is to the skewing of the weights of scales by Śaṅkaravarman (r. 883-902), not to the alloying of coins. Cunningham (1967: 29; cf. pp. 36-37), however, notes the existence of gold coins of the Kārkoṭa dynasty (from c. 760-780 C.E.) that were so heavily alloyed with silver "as to make it difficult to say whether the pieces contain any gold at all," and it is likely that such coins remained in circulation even to Somānanda's day, about which see, again, Cunningham (ibid.). Other passages in the ŚD that mention the king are as follows: ŚD 4.4-5 suggests that the king, in a manner analogous to Śiva, exemplifies the master who controls subordinated, yet nevertheless semi-autonomous, agents. ŚD 1.37cd-38, suggests that the king who chooses the difficult life of the foot-soldier for his own amusement may serve as an analogy for Śiva, who for his own amusement assumes the form even of those sinners who suffer their punishment in hell.

⁴²See RT 5.279: *prāpūs cīram avasthānaṃ pāṛthivā na tadā kvacit / dhārāsampātasambhūtā budbudā iva durdīne*. The translation here is Stein's. Though Kashmir was witness to real stability under the well-regarded king Avantivarman (857/6-883) in a period that likely predates Somānanda by a few decades, the Valley was subsequently ruled by Śaṅkaravarman (883-902), described by the RT as a corrupt and powerful king. (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, however, had some kinder words for his patron, about which see Dezső 2005: 15-19, 145, and 151.) This was followed by the period of severe political turmoil and wrangling for the throne just mentioned (902-939), when the royal throne changed hands no fewer than twelve times, though this was followed by a short period of the "mild rule" (939-948), as Stein [1892] 1989 (vol. 1): 103 described it, of King Yaśaskara. See RT 5.219ff. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer of the present volume for the reference to Dezső's *Much Ado About Religion*.

the same as the one who is mentioned in Jayaratha's commentary on Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* (TĀ), the *Tantrālokoviveka* (TĀV), as the keeper of the teachings of the Trika.⁴³ That the text also links Somānanda's family to the irascible and imprecating sage Durvāsas further suggests a thoroughly Śaiva context.⁴⁴

One may note that, if this autobiographical passage may indeed be attributed to Somānanda and identified as the last part of the ŚD,⁴⁵ then it would be a rather early example of the autobiographical genre in Indian literary history, for while we have autobiographical passages from the authors of various prose poems who wrote prior to Somānanda,⁴⁶ we have to my knowledge none, prior to the present one, from any author purported to be an enlightened being, whether a renunciant or a householder. (The author's name, Somānanda, must be an initiation name or *dikṣānāma*, not a given name.) Of course, to include such

⁴³Note that Dyczkowski 1987: 18 and Torella 1994: xiv have made similar observations regarding the Śaiva nature of the passage in question. That a Tryambaka is also mentioned in a number of Trika sources, such as the *Tantrasadbhāvatāntra* (TST) (10.302c and 25.62b), for example, adds further support to the notion that this reference points to Somānanda's links with the Trika tantras. Cf. TĀV vol 1, p. 28, and TĀ 36.12, both also quoted in Torella (1994: xiv, fn. 11).

⁴⁴See Dyczkowski 1987: 228–229, fn. 68.

⁴⁵The passage is found in verses 7.107–123ab of the KSTS edition of the ŚD, but the following four reasons lead one at least to suspect that the material should be counted as an addendum to, rather than the culmination of, that text. (1) First of all, that the passage appears in the published edition following what appears to be a culminating verse of the text, written in Mālinī meter and counted as ŚD 7.106 in the published edition, gives *prima facie* evidence that the autobiographical passage is an addendum to the ŚD. (2) Second, the only manuscript source I have of the text of the autobiography, the Berlin Manuscript from the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, manuscript number Ms/fol 910a, suggests that the autobiographical passage in question, the only passage found in the manuscript in question, is part of a certain *Śivadṛṣṭivivṛti* and not the ŚD itself. (3) Third, the only complete manuscript in my possession of the ŚD, the manuscript of Calcutta Sanskrit College (C in the critical edition of ŚD 1–3 included in the present volume), does not record the autobiographical passage. C ends with what is counted as ŚD 7.106ab, followed by the colophon. (4) Finally, in referring to a vernacular form of the title of Somānanda's lineage (ŚD 7.121c), the text invokes a practice—precisely this reference to the vernacular—that is not seen elsewhere in Pratyabhijñā writings before the time of Abhinavagupta.

It is possible that the identification of the present passage with a portion of the text of a “*Śivadṛṣṭivivṛti*” refers to an auto-commentary on the ŚD composed (of course) by Somānanda himself. This is precisely the conclusion that Chatterji apparently reached some time ago. Pandey, too, suggests that such a work was composed by our Somānanda. Evidence for the existence of this auto-commentary, however, is to my knowledge limited to the references in the manuscript sources to the present autobiography as belonging to what is called the *Vṛtti* or *Vivṛti*. It is my opinion that the present text is not only an addition to Somānanda's text, but one that is rather more likely to have come from the pen of one of Somānanda's disciples than from the author of the ŚD himself. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the (rather general and limited) historical data offered in this text—that Somānanda was a Brahmin whose great-great-grandfather immigrated to Kashmir, etc.—were invented, but only were likely to have been reported by another than Somānanda himself. See note 25, above, for the relevant references and for a discussion of the existence of this auto-commentary.

⁴⁶This includes both the “true” stories (the *Ākhyāyikās*) and the “fictive” stories (the *Kathās*) written in prose. See Lienhard 1984: 228–264, esp. 250 and 260. The earliest known autobiography is that of Bāṇa, court poet of King Harṣa (606–647 C.E.), found in the opening chapter (*ucchvāsa*) of his *Harṣacarita*.

autobiographical information, however scant, squares perfectly well with the idea of the author as a Siddha descended to earth in order to propagate the secrets of the enlightened ones among those ready to hear them. As the autobiography, often mentioned in the secondary literature,⁴⁷ has yet to appear in translation, I include it here, as follows.⁴⁸

⁴⁷See: Chatterji [1914] 1986: 150–153; Pandey [1963] 2000: 135–137; Dyczkowski 1987: 18; Dyczkowski 1992¹: 42; Torella 1994: xiv.

⁴⁸As mentioned (see note 45, above), the present text is counted as ŚD 7.107–123b in the KSTS edition (a numbering of verses preserved, for convenience's sake, in the edition here included). Other than the Srinagar manuscript used for the KSTS edition, only one other manuscript exists, to my knowledge, of the passage in question, one that is held in the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. Thus, I have collated the readings of this manuscript, along with both those of the KSTS edition of the ŚD and those appearing in the KSTS edition of Jayaratha's TĀV, as follows:

B = Berlin Manuscript. Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, manuscript number Ms/fol 910a. This is a paper manuscript written in *śaradā* script. I am unsure of its measurements as I have only seen a photocopy of reduced size. It records 17 lines per page, 17–19 characters per line. Numbering two folios in length, it includes ŚD 7.107–123ab. The *maṅgala* and opening passage of the MS read: *om. mayā gurucaraṇasamārāadhanenaivaṃ kila śrūyate. yad uktaṃ śivadr̥ṣṭivivṛtau.* The manuscript appears to be in very good condition, and its readings are generally correct. K^{ed.} = KSTS edition of ŚD. See Madhusudan Kaul, ed., *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* (KSTS no. 54). Pune: Aryabhushan Press, 1934. T = KSTS edition of Jayaratha's TĀV ad TĀ 1.8. See R. C. Dwivedi and Navajivan Rastogi, eds., *The Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta, with the Commentary of Jayaratha*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 27–28.

7.107. śaivādīni rahasyāni pūrvam āsan mahātmanām(BK^{ed.}; mahātmanā T) / ṛṣiṅāṃ vaktrakuhare teṣv evānugrahakriyā. 7.108. kalau pravṛtte yāteṣu teṣu durgamagocaram(BT; durgamagocare K^{ed.}) / kalāpigrāmapramukham(BT; kalāpigrāmapramukhe K^{ed.}) ucchinne śivaśāsane(BT; samucchinne ca śāsane K^{ed.}). 7.109. kailāsādau bhraman devo mūrtyā śrikaṅṭharūpayā / anugrahāyāvātirṇaś codayām āsa bhūtale. 7.110. munim durvāsasaṃ nāma bhagavān ūrdhvaretasaṃ(K^{ed.}T; uvaretasaṃ B) / nocchidyate(em.; na cchidyate B, nocchidyeta K^{ed.}, ucchidyate T) yathā śāstraṃ rahasyaṃ kuru tādr̥śam. 7.111. tataḥ sa bhagavān devād ādeśaṃ prāpya yatnataḥ(BT; yatnavān K^{ed.}) / sasarija mānasaṃ putram tryambakādityanāmakam. 7.112. tasmīn(K^{ed.}T; tasmimn B) saṃkramayām āsa rahasyāni samantataḥ / so 'pi gatvā guhāṃ samyak tryambakākhyāṃ(K^{ed.}T; tryambakākhyam B) tataḥ param. 7.113. (B includes the following half-verse prior to 7.113ab: jñānam adyāsakāṣṭhāṃ tannitavāṃs tadguhāntare.) tannāmnā(K^{ed.}T; tatrāmṛā B) cihnitām(K^{ed.}T; cihnitām B) tatra sasarija manasā sutam(K^{ed.}T; āpi guhākhyā tatra bhūtale B) / (B includes the following half-verse prior to 7.113cd: sa tatra jñānasamsiddhā sasarija manasā sutam.) kham utpapāta saṃsiddhas tatputro 'pi tathā(K^{ed.}T; yathā B) tathā. 7.114. siddhas(K^{ed.}T; siddhās B) tādvat sutotpattyaḥ siddhā evaṃ(K^{ed.}T; eva B) caturdaśa / yāvāt pañcadaśaḥ putrah sarvaśāstraviśāradaḥ. (7.115–117 are omitted from B, which includes the following prior to its reading of verse 7.118: sa kadācid rāgavaśāt kutaścid brahmaṇā svayam) 7.115. sa kadācid lokayātrām āsinaḥ prekṣate tataḥ / bahir mukhasya tasyātha brāhmaṇi kācid eva hi. 7.116. rūpayau vanasaubhāgyabandhurā sā gatā dr̥śam / dr̥ṣṭvā tāṃ laksanaṃ yuktāṃ yogyāṃ kanyāṃ athātmanah. 7.117. sadharmacāriṇim sanyag gatvā tatpitaraṃ svayam / arthayitvā brāhmaṇim tāṃ ānayām āsa yatnataḥ. 7.118. brāhmaṇena vivāhena(K^{ed.}T; brahmaṇim ānayāmāsa B) tato jātas(K^{ed.}T; jñātam B) tathāvidhaḥ / tena(K^{ed.}T; tana B) yaḥ sa ca kālena kaśmīreṣv āgato bhraman. 7.119. nāmnā sa saṃgamādityo(K^{ed.}T; samangamādityo B^{p.c.}, samangamādityo B^{a.c.}) varṣādityo 'pi tatsutah(K^{ed.}T; tatatsutah B) / tasyāpyi(B^{p.c.}K^{ed.}T; tasyāpyi B^{a.c.}) abhūt sa bhagavān aruṇādityasamjñakah(K^{ed.}T; °saṃkakah B). 7.120. ānandasamjñakas tasmād udbabhūva(K^{ed.}T; sa babhūva B) tathāvidhaḥ / tasmād asmi samudbhūtaḥ somānandākhyā idr̥śah. (7.121–123 are omitted from B, which instead reads: ādau manaso jñāto durvāsatryambakādityaḥ / kramaśas tatkulajñātās sadgāmavarsārūṇānandah. tasmāt somānandana gurur iti kuśalāḥ prabodhavān jñataḥ.) 7.121. karomi sma prakaraṇaṃ śivadr̥ṣṭyabhidhānakam / evam eṣā(em. [Chaturvedī]; eṣāṃ TK^{ed.}) tryambakākhyā terambā deśabhāṣayā. 7.122. sthītā śiṣyaprasīṣyādir vistīrṇā maṭhikoditā / tad evam etad vihitaṃ mayā prakaraṇam manāḥ. 7.123. prārthyante 'smīn prayukte 'pi guravo grahaṇaṃ prati.

In the past there were secrets, of which the Śaiva ones were chief, (held) in the mouth(s) of great-souled sages; they alone were able to give initiation.

When the Kali(-age) began, they went to an inaccessible region and to Kalāpi village in particular. This being so, (and) the teachings (therefore) being lost, God, wandering on Mount Kailāsa, crossed down to earth in the image of Śrīkaṇṭha in order to grace⁴⁹ (humanity). The Lord commanded a sage named Durvāsas, whose semen was turned upwards: “act in a manner such that the *śāstra* is not lost.”

Following that the lord [Durvāsas], having received the command from God, made a great effort and created a mind-born son named Tryambakāditya, to whom he transferred the secrets completely.

Following that, he, for his part, went to a cave,⁵⁰ appropriately called Tryambaka, and there created with his mind a son marked by that name.⁵¹ The Siddha, fully accomplished, flew to the sky, as did his son, and so on and so forth.⁵²

In this way, through the birth of sons, there were fourteen accomplished ones, until the fifteenth son, who was learned in all the scriptures. Sitting (in that inaccessible region), he at some point in time observed from there the activity of the world. Thereupon, a certain female Brahmin, who was young and beautiful, fell into the gaze of that outward-looking one. Then, having seen that young woman endowed with good characteristics and suitable to be his wife, he went, as is appropriate, to her father himself, supplicated him and took that Brahmin woman with great effort (as his wife).

Following that there was engendered by the brahminical marriage one [i.e., a son] of the same qualities (as the others in his family line), and wandering about he⁵³ went, after some time, to Kashmir. He was Saṃgamāditya by name, and Varṣāditya was his son. He [i.e., Varṣāditya] also had (a son,) the lord named Aruṇāditya. From him was born one named Ānanda of the same qualities (as the others in his family line).

I, Somānanda by name, am his son, endowed with such qualities (as those preceding me in my family line). I wrote the treatise called the *Śivadṛṣṭi*. In this way is established this [lineage], called the

⁴⁹The term in question, *anugraha*, also suggests that he came to earth to offer initiation. See ŚD 7.107d, above, where *anugrahakriyā* refers to the rite of initiation.

⁵⁰The word in question, *guhā*, can also refer to the heart.

⁵¹That is to say that the son's name was also Tryambaka.

⁵²In other words, each produced mind-born sons in whom they bestowed the secrets of the tradition. These acts of creation, the text implies, constituted the fulfillment of each sage's duty, after which they left the world in a dramatic fashion. Note that I construe *siddha* of ŚD 7.114a with the preceding line and translate it as a proper noun. An emendation might be in order, however, given that the Berlin manuscript records the term in the nominative plural.

⁵³This refers to the son produced by the marriage.

Tryambaka—Teramba in the local language—, which has been widely diffused by generations of students (prior to me) and is spoken of as a school of thought. Now, I have therefore merely provided this treatise; (but) even though I have undertaken it, one should resort to the gurus in order to understand (it).

The Author's Thought and the Intellectual History of the Pratyabhijñā

5. Somānanda's "Settled Opinion" (*siddhānta*)

The foundation of Somānanda's philosophical theology rests with the idea that Śiva is not a passive, transcendent, and inaccessible deity, but rather is fully engaged in manifesting all the appearances and activities that constitute the very existence of the universe. Śiva acts by initiating a cycle of his powers, will (*icchā*), cognition (*jñāna*), and action (*kriyā*), one that spins out all action and all reality. At the same time, the powers exist in a unified or nonsequential state when Śiva is in his apparently quiescent mode (ŚD 1.3–4).

The basis of this idea rests on the notion that all action necessarily involves agency: nothing is accomplished and nothing appears in the absence of the agent who chooses to engage in some activity; and action begins with the very will or desire (*icchā*) to accomplish the act in question. Śiva, then, is the embodiment of the power of will,⁵⁴ which leads to any and every cognition or action.⁵⁵ It is will (*icchā*) that directs both the creation (ŚD 3.33cd–34) and the appearance of the form of the universe (ŚD 3.42cd–47). The power of will creates the distinction between unity and multiplicity (ŚD 3.35–36ab), just as it causes beings to be cognizant or ignorant of their inherent freedom (ŚD 3.72); and by Śiva willing it even the teacher, the teachings, and the student who benefits from both come into existence (ŚD 3.73–76ab).

⁵⁴He is described as *icchāśaktimaya* by Utpaladeva on ŚDVṠ ad ŚD 2.1.

⁵⁵Thus, Utpaladeva explains the meaning of ŚD 1.19ab—"since he desires to know or to act, the activity is by means of will" (*yata icchati taj jñātuṃ kartuṃ vā secchayā kriyā*)—as follows: "since it is said that the Lord desires either to know or to act, [Somānanda] expresses the verbal form of it as 'activity by means of will,' i.e., activity in the form of will" (*yasmād icchatīśvaro jñātuṃ vā kartuṃ veti yad ucyate, tadākhyaṭapadam icchayecchālakṣaṇām kriyām āha*). In other words, since it is said that Śiva wishes to know or act, to do either implies a preceding action of desire.

What is more, Somānanda understands all agents ultimately to be none other than Śiva himself, whether he exists in his apparently quiescent form, as a being consisting of pure power, as one of the many agents appearing in the world, or even as those beings who are condemned to suffer in hell (ŚD 1.39–43; cf. 1.29cd–33, 1.34, and 1.35). Just as a king engages in the duties of a foot-soldier as a game, he says, so also does Śiva engage the activities of the limited agents of the world (ŚD 1.37cd–38); and the cognitive understanding that any agent acquires is similarly linked to Śiva's nature as pure consciousness (ŚD 1.26–29ab; cf. the *Vṛtti* on the same). The same Śiva who creates the universe, then, may be identified with the individual, apparently limited agents who populate it (ŚD 1.1, 1.2, 1.34), because the same powers that Śiva employs to manifest all of creation (ŚD 1.20cd–21) also operate in the same sequence in any individual action or cognition (ŚD 1.22; cf. ŚD 1.6cd–7ab). And just as Śiva knows a sort of quiescent condition, so too do the powers come to rest (*viśrānti*) in the moments prior to and following the mundane cognitions of any and every of the apparently limited agents found in the universe (ŚD 1.5–6ab). Simply, all action stems from the divine impulse to perform an action or cognition, and this impulse, like the other powers, belongs to none other than the one Śiva. Indeed, all entities exist in all other entities, this insofar as everything is equally possessed of the same Śiva-nature (ŚD 5.105–110).

Activity, then, is in Somānanda's view always of a single kind, namely, that of the yogin in concentration. All that is manifested, and all cognition and action, is the product of the will of Śiva the yogin, who effects the changes seen in the world instantaneously, merely by imagining things to be thus (ŚD 1.44–45ab; 3.36c–37c; cf. ŚD 5.91–93). Simply, Śiva is consciousness itself (ŚD 1.39a), which is all-pervasive,⁵⁶ and Śiva and the universe are one and the same entity (ŚD 1.48ab, 1.49). The one can no more be separated from the other than a power can be separated from the agent who possesses it,⁵⁷ just as an object cannot be separated from the action it performs (ŚD 6.1). As such, Śiva, the individual, and the entities found in the world are all equally Śiva himself.⁵⁸ To put it in the language of the Trika, the tantric scriptural tradition that most influenced Somānanda, Śiva, his powers, and the individualized forms of consciousness are all one.⁵⁹ The universe as it is known through one's everyday, sensory experience is therefore absolutely real (ŚD 4.6cd–7ab; cf. ŚD 4.29), this insofar as it is the very form of Śiva's consciousness (see ŚD 5.3cd and 5.12; cf., e.g., ŚD 3.63–68ab).

⁵⁶The proof of this is provided in the fourth chapter of the ŚD. See ŚD 4.1ab: *athedānīm pravaktavyaṃ yathā sarvaṃ śivātmakam*. See also ŚD 3.17: *tasmāt samagrākāreṣu sarvāsu pratipattiṣu / vijñeyaṃ śivarūpatvaṃ svaśaktiṣveśanātmakam*. Cf. ŚD 1.46cd–47.

⁵⁷See also ŚD 3.18ab: *svātmaniṣṭhe śivatā deve pṛthivyādāv apiḍṛśam*.

⁵⁸I put the view in these terms, even if Somānanda does not quite say as much, to indicate the diametric opposition of this view to that of the dualist Śaiva Siddhānta, whose dualism is defined by the very distinction here denied, namely the mutual distinction of God, the individual, and the various material entities found in the world.

⁵⁹See Sanderson 1990: 56.

And the change in the condition of Śiva's consciousness in the moment of manifestation does nothing to change its fundamental nature, just as the condition of milk changes as it falls from the cow's udder without becoming something other than itself (ŚD 1.18). Everything is created instantaneously and in a manner that is indistinguishable from Śiva's very consciousness, and therefore all action is nothing but consciousness performing as Śiva wills it.

The degree to which the ŚD presents a philosophy of radical agency therefore cannot be overstated. Indeed, Somānanda's understanding of the agent's will—and its nature as the root cause of all action—is more developed, nuanced, and emphasized in the ŚD than it is by Utpaladeva in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ (or elsewhere, for that matter). This is so because Somānanda is unique in identifying an initial moment of will, *aunmukhya* or "eagerness," that stirs the moment Śiva begins to desire to create experience in the form of phenomena appearing in his consciousness (ŚD 1.7cd–8). This first stirring of will, this eagerness, is a sort of sudden excitement that occurs in an instant (*tuṭi*), and it initiates the process of creation. As such, it may be experienced in the first moment of an action, as one can see it in the moment of tension in the hand about to close into a fist, in still water just prior to its stirring into waves, and so on (ŚD 1.13cd–17). It may also be perceived, for example, upon hearing good news, in the moment one senses danger, and the like—in other words in heightened moments of experience (ŚD 1.9–11ab).

Insofar as will (*icchā*) has two parts, the initial moment in the form of eagerness (*aunmukhya*), and a subsequent, fully formed manifestation of will (*icchā*), it is considered to be an action (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.19–20ab), one that Somānanda suggests is performed entirely within the movement of consciousness (ŚD 1.25d). This is to say that Somānanda defines will as an action on the basis of the grammarians' famous definition thereof, which suggests that action must involve the occurrence of a sequence of related activities that are conceived of as being ordered toward a single end.⁶⁰ Behind will, in turn, lies another power, according to Somānanda, that of "delight" (*nirvṛti*), the very nature of Śiva's consciousness (ŚD 1.2). Śiva, one must recall, acts only out of his own desire to enjoy, to play (ŚD 1.36a), and not for any particular purpose. He acts as he does only because it is his nature to do so (ŚD 1.11cd–13ab), and the only telos Śiva pursues in engaging action is his own delight. (Indeed, Utpaladeva goes so far as to define play as the vibration of Śiva's consciousness in pursuit of joy).⁶¹ Thus, to engage in the world—that which is "reviled," says Somānanda, referring to

⁶⁰Kaul 1934, quoting Bhartṛhari's famous definition of action found at VP 3.8.4, suggests that Somānanda borrows this concept from that author. While this is possible, it is not necessarily so, as awareness of Patañjali's definition of action would suffice to inform Somānanda's position. See note 164 to chapter 1 of the translation, below.

⁶¹See ŚD 1.36–38 and in particular the ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.37cd–38, wherein Utpaladeva offers the following: *harṣānusāri spandaḥ kriḍā*.

the erroneous perception of the world as being full of impurity (ŚD 1.25a–c)—is simply to indulge one’s desires. For, there can be no other reason for action when one understands the agent to be utterly free.⁶²

Will, then, is cognition imbued with the agent’s intentions (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.24–25). And it is a power that arises from and is integrated with the power of delight (*nirvṛti*): the first moment of will, *aunmukhya*, is a form of *nirvṛti* that is circumscribed by a particular action, one that is preceded by and arises from the unlimited form of *nirvṛti*, which remains unassociated with particular objects and thus is the very nature of Śiva himself. This, at least is how Utpaladeva explains it on ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.22.

This paired interaction of the two moments of delight and will in turn points to a larger theory regarding the functioning of Śiva’s powers. The unlimited form of delight, which Utpaladeva tells us exists in the form of bliss (*ānanda*),⁶³ both precedes and develops into a limited form of delight, one that is delimited by the particular object to which the agent directs his attention. Similarly, that limited form of delight, in turn, is identified with eagerness (*aunmukhya*), the initial moment of will.⁶⁴ It effects a fully manifested form of will.⁶⁵ The fully manifested form of will, in turn, holds within itself the potential to manifest the power of cognition (*jñāna*), which itself holds within itself the potential, pre-manifested form of the power of action (*kriyā*). All of this is so in a manner that reflects the principle that the power (*śakti*) and the agent who possesses the power in question are identical. Just as a given power is inherent in the agent who exercises it, so too the subsequent power in the sequence of *śaktis* exists in a potential form at the level preceding its full manifestation, a level at which the preceding power in the sequence is fully manifested.⁶⁶ In this way, every power, being involved in the sequence here outlined, is itself an action, just as much as will may be considered an action for having an earlier and a later phase. The entire cycle of powers is therefore constructed as a chain of overlapping pairs, with each fully manifested power holding within it the seminal form of the subsequent power in the cycle.

In this way, Somānanda’s sequence of powers holds inherent within it a pair of conceptual principles. The first, as already outlined, is the radical notion of agency for which the ŚD uncompromisingly argues, a position the logical consequence of which is what Torella has called an “extreme formulation,”⁶⁷ namely that volition and therefore agency exists in even the apparently inanimate

⁶²One therefore suspects that Somānanda’s understanding of and emphasis on divine will is the product of his reading of the scriptural sources that emphasize Śiva’s independence and playfulness.

⁶³The text reads *anavacchinnānandarūpā nirvṛtiḥ* at ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.22.

⁶⁴See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.13cd–17: *icchāpūrvabhāgo ’sti karmāvacchinnaviśiṣṭānirvṛtirūpaḥ*.

⁶⁵See *ibid.*: *tasyaunmukhyasyecchā kāryā*.

⁶⁶See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, where Utpaladeva articulates this principle with reference to the power of action (*kriyā*) in relation to the power of cognition (*jñāna*): *śaktiśaktimator abhedāj jñānaśaktimān sadāśivah, udriktakriyāśaktir īvara iti*.

⁶⁷See Torella 1994: xxviii.

entities found in the universe, as in, for example, a pot. "Cognizing itself as the agent, the pot performs its own action. If it were not aware of its own agency, the pot would not be present."⁶⁸ All powers are linked in a cycle of activity, one that inexorably leads back to the agent who sets these powers in motion. Indeed, the prerogative of the agent is enshrined in the system as the first in the cycle of these powers, as will.

Related to this is the second principle, the notion that the various powers are modes or conditions of the same entity. This is to say that the powers, though multiple, share a common nature: they all are elements of Śiva's form as consciousness. As such, Somānanda implicitly identifies the powers with one another. Action is a form of cognition, for Somānanda identifies action with the cognition that leads to it, just as cognition is an extension of the agent's desire to know, to experience, some object. To act, then, is to know; to know is to desire; and to choose to engage in some cognition or action as one wishes is the very nature of agency itself. All entities, being equally Śiva, are omnipotent, animate, and self-aware (ŚD 5.98–110). Consciousness is located equally in everything (6.102ab). It is one, but appears to be multiple, and it is many things in one form (6.119cd). As such, absolutely everything is Śiva, endowed with omniscience and his other attributes, just as everything is all-pervasive (6.120).

One may therefore add that, because these powers are always present, insofar as the power and the one possessing it are identical (ŚD 3.2cd–3), whatever is found *in esse* is possessed of the same nature as that which exists *in posse* in the divine agent, this just as the nature of fire may be said to exist equally in the unlit charcoal and in the flames rising from it when it is ignited (ŚD 3.57–59). Pushed to the extremes as they are in Somānanda's system, the philosophical consequences of this idea are dramatic, for to identify potential with activity is in this case essentially to identify the existential with the predicative forms of being, to identify being-as-such with being-in-the-world, to use Heidegger's terminology. This is to say that, insofar as Somānanda suggests that all of existence is constituted by the presence of a single agent who wishes to know or act in some manner or another, by an agent who is always fully possessed of his powers (ŚD 3.86cd–88ab, 3.90ab), he identifies the ontic with the ontological forms of existence. For Somānanda, then, Śiva's existence even in his peaceful or quiescent condition is itself a form of activity (ŚD 3.37d–39; ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 3.57–59), simply insofar as all activity is a form of awareness or knowledge, even if that awareness is solely of one's own existence (see ŚD 5.13cd–14). It is for this reason that all of creation is just Śiva's play: existence is, philosophically speaking, nothing but activity, Śiva's activity as consciousness itself, an activity that by definition suggests that to exist is to act, but the action is in the form of an act of cognition, and the cognition is directed entirely by the agent's desire to know.

⁶⁸See ŚD 5.16: *jānan kartāram ātmānaṃ ghaṭaḥ kuryāt svakāṃ kriyām / ajñāte svātmakartṛtve na ghaṭaḥ sampravartate*. Cf. ŚD 1.23 and the *Vṛtti* on the same; cf. also ŚD 3.62.

Shifting attention now to a pragmatic concern, it may be asked why, if the entire universe and all activity found within it is merely the appearance of the divine agent in his capacity to desire, to know, or to act, the world is not witness to, for example, an apparently inanimate pot ruling a kingdom in all its self-awareness, or the same pot performing some other elevated action. To formulate the problem in a more sociologically relevant manner, why is it that Brahmins and Kṣatriyas occupy both distinct and privileged positions in society, while, say, the street-sweeper or foot-soldier finds himself in a less privileged position? If all entities are equally identified with the willful agent, Śiva, then why are all entities not equally free to act as they choose in the world? Somānanda's answer to this concern is offered first by way of analogy. All entities in the universe, down to mundane objects such as a water pot, are fully empowered entities, and yet it is not the case that their powers are unconstrained. It is rather that the superior power circumscribes the domain of activity of the subordinate power (ŚD 4.1–3), just as a king authorizes his subordinates to act in a limited domain. The king's men can exercise their discretion, but only with respect to a limited portfolio of concerns as authorized by the king himself (ŚD 4.4–5). Similarly, the pot is fully empowered to perform the action it so chooses—in particular, holding water—but it is not authorized to act in another domain, such as ruling the kingdom. To extend the analogy, one might say that the pot has the desire to contain the water within it until the moment it chooses otherwise. Thus, “the bank (of the river) wishes to collapse” (ŚD 5.17c), suggests Somānanda, for nothing is devoid of will.

This notion of power within a limited domain is again reflected in the very process of manifestation that Somānanda describes with the cycle of powers, as one should recall that the very will that initiates any given action, according to Somānanda, is itself a form of delight or *nirvṛti* that is delimited by an object. In other words, Śiva's very process of manifestation involves the engagement of his powers in a limited manner or domain, just as apparently individual agents or entities in the universe are empowered in limited spheres of action. Śiva's power of will, insofar as the entire sequence of powers derives from it and therefore is thoroughly imbued with it, never disappears in the particulars of manifestation, though these particulars circumscribe its efficacy in accordance with the conditions they present. Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, in this view, for while it is true that the apparently limited and individual agents and entities that are found in the world know only a limited domain in which they are authorized to act, so too does Śiva circumscribe his power of delight (*nirvṛti*), in the form of the first movement of will (*aunmukhya*), in beginning the process of manifestation.

Somānanda also suggests that all of the various theological formulations found in scripture that describe various existential hierarchies are mere convention. Ultimately, scriptural references to such hierarchies as the one that identifies three different conditions of Śiva, the mundane (*aparāvasthā*), the

supreme (*parāvasthā*), and the one between them (the *parāparāvasthā*), point to distinctions that ultimately do not exist. They are simply useful concepts for analyzing Śiva's nature and his mode of operation. In a word, Somānanda says (in ŚD 1.48) that these distinctions exist only insofar as people have faith in them, for in reality there is only one Śiva-nature for everything. So thorough and consistent is Somānanda in this formulation, moreover, that he goes so far as to suggest that even the important sociological distinctions related to caste identity are mere convention. For, when asked about the nature of fire (and thus, by analogy, about Śiva's nature as consciousness, fire being a common metaphor in Indian literature for consciousness), he emphatically denies that fire can be anything but fire, just as Śiva-nature is always the same. And the rites one performs on the fires to "purify" them are performed merely as a matter of convention: they have their own performance and nothing else as their end. Therefore, nothing but one's attitude distinguishes the sacred fire installed in the Brahmin's house from the one burning in the house of the outcaste (3.45–47): nothing inherently pure or impure exists in these supposedly different forms of fire, and only convention justifies any recognition of caste differences.⁶⁹

6. Divergences Between the Writings of Somānanda and Utpaladeva

DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE ŚIVADRṢṬI AND THE ĪŚVARAPRATYABHIJÑĀ-KĀRIKĀS AND -VṚTTI

Torella has already communicated the presence of a thoroughgoing Vijñānavāda background to the concept of intentional consciousness that is articulated in the ŚD.⁷⁰ In particular, he argued that the influence of the Vijñānavāda supplied Somānanda with the notion that all entities must share a common feature—the fact of appearing in consciousness (ŚD 5.12)—in order to stand in relation to one another (ŚD 5.1), and as such there can be no essential difference between consciousness and the things it perceives. For, if the things found in the universe were truly different from consciousness, there would be no way for them to be known in consciousness (ŚD 4.30). Thus, being is the state of being manifested in consciousness (ŚD 4.29, 4.6–7ab). Somānanda also adds to the Vijñānavādins's view in claiming that this formulation demands that one understand all things to be pervaded by will, like consciousness itself (ŚD 5.4), and that all action is accomplished by the very wish or desire of the entity in question, as for example when the pot cracks with age or the aforementioned bank of the

⁶⁹It is with Somānanda, then, that the theory of tantric ritual espoused by non-dualist tāntrikas and explained in detail by Sanderson was first proposed, this being the idea that ritual is to be performed for its own sake and not to effect any material change in the agent who performs them. See Sanderson 1995: 43–47 and *passim*.

⁷⁰See Torella 1994: xv–xvi.

river “wishes” to collapse. In other words, the Vijñānavādins also expressed the idea that is central to Somānanda’s system, namely, that all things are conscious, aware of themselves (cf. ŚD 5.36–37).

It is important to note, however, that Somānanda’s conception of will has not found its way into the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ. In particular, Utpaladeva thoroughly downplays the presence of the power of will in the activity of the universe, for while he repeatedly refers to Śiva’s will as the cause of an apparently external creation, he essentially abstains from doing so with respect to the apparently limited agents found in the world.⁷¹ To put matters differently, Utpaladeva emphasizes the power of will in its role in creating the universe, but not in the quotidian activity found therein. Thus, he repeatedly identifies will with the power of illusion (*māyā*) that makes the entire world and all that is within it appear to be external to Śiva.⁷² One passage (ĪPK 2.3.12) even suggests, contra the Buddhist epistemologists and in a manner that simultaneously mutes Somānanda’s formulation of the question, that the individual entities that appear in the world perform their respective functions on the basis exclusively of the Lord’s will, and not of a volition that can be located in them.⁷³ Clearly, then, Utpaladeva’s presentation of will is far removed from Somānanda’s suggestion that even apparently inanimate entities are fully conscious and cannot be proven otherwise (see, in particular, ŚD 5.18).

If will (*icchā*) has a limited role in Utpaladeva’s magnum opus, the two powers so thoroughly discussed in the ŚD, *nirvṛti* and *aunmukhya*, are essentially erased from the ĪPK, as well as the ĪPVṛ. The former term does not appear in the text at all, and the latter appears only once, and even there the context is entirely different from that of the sequence of powers enumerated in the ŚD.⁷⁴ In removing *nirvṛti* and *aunmukhya* from the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, moreover, Utpaladeva also essentially discards Somānanda’s understanding of the cycle

⁷¹ Among all the nineteen occurrences of the terms *icchā* or *icchāśakti* in the ĪPK and/or ĪPVṛ (the latter of which appears only once, on ĪPK 2.4.1), will is associated with the Lord, Śiva, in thirteen instances. (These are: ĪPK 1.5.10 and ĪPVṛ on the same; ĪPK 1.6.7; ĪPK 1.8.9; ĪPK 2.3.12; ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.3.15–16; ĪPK 2.4.1 and the *Vṛtti* on the same; ĪPK 2.4.21 and the *Vṛtti* on the same; ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 3.2.4; ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 3.2.5; and ĪPK 3.2.7.) Nowhere is there an association of the power of will with individual, apparently inanimate, entities in the world. The remaining occasions for the use of these terms point either to the power of the yogin to create entities at will (ĪPK 1.5.7 and the ĪPVṛ on the same; ĪPK 2.4.10 and the ĪPVṛ on the same), as does Śiva, these being parallel passages to ŚD 1.44–45ab; or to the nature of the individual agent’s inclinations or desires in forming his or her perception of a particular object, this in line with Dharmakīrti’s understanding of the way an individual’s judgement shapes perception, for which see ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.3.3.

⁷² See ĪPK 1.6.7; ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.3.15–16; and ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 3.2.5.

⁷³ The matter, of course, is one of emphasis, as the two forms of will are ultimately identifiable in Somānanda’s view.

⁷⁴ The term *aunmukhya* is used in the ĪPK to suggest that Śiva could not be inclined toward an object of cognition that is separated from his consciousness, for to do so would compromise his independence. No mention of “eagerness” as an initial moment in the order of the cognitive process is mentioned anywhere in the text or auto-commentary. See ĪPK 1.5.15.

of powers, as there are no overlapping pairs of powers in those works as there are in the ŚD.⁷⁵

The difference in question is further underscored by the fact that Utpaladeva suggests in his ŚDVṛ, as well as in his ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, that there are two phases in the act of manifestation, the first involving the development of subject-object distinctions, the second involving the infusion of agency, albeit limited in scope, into only selected parts of the objective sphere. In this schema, which is not found in the ŚD, all entities existing in the world are initially created by the manifestation of a distinction between all of them, on the one hand, and the divine agent, Śiva, on the other. Only some among them are subsequently imbued with the sort of circumscribed agency that Somānanda confers equally on all apparently distinct entities in the universe.⁷⁶

The basis of this formulation, which relies in some degree on a distinction between the objective world and its source, may be found in Utpaladeva's well-known, open embrace of the philosophy of the VP and VPVṛ, which stands in contrast to Somānanda's famously hostile reception of the same (about which more will be said, below). For, in adopting much of the language and concepts of Bhartṛhari's VP, in particular his repeated reference to *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, the paired opposites of self-luminous light and the concomitant power of reflective awareness, Utpaladeva also adopted the notion that entities exist internally within Śiva or, contrariwise, externally.⁷⁷ Indeed, Utpaladeva in one place goes so far as to suggest that the three qualities (*guṇas*) found in the limited subject, purity (*sattva*), passion (*rajas*), and inertia (*tamas*), which at the level of the supreme lord correspond, respectively, with cognition, action, and the power of *māyā*, cannot be considered to be powers in the limited agent who possesses them.⁷⁸

⁷⁵That Utpaladeva does describe this sequence of overlapping pairs in his ŚDVṛ does not contradict the fact that it is absent from his ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, for the purpose of his ŚDVṛ, as is the case in any student's commentary on a teacher's work, is to explain his guru's vision of the Pratyabhijñā, while the purpose of the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ is to articulate his own formulation of the same. It may here be reiterated that the philosophical differences between the systems exist at the level of strategy and nuance without there existing in Utpaladeva's writings anything like a thorough repudiation of the general spirit of the system as presented by Somānanda. This issue is taken up, again, in what follows, for which see the sub-section entitled "Continuities and Divergences between the Śivadṛṣṭi and the Śivadṛṣṭi," below.

⁷⁶Utpaladeva's articulation of this two-step process of manifestation may be found at ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.1. See the text and translations, below, as well as note 11 of chapter 1 of the translation. Cf. ĪPK 4.2 and the ĪPVṛ on the same. See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.2.0cd–21, where Utpaladeva similarly argues that two stages exist in the creation of the universe, one occurring in the stage when Śiva alone "sees" the universe with his power of cognition, this at a sort of "mental level," followed by a second stage in which all agents in the universe, and not just Śiva, may see it, it being a coarse (*sthūla*) object.

⁷⁷For a thorough treatment of these concepts, see Dyczkowski 1987: 59–75. See also Muller–Ortega 1989: 95–99. On Utpaladeva's adoption of Bhartṛhari's ideas, see Torella 1994: xxiii–xxvii and Torella 2008.

⁷⁸See ĪPK 4.4–5 and the passages of the ĪPVṛ thereon.

Even if Utpaladeva understood this to be a distinction ultimately without difference, this formulation lays emphasis on the differences between an apparently transcendent Śiva, on the one hand, and an active universe he is said to create, on the other, an emphasis that contrasts with Somānanda's insistence on the absolute identity of the two. Indeed, Somānanda's vision of Śiva is so strict that the terms that Utpaladeva uses to express the opposition of the light of consciousness (*prakāśa*) and its reflective awareness (*vimarsā*), which are said to be internal (*antar*) and external (*bahis*), respectively, nowhere appear as paired opposites in the ŚD, excepting in one place where Somānanda is querying the shortcomings of Bhartṛhari's system.⁷⁹ The same is true of the related pair of opposites that Utpaladeva frequently mentions in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, as well as the ŚDVṛ, that of the internal "I-ness" (*ahantā*) of phenomena closely associated with Śiva, on the one hand, and the apparently external "that-ness" (*idantā*) of those entities manifested in the universe, on the other. These terms do not appear anywhere in the ŚD at all, because Somānanda is loathe to differentiate Śiva from the universe he creates.

These differences, then, are not trivial, though the tradition assiduously synchronizes the two articulations of Pratyabhijñā philosophy.⁸⁰ The radical notion of singularity found in the ŚD is downplayed in favor of an emphasis on something more akin to a recognition of a unity of opposites in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ. Utpaladeva's formulation of the Pratyabhijñā acknowledges a sort of transcendental Śiva who is possessed of adventitious powers that manifest a universe of activity. On the other hand, Somānanda's formulation of the Pratyabhijñā cannot imagine Śiva to be separated from either the universe or his powers. The two theories diverge, then, in ways other than merely the degree to which their authors adopted the ideas and terminology of the grammarian Bhartṛhari. For, while Utpaladeva certainly does so and while Somānanda emphatically does not, it is further the case that Utpaladeva emphasizes the relationship of the heteronomy of phenomena to an autonomous, transcendent, and apparently static Śiva, while Somānanda lays rather more emphasis on the active nature of the processes of cognition in the functioning of this utterly free agent within and as the universe. The accommodation of Bhartṛhari's terminology in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, then, was accompanied by a fundamental, if subtly conceived, reassessment of Somānanda's philosophical theology, even if Utpaladeva reiterated all of his teacher's basic claims regarding the unity of consciousness and the identity of Śiva with the universe. Simply put, Somānanda's is a pantheistic monism, Utpaladeva's is a panentheistic one.

⁷⁹See ŚD 2.41cd–42ab, where Somānanda suggests the grammarians cannot logically explain whether *paśyanti*, the power of speech, is located either in the body of the individual speaker or outside of it. It is important to note that the ŚD does refer to the externality of pots, etc., in at least one place (ŚD 5.93b).

⁸⁰While this is particularly the case in Abhinavagupta's ĪPV and ĪPVV, a thorough examination of this phenomenon must be left to future study.

CONTINUITIES AND DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE
ŚIVADRṢṬI AND THE ŚIVADRṢṬIVṚṬTI

Given the existence of real differences between Somānanda's expression of the Pratyabhijñā and Utpaladeva's, one naturally will wish to know how such differences manifest themselves in the latter's commentary on the former's work, if at all. Does Utpaladeva attempt to "correct" or "improve" his teacher's work, by way of clarifications? Does he simply gloss over any differences that might separate their respective intellectual visions, only to express himself more freely in his freestanding works? How does the commentator, whose intellectual vision and agenda led him to present the Pratyabhijñā in a manner that could appeal to a more general, learned public, speak to the details of his guru's magnum opus, which, as noted, was probably composed for a much smaller audience of tantric initiates? The short answer to these questions is simply this, that Utpaladeva's *Vṛtti* is largely a faithful commentary that on the whole cleaves closely to the topics and concerns of his teacher's work: it is practically devoid of overt editorializing, as it does not attempt systematically to overlay the commentator's intellectual vision on its source text. The more detailed answers to these questions involve three related variables: those of audience, nomenclature or terminology, and what I shall refer to as philosophical systematicity. We shall take each up in turn.

First, as one would expect, the audience for which Utpaladeva wrote the ŚDVṚ is the same as the one for whom Somānanda wrote the ŚD: the *Vṛtti* was written for initiates and not for the wider audience for which Utpaladeva set the ĪPK and ĪPVṚ. We may say that this is so for the following reasons. To begin, Utpaladeva explicitly states that his commentary was written for his son and his fellow student and not, by implication, for a larger audience, as I have already noted above.⁸¹ In addition, Utpaladeva refers the reader to tantric sources in a couple of places in the ŚDVṚ, something he never does in the ĪPK and ĪPVṚ. In particular, he quotes the SpKā in places where context did not demand that he offer additional references to the writings of his fellow tāntrikas.⁸² More generally, the tone and the overwhelming majority of the contents of the ŚDVṚ reflect those of the ŚD itself: Utpaladeva largely limits himself to the task of addressing the issues presented by his teacher, which he often does in great detail or by painstakingly glossing each term from his teacher's text. This is to say that when it comes to the concepts and concerns of the ŚD that were excised from the ĪPK and ĪPVṚ, such as the repeated reference to Śiva's powers of *nirvṛti*

⁸¹ See section 3, "The Author and His Works," above, as well as note 38.

⁸² See ŚDVṚ ad ŚD I.1, where Utpaladeva analyzes the nature of "penetration" or "possession" (*samāveśa*) by way of reference to SpKā 8; ŚDVṚ ad ŚD 3.92cd–94ab, where Utpala quotes SpKā 35 to explain how Śiva's powers continually emerge in the activity of creating and moving the universe.

and *aunmukhya*, Utpaladeva generally limits himself in the ŚDVṛ to explaining these ideas, as he makes no concerted effort there to remove these concepts from the conceptual universe of the Pratyabhijñā.⁸³ We cannot say, then, that the ŚDVṛ was composed to translate the ŚD, as it were, for a wider audience than the one Somānanda had in mind.

Turning now to the terminology of the ŚDVṛ, it is notable that Utpaladeva's commentary accesses a lexicon that is markedly different from the one witnessed in the ŚD: though Utpaladeva often refers to terms and concepts favored by Somānanda, the ŚDVṛ also makes use of the technical terminology not only of the VP and VPVṛ, as already noted,⁸⁴ but also of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins and the Buddhist epistemologists in particular. Although a detailed survey of these terms and the concepts they invoke lies beyond the present study—and Torella, anyway, has already thoroughly mapped the ways in which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta have adopted the ideas and terminology of the Buddhist epistemologists⁸⁵—it is of note that Utpaladeva has not only adopted the terminology of his Buddhist interlocutors in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, but he also invokes this technical lexicon in the ŚDVṛ, despite the fact that it is one that is not found in the ŚD. To offer but one example: Utpaladeva glosses ŚD 1.2 by suggesting that the verse in question proves that Śiva is the essence of all beings in accordance with the two-part syllogism favored by the Buddhists, referring to the self-awareness form of cognition (*svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*) in doing so, to which no reference is made in the ŚD.

On the other hand, Utpaladeva was not particularly intent on redirecting the focus of the ŚD by using his ŚDVṛ to draw greater attention to the theories of the Buddhist epistemologists, because the various concerns of that school that are addressed at length in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ but are left out of the ŚD are also left out of the ŚDVṛ (or from what survives of the ŚDVṛ, in any case). This includes not only the analysis of technical concerns, such as Dharmakīrti's theory of noncognition (*anupalabdhi*), which is criticized at some length in the ĪPK, but also central ideas and concerns first conceived by the Buddhist epistemologists and subsequently incorporated into Utpaladeva's oeuvre.⁸⁶ For example, Utpaladeva

⁸³One exception to this rule may be found in the manner in which Utpaladeva discusses the *śaktitraya*. Although he is consistently faithful in explaining the powers of *nirvṛti* and *aunmukhya*, which we have already shown to have been erased from the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, he conversely appears to make an effort to synchronize Somānanda's *śaktitraya* with the pentad of powers to which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta refer with frequency but of which Somānanda makes no mention. Why this is so is not entirely clear, however. See *infra*, section 7.3.

⁸⁴See *supra*, the immediately preceding subsection entitled "Divergences between the *Śivadrṣṭi* and the *Īsvara*pratyabhijñākārīkās and *-vṛtti*." Cf. also section 13, below.

⁸⁵See Torella 1992 and Torella 2008. See, also Torella 1994 and the author's notes to the translations of ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 1.2, 1.5, 1.7, 2.3, 2.4, and, to a lesser extent, ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 1.6, 2.1. Cf. Ratié 2006, 2007, and 2009.

⁸⁶For Utpaladeva's treatment of *anupalabdhi*, see ĪPK 1.7ff.

nowhere refers in the surviving text of the ŚDVṛ to the notion that only two types of cognition exist, those involving direct experience (*pratyakṣa*) and those involving conceptualization (*anumāna*), despite the fact that this is a fundamental tenet of Dharmakīrti's system and is one that Utpaladeva both addresses explicitly in ĪPK 1.2.1–2 and adopts, *mutatis mutandis*, in his formulation of the Pratyabhijñā.⁸⁷ Similarly, and equally surprisingly, no reference is made to the *svalakṣaṇas* in the surviving portions of the ŚDVṛ despite the fact that Utpaladeva adopts the concept, again with modifications, in his presentation of the Pratyabhijñā in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ.⁸⁸

We could know more about how Utpaladeva wished to negotiate the differences between his Buddhist-influenced presentation of the Pratyabhijñā and that of his teacher's if only we had access to the ŚDVṛ after the middle of the fourth chapter, because Somānanda himself deals with a number of key concepts and technical terms of the Buddhist epistemologists in the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters of the ŚD. In particular, Somānanda makes mention of (and offers critiques of) the Buddhists' conceptions of the *svalakṣaṇas* (ŚD 4.81a), *apoha* (ŚD 4.76c), *svārthānumāna* (ŚD 5.55a), *parānumāna* (ŚD 5.61c), *sādrśya* (ŚD 4.86a), and of *arthakriyā* (ŚD 4.21a, 6.59a) in these chapters, which are largely devoted to the treatment of opposing, mainstream philosophical schools, as already noted.⁸⁹ Sadly, however, such an analysis will of necessity remain incomplete in the absence of the discovery of the remainder of the commentary. Regardless, the thoroughgoing treatment of the similarities and divergences between Somānanda's and Utpaladeva's criticism of Dharmakīrti and the Buddhist epistemologists, while it remains a major desideratum, lies beyond the scope of the present volume and will be included only in the sequel to the present volume, wherein the remainder of the ŚD will be edited and translated. The most that can be said at present is that the ŚDVṛ clearly avoids mention of any differences between Utpaladeva's treatment of the Buddhists and Somānanda's, although the commentary often adopts Buddhist terminology in the course of explaining Somānanda's masterwork.

Finally, we turn to the question of the philosophical systematicity of Utpaladeva's writings. If the *Vṛtti* does not attempt to emend the formulation of the Pratyabhijñā as it is found in the ŚD, then a question arises as to how Utpaladeva negotiates the real differences between his *kārikās* and the ŚD in his ŚDVṛ. This is an important question, because, as we have already

⁸⁷ See Torella 1992 for a concise but thorough treatment of the influence of the Buddhist epistemologists on the Pratyabhijñā of the ĪPK, ĪPVṛ, ĪPV, and ĪPVV.

⁸⁸ See Torella 1992: 329; cf. Torella 1994: 89–90, fn. 3.

⁸⁹ The presence in the ŚD of the first four of the terms here listed was noted by Torella 1994: xxii, fn. 28. We noted the rather more philosophical concerns of chapters 4–6 of the ŚD in section 2 ("About This Book"), above.

noted, Utpaladeva in his ŚDVṛ readily acknowledges and explains a number of the ŚD's unique formulations of the Pratyabhijñā, such as the existence of the powers of *aunmukhya* and *nirvṛti*, even though he excises them from the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ. The answer to this concern is that Utpaladeva seeks in the ŚDVṛ to synchronize his understanding of the Pratyabhijñā with that of his teacher; but he does so not by “correcting” Somānanda's thought, as no faithful student would seek to do, but rather by indicating that his ĪPK and its auto-commentaries fairly and accurately reflect the contents of the ŚD. The evidence for this strategy is found in the dozens of references Utpaladeva makes to the ĪPK, ĪPVṛ, and ĪPTṛ in the ŚDVṛ.

These references are often oblique. Without any explanation or comment, they regularly ask the reader to visit unspecified passages of the ĪPK, and they only occasionally cite specific passages of text. Tracing these references therefore takes some work and sometimes involves speculation, as the relevant passages of the ĪPK often approach the matter at hand in a manner that differs greatly from the given approach that is found in the ŚD. These references occur most often in the commentary on the first chapter of the ŚD, the chapter in which are found the particulars of Somānanda's formulation of the Pratyabhijñā, the existence of overlapping pairs of powers, the powers of *nirvṛti* and *aunmukhya*, etcetera. This further indicates that Utpaladeva intended these references to show that the matters addressed in the ŚD were also explored in the ĪPK and its autocomentaries. To offer but one example, in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.7cd–8, Utpaladeva suggests that the *Īsvara*pratyabhijñā treats the appearance of temporal and spatial distinctions in the *aparā* condition. One suspects that the reference is to ĪPK 2.1.1–8, which is part and parcel of a larger argument regarding the necessity of the existence of a single unifying entity, of an *ātman*, in order for action to occur. The arguments presented in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ deal extensively with the notion that the nature of action is simultaneously both unitary and multiple, a philosophical formulation of the problem that both serves to refute the Buddhist denial of the self and is absent from the ŚD. To synchronize the ŚD with the ĪPK, then, the ŚDVṛ notes in a vague manner that the teachings of the ŚD are also found in the ĪPK, all the while downplaying the existence of any differences, let alone discrepancies, between the texts and the formulations of the Pratyabhijñā that they present. In other words, the ŚDVṛ is the work of a rather faithful commentator who nevertheless holds his own philosophical views.

In sum, Utpaladeva's commentary does not impose that author's views on his teacher's work, rather quite the opposite. He uses the nomenclature of the Buddhist epistemologists and the Hindu grammarians in the ŚDVṛ not to “correct” his teacher, but to demonstrate to his fellow initiates that the description of the Pratyabhijñā found in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, influenced as it is by Bhartṛhari and the Buddhist epistemologists, fairly reflects the views of his teacher.

7. The Use of Trika and Technical Terminology in the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*

Just as Utpaladeva and Somānanda present distinct philosophical explanations for the unity and ubiquity of Śiva-as-consciousness, it is also true that Somānanda is rather more likely to do so in the language of scripture, as mentioned already. (Utpaladeva, by contrast, regularly speaks the language of philosophy in a manner that conforms to the rules of public debate, as we have shown.) In doing so, Somānanda reveals a pervasive and deep contact with Trika scriptural sources. For, as true as it is that Somānanda abstains from using the language of the VP and VPVṛ, as he similarly leaves out some of the preferred terms and concepts of the Vedānta and Buddhist epistemologists,⁹⁰ it is nevertheless equally true that Somānanda freely uses the terminology of the Trika tantras throughout the ŚD. A summary account of the Trika and other terminology of the ŚD, along with an assessment of the differences between the terminology of the ŚD, on the one hand, and of Utpaladeva's ĪPK, ĪPVṛ, and ŚDVṛ, on the other, is therefore in order, as follows.

1. Invoking a concept and vocabulary whose origins lie in the philosophy of the Sāṅkhya, but were commonly invoked, in a modified form, in Trika scriptural sources,⁹¹ Somānanda refers to the thirty-six *tattvas* or levels of reality in explaining Śiva's powers.⁹² The presence and functioning of this system of classification is by now so well-known as hardly to merit further comment here,⁹³ except that we note that Somānanda identifies each of the powers of the Trika triad of powers (the *śaktitraya*) with one of the *tattvas*: will (*icchā*) is identified with the second *tattva*, the *śaktitattva*, cognition (*jñāna*) with the third, the *sadāśivatattva*, and action is identified with the fourth *tattva*, the *īśvaratattva*.⁹⁴ Utpaladeva further suggests that the powers of eagerness (*aunmukhya*) and delight (*nirvṛti*) exist at an interstitial level, between the *śivatattva* and the *śaktitattva*.⁹⁵

2. Again drawing on the language of the Trika, Somānanda also mentions the three levels or conditions of existence and experience, which, as mentioned above, include the *parāvasthā* or supreme condition, the

⁹⁰Here I have in mind the absence of the theory of *ābhāsas* in the ŚD, as Torella 1994: xxvii has already noted.

⁹¹That the Trika made particular use of the schema of thirty-six *tattvas* is Padoux's observation, for which see Padoux 1990¹: 365.

⁹²See ŚD 1.29cd–33 and the commentary on the same.

⁹³See Pandey [1963] 2000: 357–381; Padoux 1990¹: 358–359 and 364–366; and Pandit 1997: 71–79.

⁹⁴See Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 2.1 and the notes on the same.

⁹⁵See ŚDVṛ ad 2.1, and my notes on the same. On the other hand, Utpaladeva says that the *śivatattva* is itself identical with all of the *tattvas*, suggesting the simultaneous unity of all levels of reality and all the powers, in his view. See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.23; cf. the introduction (*avataraṅikā*) to ŚD 1.29cd–33, a passage that, Utpaladeva suggests, articulates the identity of the *śivatattva* with all the *tattvas*. See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.39–41ab and note 301 of the first chapter of the translation.

aparāvasthā or mundane condition, and one in between the two (the *parāparāvasthā*).⁹⁶ These three conditions reflect the order of the triadic pantheon of the goddesses of the Trika, Parā, Parāparā, and Aparā, but in Somānanda's text, the three are equated with modes of consciousness.⁹⁷ Śiva, moreover, is said to exist equally at all of these levels. Comparing Śiva to a yogin, Somānanda suggests that the *parāvasthā* consists of Śiva's absorption in the bliss of his own consciousness, a sort of quiescent, enstatic state of existence (ŚD 1.3-4). While he does not define the middle level,⁹⁸ Somānanda suggests that the *aparāvasthā* exists at the time when mundane cognitions and actions are engaged.⁹⁹ However, all of the elements that constitute the exalted state of the *parā* condition exist equally in all three conditions,¹⁰⁰ as, indeed, Somānanda suggests that the distinction is only a matter of convention or faith, as already noted.

3. Although the language of the *tattvas* and the *avasthās* appears in both the ŚD and the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, Somānanda's repeated reference to and reliance on the Trika triad of powers, *icchā*, *jñāna*, and *kriyā*, distinguishes the ŚD from Utpaladeva's philosophical writings. It may further be observed, incidentally, that a discrepancy also exists in the way the two authors enumerate Śiva's powers: Utpaladeva regularly refers to five powers in his ŚDVṛ, including consciousness (*cit*), bliss (*ānanda*) (which in one place, ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.2, is replaced with "delight" [*nirvṛti*]), will (*icchā*), cognition (*jñāna*), and action (*kriyā*), while Somānanda routinely mentions only the last three (i.e., the *śaktitraya*).¹⁰¹ While the significance of this difference is not entirely clear, it is important to note that Utpaladeva does not enumerate the five powers anywhere in his ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, this, to reiterate, probably being the result of the fact that these works were meant to reach a wider readership and not merely the audience of initiates for which the ŚD and, consequently, its commentary were probably intended.

⁹⁶This hierarchy is present in all of the Trika scriptures, including the *Mālinivijayottaratantra*, the *Siddhayogesvarimata*, the *Tantrasādhbhāvanatantra*, and in two texts that are not fully available at present, the *Devayāmalatantra* and the *Trīśirobhairavatantra*. See Sanderson 1990: 31–32.

⁹⁷This correlation of the goddesses with states of awareness also occurred in Abhinavagupta's articulation of the system, as well as in the VBh. See Sanderson 1990: 73–76.

⁹⁸Though Somānanda does not explicitly define this condition, Utpaladeva does, this despite the fact that he does not give nearly as much emphasis to these terms as does Somānanda. (He does mention the *parāparā* condition in ŚD 1.48, however.) See ĪPK 3.1.5 for Utpaladeva's definition of the *parāparā* condition.

⁹⁹See ŚD 1.22 and 1.24–25.

¹⁰⁰See ŚD 1.5–6ab and 1.18.

¹⁰¹Compare the *avataranikā* introducing ŚD 1.6cd–7ab with the commentary on the same. Cf. the *avataranikā* to ŚD 1.7cd–8; and the ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.3–4, where Utpaladeva refers to the "pentad of powers" (*śaktipañcaka*). Somānanda refers to the *śaktitraya* at ŚD 1.22, 3.20, and 3.53cd, and to the synonymous *śaktitraya* at ŚD 1.4, 1.47, and 3.56.

It may be added that it has, to my knowledge, gone unnoticed to date that Somānanda is the first post-scriptural author explicitly to invoke the *śaktitraya* in his writings. Indeed, the triad of powers appears at most in faint echoes in the ŚSū or the SpKā and nowhere, to my knowledge, in the Krama writings extant before Somānanda's time. At the same time, the *śaktitraya* is absent from the works of any of the dualist Śaiva Siddhāntins whose writings predate the ŚD, though this is as expected, given that the Śaiva Siddhānta did not accept the authority of the Trika.

Of further interest is the fact that the formulation found in some of the early Saiddhāntika sources, a formulation that recognizes a pair of activities in the form of cognition (*jñāna*) and action (*kriyā*), is found in both the Spanda literature of Somānanda's day and in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ.¹⁰² Somānanda's emphasis on the power of will may therefore be read as an implicit critique of the formulation of agency found in the contemporaneous Spanda and Saiddhāntika literature, and the fact that Utpaladeva echoes this formulation in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ may indicate that he wished to move the Pratyabhijñā from Somānanda's triadic formulation to one more in line with these other schools of thought. Somānanda may even be read, in two places, at least, in a manner that strongly suggests he wished intentionally to trump this bipartite formulation by placing the power of will (*icchā*) over and above cognition and action.

First, Somānanda suggests in ŚD 1.19–20ab that both knowledge and action involve first of all the intention to know or to act, and they therefore should be classed as forms of “activity by means of will,” a statement that clearly places will (*icchā*) over and above cognition and action.¹⁰³ Second, in ŚD 2.84–88, Somānanda compares the Grammarians' *paśyanti*, grammatically a present participle of the feminine gender that literally means “seeing,” to the act of a potter making a pot. Both must be preceded by the power of will, by the agent's intention to perform a certain action or engage in a particular cognition.¹⁰⁴ Regardless of whether or not Somānanda intended to challenge the bipartite model, however, it is clear that Somānanda's inclusion of the tripartite formulation so commonly found

¹⁰²Compare NP 1.2 (*jñātā kartā ca bodhena buddhvā bodhyaṃ pravartate / pravṛttiphalabhoktā ca yāḥ pumān ucyate 'tra saḥ*) with ĪPK 1.1.2 (*kartari jñātari svātmany ādisiddhe maheśvare / ajaḍātmā niśedhaṃ vā siddhaṃ vā vidadhita kaḥ*) and contrast with ŚD 1.2: *ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu sphuran nirvṛtaciḍ vibhuh / aniruddhecchāprasaraḥ prasaraddṛkkriyāḥ śivaḥ*. Though the *śaktitraya* does not appear in the text, the power of will is mentioned in ŚSū 1.13, however: *icchāśaktitamā kumāri*. (Cf. ŚSū 3.41: *abhilāṣād bahir-gatiḥ saṃvāhyasya*.) SpKā 33 also refers to will: *yathecchābhyarthito dhātā jāgrato 'rthān hṛdi sthitān / somasūryodayaṃ kṛtvā sampādayati dehinaḥ*. See also note 16 of the first chapter of the translation, below.

¹⁰³See ŚD 1.19ab, quoted in note 55, above.

¹⁰⁴Cf. Dyczkowski 1992¹: 43–44. Note also that, while Utpaladeva's commentary on this passage addresses the existence of will prior to cognition, the analogy of the potter clearly points to the existence of the same prior to the action, as well.

in the Trika scriptures became indispensable both to Abhinavagupta in his presentation of the Pratyabhijñā and to the commentators on the SpKā and ŚSū, this despite the absence of the *śaktitraya* from the SpKā and the ŚSū, as well as the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ.

4. Although Somānanda is frequently willing to repeat Trika formulations in the ŚD, a survey of terms and concepts found in the text likewise shows a concomitant absence therein of what have come to be considered hallmarks of the Pratyabhijñā. In addition to the absence of the pairs of opposites mentioned above, including *ahantā* and *idantā*, *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, and *antar* and *bahis*, one should further note that Somānanda refers almost nowhere to the “fullness” of consciousness (*pūrṇa/pūrṇatā*),¹⁰⁵ a common formulation in the writings of subsequent Pratyabhijñā authors, beginning with Utpaladeva. He also essentially refrains from using the language of the various “appearances” (*ābhāsas*) of consciousness, which Utpaladeva frequently uses in his ĪPK, ĪPVṛ and ŚDVṛ. Somānanda similarly omits any reference to *ahambhāva* and related terms (such as *ahampratyaya*), a fact that helps to substantiate Dyczkowski’s observation that the Pratyabhijñā notion of the Self as a supreme, universal “I” is born in the writings of Utpaladeva, not Somānanda.¹⁰⁶ Also omitted is any reference to a fourth state of awareness (*turiya*), or to the one said to exist beyond it (*turiyātīta*). So, too, does Somānanda leave out any mention of the three impurities (*malas*), a formulation that was borrowed from the Śaiva Siddhānta and regularly described in the Pratyabhijñā beginning with Utpaladeva. The power of time (*kālaśakti*), which according to Utpaladeva causes the passage from the pure non-duality of Śiva’s unmanifested state to the apparent duality of the manifested universe, likewise is not mentioned in the ŚD, though Somānanda clearly accepts that time is necessarily present in manifestation, as he refers to the “first moment” (*prathamā tūṭi*) of action.¹⁰⁷ It may further be observed that Somānanda nowhere refers to the concept of an individual life-force or *jīva* other than in two places where he treats the positions of rival schools,¹⁰⁸ this omission being most likely the result of Somānanda’s

¹⁰⁵He does use the term °*pūrṇatā* on ŚD 2.15b, but even there two manuscripts, T and C, carry the variant reading of °*pūrṇatā*. In any event, this nomenclature is not common in the ŚD.

¹⁰⁶Torella finds essentially the same formulation to be evident in the ŚD, but while a common spirit may be found in the writings of the two authors, the language of the supreme “I,” and the concomitant notion of the existence of the self as the entire universe, as a “pure egoity,” is thoroughly more developed and prevalent in Utpaladeva’s works. See Dyczkowski [1990] 2004: 33; Torella 1994: xxix.

¹⁰⁷See ŚD 1.8d. Note that Utpaladeva here is following the lead of the grammarian Bhartṛhari. See Torella 1994: 153, fn. 2; cf. VP 1.3. According to Utpaladeva, the power of time is implicitly accepted in Somānanda’s understanding of creation, which is effected by a sequence of powers. See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.7cd-8, where Utpaladeva describes *aunmukhya* as being divided by a minimal period of time. See also Iyer [1969] 1992: 125–126.

¹⁰⁸See ŚD 6.9 and ŚD 6.24.

emphasis on the existence of only Śiva as the one and only agent of all action and cognition. Finally, while Somānanda does refer in a few places to a “supreme reality” (*paramārtha*), just as he occasionally refers to an “everyday reality” (*vyavahāra*), he nowhere contrasts the two or uses the terms in a manner that suggests they are mutually exclusive, opposed conditions.¹⁰⁹

5. On the other hand, Somānanda uses one term that is entirely absent in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ and appears to be of central importance to his understanding of the nature of reality. This is the repeated reference to the notion of the immateriality (*amūrtatva*) of consciousness. The term is invoked in one place with reference to a verse attributed to Bhartṛhari (see ŚD 2.73cd–74ab), where that author pays homage to a “peaceful” god, who is the image (*mūrti*) of pure, endless consciousness, one that is not limited by space, time, and the like. Criticizing this description of the divine (ŚD 2.74cd–76), Somānanda suggests that it is inappropriate to think of consciousness as an image (see ŚD 2.76d), by which, Utpaladeva’s *Vṛtti* tells us, Somānanda meant that consciousness is not a substance of limited measure, or in other words some sort of “solid” entity. Elsewhere, the term is used in what appears to be a technical sense, the best example of this being ŚD 5.4cd–5ab. There, Somānanda describes everything in the universe as follows: “Absolutely everything is possessed of will, and pervades everything else, and everything is similarly lacking a material form [*amūrta*], as everything consists of cognition and action.”¹¹⁰

This idea, in turn, serves elsewhere to shape Somānanda’s arguments concerning the ways in which reality functions. In ŚD 2.53–54, for example, Somānanda dismisses a potential objection from the point of view of the philosophy of the grammarians by pointing to the fact that *paśyanti*, the “seeing” goddess who is supreme on their view, cannot subdivide herself into agent of action, object, instrument, and so on, this being impossible for her if they maintain that she is *amūrtā*, not a material entity (cf. ŚD 4.63cd–64ab). The point, of course, is that Somānanda understands everything to be pure consciousness, which is simply not a

¹⁰⁹The degree to which these omissions differentiate Somānanda’s articulation of the Pratyabhijñā from, say, that of Abhinavagupta may be adduced by comparing the terms and concepts in the ŚD to those of Abhinava as summarized in a recent treatment, too long to reproduce here, of that author’s understanding of *śaktipāta*. Cf. the present treatment of Somānanda’s ŚD with the précis of Abhinavagupta’s “vision of reality” found in Wallis 2007: 248–249.

¹¹⁰See ŚD 5.4cd–5ab: *icchāvantaḥ sarva eva vyāpakās ca samastakāḥ. amūrtās ca tathā sarve sarve jñānakriyātmakāḥ*. Cf. ŚD 6.101cd: *sarvasya sarvadeheṣu vyāpakatavavyavasthiteḥ*. Still elsewhere, Utpaladeva summarizes *Kiraṇatantra* (KT) 1.15 in explaining Somānanda’s text. In doing so, he describes the “bound soul,” the apparently limited agent who acts in the universe, as *amūrta*. In other words, Utpaladeva’s commentary indicates that Somānanda’s frequent use of this term has a scriptural source. (See note 317 to chapter 1 of the translation, below, for a quotation of the verse in question.)

substance. The rules that define how a substance may function, then, such as the capacity of such an entity to be physically divided, isolated, and the like, simply cannot apply to Śiva, even when he exists in the form of the universe.

To sum up: Somānanda makes liberal use of Trika terminology while regularly spurning the language of the more mainstream, philosophical schools, in particular (and in contrast to Utpaladeva) that of the grammarians and of the Buddhist epistemologists. In doing so, however, he blatantly codes the terms he adopts with the notion that there is only one form of existence, Śiva as the yogin, thereby discarding the notion of ontological or epistemological hierarchy contained in the terms he adopts from Trika scriptural sources. This is to say that Somānanda's theory of will trumps any desire he might have to conform to the scripturally based concepts implied by the scripturally sourced Trika terms found throughout the ŚD. The author's pantheism is thoroughly and strictly monistic, indeed.

8. The Influence of the Trika VBh on the *Śivadṛṣṭi*

Torella has already noted, albeit briefly,¹¹¹ that both the ŚD and the works of the Spanda school show themselves to have been influenced by the VBh, a well-known Trika scripture that is said to be a part of the *Rudrayāmalatantra*, one that details a series of *dhāraṇās*, or exercises in concentration on a single point, in order to aid the practitioner in achieving full realization of the nature of reality and of himself as Śiva. In particular, Torella suggested that reference in the ŚD to the moments in which *aunmukhya* may be experienced (found in ŚD 1.9–11ab) betrays the influence of the VBh and not the SpKā,¹¹² as Gnoli initially

¹¹¹ See Torella 1994: xiv–xv.

¹¹² A parallel passage to ŚD 1.9–11ab is found in VBh 118: *ksutādyante bhaye soke gahvare vā raṇād drute / kutūhale kṣudhādyante brahmasattāmayaḥ daśā*. Mention of orgasm, on ŚD 1.10b–c, is also found in the VBh, where the moment of orgasm is equated with the pleasure of Brahman and the *ātman*. See VBh 69: *śaktisaṃgamasamkṣubdhasāktyaśēśāvasānikam / yat sukham brahmatattvasya tat sukham svākyam ucyate*. (Making clear the sexual context of the passage, Śivopādhyāya glosses *śaktisaṃgama* with *strisaṃgama*, and VBh 70 goes on to suggest that even the memory of the “pleasure of women” leads to a flood of bliss: *lehanāmanthanākoṭaiḥ strisukhasya bhārāt smrteḥ / śaktyaabhāve 'pi deveśi bhaved ānandasamplavah*.) VBh 71 also refers to the delight felt at the reception of good news, a parallel to ŚD 1.9c: *ānande mahatī prāpte dṛṣṭe vā bāndhava cirāt / ānandam udgataṃ dhyātvā tallayas tanmanā bhavet*. Torella further suggested that the quivering nature of the powers (*sarvaśaktivilolātā*) identified by Somānanda as present in the first moment of the various acts listed in the ŚD passage in question is also mentioned in the VBh. It should be noted, however, that there is no explicit mention of *vilolātā* in the VBh, and the tenor of that work is not one entirely devoted to the presence of powers, even if the text invokes a sort of Śakta inclination toward the activity of powers in the manifestation of the universe.

thought.¹¹³ The extent of the influence of the VBh on the ŚD has yet to be fully appreciated, however, as numerous additional and heretofore unidentified references to the VBh appear in the ŚD. In surveying them here, moreover, I argue that Somānanda's reading of the VBh emphasizes the pantheistic form of the divine portrayed in that scripture, as opposed to a panentheistic formulation that is also in evidence in the VBh.

To begin, parallels to the VBh may be found in the third chapter of the ŚD, beginning with ŚD 3.2c–3, where Somānanda suggests that Śiva is never separated from his powers,¹¹⁴ a dogma expressed in VBh 18.¹¹⁵ Somānanda goes on to echo VBh 19 only a few verses later, in ŚD 3.7, when he suggests that it is impossible to separate an entity, such as snow or fire, from its nature, the fact of being cold or hot, respectively.¹¹⁶ ŚD 3.36cd–39, in turn, has a parallel in VBh 110: both describe the relationship of the manifested universe and its creator by way of the famous analogy of the appearance of waves on the ocean, the point of course being that the temporally and spatially distinct phenomena cannot change the underlying nature of the source of manifestation, just as the waves and the ocean in which they stir remain entirely composed of water.¹¹⁷ Śiva, by analogy, is indistinguishable from his powers and the activities they engender. Finally, ŚD 3.68c–69 (echoed in ŚD 7.87cd) parallels VBh 135 in suggesting that neither bondage nor liberation is real, given that all things are ultimately Śiva himself.¹¹⁸

Although some of these parallel passages may be attributed to the coincidental expression of common dogmas or tropes of the non-dual tantras, the seventh chapter of the ŚD may be shown to parallel the structure and spirit of the VBh to a degree that is not so easily dismissed, as both texts go to equally great lengths in

¹¹³Gnoli traced the present passage to SpKā II.6 [= SpKā 22] without recognizing the VBh as the ultimate source of the quotation in both that work and the ŚD. See Gnoli 1957: 19.

¹¹⁴See ŚD 3.2cd–3: *na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekiṇī. śivaḥ śaktas tathā bhāvān icchayā kartum idr̥śān / śaktiśaktimātor bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varṇyate.* “Śiva does not exist devoid of power; power is not something excluded (from Śiva). Thus Śiva, being empowered, is able to create such (worldly) entities at will. In Śaivism, no distinction whatsoever between power and the one possessing power is described.”

¹¹⁵See VBh 18: *śaktiśaktimātor yadvad abhedaḥ sarvadā sthitaḥ / atas taddharmadharmitvāt parā śaktiḥ parātmanaḥ.* This idea is of course expressed elsewhere in the canon, however, as in, e.g., TST 1.28: *na śivād rahitā śaktir na śaktirahitaḥ śivaḥ / viyogo naiva dr̥śyeta pavanomvarayor iva.*

¹¹⁶See ŚD 3.7ab: *na himasya pr̥thak śaityaṃ nāgner auṣṇyaṃ pr̥thag bhavet;* cf. VBh 19ab: *na vahner dāhikā śaktir vyatiriktā vibhāvayate.*

¹¹⁷See ŚD 3.36cd–39: *yathā na yogino 'stiha nānāsainyaśarirakaiḥ. vibhāgas tadvad isāsya madhy-otr̥kṣṭanikṣṭakaiḥ / bhāvair nāsti vibheditvam athavāmbudhivivivat. tatra vicitvam āpannam na jalam jalam ucyate / na ca tatrāmburūpasya vicikāle vināśitā. niścalatve 'pi hi jalam vicitve jalam eva tat / vicibhis tad viśiṣṭam cet tan naiścalyaviśiṣṭakam.* Cf. VBh 110: *jalasyevormayo vahner jvālābhaṅgyaḥ prabhā raveḥ / mamaiva bhairavasyaitā viśvabhaṅgyo vibheditāḥ.*

¹¹⁸See ŚD 3.68c–69: *bandhamokṣau na vidyete sarvatraiva śivatvataḥ. vijñānam idr̥k sarvasya kasmān na syād vimohitā / saiveśā sā ca saṃsāro bandhamokṣāv ataḥ sthitaḥ.* Cf. VBh 135: *na me bandho na mokṣo me bhūtasyaitā vibhīṣikāḥ / pratibimbam idaṃ buddher jaleṣv iva vīvasvataḥ.* Cf., also, ŚD 7.87cd: *na me bandho na me mokṣas tau malatvena saṃsthitau.*

redefining the nature of the various modes of external worship in non-dualistic terms. The final section of the VBh begins with a series of questions posed by the goddess to Bhairava, the teacher of the VBh. She asks him whose name is recited in worship (*japa*), what is to be recited, who is visualized (in the *dhyāna*), who is worshiped (in *pūjā*), who is gratified (*trpti*), for whom is the oblation into the fire (*homa*) given, the sacrifices (*yāga*) made, and how.¹¹⁹ The answers to these questions are given in the subsequent verses of the text, this in a manner that “translates on to the plane of abstract contemplation the acts of offering, visualizing the deity, cycling the mantras, and so forth” that constitute “ordinary Tantric worship.”¹²⁰ This process of abstraction is precisely the one that occurs in the seventh chapter of the ŚD.

To start, the VBh explains the recitation of the name or mantra of the deity (*japa*) as involving the contemplation of the highest, which in turn involves the spontaneous repetition of primordial sound (*nāda*) internally. In other words, it is a subtle sound, not an explicit name or mantra, that is expressed in the proper form of *japa*.¹²¹ In the ŚD, *japa* is similarly defined as the ceaseless awareness of one’s identity with Śiva, which exists in every state of existence.¹²² One who always practices this on every occasion—with whatever form one encounters—becomes omnipresent,¹²³ and the highest *japa* is constituted by the repeated awareness “I am [Śiva].”¹²⁴

The VBh goes on to redefine the process of visualization (*dhyāna*), suggesting that the practice is not properly associated with the contemplation of the physical constituents of the deity, but rather is constituted by any act of unwavering concentration, one that is not supported by any particular form.¹²⁵ The ŚD similarly redefines *dhyāna*, but instead suggests that the visualization occurs when one sees any thing as appearing in the form of everything. Thus, the visualization

¹¹⁹See VBh 142cd–144ab: *idam yadi vapur deva parāyās ca maheśvara. evam uktavyavasthāyām japyate ko japaś ca kaḥ / dhyāyate ko mahānātha pūjyate kaś ca trṣṣyati. hūyate kasya vā homo yāgaḥ kasya ca kiṃ katham.*

¹²⁰See Sanderson (1990: 76) for this reference to the VBh as the basis for Abhinavagupta’s turn toward abstract contemplation in preference to ordinary tantric worship. Sanderson does not note the parallels with the seventh chapter of the ŚD, however.

¹²¹See VBh 145: *bhūyo bhūyaḥ pare bhāve bhāvanā bhāvyate hi yā / japaḥ so ’tra svayaṃ nādo mantrātmā japyā idrśah.* “That creative contemplation which is practised on the highest Reality over and over again is in this scripture *japa* (recitation in reality). That which goes on sounding spontaneously (inside) in the form of a *mantra* (mystic formula) is what the *japa* is about.” (Translation Singh’s).

¹²²See ŚD 7.84–85b: *ata eva śivaḥ sarvam iti yogo ’tha cetasi / santataṃ saktisantānaprasareṇa sadaiva me. aniruddho japo ’ty eva sarvāvasthāsv asau japaḥ.*

¹²³See ŚD 7.85cd: *nānākāraiḥ sadā kurvann udayan sarvavastugaḥ.*

¹²⁴See ŚD 7.86–87b: *abhyāsenāsmi so ’py atra japaḥ parama ucyate / samkalpān janayann asmi sthitah śabdānato mukhe. so hi nāma japo jñeyah satyādis trividho hi saḥ.*

¹²⁵VBh 146: *dhyānaṃ hi niścalā buddhir nirākārā nirāśrayā / na tu dhyānaṃ sarirākṣimukha-hastādīkalpanā.* “Unswerving *buddhi* without any image or support constitutes meditation. Concentration on an imaginative representation of the divine with a body, eyes, mouth, hands, etc., is not meditation.” (Translation Singh’s).

occurs by means of the contact of any sense-organ with any object, since everything has Śiva-nature. It also appears in any cognition to which the mind turns when filled with the awareness “I am Śiva.”¹²⁶

Worship (*pūjā*), in turn, is defined in the VBh not as the offering of flowers, and so forth, in an act of physical worship, but is rather said to involve the worshiper’s absorption in a state of nonconceptual awareness.¹²⁷ The ŚD, for its part, suggests that all the various components of the act of worship, the agent who worships, the object that is worshiped, and the act of worship itself, are all Śiva himself.¹²⁸ Next, the offering of oblations into the fire (*homa*) is redefined in the VBh as a sort of destruction of duality, for it involves the mental offering of the elements, the senses, the objects of sense, and the mind into the fire that dissolves “even the highest void.”¹²⁹ Somānanda, for his part, redefines *homa* as knowledge that one is Śiva fully satisfied.¹³⁰ ŚD 7.89, in turn, mirrors VBh 152 in redefining the ritual bath (*snāna*). The latter work suggests that the true nature of the ritual bath is entrance into one’s true (non-dual) form, namely into the essence of pure consciousness, which is both free and blissful.¹³¹ The ŚD for its part suggests that the delightful thought “I am Śiva” is the highest form of the water-bath.¹³²

It is clear from the review of these parallel passages, then, that both the VBh and the ŚD sought to reinterpret the nature of religious practice. Both texts sought to transform the reader’s understanding of quotidian forms of discipline and worship by indicating that these practices involve a more subtle and abstracted evolution in the practitioner’s awareness of the nature of reality.

¹²⁶ See ŚD 7.78–80: *dhyānaṃ nāmātra yat sarvaṃ sarvākāreṇa lakṣyate / bhāvanācakṣuṣā sādhi sā cintā sarvadarśini. yena yendriyeṅārtho gṛhyate tatra tatra sā / śivatā lakṣitā satyā tad dhyānam api varṇyate. yasyāṃ yasyāṃ pratitau tu śivo ’smiṭi manogamaḥ / tasyāṃ tathaiva cintāyāṃ tad dhyānam api jalpitam.*

¹²⁷ See VBh 147: *pūjā nāma na puṣpādyaire yā matiḥ kriyate dṛḍhā / nirvikalpe pare vyomni sā pūjā hy ādarāl layaḥ.* “Worship does not mean offering of flowers, etc. It rather consists in setting one’s heart on that highest ether of consciousness which is above all thought-constructs. It really means dissolution of self with perfect ardour (in the Supreme Consciousness known as Bhairava).” (Translation Singh’s.) Cf. VBh 150cd–151: *kṣapaṇāt sarvāpānāṃ trāṇāt sarvasya pārvati. rudraśaktisamāveśas tatketraṃ bhāvanā parā / anyathā tasya tattvasya kā pūjā kaś ca tṛpyati;* and VBh 153: *yair eva pūjyate dravyais tarpate vā parāparaḥ / yaś caiva pūjakaḥ sarvaḥ sa evaikaḥ kva pūjanam.*

¹²⁸ See ŚD 7.92c–94: *pūjanān nāsti me tuṣṭir nāsti khedo hy apūjanāt. pūjakair avibhedena sadā pūjeti pūjanam / atrākāre ca me pūjā yā syāt sādāśivātmani. lingādike pūjito ’smi sadā pūjeti vā sthītā / pūjakaḥ pūjanam pūjyam iti sarvaṃ śivaḥ sthitaḥ.*

¹²⁹ See VBh 149: *mahāsūnyālaye vahnau bhūtākṣaviṣayādikam / hūyate manasā sārḍham sa homaś cetanāsrucā.* “When in the fire of Supreme Reality (i.e., Bhairava) in which even the highest void is dissolved, the five elements, the sense, the objects of the senses along with the mind (whose characteristic is dichotomizing thought-constructs) are poured, with *cetanā* as the ladle, then that is real oblation (*homa*).” (Translation Singh’s.)

¹³⁰ See ŚD 7.91: *so ’ham śivaḥ sutṛpto ’smi homa ity uditāḥ paraḥ / atrākāre na yan me ’sti tad ākārāntare ’sti me.*

¹³¹ See VBh 152: *svatantrānandacinmātrasāraḥ svātmā hi sarvataḥ / āveśanaṃ tatsvarūpe svātmanaḥ snānam īritam.* “The essence of self consists universally in autonomy, bliss, and consciousness. One’s absorption in that essence is said to be (real) [sic] bath.” (Translation Singh’s.)

¹³² See ŚD 7.89ab: *śivo ’smiṭi manohlādo jalasnānam paraṃ matam.*

The manner in which the two texts reinterpret these practices, however, shows a certain divergence in strategies of interpretation; for while the VBh regularly emphasizes entrance into a state free of distinction and conceptualization, the ŚD emphasizes the agent's action *as Śiva*. Thus, the visualization (*dhyāna*) involves concentration on no image in the VBh, but recognition of all entities as Śiva in the ŚD. Worship (*pūjā*) involves absorption in a nonconceptual "ether" in the VBh, but the identification of all the elements of the action with Śiva in the ŚD; and so on. Somānanda does not guide the practitioner toward the cessation of all conceptualization (*vikalpas*) or to any resorption into the divine plenum that is encouraged in the VBh, but rather calls the practitioner to recognize his identity with Śiva in all that he or she sees and does.

This is not to say that Somānanda wished merely to contradict the VBh, though. Indeed, he may well have found in the VBh inspiration for, or at least validation of, the most striking element of his entire system, what Torella termed an "extreme formulation," namely, the notion that volition and therefore agency exists equally in all entities, down to the mundane pot. For something similar to this idea is expressed on VBh 105: "Knowledge, desire, and so forth, do not appear only within me, they appear everywhere in jars and other objects.' Contemplating thus, one becomes all pervasive."¹³³ Similarly, the VBh suggests that Śiva-nature is all-pervasive, and that the mind cannot but experience Śiva, regardless of the identity of the objects with which the senses make contact.¹³⁴ It also suggests that the senses may bring one to Śiva-consciousness,¹³⁵ an idea clearly echoed in Somānanda's reformulation of the process of visualizing the deity (*dhyāna*), surveyed above.¹³⁶

It may be said, rather, that one can identify two streams of thought in the VBh. One (which is emphasized, as we shall see, by the SpKā and the ŚSū) suggests that the path to knowing the divine involves the cessation of desire. This

¹³³See VBh 105: *ghaṭādau yaç ca vijñānam icchādyam vā mamāntare / naiva sarvagatam jātam bhāvayann iti sarvagaḥ*. The translation is Singh's. Cf. ŚD 5.16: *jānan kartāram ātmānam ghaṭaḥ kuryāt svakām kriyām / ajñāte svātmakartrtve na ghaṭaḥ sampravartate*. "Cognizing itself as the agent, the pot performs its own action. If it were not aware of its own agency, the pot would not be present."

¹³⁴See, e.g., VBh 116: *yaत्रa yaत्रa mano yāti bāhye vābhyantare 'pi vā / tatra tatra śivāvasthā vyāpakatvāt kva yāsyati*. "Wherever the mind goes, be it internal or external, the Śiva-condition exists there; where (else) can [the mind] go, given his omnipresence?"

¹³⁵See, e.g., VBh 117: *yaत्रa yaत्रākṣamārgeṇa caitanyaṁ vyajyate vibhoḥ / tasya tanmātradharmitvāc cil-layād bharitātmatā*. "On every occasion that the consciousness of the Omnipresent reality is revealed through the sensory organs, since it is the characteristic only of the Universal Consciousness, one should contemplate over the consciousness appearing through the sensory organs as the pure Universal Consciousness. He will then attain the essence of plenitude (which is the characteristic of Bhairava)." (Translation Singh's.)

¹³⁶That the verse in question immediately precedes the primary verse that is echoed in ŚD 1.9–11ab is further suggestive of the connection articulated in the VBh between quotidian engagement with the world and an active awareness of the divine, something Dyczkowski (1992: 52) noted, and identified as a peculiarly Kaula inclination, some time ago.

is expressed in VBh 96–97, for example:¹³⁷ “Seeing a desire arise, he should quickly quiet it. It will be reabsorbed in the very place from which it arose. When I am one without desire or cognition, who, verily, am I? Being thus, I am in reality absorbed in that [condition] and become mentally absorbed in the same.” The other, taken up in the ŚD, suggests that one may contact the divine by attentively and actively engaging the world in all its apparent diversity. This latter stream of thought is encapsulated in the *dhāraṇā* found in the very next verse (VBh 98), one that intimates that the practitioner should embrace his desires:¹³⁸ “Alternatively, when a cognition of a desire occurs one should fix one’s consciousness on it; being one whose mind is fused with awareness of the self he will then see the nature of reality.” In other words, Somānanda emphasizes this stream of thought over and above the one that articulates the need for the practitioner to withdraw from the world in order to know the divine.

It is intriguing, then, that Somānanda explicitly suggests in the third chapter of the ŚD that any mention in Śaiva scripture of the universe as being somehow illusory exists only for the purpose of cultivating dispassion in the individual practitioner. For in doing so he suggests that these passages should therefore be taken in no way to contradict the arguments he has put forward regarding the active and engaged form of Śiva-as-consciousness.¹³⁹ This statement is intriguing because the VBh occasionally makes just this sort of suggestion, intimating that one should imagine that the universe is an illusion so that one may transcend it.¹⁴⁰ “By contemplating the universe as being Indra’s web of illusion, or as configured like the work of a painting, or as moving to and fro unsteadily, and by seeing everything (thusly), one becomes delighted.” One cannot help but wonder whether Somānanda had in mind just such passages from the VBh as the one here quoted when he explained away such references to the universe as illusion. After all, the tantra is filled with exercises in concentration (*dhāraṇās*), and it explicitly recommends the very sorts of methods for yogic contemplation that are here in question.¹⁴¹

There can, in sum, be little doubt that the VBh is a primary—perhaps the premier—work in Somānanda’s mind when he composed the ŚD. And Somānanda emphasizes the practices therein that are associated with understanding the divine to be present in all activity and all appearances. In light of the existence of a significant influence of the VBh on subsequent Pratyabhijñā authors,

¹³⁷ See VBh 96–97: *jhagiticchāṃ samutpannāṃ avalokya śamaṃ nayet / yata eva samudbhūtā tatas tatraiva liyate. yadā mamecchā notpannā jñānaṃ vā kas tadāsmi vai / tattvato ’haṃ tathā bhūtas tallinas tanmanā bhavet.*

¹³⁸ See VBh 98: *icchāyām athavā jñāne jāte cittaṃ niveśayet / ātmabuddhyānanyacetās tatas tattvārthadarśanam.* Note that I understand *tattvārtha* to refer to *paramārtha*, the nature of reality.

¹³⁹ See ŚD 3.95cd–96ab.

¹⁴⁰ See VBh 102: *indrajālamayaṃ viśvaṃ vyastaṃ vā citrakarmavat / bhramad vā dhyāyataḥ sarvaṃ paśyataś ca sukhodgamaḥ.*

¹⁴¹ Cf. note 81 of the second chapter of the translation.

then, Abhinavagupta most notable among them,¹⁴² it should perhaps come as no surprise that the founding author of the Pratyabhijñā was so deeply engaged with the VBh in the course of defining, in a similar manner, the nature of ordinary tantric worship in abstract terms closely associated with the theological-cum-philosophical claim that Śiva, in the form of consciousness, is the entire universe.

¹⁴²Abhinavagupta is notable in this context for his effort to suppress the role of the visualization of the deity in the desiderative rites of worship of the Trika. See Sanderson 1990: 74–78.

Somānanda’s Tantric Interlocutors, and the Philosophy of the Grammarians

We have already mapped Somānanda’s interaction with the Trika scriptures in our review of Somānanda’s philosophical theology, as we have examined the differences between the ŚD and the writings of Somānanda’s disciple, Utpaladeva, followed by a consideration of the ways in which the ŚD invokes Trika terminology.¹⁴³ In doing so, we have shown that Somānanda’s ŚD should be considered to be a Trika-influenced post-scriptural work that is closely linked to the VBh, even if Utpaladeva’s ĪPK and ĪPVṛ exorcize the scriptural flavor of the ŚD in favor of speaking in a more purely philosophical register. We turn now to the task of mapping Somānanda’s interaction with his tantric interlocutors, as well as the Hindu grammarians who informed some among them.

9. The Tantric Post-Scriptural Schools and Authors Known to Somānanda

By the time of the golden age of tantric Śaiva exegesis, around the middle of the tenth century and certainly by the beginning of the eleventh, six distinguishable streams of post-scriptural learning flourished in the Kashmir Valley. These include: the Śaiva Siddhānta, with its ritual and liturgy that closely mirrored orthodox Brahminical mores, even as its adherents considered theirs to be a revelation superior to that of the Veda; the traditions of exegesis based in the Kālīkula, or the “Family of Kālī,” which elevated the divine feminine, usually in the form of Kālasaṃkarṣiṇī, the goddess Kālī as the “Destroyer of Time,” to the highest level of reality and located her at the pinnacle of ritual worship; the Krama subgroup of the Kālīkula, which understood the universe to exist as the flow of divine powers or *śaktis*;¹⁴⁴ the tradition of exegesis based in the

¹⁴³ See, *supra*, sections 5, 6, and 7.

¹⁴⁴ On the structure of Krama worship, see, e.g., Dyczkowski 1987: 117–138.

Trika, which developed a ritual and philosophy associated with, as its name suggests and as already mentioned above, a triad of female deities, Parā, Parā-parā, and Aparā; the writings associated with the “Doctrine of Vibration” or the Spanda School, which articulated a vision of the universe in the form of Śiva the yogin, whose consciousness was said to form and move the universe and all who occupy it; and, finally, the Pratyabhijñā or “Recognition” School, whose explanation of the universe as the form of Śiva’s consciousness adhered to a strict non-dualism that drew on both Buddhist idealist philosophy and a number of the aforementioned tantric post-scriptural traditions.

Now, if the Śaiva post-scriptural traditions of Kashmir reach their apogee before the turn of the eleventh century, the situation was rather more fluid and ill-defined when Somānanda composed the ŚD, at the beginning of the tenth century. At that time, three of the six traditions just mentioned—the post-scriptural writings of the Trika, the Kālikula, and the Pratyabhijñā—were not yet extant,¹⁴⁵ and a fourth—the post-scriptural Śaiva Siddhānta—had not yet reached maturity.¹⁴⁶ The Spanda School, too, existed only in an incipient form at the turn of the tenth century, for while the root texts of the tradition, the SpKā and the ŚSū that informed them, were in circulation by the end of the ninth century, virtually none of the extensive commentatorial tradition on the two works was extant in Somānanda’s day. If it is true, then, as the RT states, that the ninth century was particularly notable for the descent of enlightened Siddhas or “Accomplished Ones” to earth for the benefit of humankind during the reign of the Kashmiri king Avantivarman (r. 855/6–883), then it is also true that the genre of literature associated with them—the post-scriptural works said to be authored by these enlightened Siddhas—took some one hundred years to develop fully and in all the forms known to scholars and aficionados of tantric learning and practice today.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Although the exegesis of the Kālikula, be it based in the massive compendium of apotropaic and other forms of learning, the *Jayadrathayāmala*, or otherwise, is datable only to the middle of the tenth century—it can be shown to have followed the writings of Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975), for which see Sanderson 2007¹: 252–259, esp. 255—the activities of the authors of the Krama subdivision of the Kālikula may be traced in Kashmir to Jñānānātrānātha (c. 850–900), to whom all Krama lineages are traced (ibid.: 263 and 411). The Spanda stream, in the form of the “Aphorisms of Śiva” or *Śivasūtras* (ŚSū) and the “Stanzas on Vibration” or *Spandakārikās* (SpKā), being the first post-scriptural works of a Śākta Śaiva nature that sought to contrast themselves from the Śaiva Siddhānta (ibid.: 426), emerges in Kashmir around the middle of the ninth century. The second stream of Śākta Śaiva exegesis, other than those myriad traditions of the Kālikula, i.e., the Trika—on this division, see Sanderson 2007¹: 250—, is in fact not represented in Kashmir in the early tenth century, other than in the writings of Somānanda himself, and it knows its full development only with the writings of Abhinavagupta around the turn of the eleventh (ibid.: 371).

¹⁴⁶ Indeed, the precise contours of that tradition are in many ways unclear prior to the writings of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha II (fl. c. 950–1000). See Goodall 1998: ix–xviii; cf. Sanderson 2006²: 45. Earlier Saiddhāntika exegetes were likely to have been active in the Valley around the turn of the tenth century, as is evidenced in Somānanda’s reference to one Vyākhyāniguru, about which see Goodall 1998: cvi–cvii, and Sanderson 2006²: 80.

¹⁴⁷ See RT 5.66: *anugrahāya lokānām bhaṭṭasrikallaṭādayaḥ / avantivarmaṇaḥ kāle siddhā bhuvam avātaran.*

10. The Śivadr̥ṣṭi and the Spanda School

The philosophical theology of the ŚD shows itself to be in many ways rather compatible with the Spanda School of Somānanda's time. Indeed, in examining the SpKā, Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa's commentary thereon, the *Spandakārikāvṛtti* (SpKāVṛ), and the ŚSū—these texts being the only three works associated with the Spanda School that were extant in Somānanda's time—it becomes evident that a great deal of continuity exists between Somānanda's thought and these works.¹⁴⁸ Both Somānanda and these Spanda works maintain that Śiva exists as the source (SpKā 1) and substance (SpKā 2) of the universe, one that remains unchanged even when the world appears to be both multiple and changing (SpKā 3–5, esp. 3), and like the ŚD the Spanda School recognizes Śiva as the sole agent who both creates and acts within the universe (SpKā 3 and 10; cf. SpKā 8). Similarly, all experience is ultimately rooted in the experience of Śiva himself (SpKā 4–5), who exists as the individual agent (*jīva*) who experiences the world (SpKā 28; cf. SpKā 36–39, ŚSū 1.11), just as he realizes this exalted state at will (SpKā 31).

All experiences, moreover, are ultimately identical with Śiva, including even conceptual experience or, in other words, thought and language (SpKā 29). Both Somānanda and his Spanda counterparts further understand only consciousness to exist, this being, as already noted, a doctrine of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins, for the absence of consciousness could never be experienced (SpKā 12–13); and this consciousness belongs to the inner being, who is ultimately Śiva himself (SpKā 16). (The ŚSū declare, somewhat cryptically, that “it is the same there as it is elsewhere” [ŚSū 3.14].) The universe, then, appears in both systems only as a result of Śiva's desire to play (SpKā 30), as he creates the universe at will (SpKā 33). In the ŚSū this is described by way of analogy with the theatre, where the self (*ātman*) is the actor (ŚSū 3.9), the stage is the inner self (*antarātman*) (ŚSū 3.10), and the senses are the audience (ŚSū 3.11).

What is more, though the *śaktitraya*, the triadic schema of the three Trika powers of will (*icchā*), cognition (*jñāna*), and action (*kriyā*) that is so central to Somānanda's ŚD, does not appear in either the ŚSū or the SpKā, both works make mention of the power of will (*icchā*) in some context. The ŚSū, for one, refers to the power of will and identifies it as the greatest power,¹⁴⁹ as it states simply that the universe is the aggregate of the powers of the divine (ŚSū 3.31). One aphorism even suggests that creation is the product of the divine agent's desire (ŚSū 3.41). The SpKā, for its part, approaches the idea of the existence of an individual agent whose knowledge and action are preceded by the agent's

¹⁴⁸For the sake of convenience, I will here refer to the three texts here listed as works of the “Spanda School,” though the relationship between the ŚSū and the SpKā is more complex than my nomenclature can suggest. On the somewhat ambiguous relationship of the SpKā to the ŚSū, see Dyczkowski 1992: 11–17.

¹⁴⁹See ŚSū 1.13: *icchāśaktitamā kumārī*.

will. This is found in SpKā 10, where it is said that one may know or do whatever one wishes once one has freed oneself to experience one's own innate nature. The verse, then, might be considered a precursor of sorts to ŚD 1.19ab, where Somānanda suggested that cognition and action constitute "activity by means of will," as mentioned already.¹⁵⁰

There are therefore intriguing points of contact between the Spanda School of Somānanda's day and the contents of the ŚD, with the latter certainly owing the former something in the way of inspiration for the idea that the universe is the product of a creator god in the form of consciousness. Indeed, both the Spanda School and the ŚD suggest that Śiva is the agent who is all agents, the universe being a part of his very experience. Also held in common is the notion that one may witness the functioning of the universal power in heightened moments of experience, though in the SpKā it is *spanda* and not *aunmukhya* that one may experience in, for example, moments of anger, when intensely excited, when wondering what to do, or when running. And this feature, common to the ŚD and the SpKā, may be traced to the influence of a shared scriptural source, the VBh, as we have already discussed above.¹⁵¹

As close as the two schools appear to be, however, they do not present identical formulations of the nature of reality, of Śiva, or of the individual agent who resides within the manifested universe. To begin with, the SpKā and ŚSū are texts that essentially speak the language of yoga rather than philosophy.¹⁵² This pair of Spanda works regularly refers to the states of awareness, to yogic concentration, to the three phases of existence, often spoken of in terms of states of wakefulness, along with a fourth that transcends them (see, e.g., ŚSū 3.21), and the like. And they do so to a degree not even a fraction of which is found in the ŚD, even if Somānanda's notion of Śiva as a yogin is strongly reminiscent of the depiction of Śiva in the SpKā.

More substantively, the SpKā and the ŚSū show themselves rather willing to recognize the existence of some real differences between the manifested universe and the agent who manifests it, a distinction Somānanda fully rejects, as we have seen. For the fourteenth verse of the SpKā suggests that two states (*avasthā*) exist, that of the agent and another of the product of his action. The

¹⁵⁰Compare SpKā 10 (*tadāsyākṛtrīmo dharmo jñatvakartṛtvalakṣaṇaḥ / yatas tadipsitam sarvaṃ jānāti ca karoti ca*) with ŚD 1.19ab (quoted in note 55). Compare the same with NP 1.2, etc. (quoted in note 102), this to see the degree to which the SpKā continues to emphasize the pair of activities over a formulation that reflects the presence of the *śaktitraya* in the text.

¹⁵¹See section 8, above. See also SpKā 21–22: *ataḥ satatam udyuktaḥ spandatattvaviviktaye / jāgrad eva nijam bhāvam acireṇādhiḡacchati. atikruddhaḥ prahr̥ṣṭo vā kiṃ karomiti vāmṛṣan / dhāvan vā yat padam gacchet tatra spandaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ*. Dyczkowski (1992¹: xvi) translates: "Therefore he who strives constantly to discern the *spanda* principle rapidly attains his own (true) state of being even while in the waking state itself. *Spanda* is stable in the state one enters when extremely angry, intensely excited, running, or wondering what to do."

¹⁵²See Torella 1994: xiii.

two, moreover, are of differing natures and are therefore distinct, because the state of being an agent is said to be permanent, while the state of being a product of action is perishable. Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa's commentary on this stanza even goes so far as to indicate that agency, associated with the one who enjoys (the *bhoktr̥*), has consciousness as its form (*cidrūpa*), while the other state, apparently, does not.¹⁵³

Both the ŚSū and the SpKā also identify two forms of knowledge, one binding (ŚSū 1.2, 3.2) and the other liberating (ŚSū 1.16, 1.18, 1.22, 3.7), as the former suggests that the realm of pleasure and pain is “external” (*bahis*) to the one who experiences them (ŚSū 3.34), this while simultaneously indicating that the one freed of pleasure and pain is liberated (ŚSū 3.35).¹⁵⁴ This formulation of course stands in direct contrast to the ŚD, where, as we have seen, it is no one but Śiva himself who suffers and enjoys the world, or even hell below. Bondage and liberation are not linked to states of pleasant and unpleasant experience in the ŚD as they apparently are in the ŚSū. Concomitant with this difference is a certain willingness in the SpKā to differentiate the pure agent, who knows his enlightened and elevated state (SpKā 43–44, 48, and 51), from the agent afflicted by the impurities that defile him and distort his awareness of reality (SpKā 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49–50). Indeed, the yogin is said to avoid the bodily afflictions of old age (SpKā 39), while the ignorant do not (SpKā 40 and Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa's *Vṛtti* on the same). And the ninth stanza of the SpKā, along with Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa's *Vṛtti* thereon, suggests that there exists an “innate impurity” (*nijāsuddhi*) that one must eliminate prior to experiencing the supreme state (*parama pada*). When one does so, one may know or do what one likes (SpKā 10). On the other hand, the SpKā, along with Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa's *Vṛtti*, also suggests that the fetters that bind the individual are of a kind with the vibration of consciousness that creates all reality, it being only a matter of perspective that binds the individual practitioner to the limiting qualities (*guṇas*) that are found manifested in the universe (see SpKā 19–21 and the *Vṛtti* thereon).

In sum, both the Spanda works in question and the ŚD present clearly non-dualistic expressions of the unity of Śiva as the agent who creates the universe; and the differences between the ŚD, on the one hand, and the Spanda School, on the other, may be said rather to lie in their respective, specific formulations of a shared non-dualistic philosophy. As with the divergences between the philosophical writings of Utpaladeva and Somānanda, the differences between the writings of the Spanda School and the ŚD may again be characterized as being similar to the difference between pantheism and panentheism, Somānanda's view of course being the former. The Spanda School, moreover, may be said to

¹⁵³See SpKā 14: *avasthāyugalam cātra kāryakartṛtvaśabditam / kāryatā kṣayīṇi tatra kartṛtvam punar akṣayam*. Cf. Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa's commentary on the same: *avasthāyugalam avasthādvayam eva kāryakartṛtvasamjñam bhogyaboktr̥bhedabhinnam. tatra yo bhogyarūpo bhedaḥ sa utpadyate naśyati ca. bhoktr̥bhedas tu cidrūpāḥ punar na jāyate na kadācid vinaśyati. tena nityaḥ*.

¹⁵⁴See Dyczkowski 1992¹: 16 and fn. 52 for a similar observation.

have influenced Somānanda to some significant degree—indeed, the ŚD even uses the term *spanda* in two places.¹⁵⁵

Yet, testament to the differences between the two may be found in the mutual absence of the fundamental ideas of the two schools, for not only is Somānanda's formulation of a radically willful consciousness absent from SpKā and the ŚSū, but, conversely, the most basic and fundamental concept of the SpKā, the notion that Śiva-the-yogin creates and dissolves the universe in his gaze, the act of creation being identified with the opening (*unmeṣa*) of his eyes, the act of dissolution being identified with their closing (*nimeṣa*), is entirely absent from the ŚD. Perhaps the unity of opposites implied by the opening and closing of Śiva's eyes did not fit entirely well with Somānanda's strict pantheism, while his unvarying emphasis on all existence as Śiva in the form of willful consciousness did not square well with the more panentheistic model of the Spanda School, which saw the world, though essentially a part of the divine, as something one must ultimately transcend.

II. Krama Influences on the *Śivadṛṣṭi*

Although the influence of the Trika VBh is explicitly felt and expressed in the ŚD, the significance of the Krama to Somānanda's thought is more difficult to identify. Indeed, while it has been known for some time that the authors of the Pratyabhijñā had access to the *Kālikulapañcaśataka*, a key Krama work,¹⁵⁶ one can identify Krama ideas in the ŚD only in the most general of terms. This is so because the ŚD, like the VBh before it, evokes the spirit and not the letter of Krama theology.¹⁵⁷ There is nowhere in the ŚD any mention of the four phases of existence, creation (*śṛṣṭi*), maintenance (*sthiti*), dissolution (*saṃhāra*), and the "nameless" (*anākhyā*), so common in Krama scriptural and post-scriptural works. Somānanda nowhere mentions the goddess Kālasaṃkarṣiṇī, who is said to be the supreme, unmanifested deity of the Krama. Finally, there is nowhere in the ŚD any mention of the cycle of thirteen goddesses that is said in Krama theology to be the path within the "nameless" phase to this supreme goddess.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ See Torella 1994: xiii, fn. 8. Cf. Dyczkowski 1992¹: 51.

¹⁵⁶ Both Torella and Sanderson (see Torella 1994: xiv; Sanderson 2007¹: 382, fn. 492.) note the proximity of the Krama (as well as the Trika) to the ŚD and its author, and both quote the TĀV (vol. 3, p. 194, lines 10–11) as their evidence, wherein Jayaratha explains that knowledge of the *Devīpañcaśataka* (= *Kālikulapañcaśataka*) passed from Somānanda to Utpaladeva to Lakṣmaṇagupta to Abhinavagupta. Sanderson, however, argues, contra Torella, that Somānanda was not initiated by the Krama Guru Govindarāja. Compare Torella 1994: xiv with Sanderson 2007¹: 352–353 and fn. 405.

¹⁵⁷ On the presence of the "spirit" of the Krama in the VBh, see Sanderson 2007¹: 279.

¹⁵⁸ On the basic scriptural form of the Krama, see Dyczkowski 1987: 117–138. See also Sanderson 1988: 683–684.

It is nevertheless worth pondering whether and how Somānanda's understanding of Śiva's activity owes something to the spirit of the Krama scriptures, or the exegetes of the Krama,¹⁵⁹ because Somānanda's philosophical theology mirrors two key features of the Krama system. First, Somānanda's sequence of powers, *nirvṛti*, *aunmukhya*, *icchā*, *jñāna*, and *kriyā*, which proceeds in a manner that creates all phenomenal existence within consciousness and occurs in both the act of cosmic creation and in any and every mundane act, echoes the Krama formulation of a sequence of phases that are associated with both the powers that create the universe and one's experience of it. Second, Somānanda further claims that the powers exist concurrently, as they are always present regardless of whether they are active or at rest, and this formulation closely parallels the model of the Krama, which suggests that the sequence of powers unfolds both sequentially and instantaneously.¹⁶⁰ These features, then, strongly suggest the presence of a Krama influence in the ŚD, even if Somānanda formulates a novel sequence of powers that clearly reflects his affinity for the Trika.

Beyond these affinities, one can only guess, for now, the extent to which the Krama influenced Somānanda.¹⁶¹ Two items, in particular, are worthy of speculation. First, it is intriguing that Utpaladeva, following Somānanda, identifies a moment of "rest" (*viśrānti*) prior to and following every cognition, one in which Śiva appears in his unmanifested potential form.¹⁶² If one adds this state of "rest" to the sequence of powers found in the triad of powers (*śaktitraya*), will (*icchā*), cognition (*jñāna*), and action (*kriyā*), one may identify a tetradic scheme that echoes that of the four phases of existence of the Krama, the one in which the unmanifested is reached in the fourth, "nameless" state. Of course, the ŚD also identifies a power preceding the *śaktitraya*, namely *nirvṛti*, as we have seen, just as it accounts for a subtle moment of will, *aunmukhya*, prior to the will (*icchā*) of the Trika triad of powers, both items that are not attested in the Krama literature. Yet, the post-scriptural Krama is marked by a penchant for innovation, and the Krama post-scriptural works elaborate on the four phases of existence in various ways.¹⁶³ Could this formulation, of the *śaktitraya* followed by a moment of "rest," be a Pratyabhijñā innovation on the Krama, one based in the Trika? Second, it may be stated briefly that it is worth questioning whether the thirteen knowledges outlined in the ŚāVi and summarized, above,¹⁶⁴ but found nowhere else, to my knowledge, in the extant primary literature were

¹⁵⁹On the various configurations of the phases of existence, the cycles of the Kālīs in the "nameless" phase, etc., in Krama post-scriptural sources, see Sanderson 2007¹: 260ff.

¹⁶⁰See Dyczkowski 1987: 125.

¹⁶¹I say "for now," because little of the Krama materials has thus far come to light, and much scholarly work remains to be done on the school. I thank an anonymous reviewer of this volume for suggesting as much.

¹⁶²See ŚD 1.5–6ab and the *Vṛtti* on the same.

¹⁶³Jñānanetra's *Kālikāstotra*, for example, identifies six phases of worship that precede the four phases in question. See Sanderson 2007¹: 270–272 and 307.

¹⁶⁴See notes 23 and 24, above.

meant somehow to echo the thirteen Kālīs in the fourth, “nameless” phase.¹⁶⁵ Regardless, it seems clear, in sum, that Somānanda’s is a work that, while heavily influenced by the Trika, also imports the aforementioned Krama tendencies into its system.

12. Somānanda and the Śaiva Siddhānta

It is well known that the scriptures of the dualist Śaiva Siddhāntins are clearly distinguished from the scriptures of the increasingly goddess-centered and non-dualistic Śākta Śaiva tantras. Yet both the post-scriptural tradition and the scriptures themselves acknowledge a hierarchy of scripture, one that conceives of the relationship between the Saiddhāntika and the Śākta Śaiva scriptural sources in a relative manner. Later scriptural works and traditions regularly consider their own teachings to be superior to what are regarded as the less powerful traditions that preceded them; and, at the same time, these traditions acknowledge a relative power and legitimacy for the scriptures and schools deemed to be of a lesser status. Indeed, scriptures of a lesser status are often quoted favorably and are treated as authoritative sources by subsequent traditions and texts. Somānanda, for his part, took this very approach to the dualist tantras of the Śaiva Siddhānta.

This may be said to be so because Somānanda favorably quotes Saiddhāntika sources in a number of places, implying that they are authoritative works whose doctrines he must account for in dealing with his opponents’ objections. At ŚD 3.10–12ab, Somānanda anticipates an objection from his Śākta opponent, who suggests that Śaiva scripture confirms his position that the divine feminine in the form of speech is supreme, for so much, the opponent argues, is said in the Saiddhāntika *Kālottaratantra*, a dualist scripture preserved in a number of versions of varying lengths.¹⁶⁶ Instead of dismissing the scripture as a lower revelation, however, Somānanda goes to some length (ŚD 3.12cd–15ab) to explain that his opponent has misunderstood the Śaiva position. He follows this by anticipating a second objection based in the KT (ŚD 3.15cd–16ab), one that suggests that the goddess, as speech, may be understood to be supreme in Śaivism by an inference based on a mention in that Saiddhāntika scripture of the fact that speech is the means to acquiring the power of mantras. Somānanda again goes on to refute the claim by contextualizing the statements in the KT, rather than dismissing the scripture outright. In a word, Somānanda replies to these objections by engaging in an exegesis

¹⁶⁵Of course, nothing but the presence of some flavor of the Krama in the ŚD and the numeric coincidence of thirteen stages in both the nameless and the ŚāVi invite speculation regarding this short work, whose attribution to Somānanda is highly doubtful. This is to say that this idea involves speculation on the basis of only the flimsiest of evidence.

¹⁶⁶See Goodall 2004: xxv; Goodall 2007: 125–129.

of Saiddhāntika scripture, this to show their consistency with his position that Śiva alone, the possessor of the powers, is supreme. He even goes on to cite the *Kālottaratantra* favorably (at ŚD 3.63cd), suggesting, according to Utpaladeva, that Saiddhāntika scripture points to the existence of Śiva-nature in all beings.

In another place,¹⁶⁷ Somānanda refers to a well-known Saiddhāntika dogma, namely, that the Lord uses the power of *māyā* to create the universe and uses the occasion of the equal strength of good and bad *karma* in the bound individual to grace him with liberating insight.¹⁶⁸ Despite this, he suggests, the Lord may not be said not to be powerful, or sovereign. The same is true, he suggests, of Śiva in the Pratyabhijñā, for he subordinates certain powers to superior ones, as discussed above.

Clearly, then, while Somānanda would have real misgivings with their philosophical dualism, he understands all the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta that he bothers to mention to be authoritative works against which his own philosophical theology may be measured. Here, then, is one instance where it may be said that Somānanda wished to accommodate his presentation of the Pratyabhijñā to an audience sympathetic to the tantric school most closely aligned with orthodox Brahminism and therefore with mainstream Hindu thought and practice.

13. The Śivadṛṣṭi and the Philosophy of the Grammarians

We now turn to a consideration of Somānanda's extended and vociferous arguments against Bhartṛhari's non-dualism. The arguments put forth in the ŚD focus primarily on the first of three chapters (*kāṇḍas*) of the VP, and the explanations thereof furnished by Utpaladeva in the ŚDVṛ quote extensively from the VPVṛ, which, one must note, is attributed in the Pratyabhijñā literature to Bhartṛhari himself.¹⁶⁹ In particular, Somānanda gives a great deal of attention to VP 1.159, where Bhartṛhari refers to the three levels of speech, *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*, though he also offers detailed criticism of both VP 1.167ab, which describes *paśyanti*,¹⁷⁰ and Bhartṛhari's description of Brahman found in a verse Somānanda identifies as belonging to the *Śabdadhātusamikṣā*

¹⁶⁷ See ŚD 4.4–5.

¹⁶⁸ For more on this doctrine, and Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's detailed exposition thereof, see KT 1.20cd–22ab and Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's *Vṛtti* on the same. Goodall explains the exegetical skill with which Rāmakaṇṭha interprets the present verse, in order to make it accord with Sadyojyotis's account of what precedes a descent of power. See Goodall 1998: 215–216, fn. 171.

¹⁶⁹ Considerable differences of opinion remain over the authorship of the principal commentary on Bhartṛhari's VP, the VPVṛ, though I agree with Iyer, as well as George Cardona (personal communication, 2002), that the commentary is likely to have been Bhartṛhari's and not the work of another author. For a review of the arguments, see Iyer [1969] 1992: 16–36.

¹⁷⁰ See ŚD 2.44cd–51.

(ŚDhāSam), one that happens to be identical to the first stanza of Bhartṛhari's *Nitiśataka* (NŚ).¹⁷¹ Now, because Utpaladeva adopts much of the terminology of the VP and the VPVṛ, as well as many of the associated conceptual formulations regarding the relationship between the creator and the created universe, scholars today have been at a loss to explain why Somānanda's arguments are so categorical and unforgiving of Bhartṛhari's system. For the VP and VPVṛ present a non-dualism that has much in common with the philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā, particularly Utpaladeva's formulation thereof.

Indeed, one may fairly ask why Somānanda would object so unyieldingly to Bhartṛhari's views when he accepts, *mutatis mutandis*, many of the fundamental philosophical premises that, on his own reading, appear in the VP and VPVṛ. These include: the philosophical non-dualism of those works, which maintain that all of existence is nothing but the divine (i.e., Brahman),¹⁷² who, consisting of the power of cognition,¹⁷³ is made up of a consciousness that is all-pervasive, real,¹⁷⁴ and is identified, according to Somānanda, with the very individual who experiences quotidian life in the manifested universe.¹⁷⁵ Somānanda and Utpaladeva further understand Bhartṛhari to envision the creation of the universe as a product of this divine consciousness, a creation that is accomplished through the application of a series of divine powers.¹⁷⁶ The VP even refers to the individual agent as the enjoyer (*bhoktr*) of worldly delights, something Somānanda surely would appreciate.¹⁷⁷ And we have already seen that Utpaladeva adopts Bhartṛhari's notion that consciousness is a self-reflective power that reveals itself and its contents simultaneously, this idea being reflected in the formulation of the famous *prakāśa-vimarsā* pole on which the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, and all subsequent Pratyabhijñā philosophy, for that matter, relies so fundamentally.¹⁷⁸

In what is perhaps the leading theory to date, Torella has suggested (or at least he has implied) that Somānanda's arguments stem from his inadequate familiarity with Bhartṛhari's philosophy. The bases for this hypothesis are two. First, Somānanda is very possibly ignorant of the articulation in the VPVṛ of the existence of a supreme (*parā*) form of *paśyanti*, literally "seeing," the highest level of speech in Bhartṛhari's system, one that is identified with Brahman. Second, Somānanda seems to have misunderstood the ways in which the VP and VPVṛ

¹⁷¹ See ŚD 2.72d–76.

¹⁷² See ŚD 2.2.

¹⁷³ See ŚD 2.1, 2.2cd, and 2.3.

¹⁷⁴ See ŚD 2.3. See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.2 (which paraphrases VP 1.1), where Utpaladeva paraphrases VP 1.132 in suggesting that, according to Bhartṛhari, Brahman exists in the form of consciousness that is supreme speech, called *paśyanti*.

¹⁷⁵ See ŚD 2.3ab.

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., ŚD 2.9. Compare also VP 1.131ab (*vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ*) to ŚD 1.21d: *tataḥ sarvaṃ jagat sthitam*.

¹⁷⁷ See Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 2.3; cf. VP 1.4 and the related passage of the VPVṛ.

¹⁷⁸ Utpaladeva quotes the term *prakāśa* as it is used in the VPVṛ in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.2. See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.8cd–11. Finally, see ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.56, where Utpaladeva may be seen to understand Bhartṛhari's *paśyanti* to have *prakāśa* as its nature.

described both “nescience” (*avidyā*) and the manifestation of the divine in the phenomenal world (*vivarta*). For, Torella suggests, Somānanda was ignorant of the fact that Bhartṛhari conceived of nescience as a power of Brahman and not as an ontologically extraneous entity; and he did not conceive of the manifestation of the divine in the phenomenal world as involving any sort of de-realization of Brahman, but rather understood it to involve the extension of Brahman and none other into the form of the universe itself.¹⁷⁹

It is of course possible that Somānanda was insufficiently versed in Bhartṛhari’s œuvre. Indeed, Somānanda does not show any awareness of the contents of the VP beyond the first *kāṇḍa*, as Torella already noted,¹⁸⁰ just as he was right further to note that VP 3.7.39–41 (from the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*) articulates a view to which Somānanda himself easily could have subscribed—namely, that oneness is not the product of a separation from multiplicity, but rather is the nature of all reality.¹⁸¹ It is further possible, at least, that Somānanda did not know the philosophy of the grammarians as intimately as did Utpaladeva, for not only does Somānanda fail to display any familiarity with the contents of the second and third *kāṇḍas* of the VP, this contra Utpaladeva, who repeatedly invokes the later chapters in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ,¹⁸² but there is also no proof that Somānanda had access to the VPVṛ: Somānanda nowhere quotes or paraphrases the VPVṛ, while Utpaladeva does so extensively, particularly, as already noted, in the ŚDVṛ.

On the other hand, just as real differences exist between the monism of the ŚD and that of the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, so too is it possible that substantive differences exist between the monism of the former and that of Bhartṛhari, as Somānanda clearly believes. Now, it is certain that Somānanda was aware of the very terms and concepts of the VP and VPVṛ that Utpaladeva found so compelling, in particular the dual nature of light, the *prakāśa-vimarśa* pole, which is described in the first chapter of the VP.¹⁸³ It therefore strikes one as likely that Somānanda’s critique of Bhartṛhari stems, in part, at least, from his interpretation of the

¹⁷⁹ See Torella 1994: xxvi, esp. fn. 37.

¹⁸⁰ This is so despite Kaul’s suggestion that Somānanda’s understanding of action depends on Bhartṛhari’s famous definition thereof, which may be found at VP 3.8.4 (see note 164 to the translation of the first chapter of the ŚD, below). As noted, already (see note 60, above), Patañjali’s definition of action sufficiently informs Somānanda’s understanding of the same as to make it unnecessary to assume he knew Bhartṛhari’s definition. Cf. ĪPVṛad ĪPK 1.2.9 and Torella 1994: 94, fn. 17.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. Cf. VP 3.7.39–41: *paramārthe tu naikatvaṃ prthaktvād bhinnalakṣaṇam / prthaktvaikatvarūpeṇa tattvam eva prakāśate. yat prthaktvam asaṃdigdham tad ekatvān na bhidyate / yad ekatvam asaṃdigdham tat prthaktvān na bhidyate. dyauiḥ kṣamā vāyur ādityaḥ sāgarāḥ sarito diśaḥ / antaḥkaraṇatattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthitāḥ.*

¹⁸² On Utpaladeva’s references to the later *kāṇḍas* of the VP, see Torella 1994: 94, fn. 17; 108, fn. 14; 121, fn. 29; 124, fn. 36; 150, fn. 12; 153, fn. 2; 154, fn. 5; and 164, fn. 8.

¹⁸³ See VP 1.132, which is echoed in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.2 and 2.8cd–11. Cf. ŚD 2.14cd–15ab, where Somānanda mentions (in ŚD 2.15a) the power of reflective awareness (*parāmarśa*) for which the VP argues.

merits of and problems with the grammarian's philosophical system, rather than merely from his insufficient understanding of Bhartṛhari's oeuvre.¹⁸⁴

On this alternative hypothesis, Somānanda's various criticisms stem primarily from his desire to defend his particular formulation of the Pratyabhijñā, even if they reflect the sort of interpretation of the VP and VPVṛ favored by later Vedāntins, who were influenced by Śaṅkara's non-dualism, as Torella argues.¹⁸⁵ Indeed, while Somānanda focuses many of his various arguments against Bhartṛhari on the difficulties he perceives the grammarians to have in explaining the relationship between Brahman, conceived of as speech in the form of *paśyanti*, and the created universe—I will not here analyze these arguments in great detail, given that they have already been summarized by both Torella and Gnoli,¹⁸⁶ and, anyway, they appear in full, along with the commentary, in the translation that follows—all of these arguments arise from Somānanda's observation that the grammarians fail to conceive of the power of will in articulating Brahman's creative powers.

SOMĀNANDA'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GRAMMARIANS' PAŚYANTĪ

It may be observed that the opening verse of the second chapter of the ŚD simply and clearly states that the grammarians' *paśyanti* is an insufficiently elevated state to be considered supreme: it is the equivalent of the power of cognition (*jñāna*), which in Somānanda's system is located at the level of the *sadāśivatattva*, the third of thirty-six *tattvas*. On Somānanda's analysis, the problem here involves the incapacity of the grammarians' system to account for the power of will (*icchā*) that the agent who sees the universe must exercise if any cognition is to take place. This he states simply in the closing verses of the second chapter of the ŚD, where he compares *paśyanti*'s act of cognition to the potter's production of a pot: both require the agent in question to exercise his will prior to the action in question. Brahman, in the form of *paśyanti*, must choose to see the manifested universe, just as the potter must choose to make a pot before doing so.¹⁸⁷ As Utpaladeva's commentary makes explicit, this act of volition must accord with the formulation thereof found in the first chapter of the ŚD.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴It must be noted, however, that these are not mutually exclusive explanations for the cause of Somānanda's unyielding critique of Bhartṛhari and "the grammarians," for it is possible that he both disagreed with and simultaneously was insufficiently versed in the philosophy of the VP and VPVṛ.

¹⁸⁵See Torella 1994: xxvi, fn. 37.

¹⁸⁶See Torella 1994: xix–xx; Gnoli 1959: 55–63.

¹⁸⁷See ŚD 2.84–88.

¹⁸⁸See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.84–88: *evaṃ cecchā darsanakriyāyāḥ pūrvā sthitā, tasyās cecchāyā api cittatvasambandhisūkṣmatarollāsam iṣṭajñeyakāryaunmukhyalakṣaṇam vinā prāguktanyāyāt katham prasaraḥ, tasyā api cito nirvṛtyaunmukhyecchājñānakriyākramavyavasthāyā yat sāmasyam ekibhāvāḥ samāveśaviśayas tatra vyavasthāvān vyavasthāśrayo 'kramah śivabhāṭṭarakah sthita iti.* "In this way, moreover, the desire is the first condition of the act of seeing, and how could that desire, for its part, come

This is not possible, however, because the grammarians conceive of Brahman as *paśyanti*; and by putting *paśyanti* at the top of the cosmic hierarchy they leave insufficient room above her, as it were, for the stages of will that must occur prior to cognition.

As per Somānanda's system of overlapping pairs of powers, the manifestation of the power of cognition (*jñāna*) coincides not only with the premanifested form of the power of action (*kriyā*), the form of action *in posse*, as Utpaladeva has indicated,¹⁸⁹ but it also must be preceded by the act of will, which on Somānanda's view, necessarily must consist of two stages, that of will being fully manifested as *icchā* (at which point the power of cognition exists in its potential form) and, prior to this, a first movement of will, *aunmukhya*, which, in turn, is the manifested form of the power of delight (*nirvṛti*) that exists in its potential form within Śiva himself.

Left out of the grammarians' system, then, is the possibility of locating either this first movement of will or the agent who exercises it. This is so, Utpaladeva explains, because even if a supreme, premanifested form of cognition, the form of cognition *in posse*, were imagined to exist in Bhartṛhari's system, this at the level of the *parā* form of *paśyanti* identifiable in Somānanda's system with the power of will fully manifested, there is no space, so to speak, for either the first movement of will (*aunmukhya*) or the agent who exercises this volition prior to this pre-manifested phase of cognition. In the nomenclature of the *tattvas*, the grammarians may account for a moment prior to cognition, which is found at the level of the second *tattva*, the *śaktitattva*, this being equivalent to the grammarians' *parā* form of *paśyanti*, but they cannot account for the initial moment of divine will that initiates the very act of cognition, this occurring, Utpaladeva suggests, at an interstitial level that is associated with *nirvṛti* and *aunmukhya*, one that is found between the level of the *śivatattva* and that of the *śaktitattva*.¹⁹⁰

Thus, in identifying *paśyanti* with Brahman, Somānanda suggests, the grammarians incorporate a subject-object dichotomy between the seer and the object seen in the very nature of Brahman-as-speech, for such a dichotomy is inherent in the nature of *paśyanti*, the nature of "seeing," this being the literal meaning of the term. Because the existence of such a dichotomy at the level of

forth, in the manner previously explained, in the absence of the extremely subtle joy, characterized by an eagerness for desired objects of cognition and action, that is connected to the nature of consciousness? As for that [consciousness], as you know, Śiva Bhaṭṭāraka, being without sequence, is established as the one possessed of, i.e., as the locus of, the equilibrium—the unity of penetration—of consciousness, abiding in the sequence or the absence thereof of delight, eagerness, will, cognition, and action."

¹⁸⁹See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, where Utpaladeva quotes the following, heretofore untraced, maxim to suggest that the power of action (*kriyā*) exists (in potential form) at the level of the *sadāśivatattva*: *jñānakriye sādākhyam*. "Cognition and action exist at what is called the Sāda(-level)."

¹⁹⁰See the chart provided in my notes to ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, note 10 in the translation of the second chapter of the ŚD.

Brahman itself signals a philosophical dualism that Bhartṛhari, of course, would not accept, Somānanda figures that the universe must either be explained away, somehow, in order to preserve its unity, or Brahman's relationship to the universe must be finessed in some manner or another. This is so because any contact with the universe of diverse entities would threaten Brahman's unity, as it would have to register such diversity in its very being, dividing itself in doing so. In short, Somānanda analyzes Bhartṛhari's system in terms of the fundamental tenet of his own system, and in finding the VP unable to account for the supremacy of the divine agent, in the form of a willful consciousness, he develops the many arguments related to the Bhartṛhari's understanding of *avidyā* and *vivarta*. Indeed, the very prospect of Brahman existing in the form of speech is off-putting to Somānanda, as speech itself involves the very sort of subject-object dichotomy that he finds impossible to locate in Brahman itself.¹⁹¹

BHARTṚHARI'S AVIDYĀ AND UTPALADEVA'S
ABHEDĀKHYĀTI

Turning now to a particular contribution of the ŚDVṛ, one not found in the ŚD itself, it may be noted that Utpaladeva puts forward a unique argument to explain how one could be ignorant of one's own identity as Śiva. And one must further note that the formulation of this argument stands in direct contrast to the one Somānanda anticipates Bhartṛhari making for nescience (*avidyā*). In ŚD 2.34–35, Somānanda considers the possible nature of nescience by analyzing the term by which it is named. Insofar as nescience impedes one's awareness of Brahman's non-dual nature, he suggests, it must somehow negate, block, or alter the appearance of Brahman's true nature (see ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.21cd–22ab; cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.8cd–11). Nescience involves either the cognition of that which is not real or the cognition of some entity as something other than it truly is. In order to perform its function, nescience therefore must somehow exist as something other than Brahman. A problem arises, however, with the very fact that nescience is thereby conceived of as other than Brahman, thus producing a dualism of Brahman, on the one hand, and nescience, on the other.

Somānanda anticipates that the grammarians will have considered this problem, and ponders the possibility that they understand nescience in a different

¹⁹¹This is to say that I disagree with Torella's suggestion (1994: xxvi, fn. 38) that Somānanda "essentially pass[es] over" the notion that speech is inherent in all entities, having considered this fact in ŚD 2.19–20. I rather understand Somānanda simply to disagree with Bhartṛhari's conception of the hierarchy of speech, regardless of the levels of subtlety applied to it, as it necessarily involves a level of duality that is best located at the *parāparā* level and best associated with Sadāśiva, not Śiva himself. Much of the balance of the chapter, then, is dedicated to a critique of Bhartṛhari's very conception of a self-reflexive speech as supreme, as its very self-reflexivity involves an inherent dualism, however subtle, that can only be transcended at the level prior to the intention of the agent who speaks.

manner, as simply the absence of knowledge, as “non-knowledge” (*a-vidyā*).¹⁹² However, this also fails, both Somānanda and Utpaladeva argue, because such a view of nescience would require something that does not exist, “non-knowledge” (*a-vidyā*), to impede something that does exist, Brahman. This is impossible, because logically speaking something that does not exist, something that has no form (*akiñcidrūpa*), cannot do anything at all:¹⁹³ it would be astonishing if something that has no real form were able to block something that does.¹⁹⁴

How, then, is it possible for one not to know one’s own identity as Śiva, according to the Pratyabhijñā, and how can one subsequently “recognize” it? Utpaladeva’s explanation in the ŚDVṛ, which does not appear, incidentally, anywhere in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, is as follows. That which keeps one from seeing the multiple universe as what it really is is simply the noncognition (*a-khyāti*) of Śiva’s non-duality (*a-bheda*).¹⁹⁵ It is the nonrecognition of the non-duality that one inevitably sees. Now, while the nomenclature here used echoes that of the Mīmāṃsaka Prabhākara, who spoke of the nonappearance of difference (*bhedākhyāti*), Utpaladeva does not seem to wish to respond to that position, as I have suggested elsewhere, but rather focuses on developing a theory of error that is peculiar to the Pratyabhijñā.¹⁹⁶ He suggests that the type of error in question is similar to that of a man who, standing before the woman who loves him after an absence of many years, gives her no pleasure until the moment she recognizes the man in front of her as her very own: her cognition of him is the same both prior to and after recognizing him, but the recognition makes all the difference.¹⁹⁷ In the same way, one always and only sees Śiva performing the activity

¹⁹²That is, Somānanda (ŚD 2.34–35) analyzes the term *avidyā* etymologically, it being a compound of two terms, *vidyā*, roughly meaning “knowledge,” prefixed by a negative particle, the so-called “alpha-privative” (*a-*). Here, he suggests that the term should be understood as a pure negation (*prasajyapratishedha*), referring to the absence of knowledge. As outlined, above, he also considers the possibility that the term is a negative compound that merely indicates what something is not (*pariyudās-apratishedha*), one in other words that suggests that *avidyā* is something, but what it is is “not-knowledge.” This he rejects, as already noted, on the grounds that it would require two entities to exist: a knowledge associated with Brahman-as-*paśyanti* and something other than this, namely *avidyā*. See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.22cd–23.

¹⁹³See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.43–44ab. Though this argument is put forth in the context of refuting the possibility that individual human bodies divide *paśyanti*, this because they are unreal, the general principle articulated there applies in this instance as well. See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.30cd–31, where Utpaladeva suggests that the grammarians argue that nescience is not a thing and, as such, has no nature of its own: *avastu punar avidyā niḥsvabhāvā*.

¹⁹⁴As Utpaladeva put it, “something that has no form [*akiñcidrūpa*] does not have the power, which means that it is not possible (for it), to block (anything).” See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.34–35.

¹⁹⁵See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.1, 1.7cd–8, and 1.11cd–13ab.

¹⁹⁶See my forthcoming “Two Pratyabhijñā Theories of Error.” I also examine the development of this theory in the writings of Abhinavagupta in the same article. See also Rastogi 1986, esp. p. 4, where he notes that Abhinavagupta is uninterested in Prabhākara’s theory of error, despite the existence of any terminological affinities.

¹⁹⁷This is the example given on ĪPK 4.17.

that is inherent to his nature as consciousness, and yet one does not always recognize what one sees.

More important, the noncognition of Śiva's non-duality has no form (it is *akiñcidrūpa*), because it is in reality nothing at all: it is merely the absence of a cognition.¹⁹⁸ There is in reality nothing there, as it were, to negate, block, or alter one's awareness of Śiva. Thus, while (according to Somānanda) the grammarians understand some entity other than Brahman to be a negative entity, be it a negation or an absence of the real Brahman, Utpaladeva understands the very *cognition* of duality to itself be nothing but an absence of the cognition of non-duality, or in other words to itself be a nonentity.¹⁹⁹ In fact, Utpaladeva even suggests that the noncognition of Śiva's non-duality is the very power of *māyā*, itself.²⁰⁰ As a consequence, Utpaladeva suggests, the Pratyabhijñā does not have to explain the ontological status of that which impedes one's awareness of non-duality. It is simply the absence of the awareness of unity. In either cognition, of unity or of multiplicity, the object of contemplation is the same, and nothing changes in the moments prior to and following the recognition of non-duality. Moreover, the very fact of the noncognition of non-duality is a function of the very nature of consciousness, which by nature sees diverse forms in itself. Thus, it is only the one unchanging but dynamic nature of Śiva's consciousness that one sees. In this way, Utpaladeva offers a detailed and in many ways compelling explanation for the sort of cognitive error that causes one to perceive a multiplicity of entities in the universe, where only one entity exists.

ON WHAT DIFFERENTIATES THE TWO SCHOOLS

Somānanda suggests that the grammarians could have avoided the various problems of dualism arising from their problematic formulation of the relationship between Brahman and the universe it creates, if they only had chosen to describe *paśyanti* as that which sees a subtle entity that is not autonomous from her own self (ŚD 2.57). But the language of the grammarians points toward a rather different conception of Brahman-as-speech: not only does the idea of "seeing" (*paśyanti*) literally refer to an entity that is fully distinguishable from the object of sight (something Somānanda takes very seriously);²⁰¹ but the grammarians also understand *paśyanti* as the one in whom or by whom sequence is concluded.

¹⁹⁸ See, e.g., ŚDVī ad ŚD 1.11cd-13.

¹⁹⁹ Insofar as it is an error, it is impure, but it is nothing at all because it is merely an absence. See ŚDVī ad 1.11cd-13ab: *abhedāparāmarśanam eva bhrāntirūpaṃ kuisitam, tac ca na kiñcid akhyātirūpamā-tratvāt*.

²⁰⁰ See ŚDVī ad ŚD 2.89-91: *māyāsaktyā śivābhedākhyātyā*.

²⁰¹ See ŚD 2.81 (also discussed below), where Somānanda suggests that to abandon the meaning of the term *paśyanti* is to abandon the notion that she embodies the power of cognition. See also ŚD 2.45cd, where Somānanda suggests that *paśyanti* cannot be described as "nondistinct" if she truly is one who "sees:" to see requires that the agent who sees registers the differences apparent in the diversity of the object(s) of sight.

And this, argues Somānanda, implies the existence of dualism: either there are two moments within her, one with sequence, one without; or there is sequence in some entity outside of her, which also leads to dualism; or else she has a sequential nature in one moment and a nonsequential one in a subsequent one, leading to her having two distinct forms (ŚD 2.50–51). Furthermore, Bhartṛhari also describes Brahman, in the ŚDhāSam (see ŚD 2.73cd–74ab), as the polar opposite of the diverse and dualistic universe. For Brahman is there described as one who is undivided by space, time, and so forth, but one who is known by one’s own experience, which necessarily must occur in a distinct moment of time (ŚD 2.74cd–76).

These difficulties, however, do not apply to the Pratyabhijñā’s conception of the nature of Śiva, we are told, because Somānanda rather understands the entire world to come forth from Śiva and both in full conformity with his very form and fully connected to his powers, which operate precisely in the same manner when appearing in the form of any and every entity in the universe as they do when appearing in the apparently quiescent form of Śiva himself (ŚD 2.79cd–80). In a word, Somānanda’s strict pantheism, we are told, precludes the very sort of problems he identifies in Bhartṛhari’s system, but it presupposes the acceptance of a single agent and his all-important power of will, something the philosophy of the VP simply cannot accommodate.

14. Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna and His *Tattvagarbhasotra*

Although Somānanda’s arguments against the grammarians regularly conform to the conventions of a philosophical register, much more strictly, it may be said, than the first, third, and seventh chapters do, one cannot help but feel that this philosophical tone, and the spectrum of logical problems Somānanda finds in the philosophy of the VP, cannot conceal the author’s palpable and emotional voice in the chapter, one that suggests he had something of a personal stake in his criticism of Bhartṛhari.²⁰² For even if the grammarian’s philosophy differs in fundamental ways from that of the ŚD, it seems at least possible that Somānanda could have seen *paśyantī* in a more constructive light than he did (and as Utpaladeva has for Bhartṛhari’s entire philosophical system). Surely, the idea of “seeing” could accommodate the notion of a subtle consciousness that knows a subtle entity that is not different from itself, as Somānanda’s Śiva-as-consciousness is said to do. More important, Somānanda occasionally transgresses the limits of logic and allows his critique to descend to the level of invective rhetoric. For example, he suggests that the grammarians must abandon the idea that *paśyantī* embodies any power of cognition if they choose not to understand the term literally (ŚD 2.81). He even goes so far as to mock

²⁰²Torella 1994: xix–xx reads the second chapter similarly.

the grammarians for venturing outside their field of knowledge—grammar—in their attempt to tackle philosophical questions associated with the process of cognition, something that he suggests they have no business addressing (ŚD 2.72–73ab).²⁰³

If the dispute is personal, this is very likely the result of the fact that a tantric philosophical school close to Somānanda’s Prtayabhijñā employed the philosophy of the grammarians, or something close to it, to justify its system. The school in question is none other than that of the worshipers of the goddess, the Śāktas, whom Somānanda criticizes in the third chapter of the ŚD. Indeed, both the ŚD and the ŚDVṛ make clear that this school understands the goddess in the form of *paśyanti*, “seeing,” to be supreme, this over and against the willful form of Śiva whom Somānanda champions as the highest principle:²⁰⁴ “The good Śaivas who imagine that speech itself abides in the sequence beginning with *paśyanti* prove themselves not to be Śaivas at all.”

That the supremacy of *paśyanti* is in question is reiterated in a number of places in the third chapter. Not only does Somānanda mockingly refer to his opponents there with the term “good” (*sat*), this in a manner that echoes his sarcastic references to the grammarians,²⁰⁵ but Utpaladeva also states explicitly that the “good Śaivas” in question conceive of the universe as appearing in the form of *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*, the very triadic structure of speech found in the VP.²⁰⁶ Later in the third chapter, Somānanda himself considers the possibility that his opponents understand *paśyanti* to be supreme by virtue of the fact that she is the means to enlightenment (ŚD 3.15cd–16ab).²⁰⁷ Somānanda also considers an objection from his Śākta opponents that suggests that Śiva must be identical with *paśyanti* insofar as he is experienced in/as the everyday universe (ŚD 3.30cd), an objection he subsequently and explicitly answers (ŚD 3.85cd–86ab and 3.86cd–88ab). Somānanda even reiterates in the third chapter that speech (*vāc*) can be nothing more than an organ of action (*karmendriya*), a point he made already in his treatment of the VP in the second chapter.²⁰⁸ There can be little doubt, then, that Somānanda’s Śākta opponent conceived of the goddess in terms rather similar to Bhartṛhari’s *paśyanti*. Somānanda, in turn, clearly had this fact in mind when he criticized the philosophy of the grammarians.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ See ŚD 3.9: *śaivaiḥ sadbhir vāca eva paśyantyādikrame sthitāḥ / kalpitās tair aśaivatvam ātmanah pratipādītam*.

²⁰⁵ See ŚD 2.8c. This, in turn, echoes Somānanda’s reference to the “honorable grammarians” (*vaiyākaraṇasādhu*) in ŚD 2.1c. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.8cd–11; cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, where Utpaladeva tells us that Somānanda’s reference to the grammarians as “honorable” (*sādhu*) is meant to be sarcastic.

²⁰⁶ See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 3.9.

²⁰⁷ Note that, although the ŚD makes this reference with a pronoun that, being in compound form, does not show its gender, Utpaladeva clearly states in his commentary that the entity in question is *paśyanti*.

²⁰⁸ Compare ŚD 3.10a with ŚD 2.12cd–13ab and ŚD 2.89–91.

KNOWN AND HERETOFORE UNIDENTIFIED PASSAGES
OF THE *TATTVAGARBHASTOTRA*

The identity of Somānanda's Śākta opponent may be stated clearly, even if his identity must be established by inference. He can be none other than one Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna.²⁰⁹ This is known because Utpaladeva quotes a verse from a lost work that may nevertheless be identified as an excerpt of the *Tattvagarbhastora* (TGSt) of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 3.1), because Rājānaka Rāma cites the same passage in his commentary on the SpKā, the *Spandavivṛti* (SpVi). In doing so, he refers to the name of the work in question, but without naming the author. Elsewhere, however, Utpaladeva tells us (in his commentary on ŚD 1.13cd–17) that a *Tattvagarbhastotra* was authored by Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna.²¹⁰

The verse in question (here labeled TGSt passage #1) is the following:²¹¹ “We worship you constantly, Ambā, you who are the supreme mother, the form of limitless light, the one whom people call ‘Śiva.’” Notably, the verse suggests that “Śiva” is a name for the goddess, a statement Somānanda will counter (in ŚD 3.4–5ab) by suggesting that her's must be an alternative name for Śiva if the Śāktas are to avoid the philosophical problem of an infinite regress. Apart from this, namely, that Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna understands the goddess to be supreme, however, the passage reveals little of the author's philosophical or theological disposition.

Two additional passages of the TGSt have been identified to date, both of which are quoted in the SpVi. The first (TGSt passage #2) is the following:²¹² “O Śivā, (You are variously called) consciousness expansion and the like when, Mother, the empowered state which is the ‘subtle swelling’ (of consciousness)

²⁰⁹It is of real interest, then, that Somānanda identifies the same Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna as a “great man” who refers in his own writings to something akin to *aunmukhya* as a “minimal swelling” (*kiñciducchūnatā*). How could Somānanda refer to the one who is the object of his scorn in the third chapter of the ŚD in such a laudatory manner in the first? The simplest answer to this question is to understand Somānanda to be sarcastic in the first chapter. We know that he mocks the grammarians and his Śākta opponents by hurling compliments at them, as he refers to them as “honorable” (*sādhu*) ones (ŚD 2.1) and as “good” (*sat*) people (ŚD 2.8cd, ŚD 3.9) in the second and third chapters. I propose that the present reference should be understood in the same spirit: Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna is “great” (*mahat*) insofar as he fails properly to account for the power of will, as he, like the grammarians, fails to understand the nature of Śiva's fundamental power; at the same time, the existence of the first movement of Śiva's very will, *aunmukhya*, is signaled by Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna himself in what we label passage #1 of his *Tattvagarbhastora* (TGSt), about which see below. Also, as Utpaladeva makes clear, Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna understands this “minimal swelling” to be associated with *śakti*, the goddess as power, meaning that it must arise from Śiva. See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 3.1.

²¹⁰Dyczkowski 1992: 53 was the first to associate the third chapter of the ŚD with the writings of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, followed by Torella 1994: xiv, and, most recently, Sanderson 2007: 418, n. 629.

²¹¹The Sanskrit reads: *yaśyā nirupadhijyotīrūpāyāḥ śivasamjñayā / vyapadeśaḥ parāṃ tām tvām ambāṃ nityam upāsmāhe*. The translation is based on Dyczkowski's, for which see Dyczkowski 1992: 123.

²¹²The Sanskrit reads: *kiñciducchūnatāpatter unmeśādīpadābhīdhāḥ / pravartante tvayi śive śaktitā te yadāmbike*. The translation is Dyczkowski's (1992: 123). It appears that *kiñciducchūnatāpatti* is a *bahuvrihi* compound referring to the goddess as “one possessed of the arising of a subtle swelling, etc.”

prevails within You (and, like a seed, You are about to issue forth as the sprout of creation).” The second (TGSt passage #3) reads as follows:²¹³ “O Śivā, those who know (the one) reality have said that Sadāśiva is Your state and experience when You unfold in the form of knowledge and action. The category Īśvara, full of activity, manifests when You, as the power of knowledge, recede to abeyance and are manifest as action. O Supreme One, when You are propense (to giving rise to) phenomenal existence and the power of knowledge is exalted, You are said to be Vidyā.”

In the effort to adduce what one may of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna’s philosophical vision from this pair of excerpts, let us examine the second passage (TGSt passage #3), first. This passage of the TGSt clearly invokes the model of the *tattvas* of the “pure road” (the *śuddhādhvan*), these being the *sadāśiva*-, the *īśvara*-, and the *śuddhavidyā-tattvas*, which reflects the standard formulation of the thirty-six *tattva* model. More important, the passage in question conforms with Utpaladeva’s understanding (found both in his commentary on ŚD 2.1 and, as Rājānaka Rāma noted in his SpVi, on ĪPK 3.1.1–4) of the manner in which the powers correlate to the *tattvas*: the powers of cognition and action (the latter presumably in a seminal form) are found at the level of Sadāśiva, while the power of cognition recedes and the power of action becomes predominant at the level of Īśvara. Finally, at the level of (Śuddha-)Vidyā the power of cognition is again raised to a primary level, this because the level in question is the one at which the universe begins to be manifested and therefore emerges as the object of cognition. This tells us little more than that Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna subscribed to a vision of the *tattvas* that accords with the conventional formulation thereof.

The first of the two passages (TGSt passage #2), in turn, is the one to which Utpaladeva refers in his commentary on ŚD 1.13cd–17. And it adds little to our understanding of the author’s philosophical vision. The only item of real note in the text is the author’s use of the term *unmeṣa*, which is common in the Spanda literature but absent in the ŚD and refers to the opening of the eyes and the concomitant expansion of consciousness in the form of the created universe.

In addition to these three passages, a close reading of the ŚDVṛ suggests the presence of other, heretofore unidentified, passages of the TGSt, or some work closely related to it. This is found in Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 3.9, a verse, as noted above, in which we are told of a group of “good” Śaivas who think of speech as existing in a sequence beginning with *paśyanti*. Utpaladeva explains that the Śāktas in question conceive of speech as a sequence of stages called *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*, and they consider it to be the universe itself

²¹³The Sanskrit reads: *jñānakriyāsvarūpeṇa pravṛttāyās tu te śive / sadāśivatvaṃ jagadur bhogāhvam tattvavedināḥ. guṇibhūtajñāśaktis tvaṃ vyaktibhūtakriyātmikā / yadā tadaiśvaram tattvaṃ vyaktatām eti vṛttimat. pravṛttāv unmukhibhūtā bhaves tvaṃ parame yadā / jñānaśaktis tadodārā vidyā tvaṃ parigīyase.* Again, the translation is Dyczkowski’s, for which see Dyczkowski 1992¹: 123.

(*viśvātmata*). Identifying these “good” Śaivas with the author of the verse we have labeled TGSt passage #1, Utpaladeva goes on to suggest that these same ones who “espouse the doctrine of (the supremacy of) *śakti*” (*śaktivādins*), say something else as well, namely, what is contained in two passages said to stand at the beginning and the end of a longer excerpt from a work that was uttered by the same *śaktivādin*(s) as the one(s) who subscribe(s) to the views expressed in TGSt passage #1. It seems highly likely, then, that the two passages were selected from the same TGSt of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, or perhaps from another of that author’s works, and certainly from a closely related work of the same Śākta school. I propose, then, tentatively to label them TGSt passages #4a* and #4b*, respectively.²¹⁴ They may be translated as follows:

TGSt passage #4a*: “As long as the individual does not partake in the expansion of consciousness [*unmeṣa*], he does not relate to the object; and we maintain that the expansion of consciousness [*unmeṣa*] is an action, and an action must have a variegated form.”²¹⁵

TGSt passage #4b*: “Having abandoned the fixed condition of its own true nature, the level (in question) is (nevertheless) not different from that [nature], O Śivā, in which exists the subtle form of speech the visibility of which is not yet full-grown.”²¹⁶

Difficult as they are to interpret without any context, these passages offer slight additional information on Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna’s philosophy. What we have labeled TGSt passage #4a* signals both the presence of the notion of the expansion of consciousness associated with the act of opening one’s eyes (*unmeṣa*) and the notion that action is of a “variegated form” (*nānārūpā*), this likely being a reference to the grammarians’ famous definition of action, mentioned above. What we have labeled TGSt passage #4b*, in turn, refers to a subtle form of manifested speech that is apparently difficult to recognize. The passage also seems to indicate that a certain continuity exists in the nature of existence, from the “fixed condition” of some apparently transcendental state to the condition of the manifested one. It is not entirely clear what precisely Utpaladeva finds in the present passage that contradicts the position of the Pratyabhijñā, though he might have found unacceptable this suggestion, namely, that any abandonment of “the fixed condition of its nature” is possible. It is also possible, and perhaps rather more likely, that Utpaladeva wished to indicate that Somānanda objected to the notion that the universe is manifested in the form of speech, which is

²¹⁴An anonymous reviewer of the present manuscript suggested that the present passages could be quotations of a tantric scriptural source, something that is of course possible. The passages are offered without attribution, but only with the indication that their contents are consonant with the writings of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna. It therefore bears reiterating that my attribution of these passages to the lost TGSt is provisional, as I have indicated above.

²¹⁵The Sanskrit reads as follows: ...*yāvan nonmeṣabhāg aṅuḥ / na tāvad arthe varteta sa conmeṣaḥ kriyā matā. kriyā ca nānārūpaiva...*

²¹⁶The Sanskrit reads as follows: *svasvabhāvavasthitim muktva tasmān nānyāsti sā daśā / śive yasyā na vāgrūpaṃ sūkṣmam aprāptasamnidhi.*

the core message conveyed by what we have labeled TGSt passage #4b*. After all, the balance of the third chapter of the ŚD, along with the commentary, is devoted to the repudiation of precisely this point of view: that the universe is a manifestation of the goddess, of *śakti*, in the form of speech.

In sum, the extant passages of the TGSt suggest that their author, Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, was a worshiper of the goddess who was familiar with the Spanda school, was familiar with the philosophy of the grammarians, and accepted the Trika-based theory of thirty-six *tattvas* so common in the philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā. Apart from these details, little more can be ascertained from the extant fragments of the TGSt quoted in the ŚDVṛ and Rājānaka Rāma's SpVi, however. And what is extant of the TGSt suggests that the most substantive difference between this work and those of the Pratyabhijñā involves precisely the concern addressed in the third chapter of the ŚD, namely, the purported supremacy of the goddess, in the form of speech, over and above Śiva.

BHAṬṬA PRADYUMNA AS PŪRVAPAKṢIN, AND SOMĀNANDA'S
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ŚĀKTAS

The crux of Somānanda's disaffection with the philosophy of the Śāktas is straightforward: power and the possessor of power are inextricably linked (ŚD 3.2cd–3, 3.6cd, 3.7ab, 3.7cd–8), and there must be an agent who wields the power or powers in question. If the Śāktas refer to the one who wields this power as a feminine entity called “power” (*śakti*), they must understand her to be the possessor of the power she wields, and as such she is conceptually identical with Somānanda's understanding of Śiva (ŚD 3.1, 3.2ab). Otherwise, there would be an infinite regress of *śaktis*, empowered ones, who must wield a power to accomplish their desired ends (ŚD 3.4–5ab). In a word, if she is supreme, then she, like Śiva, is the possessor of power (*śaktimat*) (ŚD 3.5cd–6ab). Indeed, the very nature of Śiva (*śivarūpatva*) consists of being thoroughly imbued with one's own powers (*svaśaktyāveśanātmaka*), and this condition, moreover, exists equally in Śiva as it does in any manifested entity (ŚD 3.17, 3.18ab, 3.18cd–20), something that simply cannot be said for speech, as can be proven by a careful examination of what is said in scripture (ŚD 3.10–15ab). This is so, moreover, even if speech is considered the means to enlightenment (ŚD 3.15cd–3.16). The Śāktas therefore show themselves not to be good Śaivas when they conceive of the universe as being comprised of speech, which is merely an organ of action in Śaivism.

Put differently, Somānanda brooks no argument with those who worship the goddess as supreme, so long as they understand the goddess to be identical with Śiva himself, the two, Śiva and his powers, being utterly indistinguishable per Somānanda's thoroughly explained pantheism. Because the very powers that create the universe are in no way different from Śiva, then, to worship power (*śakti*), the goddess, as supreme, is a perfectly legitimate form of devotion, according to Somānanda. Those, by contrast, who believe the goddess to be

absolutely supreme, this to the exclusion of the supremacy of Śiva, must answer to Somānanda's searing critique.

The various counterarguments presented by Somānanda's opponent (the *pūrvapakṣin*), which are proposed at some length (see ŚD 3.21–32), are subsequently considered in the balance of the third chapter, beginning on ŚD 3.33ab. While there is no need here to examine all of these various objections, since they appear in the translation that follows, a number of them both parallel and clarify the nature of various concerns Somānanda expressed in opposing the philosophy of the grammarians, and they are therefore worthy of further consideration here.

First, ŚD 3.21cd–22ab presents a counterargument that suggests that Śiva-nature changes and registers diversity within itself, much as Somānanda suggested of the grammarians' *paśyanti* in various places.²¹⁷ This, in turn, necessitates the existence of a real transformation in Śiva, just as milk transforms into curds, meaning that purity, impurity, and so forth, necessarily must exist there. Second, ŚD 3.25cd calls into question the reason Śiva manifests himself as the universe, because in doing so he creates a world in which the individual cannot help but commit impure acts, this by walking on Śiva, and so forth. Somānanda of course directed the same line of questioning toward the grammarians, arguing in ŚD 2.25cd–26ab and 2.26cd–28ab that they could not explain why Brahman creates the universe. Third, ŚD 3.26ab suggests that Somānanda's position contradicts the settled opinions of other philosophical schools, as well as of Somānanda's own system, an accusation Somānanda levels against the grammarians (concerning their contravention of the philosophy of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools) in ŚD 2.15cd–16ab, 2.16cd–17, 2.18–20ab, and concerning all philosophical schools in ŚD 2.82–83.

Fourth, ŚD 3.26cd questions the nature of bondage and liberation, just as ŚD 2.69cd–71 questioned whom the uttering of correct speech would lead to heaven and liberation. Fifth, ŚD 3.27–28ab suggests that there is no reason for teachings, a guru, and so forth, if everyone is inherently free, as Somānanda's strict pantheism would require, just as ŚD 2.65cd–67ab and 2.67cd–68ab called into question the value of pedagogy, given the grammarians' conception of *paśyanti* as omnipotent and omnipresent. Finally, Somānanda's Śākta opponent explicitly equates Śiva-nature with *paśyanti* in ŚD 3.30cd, this on the basis of the fact that it is experienced, an argument that Somānanda crafted in identical terms to oppose the grammarians' *paśyanti* in ŚD 2.55 and 2.56.

The responses to these objections, then, serve further to distinguish Somānanda's "settled opinion" (*siddhānta*) from that of the grammarians. Replying to the first objection (ŚD 3.21cd–23c)—that real change occurs in Śiva, requiring him to have a multiple nature—Somānanda argues, as we have already

²¹⁷ See esp. ŚD 2.45cd. Cf. ŚD 2.38, 2.40–41ab, 2.46–47ab, 2.47cd–48ab, and 2.48cd–49.

seen,²¹⁸ that a real change in Śiva would be necessitated by his being either a coarse (*sthūla*) or even a subtle (*sūkṣma*) entity, but so much is not required when he is akin to the yogin who creates phenomena in his consciousness at will (ŚD 3.33cd–34). The present argument thus adds some nuance to the idea already expressed in ŚD 1.18, namely, that Śiva creates real entities that are inherent in him (Somānanda being, in other words, an adherent of the *satkāryavāda*, the doctrine that the effect of action is inherent in its cause), but it is not possible to differentiate the nature of the effect from that of the cause immediately upon the creation of the former, just as milk is appropriately called “milk” immediately after it falls from the cow’s udder.

Creation, in other words, is not material, but is made of consciousness, one that immediately creates its effects of itself and within itself, at the very will of Śiva the yogin. Śiva’s nature is not changed in creation, then, but through his will he simply manifests the reality of which he conceives, immediately upon conceiving of it (ŚD 3.35–36ab); and this exercise of will does not divide Śiva’s nature in any way, just as the yogin who imagines a fourfold army is not himself divided by doing so (ŚD 3.36cd–39). Nothing that is created, moreover, is inert (*jada*), absent the power of consciousness described as Śiva himself (ŚD 3.40–42ab). His nature exists in the apparently diverse entities as much as gold appears equally in a tiara or a golden spittoon: gold is gold, whether it exists in an impure form or a pure one, just as fire is fire, even if it appears in the house of an outcaste person (ŚD 3.42cd–47), as discussed above. The world, then, is in no way the appearance of nescience (*avidyā*), because Śiva himself exists in the form of the universe (ŚD 3.48–49ab). Thus, Somānanda concludes, responding to the accusation that Śiva creates a world of impurity for no apparent reason (ŚD 3.25cd), the universe is not impure at all, because the effect is inherent in the cause according to the *satkāryavāda*, and Śiva is himself pure (ŚD 3.49cd–51ab). The world simply does not arise from a material cause, and so there is no need to explain the nature and quality of any material product that might be said to make up the universe, for it is only Śiva’s consciousness itself (ŚD 3.51cd–53ab), and nothing new is created in the universe that does not exist in Śiva’s so-called quiescent state, which is, as we have seen, a state of activity as much as is any action of cognition (ŚD 3.57–59).

Bondage and liberation, then, are not distinguished, because Śiva-nature exists equally in both (ŚD 3.68cd–69; 3.72). They exist only insofar as one sees, or fails to see, one’s true nature (ŚD 3.70), for there is no occasion when a real, liberating perception interrupts an unreal, binding one (ŚD 3.71). The teacher, the teaching, and the learned works written by Somānanda and others, then, however much one might wish to question their use in a world in which everything is Śiva (Somānanda imagines that the opponent reiterates the objection of ŚD 3.27–28ab on ŚD 3.73–74ab), exist merely by Śiva’s will

²¹⁸See supra, section 5.

(ŚD 3.74cd–76ab), for the distinction of erroneousness from truthfulness is conventional, while Śiva’s nature encompasses both (ŚD 3.76cd–78ab).

This view, moreover, cannot be said to contradict the settled opinions of other, authoritative schools of thought, as the gamut of scriptures describe the divine as both empowered and active (ŚD 3.63–68ab). In short, Somānanda argues that Śiva-nature cannot be equated with the nature of the *paśyanti* of the grammarians, as is suggested in ŚD 3.30cd, because Śiva, unlike *paśyanti*, sees all the entities in a single mass, devoid of distinctions of time, space, class of entity, and so forth, this in the manner of a perfume vendor, who smells all the various perfumes at once, delighting in them all simultaneously (ŚD 3.85cd–86ab). There is therefore no separation of the agent from the object in the act of cognition, as there necessarily is in any cognition conceived of in terms of a “seeing” one (*paśyanti*), for all of the various entities one experiences are primarily and always a part of Śiva himself. Even the moment of “rest” following any cognition is imbued with Śiva’s various powers, for there is no separation anywhere of Śiva-nature from the objects of cognition (ŚD 3.86cd–88ab). There simply can be no moment when the will is inactive, because there must always be a desire to experience, even if no external entity, but only one’s sense of self, is experienced (ŚD 3.90cd–91ab).

In a particularly important counterargument, the Śākta opponent asks Somānanda how Śiva can produce an effect that in turn is possessed of the very same power of will as was Śiva: should not this power of will have been “left behind,” as it were, at the level of the cause, rather than being reconstituted in the effect of action, one that is the very object of cognition toward which Śiva directed his will (ŚD 3.31)? Will simply arises, Somānanda replies, as Śiva wishes it to do. The cycle is endless. The powers are eternally existent and function simply as Śiva wishes, because Śiva’s willful consciousness regularly manifests itself in a form that is identical with Śiva’s form. This is to say that the fact that the powers are eternal, the fact that they always function, stems from the fact that it is their nature continually to manifest reality (ŚD 3.92cd–93ab). At the same time, will is entirely free, meaning it can create whatever it likes, without limitation (ŚD 3.94cd–95ab). This is simply the nature of Śiva’s activity, and, unlike the grammarians’ *paśyanti*, there is no need for any extrinsic cause, nor any need to explain the relationship of Śiva to any apparently or truly external objects of cognition, as this form of dynamic will is simply Śiva himself in all his power.

Śiva’s power of will, then, which initiates all cognition and action, forever renews itself. The powers simply emerge in accordance with their nature. The powers *in esse* are identical with the powers *in posse* because there is no distinction between the nature of the entity consciousness creates and the consciousness that created it: both are unlimited, replete with the unlimited form of delight (*nirvṛti*), and yet both simultaneously direct their delight to the desired objects, according to Śiva’s very will. Thus, the series of causes is endless. Will, conceived in this manner, is clearly central to Somānanda’s pantheism, then,

for it is manifested in every action and cognition, and thus in every entity in the universe, this in a sort of cascading bricolage of will, apparent in any and every entity. The peculiarly tantric nature may therefore be seen in this fundamental element of Somānanda's thought: this is a path of power, rather than one of purity, for all of existence involves the exercise of power, always beginning with will.²¹⁹ Somānanda's fascinating sequence of overlapping pairs of powers, then, places the power of will at the center of all existence, as it essentially equates existence with willful action, the powers *in posse* with the powers *in esse*, the ontic with the ontological, Śiva with the very powers that constitute and create the universe, and, thus, Śiva with all the universe.

According to Somānanda, then, the Śākta vision of the goddess is flawed for the same reasons that the grammarians' *paśyanti* cannot explain the nature of the supreme. Just as there is no "room" for the power of will in the philosophy of the grammarians, there is similarly no place for it in Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna's vision of a supreme goddess in the form of *paśyanti*. She is, for Somānanda, a form of "seeing" that is neither supreme nor free, because her very nature assumes the existence of true differences between the agent and object of cognition, and she is in no way conceived as the willful possessor of power who directs all activity and all existence by her very nature, as is Śiva. These, of course, are fatal flaws, on Somānanda's view.

15. Conclusions: Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi* and the Emergence of the Pratyabhijñā

It is clear from our survey of the various contemporaneous tantric schools and authors that Somānanda's view was decidedly his own, and it had a legacy in the highly influential tradition of the Pratyabhijñā that is characterized more by its having set the tone and shaped the spirit of Pratyabhijñā ideas than in guiding the particular philosophical and argumentative strategies of the authors who followed Somānanda. The ŚD may be said to be constituted by a combination of Trika ideas, in particular the Trika triad of powers, *icchā*, *jñāna*, and *kriyā*, with the Vijñānavādin's notion of existence in the form of willful consciousness, a combination grafted onto the thoroughly Hindu notion of the existence of a single divine agent, Śiva in this case, who creates the universe out of himself. Utpaladeva turned away from the peculiarly Trika terminology and theological formulations represented in the ŚD, while simultaneously embracing wholeheartedly the philosophical register and engaging more extensively and explicitly the theory of consciousness found in the theories of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins and the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti in particular. And

²¹⁹On the famous distinction of purity from power, see Sanderson 1985.

while the supremacy of Śiva is preserved in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, the intuitive and flowing nature of Somānanda's strict pantheism is lost in the reformulation. For while the philosophy of Utpaladeva's works is clearly more sophisticated and subtle than that of the ŚD, Śiva in Utpaladeva's pantheism seems further removed from our own thoughts, actions, and perceptions, a little more difficult to reach, to experience, than is the Śiva of the ŚD. Is this the philosophical price of bringing the Pratyabhijñā to a wider audience, something Somānanda did not intend to do? Did the more strictly philosophical register of the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, which proved itself to be more appropriate than Somānanda's partly theological, partly philosophical style for the propagation of this new school of thought, demand such a reformulation of Somānanda's strict pantheism?

Whatever we know of Somānanda's system, it is clear that more than just a little is lost of the full contours of the opponents against which Somānanda directed his invective. We of course know very little about Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, aside from what may be culled from the handful of quotations recovered from his TGSt and what Somānanda himself tells us of him. And, more generally, the materials here surveyed suggest the presence of a rather pervasive and deep influence of both the philosophy of the grammarians and that of the Buddhist idealists in the extant tantric writings of the early tenth century, influences the full impact of which has yet to be mapped, and perhaps cannot be mapped fully, by modern scholars of Indian religions. For the influence of both of these schools is seen across a number of the tantric schools surveyed in the present Introduction. With regard to the grammarians, they not only play a major role in the ŚD (and, after this, in the ĪPK and all the subsequent Pratyabhijñā literature), as has been known for some time, as well as in the philosophy of the Śāktas, as shown here, but even the VBh contains the same half-verse of the MBh that Somānanda quotes in the course of summarizing Bhartṛhari's philosophy (ŚD 2.10cd).²²⁰ As for the Buddhists, the influence of the Vijñānavāda and of Dharmakīrti on the Pratyabhijñā has been known for some time, as has the influence of the former on the Spanda School, and the notion that all entities must be pervaded by will, fused by Somānanda with the Vijñānavāda theory of consciousness, may also be found in the VBh. Indeed, as we already noted, the 105th verse of that Trika scripture refers to the volition and conscious awareness of all entities, a postulation fused by Somānanda with the Vijñānavāda theory of consciousness on which Somānanda so heavily depended.

The degree, then, to which these tantric schools interacted with both Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists remains a subject for further study. We have in the surviving materials only fragments of this intellectual history; but the fragments we have help to inform what is an indisputably intricate and fascinating picture, one that in this instance illustrates the impassioned and inspired

²²⁰The verse is MBh (Śāntiparvan) 12.224.60cd, echoed in part in VP 1.22cd and found in VBh 38cd.

vision of a Śaiva theologian and philosopher whose arguments are more than polemical remonstrations of the grammarians and the goddess-worshippers who were inspired by them. For Somānanda's is a novel and constructive theological vision that is based in the Trika scriptures and influenced by the Krama, a tantric vision that offers a robust philosophical explanation of the nature of god, reality, and our full identity with both.

About the Edition and the Translation

16. The Manuscripts of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*

MANUSCRIPTS CONSULTED

In addition to the readings of the KSTS edition of the text (K^{ed}), I have consulted six manuscripts in preparation of the present edition of the ŚD and ŚDVṛ, chapters one through three.

T

This is the manuscript of Trivandrum University, number 5854-H. The manuscript is a palm-leaf text in fair to poor condition. It is frayed at the edges and shows pieces of text broken off at the tops and bottoms of the folios. It is worm-eaten in a number of places. The text is written in Grantha Malayalam script in a clear hand, with approximately 95 characters per line, and it regularly records 11 lines per folio. The text is written on both sides of the palm leaf. The manuscript records the *mūla* only, with the exception that it also records the first of the three invocatory verses of the commentary, but it breaks off in the middle of ŚD 7.50a, where the scribe stopped copying the text. The readings are largely, but not entirely, free of errors and corruptions.

C

This is the manuscript of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, CS 3, 153. The text is entitled *The Śivadr̥ṣṭi of Durvāsamuni*. The manuscript is written in *devanāgarī* script and is made of country paper measuring approximately 6 inches by 9 inches. The text is written on both sides of the paper, recording 40–50 characters per line, 12 lines per side. Numbering 21 double-sided folios in length, it includes the complete text of the *mūla* only. The *maṅgala* reads: *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ*. The first folio of the manuscript (folio 1r.) reads the following in large, centered script: *ślokaṣaṁkhyā: 825 // atha śivadr̥ṣṭi. prārambhaḥ. pr̥ṣṭhasaṁ(khyā):*

18 // *adhya*: 1-7. (Thus, the MS begins its record of the text on folio iv.) The MS is in good condition but is very corrupt and is full of lacunæ.

G

This is the Göttingen manuscript. Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, number: Cod.Ms.Sanscr.Vish 5 (11). It is a paper manuscript written in *śāradā* script. Judging from the microfilmed copy provided by the library, it measures approximately 8 inches by 10 inches. I am unsure as to whether or not the text is written on both sides of the folios, as I have only seen the microfilmed copy. It records 16 lines per folio and 17-21 characters per line. Numbering 150 folios in length, it includes Somānanda's *mūla* as well as Utpaladeva's commentary, beginning with ŚD 1.1 and up to the commentary on 4.73cd-75. The *maṅgala* reads: (*Auspicious Symbol*) *svasti. śrīdevyai siddhidātryai namaḥ. śrīgaṇapataye namaḥ. oṃ*. The MS is in good condition, and its readings are mostly correct.

J

This is the Jammu manuscript, owned by the Raghunāth Mandir Library, Jammu. The text is written in *śāradā* script on birchbark, measuring approximately 5 1/2 inches by 8 inches per folio. Numbering 142 folios in length, the manuscript is written in a clearly legible hand, but is fraying at the edges and is very fragile. It records approximately 17 characters per line and 18 lines per folio. The manuscript includes the *mūla* and Utpaladeva's commentary up to ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 4.73cd-75, where the text ends at precisely the same point as does the commentary in the KSTS edition. The *maṅgala* reads simply: *oṃ*. The MS is very correct in its readings. It includes some marginal notes, particularly in the first chapter, which are also written in *śāradā* script. It marks intermittently, with an unidentified mark, the completion of portions of the commentary, or of portions of the *mūla*, particularly in the third chapter. Stein (1894: 225) has suggested that the manuscript may be dated to (Vikrama)Samvat 1680 (= 1624/5 C.E.).

P

This is the Pune manuscript. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, number: 805 of 1891-95. The manuscript is written in *devanāgarī* script and is made of country paper measuring approximately 8 inches by 12 inches. The text is written on only one side of the paper, recording 25-30 characters per line, 27 lines per folio. Numbering 56 folios in length, it includes the *mūla* and Utpaladeva's commentary, beginning with ŚD 1.1 and up to the first line of the commentary on ŚD 4.64cd-66. The *maṅgala* reads: *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ. oṃ*. The MS is in excellent condition. It is also witness to a number of corrections written in a later hand in what appears to be a ballpoint pen. These corrections are added to those of the copyist, who makes a number of corrections to the manuscript, apparently

in the course of copying the work. Subsequent to the corrections recorded in ballpoint pen, the readings of the manuscript mostly support those of K^{ed}.

R

This is the manuscript of the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur. The text is recorded in *devanāgarī* script on country paper measuring approximately 5 1/2 inches by 8 inches. The text is recorded on both sides of 44 double-sided folios in a clear hand and regularly records 21 characters per line and 24 lines per folio in a style whose consistency resembles that of printed text. The *mūla* as well as Utpaladeva's commentary are recorded in full to the commentary on ŚD 4.64cd–66, where it breaks off mid-sentence. It opens with the *maṅgala*: *om śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ*. The manuscript is in excellent condition and its readings are reliably correct.

OTHER ŚIVADRṢṬI MANUSCRIPTS

Aside from these six manuscripts, two other manuscripts also have some bearing, albeit indirectly, on the present edition. These are the manuscripts consulted by Kaul in the production of the KSTS edition (K^{ed}), including the following:

1. The Srinagar manuscript. This is a *śāradā* manuscript of the ŚD and ŚDVṚ in the Research Library, Srinagar. The details of this manuscript are recorded in the introduction to the KSTS edition of the text (see Kaul edition 1934: i–ii). It would be highly desirable to see this manuscript, but all of my efforts to obtain a copy failed, due in no small part to the current political instability in the Kashmir Valley.

2. The second is the manuscript of the Government Oriental Research Library, Madras. This begins on folio 79a of manuscript number 15323 of the collection. It is a complete transcription of the ŚD, without the commentary. When I went to view this manuscript in the Government Oriental Research Library, I was shown a work written in Telugu script that was copied into a modern, twentieth-century ruled and bound “copy-book.” The manuscript is in excellent condition, but obviously it is quite a recent production. Seeing that it is clearly a late copy, I decided not to collate the readings found therein. It is worth noting, however, that Kaul, in his introduction to K^{ed}, mentions that he based his edition on two manuscripts, the aforementioned Srinagar manuscript and the transcription of a copy of the text housed in the Egmore Manuscripts Library, Madras. (See Kaul edition 1934: i.) It is not possible that the modern copybook manuscript is the one to which Kaul refers in K^{ed}, as his report states that the manuscript in question is a source text of the ŚD that is housed in the Egmore Library, and is not merely a copy of it. I was not able to locate any premodern

manuscript in the Madras Library collection, however, after visits to both the Egmore Manuscripts Library located near the Egmore train station in Madras and the Government Oriental Research Library on the campus of the University of Madras on a research visit in 2003.

Apart from these is an additional pair of manuscripts that merit mention. First, there is one manuscript that at first glance appears, on the basis of the information provided in the published catalogue, to be relevant to the present study, but in fact is not related at all to Somānanda's work. This is the manuscript of the Bodleian Library, Oxford University. The manuscript is listed as item number 168 in Aufrecht's *Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum Sanscriticorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae* (p. 108). Though listed as the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, this short excerpt bears no resemblance whatsoever to Somānanda's text, and it appears to be another work bearing the same name as the work under consideration in the present volume. Second, mention should be made of the manuscript of the Adyar Library, Accession Number 67455. This is a partial manuscript of the ŚD, without the commentary. The manuscript is written on palm leaves some 60–65 characters per line, 9 lines per folio. Writing appears on both sides of the palm leaves. The manuscript is written in Telugu script in a clear hand, but the manuscript is very incomplete and terribly damaged by worm-holes and tearing, and the brittle palm leaves are broken in many places, which has resulted in the loss of many pieces of text. Due to its incomplete and thoroughly fragmented condition, I have not collated this manuscript for the present edition.

17. About the Edition

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MANUSCRIPTS

Although all six of the manuscripts consulted include readings of the verses of the ŚD, only four manuscripts of the ŚDVṛ are included in the present edition, as the manuscript of Calcutta Sanskrit College (C) and that of Trivandrum University (T) record none of the commentary. The Jammu manuscript (J) and the Göttingen manuscript (G) regularly share similar or identical variant readings. The Pune manuscript (P) and the Rajasthan manuscript (R), in turn, also share many variants. Not incidentally, P and R break off at nearly the same place in the commentary (in the first lines of the ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 4.64cd–66); and the readings of G and J also break off at a nearly identical place in the text, namely, in the middle of the commentary on ŚD 4.73cd–75 at precisely the point at which the commentary published in K^{ed.} abruptly ends. These similarities—the regular coincidence of shared variant readings and missing passages of text—suggest that one may identify two pairs of manuscripts, that of P and R, on the one hand, and that of G and J, on the other. (We shall deal with a third pair, that of T and C, below.) The published edition (K^{ed.}), itself based on the Srinagar manuscript

and a copy of a Madras manuscript purportedly housed in the Government Oriental Research Library, both of which are currently unavailable to me, attests to a state of the text that is regularly more similar to the latter pair than the former.

Now, an examination of the variant readings of the manuscripts suggests that the major differences between P and R, on the one hand, and G and J, on the other, involve corruption of the text over time. For example, P and R offer *sevinṛ-pādi*^o for the *sevitānṛpādi*^o of G and J, with K^{ed.} agreeing with the latter pair, this on ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 4.4–5, the reading of G and J being the source of that of P and R.²²¹ Many other examples could be cited in addition to this one.²²² The readings of P and R, in other words, are regularly, though not always, shown to be corruptions of the readings found in G and J.

The relative chronology of the four manuscripts in question further suggests that one should reasonably expect the readings of G and J to be the earlier ones. It is, firstly, clear that J is the oldest manuscript examined that includes the commentary—it is written on birchbark of obvious antiquity, and Stein (1894: 225) has suggested it may be dated to (Vikrama)Saṃvat 1680 (= 1624/5 C.E.). This is indeed a fairly old manuscript, then, as far as such matters go in South Asia. G, for its part, is a paper manuscript in *śāradā* script that, while apparently of some antiquity, is clearly of a more recent provenance than is J. P and R, on the other hand, are paper manuscripts written in *devanāgarī*, with P being of an obviously recent historical pedigree, it being copied on only one side of the folios and being orthographically of a style that is quite modern (as is, to a lesser extent, R). P and R, moreover, display evidence of a text that was at some point transmitted from (presumably older) *śāradā* manuscripts to *devanāgarī* ones. In sum, while the age of a manuscript in no way guarantees the antiquity of the text to which it attests, the direction of transmission suggested by the variant readings is confirmed by the relative chronology of the manuscripts themselves, with P and R regularly showing themselves to witness variant readings that must be corruptions of the readings found in G and J. In general, then, I take as a first principle of editing the ŚDVṛ that the readings of G and J—the latter in particular, for the reasons to be stated, below—regularly attest to an earlier state of the text and are therefore very often, though not always, superior to those of P and R.

²²¹The former variant is unlikely because the context demands that it is a king who is served, not a king who is a *sevin*, or servant; and while it is possible that the compound could be read as a *dvandva*, listing all parties involved in a master-servant relationship, one rather expects, given the context, that the compound should refer only to the person served. It is therefore highly likely that the reading of P and R is a corruption of the more original reading of G and J.

²²²These include, for example, the following. G and J witness *sah*, with K^{ed.} reading the correct *sa*, while P and R omit the pronoun altogether in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.1; G and J, along with K^{ed.}, read ^o*viśeṣaṇa-kalāpo* in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.2, while P and R read ^o*viśeṣeṇa kalāpo*; G, J, and K^{ed.} read *susūkṣmaśaktitṛitaya*^o in ŚD 1.4a, while P and R erroneously read *svasūkṣmaśaktitṛitaya*^o; G and J read *tadupaśamamātraṃ* in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.4cd–5, which is transformed into *tadupadeśamātraṃ* in P, R, and K^{ed.}, the latter being easily the less favorable reading of the pair, given the context; G and J, confirmed by K^{ed.}, read *apūrvakāryābhāvāt*, while P and R drop the negative prefix (*a-*) before *bhāva* and erroneously read *apūrvakāryābhāvāt* on ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 3.51cd–53ab; and so on.

As for the manuscripts of the root text (*mūla*) of the ŚD itself, the Trivandrum manuscript (T), which as mentioned records none of the ŚDVṛ, is clearly an artifact of some antiquity, though the precise date of the manuscript cannot be specified, given the speed with which South Indian palm-leaf manuscripts deteriorate.²²³ One can only guess, based on the appearance of the palm leaves and for orthographic reasons, that T is close to the age of, but later than, the birch-bark manuscript (J) that has been dated to the early seventeenth century. The Trivandrum manuscript certainly records, in many instances, the best reading of the *mūla* available in any of the witnesses examined for the present edition. For example, on ŚD 2.28a, T and C (about which more will be said in a moment) read *satyarūpā*, while G, J, P, R, and K^{ed} read *satyarūpān*.²²⁴ This is not to say, however, that T always witnesses the best readings of the text: not only do worm holes and frayed edges litter the manuscript with lacunæ; but, more important, the manuscript shows signs of corruption, as is exemplified in, for example, ŚD 1.3c, where T reads *tadecchā* for the correct reading *tadicchā*,²²⁵ this being but one example of a number of variant and erroneous readings in T that are not found in J, G, R, or P.²²⁶ In sum, T not infrequently witnesses an earlier state of the text of the ŚD, and its variant readings are therefore often the preferable ones. Indeed, the variants of T are often preferable to readings found in G and/or J, and if either or both of the latter two manuscripts confirm the reading of T, then one must be very hesitant not to accept this reading. On the other hand, the corruptions in the manuscript require one carefully to scrutinize the variant

²²³See Gaur 1979: 12 (quoted in Goodall 1998: cxiii–cxiv).

²²⁴The latter reading appears, at first glance, to be the correct one, it being followed by the disjunctive particle (*vā*) and preceded by *asatyān*, suggesting the passage refers to a pair of possibilities, either the reality or unreality of the entities that *paśyanti* sees. However, Somānanda not infrequently uses *vā* as a connective particle (see, e.g. ŚD 1.32b, 1.42a, 2.29d, 2.30c, etc.), as he does here, tying thereby ŚD 2.28ab to what precedes it. To give preference to the more difficult reading—the oft-repeated maxim, *lectio difficilior potior*, of course has some truth in it—is to understand *satyarūpā* here to be the subject of the verb referring to *paśyanti*, ŚD 2.28ab therefore expressing the need to explain not why she sees real or unreal objects, but why she, being real, sees unreal ones. This not only follows elegantly from ŚD 2.27cd, where the unreality of the objects is considered, but it also leads beautifully into the lengthy consideration of the nature of nescience (*avidyā*) that follows the passage in question, beginning in ŚD 2.28cd–30ab, just as it accords with what I understand to be the correct reading of the commentary, where Utpaladeva suggests that the last part of the verse asks precisely the question as we, in the course of accepting the readings of T and C, have formulated it. The *Vṛtti* there reads: *punar api cāsatyān arthān satyā sā paśyanti kṛd-ādyabhāve 'pi kena prayojanaprakāreṇa sṛjatiī vimṛṣyatām*. (We must caution, however, that this reading of the commentary is itself based on the selection of a variant reading, that of P^{a.c.}, which reads *satyā sā* for the *satyān sā* of G, J, P^{c.}, R, and K^{ed}. The word order suggests this formulation of the text is rather more appropriate, though one could also choose to preserve the reading of *satyān* and emend *sā* to *vā* if the readings of T and C were deemed unacceptable in ŚD 2.28a.)

²²⁵The latter reading is the correct one, first, because it is confirmed in the commentary, and, more importantly, because the correlative (*tadā*) recorded in T's variant reading is attested by all the manuscripts (except C, which is corrupt) on ŚD 1.4d, rendering superfluous and awkward the purported presence of the same term in T's reading.

²²⁶To offer but one additional example, found in ŚD 2.12d: T and C read *vā* for *vāk*, the latter, superior reading being attested in G, J, P, R, and K^{ed}.

readings found therein, as corruption and not just the presence of lacunæ often render the reading of T inferior to that of J and/or G, and even of R and/or P.

Related to T is the Calcutta manuscript (C), which records many of the variant readings and many of the corruptions found in T but not in the other four manuscripts. Like T, then, C is frequently corrupt, the only caveat being that it is significantly more corrupt and more riddled with lacunæ than T. Indeed, C most often appears in the apparatus for reasons of errors of mistranscription, and one has a sense that the copyist of C did not know Sanskrit well. Nevertheless, while C is clearly one of the most recently copied manuscripts of the six (with the Pune manuscript [P] probably being the most recently copied of the six, C being likely to precede it only by a short period of time), its readings, when not corrupt beyond recognition and when witnessing variants that diverge from both P and R, on the one hand, and G and J, on the other, regularly accord with those of T, which, as mentioned, often, though not always, contains readings that are likely closest of all the extant variants to the original text.²²⁷ In other words, C records a version of the text that comes to it from T, but it is significantly more corrupt than T.²²⁸

There are numerous instances where T and C record variants that are not shared by G, J, P, and R, as there are likewise many occasions when the latter four manuscripts record variants absent from both T and C. This leads one to posit the existence of two recensions of the text, a Northern Recension comprising the four manuscripts—J, G, R, and P—and a Southern Recension witnessed by two manuscripts, T and C. It is further of note that the variant readings of T, often followed by C, more commonly accord with the earlier, *śāradā* manuscripts (J and G) of the Northern Recension than they do with the later, *devanāgarī* ones (R and P) when the readings of those two pairs diverge, this being some evidence for the relative antiquity of T, given that J and G predate R and P. There is, however, also some evidence of contamination in the C manuscript of the Southern Recension, as the Calcutta witness appears in places to record readings of the Northern Recension that are absent from T.²²⁹

²²⁷For example, both T and C record *vā* for the reading *hi* of the other manuscripts in ŚD 2.23a, the former being the reading that is probably closer to that of the original text, it being the less refined expression of the idea there articulated. On the other hand, both T and C erroneously record *yāvat* for *tāvat* in ŚD 2.20a.

²²⁸This may be known, moreover, by the fact that the readings of C do not diverge from those of T, except where the manuscript is corrupt or is contaminated by readings from the Northern Recension.

²²⁹Examples include: the erroneous reading in C of *yasmā* for *yasmāt* in ŚD 2.8c, where T reads *tasmāt*; in ŚD 3.6c, C accords with G, J, P, R, and K^{ed}. in reading *'pi* where T reads *hi*; C accords with the other manuscripts and K^{ed}. in reading *divisatyatvam* for the *'pi satyatva*—of T in ŚD 2.69a; etc. More substantively, C accords with all the other manuscripts excepting T in ŚD 2.46a, reading *svākya* for the *svāniḥ* of T; C, all the manuscripts of the Northern Recension, and K^{ed}. read *svaśaktyāveśanātma* in ŚD 3.17d, while T reads *svaśaktyāvedanātma*; C accords with G, J, P, R, and K^{ed}. in reading *hy upapadyate* in ŚD 2.55d, where T reads *dṛṣ<?>tā*—; C accords with G, J, P, R, and K^{ed}. in reading *pravīramyatām* for T's *pravīramyate* in ŚD 2.80d; C records °*upāyatva*° in accordance with G, J, P, R, and K^{ed}. over and against the reading of °*upāsatva*° found in T in ŚD 3.15c; etc.

There can be no doubt that T witnesses an older state of the text than does C, and the direction of transmission in the Southern Recension is indisputably one from T to C.²³⁰ As for the Northern Recension, three states of the text may be identified therein. J, as noted already, is the oldest of the manuscripts that record the commentary, and it also constitutes the earliest phase of the transmission of the commentary available to us. G generally accords with J, but it sometimes witnesses readings found in P and R.²³¹ G and J, moreover, very regularly share readings that are not found in P and R, which very regularly share readings at variance with the former pair, as already indicated, above. G, then, likely constitutes a middle phase in the manuscript transmission, albeit one rather closer to what precedes it (J) than what follows (P and R), with P and R witnessing a still later, third and most recent phase of transmission of the manuscripts here consulted.

The readings of K^{ed.}, in turn, sometimes accord with the variants found in T and C; and they sometimes accord instead with the readings of the Northern Recension. This suggests that one of the two manuscripts that Kaul consulted in producing the KSTS edition of the ŚD, either the Śrinagar manuscript or the Madras manuscript, attests to a state of the text that is close to that of T. Indeed, one may hypothesize that it is in the Madras manuscript that Kaul found such variant readings, with the Śrinagar manuscript more regularly attesting to the readings of G, J, P, and R.

There is, furthermore, some circumstantial evidence that Kaul's two manuscripts offered divergent readings when the texts of the Northern and Southern Recensions differed. It is not infrequently the case that, when K^{ed.} records a reading that accords with T (and C) over the manuscripts of the Northern Recension, the concordant reading in question may be found in the errata of the KSTS edition. In other words, Kaul sometimes records two divergent readings of the ŚD, one in the body of the edition, another in the list of errata at the end of the volume. And when he does so, it is frequently the case that the readings of the Northern Recension and the Southern Recension of our manuscripts each record one of the two divergent readings found in K^{ed.}. This suggests, though not definitively, that Kaul sometimes had occasion to choose between two plausible variant readings, and in doing so sometimes recorded the reading that he chose

²³⁰This is a transmission, moreover, that must have taken place over time, with intermediary copies of the text standing between T and C; for there can be no doubt that C was copied from a *devanāgarī* manuscript and not one written in Grantha Malayalam, as exemplified in, e.g., ŚD 3.26c, where C erroneously records °*māvaśitvena* for the °*bhāvaśivatvena* of T, G, J, P, R, and K^{ed.}, this error being one caused by the misreading of the *devanāgarī mā* for the *devanāgarī bhā*.

²³¹For example: J reads *etat tāvan* in the ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 4.1–2ab, while G accords with P, R, and K^{ed.} in reading *etāvan*. (There is some doubt, it should be added, as to whether to give the reading of K^{ed.} any weight; for one cannot know with certainty whether the manuscripts consulted for the production of the KSTS edition truly witness the reading in question, or whether the reading is instead the product of the editor's emendation.)

not to select in the list of errata. (Of course, this analysis of K^{ed.} amounts to educated guesswork; and only an examination of the manuscripts can reveal what is hidden behind the silent, if useful, edition of K^{ed.}.) For example, T, C, and K^{ed.p.c.} read *yādr̥ṣī* on ŚD 3.34b for the *yāvati* of G, J, P, R, and K^{ed.a.c.}. Other examples may be found, as well.²³²

K^{ed.} otherwise may be said generally, though by no means always, to agree with G and J when they differ from P and R, as one would expect, given that the commentary recorded in the published edition breaks off at precisely the same point as it does in G and J. One also suspects, however, that the editor of K^{ed.} has taken liberties in endeavoring to correct the text without informing the reader of his editorial decisions, as was already suggested, above. Perhaps the best example of this may be found in a passage of commentary ad ŚD 4.4–5, where K^{ed.} reads *śaktimattā*^o, while all four manuscripts of the commentary read *śaktisattā*^o. K^{ed.}'s reading certainly suggests an editorial choice on the basis of modern research into the principles of Kashmiri Shaiva philosophy, where the idea of Śiva as the possessor of the powers is frequently mentioned.

The high degree of congruence in the readings of G and J on the one hand, and P and R, on the other, suggests that we should be able to draw a stemma representing two recensions of the text. One would involve a line of direct transmission, from T to C in the Southern Recension of the ŚD. The other would involve a recension that diverged once, with J and G witnessing one reading of the text, R and P the other. K^{ed.}, being an edition based on one southern and one northern manuscript, witnesses elements of both recensions. Yet, the picture is not so simple. To start, G (very occasionally) witnesses variants that diverge from common readings found in J, P, and R, ones that are not likely to have been the product of simple scribal errors, errors caused by metathesis, haplogy, eye-skip, and the like.²³³ And, contrariwise, the readings of G sometimes accord with P and R, in contrast to those of J,²³⁴ though it must be added that lacunæ in J, resulting from damage to the manuscript, are by far the most

²³²Thus: T and C accord with K^{ed.p.c.} on ŚD 3.3b, reading *idr̥ṣān* for the *ihate* of G, J, P, R, and K^{ed.a.c.}; T, C, and K^{ed.p.c.} read *°viśiṣṭakam* for the *°viśeṣakam* of G, J, P, R, and K^{ed.a.c.} on ŚD 3.39d; on ŚD 3.90a, T, C, and K^{ed.} read *vadane* for the *vedane* of G, J, P, and R; etc.

²³³A pair of examples is as follows: in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.26cd–28ab, G, along with K^{ed.}, correctly reads *asatyasr̥ṣtau* for the unlikely *asatyadr̥ṣtau* of J, P, and R; and in ŚD 3.86b, G reads *saugandhyakṛt*, while J, P, and R, along with T, C, and K^{ed.}, read *saugandhyavat*.

²³⁴J often omits final *visarga* or transposes the short diphthong *o* for the short vowel *a* when it varies from G, P, and R, but these are minor differences. Some more significant examples of variants include the following. J omits *eva* in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.1 (line 30 of the present edition), while G, P, R, and K^{ed.} do not; the same is true of *strilingaḥ* in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.3–4 (line 63 of the present edition); J, along with K^{ed.}, reads *kāryavyatirekeṇa* for *kāryavyatirekeṇa* of G, P, and R (the omission of the alpha-privative being a recurring variant in J, though one that could possibly be explained away by scribal corrections of the error in J in subsequent states of the text); etc.

common cause of any divergence in the readings of that manuscript, on the one hand, from readings shared by G, P, and R, on the other. In other instances, the readings shared by P and R are superior to those shared by G and J.²³⁵ Put differently, there are occasions when the transmission of the text must have been one that involved the subsequent corruption of given readings witnessed in P and R but not in G and J (PR→GJ), or readings now found in G, P, and R but not in J (GPR→J). R, in turn, witnesses an (only slightly) earlier form of the text than what is found in P, this being discernible not simply on the basis of the relative antiquity, compared with P, of the manuscript (a fact that, as mentioned above, cannot serve on its own to prove the relative antiquity of the readings of the manuscripts in question), but also because one not infrequently finds R according with the superior readings of G and J against P, even if it is more common for P and R to witness identical variants. On the other hand, P also sometimes accords with the readings of G and J against those of R, as R sometimes may be shown to witness corruptions of readings found in P (and/or G and J).

There must be, then, three intermediate stages in the transmission of the ŚD and ŚDVṛ for which we currently have no witnesses. One must exist at a point of divergence of P and R, on the one hand, from G and J, on the other, the correct and better readings more often, but not exclusively, being transmitted to G and J, rather than P and R. A second stage of transmission not witnessed in our manuscripts must exist at the point of divergence of G from J, with the superior variants regularly appearing in J, but also sometimes, if rarely, in G when the readings of the two texts diverge, the variants of G sometimes according with P and R when they differ from J, and sometimes being unique among the witnesses consulted to G alone. Finally, a third divergence must exist in a hypothetical state of the text that would have existed prior to the divergence of R and P, this because R not infrequently shares variant readings with G and J (and sometimes with T, and even C) that are not witnessed in P; and, conversely, R sometimes witnesses unique variants that are not found in any of the remaining three manuscripts of the Northern Recension.

The relationships of these manuscripts, then, may be mapped in a diagram of the stemma, as seen in figure 1.

²³⁵Such true variants the preferable ones of which are witnessed in P and R, as opposed to G and J, are few in ŚD (and ŚDVṛ ad ŚD) chapters 1–3, but they do exist. For example: P, R, and K^{ed.} read *purobhāge* in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.19–20ab, while G and J read *pare bhāge*, an unlikely reading given the context, and also because it would place the power of eagerness, *aunmukhya*, within the highest condition of Śiva (which Somānanda never describes as a “part” [*bhāga*] of Śiva-nature, anyway) when it should be the first moment emerging from it. To offer a second example: P, R, and K^{ed.} read *tadṛṣyānām* for *tato ṛṣyānām* attested by both G and J in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.26cd–28ab.




FIGURE 1.

One should understand those manuscripts closer to the top of the graph to be older manuscripts than those closer to the bottom of the graph. P is likely a slightly later copy of the text than C, and it thus appears at a slightly lower point in the chart than the latter. The opposite is true of R. The Greek letter alpha (α) represents an unrecovered form of the text that served as an archetype for both the Southern and the Northern Recensions, its existence being suggested by the presence of scribal errors that are common to all the six manuscripts.²³⁶ The line from α to T represents the beginning of the transmission of the Southern Recension of the text, with the line between T and C representing the transmission of the work in the Southern Recension from a text in a state witnessed by the former manuscript to one witnessed in the rather more corrupt, latter manuscript, this transmission being one that is likely to have taken place over a relatively long period of time. The line from α to J similarly represents the beginning of the transmission of the Northern Recension of the text, with a diverging line of transmission leading to the state of the text witnessed by R and P. An unwitnessed, hypothetical state of the text exists, then, at this juncture, for the reasons stated above. Similarly, another unwitnessed and therefore hypothetical state of the text exists at the juncture where the transmission to G diverges from J; and a third one exists at the point where P diverges from R.

This configuration therefore illustrates how G sometimes accords with P and R against J, but more often accords with J against the readings of P and R. G, in the present diagram, is closer both in time and in the conceptualization of the process of transmission to J than it is to P and R, yet it nevertheless witnesses a state of the text that is intermediate to those of J, on the one hand, and P and R, on the other. P and R are located in the same branch of transmission, this to represent the great commonalities between the readings of the two manuscripts,

²³⁶See, e.g., ŚD 2.37a, where T, C, G, J, P, and R record the hypometric reading *madhyā* for the correct *mādhyaṃā* of K^{ed}. (One suspects Kaul prudently, but silently, emended the text here, though of course one or both of his manuscripts could have furnished the correct reading.)

but P diverges from R at a point where it may alternatively witness errors not found in R or, very occasionally, correct readings found in J and G but not R. There are also rare occasions where P and/or R record correct readings that are absent from both J and G. Finally, the line with the arrowhead that points towards C from the direction of the Northern Recension should be understood to represent the contamination of C with readings from the Northern Recension.

If the relationship of the various manuscripts consulted for the present edition is rather complex, one may take solace in the fact that this picture meets the expectations one would have for such a collection of sources, the provenances of which span a number of centuries and hail from all corners of the Indian subcontinent, from Kashmir to Kerala and from Bengal to Maharashtra and Rajasthan. Nevertheless, the state of the evidence is such that it demands that one weigh all of the readings of all the manuscripts wherever they vary, as any of the manuscripts theoretically could offer the best reading in any given instance, the one exception being C, which uniformly may be shown to be corrupted whenever it witnesses a unique reading of the ŚD. In practice, however, one must have good reasons not to follow the reading of J when it comes to editing both the commentary and the root text (*mūla*), as the readings there may regularly, if not exclusively, be judged to be the superior ones, with the caveat that T sometimes witnesses an earlier form of the text and therefore occasionally furnishes the preferable reading. It should be added, as well, however, that J itself, like T, sometimes shows itself to be witness to corruptions not found in the manuscripts that witness a subsequent form of the text of the Northern Recension, though these usually involve the expected sorts of trivial variants, such as the omission of the final *visarga*, small errors in the transcription of vowels (such as the recording of the short diphthong *o* for the short vowel *a*, the long vowel *ā* for its short counterpart, *a*, etc.), and the like. These readings, of course, have of necessity been filtered from the accepted reading of the present edition.

CONVENTIONS OF THE EDITION

The apparatus of the edition is a positive one, as it explicitly notes both those manuscripts that record the text appearing above the line and those that do not. There are five registers of notes to the critical edition. The first and third registers record any comments, parallel passages, or the like that are related to the *mūla* and the commentary, respectively. The second and the fourth record the variant readings, with the former recording the variants of the *mūla* by verse number and by the quarter-verse (*pāda*), labeled a, b, c, and d, the latter recording the variants found in the commentary by the line number of the chapter in question. The fifth, bottom register of the notes records the folia on which the given passages of text are recorded, this by first identifying the manuscript in question, followed by folio number and an indication of whether the following text appears on the front (“r” for recto) or back (“v” for verso) of the given folio.

Manuscripts that record text on only one side of course do not make this distinction and record only the folio number. Note, however, that when there is nothing to record in a given register on a given page, fewer than five registers of footnotes will appear on the page in question. (This often occurs, for example, on pages of the edition on which only the readings of a long passage of the commentary appear.)

All variant readings are recorded following the accepted reading, and I note the manuscripts in which they appear. Variant readings are recorded exactly as they appear in the manuscripts, while the accepted readings are silently corrected in order to standardize spelling, that is, for reasons of *sandhi*, gemination/degemination, the replacement of *anusvāra* with the homorganic nasal, etcetera. The punctuation of the commentary found in the manuscripts is not recorded in the present edition (and it varies greatly from manuscript to manuscript, the conventions of punctuation varying greatly). I have used the punctuation of K^{ed}. as the exemplar, though I often modify it, sometimes silently, sometimes with commentary on my reasons for doing so in the notes to the translation. When a manuscript records any correction in the readings it witnesses, I note both the reading *ante correctionem* (^{a.c.}) and the reading *post correctionem* (^{p.c.}). Any text that is absent from a manuscript is marked as such with *om.*, this being an abbreviation for “omitted (text).” Any reading in a manuscript that is missing due to damage to the physical manuscript, such as fraying at the ends of the folio in question, is marked with three dashes: ---. Illegible text, in turn, is recorded with the following symbol: <?>. Emendations are noted with *em.*, conjectural emendations with *conj.*, and corrections with *corr.*

18. About the Translation

The present translation includes the entirety of the first three chapters of the ŚD, along with Utpaladeva’s commentary. The translation is meant to be a literal one, but one that presents the material in idiomatic English. Needless to say, it is often difficult to conform to these two sometimes conflicting standards, particularly given that the text in question is syntactically complex and sometimes elliptically written, as well as semantically rich.

Somānanda’s style is difficult. It is often a telegraphic documentation of philosophical arguments. He furthermore assumes that the reader is familiar with the matters at hand, and his style is therefore declarative rather than explanatory: the implications of his arguments are rather left to the commentator (and the reader) to digest and elaborate. Still, despite this often terse style of Somānanda’s verse, one sometimes senses the author’s relish for language.²³⁷

²³⁷Take, for example, the flowing verse of ŚD 1.9ab (*sā ca dr̥śyā hṛduddese kāryasmarānakālataḥ*) or the alliteration of ŚD 4.51ab—*tasmāt svayaṃ svabhāvena bhāvair bhāvī bhaved bhavaḥ*—which, incidentally, offers something of an echo of VBh 145 (quoted in note 121, above).

In short, the ŚD constitutes a highly complex, often telegraphic, regularly difficult, and sometimes awkward theological-cum-philosophical verse.

Utpaladeva's commentary is extremely helpful to our understanding of the ŚD. More than a simple word-by-word gloss of his teacher's magnum opus, it is rather more expanded and explanatory, and his comments are essential to our understanding of the ŚD, the root text (*mūla*) on which it comments. This is not to say that one must always translate according to the commentator's interpretation of the text: Utpaladeva can in some instances, at least, be seen to reinterpret Somānanda's text, as the present Introduction has illustrated. (For example, he glosses Somānanda's references to the *śaktitraya* by referring to five powers, as outlined, above.) The reader should also note, however, that I sometimes intentionally preserve some of the ambiguity, some of the laconic and telegraphic style, of Somānanda's text, only to allow the commentary to clarify matters, this to give the reader something of the experience of reading the original, albeit in translation.

Though, as mentioned, Utpaladeva's commentary is much more than a word-by-word gloss of Somānanda's verses, one should not take this to suggest that he never glosses particular terms. He very often does, though he does so in a manner that is sometimes awkward to render in English translation: in many instances, Utpaladeva glosses a given term in the context of long and syntactically complicated sentences. And although I do not highlight the lemmas in the translation of the commentary, I attempt to make them easily identifiable by singling out the glosses provided for them. I do this regularly by introducing the glosses with "i.e.," rarely with "that is," and sometimes by placing the gloss in em dashes (— —) following the word Utpaladeva wishes to explain, all of this in an attempt to preserve something of the syntax of the commentary. It is not always possible, of course, perfectly to accomplish this goal, and I sometimes translate long sentences with a couple, or a number, of shorter ones. When I do so, I do so silently, without indicating that the syntax has been modified for reasons associated with the production of a fluid, legible translation.

In order to render the text in idiomatic English, I often translate Sanskrit sentences written in the passive voice with English sentences in the active voice. Likewise, I freely translate Sanskrit participles with finite verbal constructions in English, just as I translate abstract constructions into idiomatic English.²³⁸ I regularly render nominal sentences in Sanskrit with verbal ones in English. I also translate the Sanskrit connective word "and" (*ca*) into idiomatic English, sometimes replacing it with "moreover," "in addition," and so forth. I take equal liberty with the other Sanskrit connectives, *tu* ("but, and, however") and *vā* ("or, and, on the other hand," etc.). Finally, I do not replicate in translation the gender

²³⁸That is to say I translate into idiomatic English the many Sanskrit sentences that use the abstract suffixes (*-tva* and *-tā*) that are often rendered more literally in other translations with "-ness" in English.

of the various Sanskrit proper names and/or key terms, with two exceptions: I regularly refer to *paśyantī* with “she” (and related pronouns) in the translation of the second chapter, as I do the same for *śakti*, “power,” in the third chapter.

Although both Somānanda and Utpaladeva use a great deal of technical language, I have refrained wherever possible from the common practice of quoting such terms (in parentheses) in the body of a translation. I find that the frequent inclusion of numerous Sanskrit technical terms in the body of the translation often serves only to distract the nonspecialist reader, while the Sanskritist is regularly aware of how I have interpreted the particular terms and expressions. (Instead, I have identified in the notes the particular technical or other terms that were rendered in the translation when I feel it will aid the specialist or even nonspecialist reader.) I have similarly limited the use of untranslated Sanskrit words in the translation, though I do quote the Sanskrit when the terms in question are relatively well known technical ones. I don’t feel it is necessary, in other words, to develop new translations of relatively well-known Sanskrit terms just for the sake of avoiding the use of Sanskrit terms in the translation. Such a practice could easily create confusion when a well-known Sanskrit term is rendered with a new and therefore unfamiliar English term, thereby clouding the authors’ intended meaning. There is a second reason for quoting Sanskrit terms in the translation: I sometimes do so in places where Utpaladeva analyzes a given term, or simply defines the term in question with a pure synonym, as occurs for example in his commentary on ŚD 1.2. (It is, moreover, for this reason that I quote the Sanskrit verse of the ŚD prior to its translation: the presence of the verse within the translation allows even those who do not read Sanskrit to understand from where Utpaladeva has taken a given term he subsequently glosses.)

Any other of the relatively few Sanskrit terms that appear in the translation have almost without exception been explained in the present Introduction, and those few that have not are explained on the page, in the various notes to the translation, or in Utpaladeva’s very explanations of the terms in question. I should add that I have also generally endeavored, though not without exception, to translate a single Sanskrit term with a single English equivalent, not because I believe that doing so is a practice indispensable to any sound theory of translation—I do not—but because I think it will simplify matters for the reader. (This translation practice is of course more difficult to sustain when rendering longer portions of a given work, as one inevitably encounters a greater variety of contexts and therefore a greater semantic range for certain lexical items, which must be presented to the reader with the appropriate emphasis and nuance in English.)

Whatever text I supply to the translation is included in parentheses: (). I also place in square brackets [] any language that is used to explain that which immediately precedes the bracketed material. For example, if the text reads, as it does on ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.25–25 “that, being a new sequential form,” I include in brackets the referent of the pronoun: “that [appearance], being a new

sequential form.” As these materials are added to, or offered in explanation of, what is found in the Sanskrit text, the translation has been composed in a manner that allows it to be read legibly even when excluding anything found in parentheses or brackets. This is so with only two types of exceptions: I also sometimes identify in square brackets the referent of a pronoun or the agent of an action who is signified obliquely by the conjugation of a given verb. (Note that I employ this same convention even when the action in question is conveyed through one of the many nominal constructions of Sanskrit.) The most common example of this is found repeatedly in the introductory passages Utpaladeva furnishes prior to a great number of the quoted portions of the ŚD: “[Somānanda] says.” For although Utpaladeva nowhere refers to his teacher by name in what survives of the ŚDVṛ, Somānanda is clearly the agent implied by the verb in these introductory passages. In such instances, one will have to include the term found in brackets for the translation to read legibly. I try whenever possible, however, to avoid the use of any parentheses or square brackets, as I feel, again, that such conventions often serve to distract the reader.

I frequently make reference to the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ of Utpaladeva in the translation and notes thereto, and in doing so I regularly refer to the numbering of the verses found in Torella’s edition of the text. References to passages of the Śivadṛṣṭi and Utpaladeva’s commentary correspond with the numbering of verses found in the edition presented here. When referring to passages of these texts that lie beyond the scope of the present edition, I refer the reader to the numbering of the verses of the published KSTS edition (K^{ed.}). When referring to the VP, I follow Rau’s numbering of the verses.

The many notes accompanying the translation are meant to serve two distinct audiences. Some are purely technical notes, which explain philological problems, reveal textual problems or variants, explain my interpretations of the many compound words in the Sanskrit text, and the like. Others are rather meant for the general reader, as they explain the flow of logic found in the text or elaborate on a given term, concept, or concern found therein. When an important term is translated, I often record in the notes the Sanskrit term that was translated, as mentioned already. Wherever possible, I indicate the presence of parallel passages and identify any passages of text that are quoted elsewhere in the primary literature. Some of these parallel passages are recorded in the notes, but, whenever possible, I simply note the location of the parallel passage and quote it in the notes to the edition. Finally, I refer not infrequently to the various types of Sanskrit compounds—coordinative, determinative, descriptive, exocentric/possessive, and so forth—in my translation and notes (this in no small part because Utpaladeva, like all good Sanskrit commentators, regularly discusses these grammatical forms in his commentary). Those who, being unfamiliar with such Sanskrit grammatical constructions, wish to know more about them, are advised to consult the detailed and accessible, if compact, explanations thereof

that may be found in the readily available volume by Michael Coulson: *Teach Yourself Sanskrit*, Second edition (Chicago: NTC Publishing, [1976] 1992).

Finally, it is my hope that each reader will be able to choose how to use these various materials when reading the translation, and in particular I hope the non-specialist will be able comfortably to read the translation, with the aid of the relevant notes, without being confronted too often with the sort of minutiae, technical concerns, and jargon that would scare off all but the most stubbornly persistent reader. For if a translation should be meant to allow for “other people’s creations [to] be so utterly their own and so deeply part of us,” as the anthropologist Clifford Geertz expressed it,²³⁹ then it must be rendered in a language that belongs to many, and not merely to the few specialists who are already familiar with the work in question.

²³⁹ See Geertz 2000: 54.

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{ PART II }

The Translation

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Chapter One of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti*: Śiva and His Powers

(1) Homage to the Three-eyed [Śiva],¹ the source of the generation of all marvelous things, the one who creates the portrait of the universe on his own body, which is made of the ether of consciousness.²

(2–3) I have been urged by my son, named Vibhramākara, and his³ fellow student, called Padmānanda; (and) I am (therefore) composing the *Pada-saṅgati*⁴ on the treatise (entitled) “The *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*,” which was composed by my guru, the details of which I explained in my *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.⁵

¹Literally “uneven-eyed”, the present phrase is a reference to Śiva, who is said to have three eyes.

²The present verse is an auspicious, propitiatory verse (*maṅgala*) in praise of Śiva as the creator of the universe, one that notes that the universe exists as a part of Śiva in the form of consciousness. Madhusudan Kaul, the editor of the KSTS edition of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*, suggests that by referring to Śiva’s third eye, Utpaladeva reminds his reader that it is only with this special form of vision that one can see the ultimate unity of the universe. See Kaul’s note 1, p. 1 of the KSTS edition: *viṣamacakṣuṣe iti yad dhi pramāṇaprameyalakṣaṇam viśvaṃ tad bhedābhāṣena mithyaiyeti netradvīṭayena dyotyate bhagavatā. paramārthatas tadvattāyām api svātmasphurattāmātrarūpaivād asya viśvasya na kāpi bhedakalaṅkadoṣakalpaneti ṛṭīyanetreṇa dyotyata iti. tac ca bhagavata evānyasya tu na bhedādhiṣṭhāṭvād iti. Cf. ŚSū 1.14: dr̥ṣyam śariram. This may be translated: “The body is the perceptible [universe].”*

³It is possible that *sabrahmacārin* in the fourth *pāda* of Utpaladeva’s second introductory verse refers to Utpaladeva’s fellow student and not to Utpaladeva’s son’s fellow student.

⁴The *Padasaṅgati* is the name of Utpaladeva’s commentary on the ŚD, regularly referred to in this book by its commonly accepted name, the *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti* (ŚDVṛ). See Maheśvarānanda’s commentary (the *Parimala*) on his own *Mahārthamañjarī*, commentary on verse 19, where he refers to it by that name. (See Dwiveda 1972: 52.) Cf. note 11 in the Introduction to the present volume.

⁵Utpaladeva’s mention here of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* should be taken to refer not only to his verse text, the ĪPK, but also to his short and long auto-commentaries, the ĪPVṛ and the ĪPT. Later in this chapter, in commenting on verses 1.13cd–17 of Somānanda’s text, Utpaladeva refers explicitly to the ĪPT, and Pandey cites this passage as proof that Utpaladeva wrote the *kārikās* and their commentaries before he wrote his commentary on the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*. See Pandey [1963] 2000: 164.

I.I

The author pays homage to his chosen deity in a manner appropriate to the learned work under discussion.⁶

1.1. *asmadrūpasamāviṣṭaḥ svātmanātmanivāraṇe
śivaḥ karotu nijayā namaḥ śaktyā tatātmane*

May Śiva, who has penetrated my form by warding himself off by means of his own self, pay homage to his (all-)extensive self by means of his own power.⁷

I, who pay homage, am Śiva, who has attained unity with my form, for in reality Śiva's form, in the manner that will be explained,⁸ is that of all the *tattvas*.⁹ He makes entities appear to be located outside of himself for the sake of the world of transmigration, in the way explained in greater detail in my *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, by not perceiving (his) unity (with those entities) as a result of the power of *māyā*.¹⁰

⁶That is to say that he does so in accordance with the non-dual Śaiva philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā.

⁷ŚD 1.1 is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 56 of Singh's edition). The same is also quoted at MM 6. Cf. also ĪPK 4.1 for a parallel passage to ŚD 1.1.

⁸This is the subject of the first chapter of the text. See in particular, ŚD 1.29cd–33. See also ĪPK 3.1.2–11.

⁹The exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound, *sarvatattvavigraha*, refers in a technical sense to the thirty-six *tattvas*; it also could be rendered more idiomatically to suggest the less technical notion that Śiva is one "in the form of all reality." Cf. ĪPK 4.14 for reference to Śiva as full of the (infinite) *tattvas*.

¹⁰Utpaladeva explains worldly manifestation in terms of the dual polarities of *prakāśa* and *vimarsa*, and he describes the process of manifestation in particular in terms of the apparent internality and externality of phenomena, the latter of which is caused by the power of illusion (*māyā*). For reference to the power of *māyā* in the creation of worldly phenomena, see ĪPVṛ 1.4.8, where Utpaladeva states that *māyā* causes agents and objects of experience to appear distinct, and ĪPK 1.8.7 (and the *Vṛtti* thereon), where he suggests that it causes appearances (*ābhāsas*) to seem external to Śiva. Utpaladeva also refers to *māyā* as that which obscures one's recognition of Śiva-nature (ĪPVṛ 1.1.3 and ĪPVṛ 1.1.5). Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.89–91, where he refers to the power of *māyā* as the noncognition of Śiva's non-duality: *māyāśaktyā śivābheda-khyātyā*. Utpaladeva also suggests that *māyā* causes consciousness to appear as cognition, imagination, etc. (ĪPK 1.5.18). In ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.5.21, he further suggests that it is *māyā* that causes consciousness to appear to be spatially and temporally divided. In ĪPK 1.6.4–5 (and in the *Vṛtti* on the same), he suggests that *māyā* causes Śiva to identify his sense of self with entities such as the physical body, etc., and in 1.6.7, he suggests that it is by dint of *māyā* that Maheśvara penetrates (*āviśat*) into and creates limited agents. Finally, he suggests that *māyā* is the source of the individual's impurities in ĪPK 3.2.5. Cf., also, ŚSū 3.3: *kalādīnām tattvānām aviveko māyā*. "Māyā is the lack of understanding of the *tattvas* beginning with *kalā*."

This extensive reference to the power of *māyā* is almost entirely missing from the ŚD itself. Somānanda rather speaks of Śiva's nature as consciousness and as manifesting itself in the form of multiple realities. This he does through his threefold powers of will, cognition, and action, along with *aunmukhya* and *nirvṛti*; Somānanda does not resort to the concept of *māyā* to explain the apparent multiplicity of the world, this being of course the nature of his strict pantheism, explained in detail in the Introduction to the present volume. Note that the KSTS edition, leaving out a hyphen at the end of the line in question, prints *īśvarapratyabhijñā prapañcitanāyāna*, which must be read as a single compound.

After that,¹¹ wishing further to establish some of those [entities], the breath and so on,¹² as the kind of cognitive agent in worldly activities¹³ that has my form, he sees them, which were made distinct and are objects of cognition, as different from pots, cloth, etc.,¹⁴ as not different from himself, and he penetrates them. This is what [Somānanda] says.

In addition, accomplishment is possible only to the extent to which it is made possible by penetration.¹⁵ To start with, the first [penetration] is the connection with (the powers of) cognition and action conformable to agency,¹⁶ as it is stated in the *Spandaśāstra*:¹⁷

¹¹This is to say that this occurs following the appearance of worldly entities as apparently distinct from Śiva. Note that Kaul glosses *tataḥ* with *anātmasthatve*, which is presumably a locative absolute. There are therefore two stages to this process of manifestation, according to Utpaladeva, as was explained in the Introduction (section 6): Śiva first manifests a world of entities that appears to be separated from his all-pervasive self. Then, he divides these apparently distinct entities into agents (*pramātr̥s*) and insentient entities, and he “penetrates” (*samāviśati*) the agents in order to animate them. One could interpret ĪPK 4.2 (and the *Vṛtti* on the same) also to suggest that there are two stages of manifestation, the first involving the appearance of worldly phenomena and the second involving the development of the individual agent’s (false) sense of self. Utpaladeva there suggests that the sense of self is manifested by Śiva in the manifested, objective world: *tatra svasṛṣṭedambhāge buddhyādi grāhakātmanā / ahamkāraparāmarśapadaṃ nītam anena tat*.

¹²This is a reference to the four entities that, according to Utpaladeva, are falsely perceived as the self: the body (*deha*), the intellect (*buddhi*), the life-breath (*prāṇa*), and the void (*śūnya*). Regarding the last of these, *śūnya* is the state in which the intellect, the mind, the senses, etc., are all absent. It is a state in which, in deep sleep, nothing whatsoever is experienced except the void itself. (See Torella 1994: 203.) Thus, Utpaladeva refers to the list with “the breath and so on” in order to suggest the various levels below that of the void, or in other words to refer to the various entities who are not entirely aware of their Śiva-nature. Cf. ĪPK 1.6.4–5, 3.1.8, 3.1.9, and 3.2.13, as well as the corresponding passages of the *Vṛtti*.

¹³As Kaul notes, Utpaladeva here implies that an agent of cognition can only exist when an object of cognition exists: *prameyabhedenaiḥ pramātr̥bheda ity āśayaṃ śucayati lokayātr̥sṅv ityādinā*.

¹⁴According to the Pratyabhijñā everything is made up of consciousness, and all worldly entities appear as objects of Śiva’s cognitive awareness (*prameya*). Here, Utpaladeva distinguishes between worldly entities that appear in the form of cognizing agents (*pramātr̥s*) and entities that do not. In contrast to pots, etc., Śiva is said to penetrate the entities that appear as cognizing agents.

¹⁵The meaning of this sentence remains slightly obscure, but it seems to refer to the fact that individual, worldly agents are capable of cognition and action only to the degree to which they are “penetrated” by Śiva. Utpaladeva thus seems to suggest that the *samāveśa* described in the *maṅgala* verse is central to all successful action, and as such it is more pervasive than the verse states explicitly.

¹⁶There are four levels of penetration (*samāveśa*) according to Utpaladeva, corresponding to the four levels to which Śiva contracts himself, namely, at the level of the void (*śūnya*), the vital breath (*prāṇa*), the intellect (*buddhi*), and the body (*deha*). Śiva alone performs every action, but he does so by contracting his self-awareness, this by identifying with a limited agency at one of these four levels. Possession is “the state in which the pure agency of consciousness reasserts itself within them, revealing their dependence on it.” See Sanderson 1986: 176–177. Here, Utpaladeva refers to the first level, that of identification with the body. At this level, Śiva’s powers of cognition and action are manifested, and, quoting the SpKā in support of his argument, Utpaladeva suggests that the individual operates at this level by dint of the very presence of Śiva within him, as his own self. It is to this fact that Utpaladeva refers when he mentions that the first *samāveśa* is constituted by a connection with the powers of cognition and action that are present in the limited individual. (See ĪPK 3.2.11–12, ĪPV and ĪPVV on 3.2.12, and Torella 1994: xxxii.)

Note that Utpaladeva emphasizes the powers of cognition and action over and above the power of will (*icchā*), the latter having a less prominent place in the way in which he explains the Pratyabhijñā. See ĪPK 1.1.2, where he refers to Maheśvara as the *kartr̥* and *jñātr̥*, and compare to NP 1.2, quoted in note 102, section 7 of the Introduction. Cf. ĪPK 1.1.4, where he refers to cognition and action as the life-force of living beings; ĪPK 1.1.5; ĪPK 4.15; ŚŚū 1.13 and 3.41, and SpKā 33.

¹⁷See SpKā 8.

Indeed, the individual does not function by dispatching the impulse of (his) will, but rather, because of (his) contact with his own power, he becomes equal to it.¹⁸

It is similarly stated elsewhere that “(all) activity is the Lord’s.”¹⁹ With this doctrine,²⁰ he implies the following as well: for the sake of (acquiring) the various kinds of powers, one must also practice more penetration through one’s

¹⁸Following Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa’s commentary, I take this verse to mean that the individual in the world, the everyman, does not act simply as a limited agent, directing his will to perform this or that function. Rather, he operates by first having identified with his true nature as Śiva (ŚD 1.2). It is only by identifying with his power that an individual may act, for it is through this contact that the senses acquire cognitive power. As Dyczkowski (1987: 152) notes, this implies that the senses give one contact with a world that is projected outward from within oneself; it is not a world that is external to the self, as the source of the contents of consciousness is ultimately Śiva himself, who is ultimately the one who extends and withdraws the very senses of the individual subject. In a word, Utpaladeva quotes this verse to suggest that human beings are cognizant of and act in the world only insofar as they are penetrated by Śiva himself. See SpKāVṛ ad SpKā 8: *na cecchāpreṣaṇena karaṇāni preṣayati, api tu svasvarūpe sthītvā kevalam yādṛṣi tasyecchā pravartate tathāvidham eva sa bāhyāntaraṃ kāryam utpādayati. tena na karaṇaviṣayam eva sāmāthyam, kintu tasya sarvatra*. Note that Kṣemarāja’s commentary on the *kārikā* suggests essentially the same thing. Cf. SpNir ad SpKā 8: *ayaṃ laukikaḥ puruṣa icchaiva nodanaṃ pratodas tasya prerakatvena karaṇapravartanārthavyāpāraṇāya yasmān na pravartate, api tv ātmanaś cidrūpasya yad balaṃ spandatattvātmakam tatsparsāt tatkrīṭāt kiyaṃmātrād āveśāt tatsamo bhavet, ahantārasaviprudabhiṣekād acetano ’pi cetanātām āśādayaty eva*.

This verse should be read in the context of the preceding two (SpKā 6–7): “That principle [*tattva*] should be examined with great care and reverence by which this group of senses, though insentient, acts as a sentient force by itself, and along with the inner group of senses, goes towards objects, takes pleasure in their maintenance, and withdraws into itself, because this natural freedom of it prevails everywhere” (*yataḥ karaṇavargo ’yaṃ vimūḍho ’mūdhavat svayam / sahāntarena cakreṇa pravṛtisthītisamhṛtiḥ // labhate tat prayatnena parikṣyaṃ tattvam ādarāt / yataḥ svatantratā tasya sarvatreyam akṛtrimā*). The translation is Singh’s, for which, see Singh 1994: 51. Finally, see Dyczkowski 1992¹: 86–87.

¹⁹This quotation may have a more technical meaning in that it might also refer to the *īśvaratattva*, the fourth of thirty-six *tattvas*. At this level, the power of action (*kriyā*) is manifested. At the level of the third *tattva*, the *sadāśivatattva*, the power of cognition (*jñāna*) is manifested. Thus, to say that activity is related to the *īśvaratattva* is to suggest that it exists at an ontological level prior and superior to the manifestation of individual, human agents, which is precisely the point emphasized in SpKā 8. The source of this quotation is unknown to me.

²⁰There are two possible interpretations of *anayaiva dṛṣṭyā*. The first, which I have accepted in this translation, is to take it simply as a connective phrase that should not be read as a part of the *iti* clause. In this interpretation, *anayaiva dṛṣṭyā*, “with this doctrine,” refers to the fact that Śiva penetrates and thereby animates the individual agent. In other words, insofar as Śiva has penetrated the individual, the individual must, like Śiva, practice penetration (*samāveśa*) in order to increase his or her power. The second interpretation, following Kaul, takes *anayaiva dṛṣṭyā* as a part of the *iti* clause and interprets it to mean that one should penetrate everything with, by means of, the very same form of seeing by which Śiva cognizes his identity with the distinct objects of cognition. For this interpretation, see Kaul’s note 1, p. 3 of the KSTS edition: *yathā bhinnikṛtān api prāṇādīn prameyān ātmābhedenā paśyati tathāiva sarvaṃ api vyāpyam ity arthah*.

own effort. He also says that both Śiva and (individuals,) Devadatta, etc., are penetrated, because they both become unified in the same way.²¹

May Śiva, thus qualified,²² pay homage to his (all-)extensive self, i.e., to the one called Paramaśiva, whose nature is (the same as) his own, whose expansion is limitless because he comes forth as the Lord Sadāśiva in the form of the *parāparā* (condition), etc.²³ The imperative verbal suffix²⁴ is in the sense of a summons, etc., like the verb “homage” in “homage to you.”²⁵ That means: “May we, being Śiva, pay homage to the Supreme Lord.” He uses the third person, which refers to someone other than himself,²⁶ in order to show that the artificial sense of self has mere agency as its nature, since it does not have any specific form.²⁷

²¹It is a common doctrine in the non-dual Śaivism of Kashmir that “penetration” (*āveśa*, *samāveśa*) is both active and passive: the terms refer to the penetration of and the being penetrated by a single entity. In this passage, Utpaladeva suggests that both meanings are implied in the invocatory verse. See Torella 1994: xxxii.

²²The term here translated, *tathāvīdha*, refers to Śiva’s acquisition of Somānanda’s human form; it refers to the fact that the verse describes Śiva as *asmadrūpasamāviṣṭa*, one who has “penetrated my [Somānanda’s] form.” Note that the term in question, *samāviṣṭa* can be both active and passive.

²³This is a reference to the act (*kriyā*) of manifestation, beginning with the *sadāśivatattva*, the third of the thirty-six *tattvas*. (Note that two manuscripts, P and R, explicitly refer to this action: they read *parā-pararūpabhagavatsadāśivādīkriyāprasaraṇamukha* for *parāpararūpabhagavatsadāśivādīprasaraṇamukha*.) It is at this level that the first distinction between subject and object is manifested, but coarse forms, distinct entities such as pots, do not appear at this level. The subject-object distinction is here rather more mental than physical in form. As such, it is considered to be a level intermediate to the supreme (*parā*) condition, which is associated with Śiva’s quiescent state, as it were, and the mundane condition (*aparā*) of the everyday world, in which the apparent duality of the universe is fully manifested. See ŚD 1.5–6ab and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereon for further mention of the same. Cf. Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.29cd–33.

²⁴This is *loṭ*, Pāṇini’s term for the imperative. *Karotu* is the third-person, singular form of the imperative of the verb *kr*: “make, do.”

²⁵This is to say that the verb directs the practitioner to pay homage rather than merely indicating, as the grammar of the verse would suggest, Śiva’s act of obeisance. See A 3.3.162: *loṭ ca*. Kaul explains by quoting the following verse, which is a variation of VP 3.7.126: “Loṭ [the imperative] for verbs such as *prach* [to ask] is enjoined with respect to those [agents] who have not undertaken (the act in question). *Ṇic* [the causative] is enjoined for those [agents] who have undertaken (the act in question)” (*apavr̥ttasya hi praiṣe pr̥cchyāder loṭ vidhiyate/ prav̥ttasya yadā praiṣas tadā sa viṣayo ṇicah*). VP 3.7.126 reads: *dravyamātrasya tu praiṣe pr̥cchyāder loṭ vidhiyate/ sakriyasya prayogas tu yadā sa viṣayo ṇicah*. Kaul’s conclusion is that, “For this reason, one should not mistakenly think that somebody else is enjoined here by the word *karotu*” (*tena karotu ity atrāṇyaprerkatvam iti na bhramitavyam*).

²⁶Literally, *paratvena* means “as another.” That is to say that the use of the third-person form of the verb (*karotu*) refers to someone other than the one who is speaking. (One normally expects an author to use the first-person form of the verb in a *maṅgala* verse.)

²⁷Because invocatory verses more commonly are composed in the first-person, Utpaladeva here comments on Somānanda’s use of the third person, suggesting that he uses it to underscore the fact that the individual practitioner is identical with Śiva. Śiva generates the agent’s limited and artificial sense of self by directing his consciousness to recognize just such limited agency, as Utpaladeva referred to earlier in his commentary on ŚD 1.1, beginning with: “After that, wishing further to establish.” So to be a limited agent is merely to act, because there is no distinct nature—no ultimate and autonomous existence—associated with limited agency (which is, ultimately speaking, nonexistent, after all) other than the fact of being one who acts. And since there is only one agent, Śiva, to act is to be Śiva. A “limited” agent is thus in reality no one but Śiva, the one and only actor, and therefore Somānanda employed the third-person, and not the first-person, form of the verb in the opening verse of the ŚD.

Moreover, because everything is composed of Śiva, the means of action in homage—speech, the mind, etc.—are also nothing but Śiva. For this reason, he says, “by means of his own self.”

The obstacles that are to be warded off also have nothing but his nature. Therefore, he says, “by warding himself off,” and he says “by means of his own power” because in homage the power of one’s will, etc., are associated with Śiva himself.

This [verse] shows that all actions, such as moving or eating, along with their *kāraṅgas*²⁸ and their fruits, should be understood in the very same way.²⁹

1.2

Now, [Somānanda] introduces,³⁰ in brief, the meaning of the entire teaching, accompanied by the reasoning (involved in it).³¹

1.2. *ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu sphuran nirvṛtaḥ vibhuḥ
aniruddhechchāprasaraḥ prasaraḥ prakriyāḥ śivaḥ*

Śiva is the very self appearing in all entities, whose consciousness is delighted, the all-encompassing one, whose will expands unchecked, (and) whose cognition and action are expanding.³²

That one should say that Śiva is the very self in all entities is the proposition.³³ The series of adjectives beginning with “whose consciousness is delighted” is

²⁸The *kāraṅgas*, according to Pāṇinian grammar, correspond closely with the various components that make up action, the instrument, the agent, the object, etc. On the role of the *kāraṅgas* in tantrism, see TĀ 15.148ff., where Abhinavagupta equates Śiva with all of the six *kāraṅgas*. See, also, ĪPK 2.2.6.

²⁹This is to say that all actions, like the aforementioned, exemplary act of worship, emanate from Śiva in the form of, by means of, and in view of Śiva.

³⁰The verb *pratijānīte* is etymologically linked to the noun *pratijñā* and implies, as the latter term denotes, the matter to be proven in a logical syllogism. Here, the verb has the same flavor: it suggests that the following verse will state that which Somānanda wishes to establish in his treatise.

³¹The term translated here, *sayuktika*, refers to the fact that, in the following verse, Somānanda hints at the logical argument he will present in defending his theology. Utpaladeva fleshes out this argument in his commentary following the verse.

³²ŚD 1.2 is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 39 of Singh’s edition), with a variant reading (also attested in two manuscripts, P and R) of *vapuḥ* for *vibhuḥ* (ŚD 1.2b). Perhaps there is a faint echo of VBh 100 in this verse: *ciddharmā sarvadeheṣu viśeṣo nāsti kutracit / ataś ca tanmayam sarvaṃ bhāvayan bhavajij janaḥ*.

³³Utpaladeva here interprets Somānanda’s verse by suggesting that a logical syllogism is implicit in it. He here mentions the proposition (*pratijñā*) of the argument. Here and in what follows, Utpaladeva appears to furnish only a two-membered logical syllogism, including only the proposition and the reason (*hetu*), this in accordance with the expectations outlined by the Buddhist epistemologists. (I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer of the present manuscript for clarifying this point.) The Hindu Naiyāyika syllogism is traditionally one of five members. The five members of the Naiyāyika’s syllogism are: (1) the *pratijñā* or proposition: “there is fire on the mountain”; (2) the *hetu* or reason: “because there is smoke there”; (3) the *dr̥ṣṭānta* or example: “where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the hearth of the kitchen”; (4) the *upanaya* or recapitulation of the cause: “the mountain smokes”; (5) the *nigamana* or conclusion: “therefore, there is fire on the mountain.” Note that the present passage is not a proof of Śiva’s identity with self, but rather it argues that one must *speak* of Śiva as the self existing in all entities; it thus assumes the identity of Śiva and the self.

the reason. “Appearing” indicates that the self-awareness form of direct perception³⁴ proves the reason, as well as that in which the reason appears.³⁵ For this reason, “appearing” is a separate word.³⁶ Moreover, he also shows by implication that the fact of being one “whose consciousness is delighted,” etc., this being Śīva’s nature, is characteristic of Śīva.³⁷ And, once this scope³⁸ is established, it is established that one can simply refer to that which has those characteristics as Śīva-nature, according to the stages articulated in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.³⁹ Moreover, the way in which consciousness, delight, will, cognition, and action appear in every entity appearing (in experience), down to a pot or a cloth, will

Compare the present passage with Abhinavagupta’s description of the argument of Utpaladeva’s ĪPK: *tad ayaṃ pramātā jñānakriyāśaktiyogād īśvara iti vyavahartavyaḥ purāṇāgamādiprasiddheśvaravat; tadaprasiddhāv api sarvaviśayaajñānakriyāśaktimativasabhāvam evaiśvaryaṃ tanmātrānubandhitvād eva siddham; tad api ca kalpīteśvare rājādau tathā vyāptigrahaṇāt, yo yāvati jñātā kartā ca sa tāvatiśvaro rājeva, anīśvarasya jñātrīvakartṛtve svabhāvaviruddhe yataḥ, ātmā ca viśvatra jñātā kartā ceti siddhā pratyabhijñā*. (See ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.1.3.) Lawrence suggests that “This may be put formally as follows: (1) The subject is the Lord. (2) Because he/she has the Cognition and Action Powers. (3) Whoever has Cognition and Action powers is Lord. Like the Lord known in the Purāṇas and scriptures, and like the King. (4) The subject, since he/she has them, is the Lord. (5) The subject is the Lord.” See Lawrence 1999: 49–57, esp. 55. Compare also to ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.1.2, where Utpaladeva argues that, since the self possesses the powers of cognition and action, proven through inner awareness, one should not attempt either to prove or disprove the existence of God: *sarveṣāṃ svātmanah sarvārthasiddhisamāśrayasya tattatsarvārthasādhanānyathānupapattiyā kroḍhiktasiddheḥ svaprakāśasya pramātrekavapuṣaḥ pūrvasiddhasya purāṇasya jñānam kriyā ca. svasaṃvedanasiddham evaiśvaryaṃ, teneśvarasya siddhau nirākarane ca jaḍānām evodyamaḥ*.

³⁴I understand *svasaṃvedanapratyākṣa* to be a descriptive (*karmadhāraya*) compound: “the perception that is one’s self-awareness.” Cf. also, e.g., ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.1.3, where Utpaladeva refers to *svasaṃvedana* as the means of proving Īśvara: *kevalam ayaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhasyāpīśvarasya . . .*

³⁵Here Utpaladeva suggests that the *svasaṃvedana* form of cognition is the valid means of knowledge that proves that a logical inference is appropriate in this context. This, in turn, depends on the formulation of this idea as it is found in the writings of the Buddhist epistemologists. The idea is that all cognitions are simultaneously self-conscious: all cognitions involve the awareness of themselves. Utpaladeva’s argument therefore seems to revolve around the idea that there is an agent who experiences all of the cognitions in question, the agent being Śīva, of course. By this logic, the proposition (*pratijñā*)—that Śīva is the “self” in all entities—is proven by the experience that occurs in the *ātman*: there is a real agent there who experiences the self-luminosity of consciousness. The same *svasaṃvedana* also proves that the experiences in question, the delighted condition, etc., appear in the self under consideration. Utpaladeva makes a similar point regarding the role of *svasaṃvedana* in proving the nature of Śīva in his ĪPV, for which see ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.1.2, 1.1.3, and 1.1.5. Cf., also, ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.3.2, where Utpaladeva describes the nature of cognitions as self-aware. On *svasaṃvedana* in the theories of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, see Dunne 2004: 391, fn. 1, and 276–278. Cf. Hattori 1968: 100–101, fn. 1.60 and 104–106, fn. 1.64; Stcherbatsky [1930–1932] 1993, vol. 1: 163–169.

³⁶In other words, one should not understand *sphurannirvṛtacīdvibhuḥ* to be a single compound. The implication is that *sphurat* is not part of the series of adjectives expressing the reason (*hetu*) of the proposition.

³⁷Utpaladeva should therefore be understood here to suggest that the Śīva-nature of Śīva himself is identical to that of the *ātman*.

³⁸*Viśaya* refers to the “scope” of the definitions of Śīva (*śivalakṣaṇa*). In other words, the language used to describe Śīva’s nature is the same language that can be applied to the self appearing in all entities.

³⁹The “stages” that Utpaladeva mentions refer to the process by which Śīva appears as the very self or essence of all entities. As in the ŚD, the ĪPK accounts for worldly appearances by suggesting they appear in the form of Śīva’s consciousness. The differences between Utpaladeva’s arguments and those of Somānanda have been described in the Introduction.

be discussed later on.⁴⁰ He will (also) mention later on, in the manner stated in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, that the five powers are associated with the agents of cognition who act in the world⁴¹ in the *parāparā* condition and below, because the powers and the one possessing the powers are not different, and because there is only one who possesses them.⁴²

Nirvṛtacit is an exocentric compound meaning “whose consciousness is delighted,” that is, is not wishing for any object of knowledge, i.e., is complete, and he is the all-encompassing one, that is, the one who has internalized every object of cognition. *Aniruddhecchāprasara* is an exocentric compound meaning “whose will expands unchecked.” *Prasaraddṛkkriya* is an exocentric compound meaning “whose *dṛk*—that is, cognition—and action are expanding.” Śiva, having these attributes, is the very self in everything.

1.3–4

Thus, since it is established in one’s own awareness that everything has Śiva as its form, it is only how one should speak of this that has to be proven. This being so, to repudiate the opposing doctrines of those who speak for other points of view,⁴³ [Somānanda] begins to explain that Śiva-nature, having such a form,⁴⁴ exists equally from the *parā* condition down to the level of pots, cloth, and so on:⁴⁵

⁴⁰This discussion begins with ŚD 1.24. Note that Somānanda has referred to all of the aforementioned powers in the *pratijñā* verse itself: he mentions delighted consciousness (*nirvṛtacit*), which implies the powers of consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*), the power of will (*aniruddhecchā*), and the powers of cognition (*dṛk = jñāna*) and action (*prasaraddṛkkriya*). Elsewhere in the ŚD, he regularly refers only to the triad of powers, the *śaktitraya* of will, cognition, and action. See the Introduction, section 7.

⁴¹The term here translated with “the agents of cognition who act in the world” is *vyavahartṛpramātr*. I understand the present term to be a descriptive (*karmadhāraya*) compound.

⁴²Śiva is identical with his powers, and every agent is ultimately Śiva. Therefore, Śiva is present, as are his powers, in every agent at every level of existence. In ŚD 1.29cd–33, Somānanda enumerates the various types of agents (*pramātrṣ*), mentioning their relationship to Śiva’s five powers. In doing so, he illustrates the manner in which they are all ultimately Śiva himself. For a discussion of the various agents at the various levels of the *parāparā* and *aparā* conditions, see ĪPK 3.2.1–20 esp. 3.2.6–9. Finally, for mention of the identity of the powers and the one possessing them, see, e.g., ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.5, as well as the Introduction to the present volume.

⁴³By glossing *vādyantaravimatim* with *vedāntānām bhinnavedyavādinām ca*, Kaul suggests that Somānanda’s primary opponent is the Vedānta. Judging the relative strength of his opponents by the amount of space devoted to refuting their philosophical positions, however, it may be clearly said that the Vedānta is a minor concern in the ŚD, and, moreover, that Somānanda’s main opponents are Bhartṛhari and the grammarians, and the Śāktas who subscribed to their philosophical position, or something close to it (about which see the Introduction). Somānanda also criticizes (non-Śāṅkara forms of) the Vedānta in ŚD 6.6–15. Other opponents mentioned in the text include the Mīmāṃsakas (ŚD 3.63–68ab, 4.40), the Sāṅkhyas (ŚD 6.27), the Pāñcarātrikas (ŚD 5.15–18ab), the Vaiśeṣikas (ŚD 4.38) and “Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas” (ŚD 6.28), the Cārvākas (6.88), the Vijñānavādins (ŚD 4.25–31, 6.33–87), and other Buddhists (ŚD 4.39, 6.32).

⁴⁴That is, having the form described in ŚD 1.2.

⁴⁵In other words, Śiva-nature (*śivatā*) exists equally in the *parā*, *parāparā*, and *aparā* conditions, the last being the condition in which pots, etc., are manifested.

- 1.3. *sa yadāste cidāhlādamātrānubhavatallayaḥ
tadicchā tāvatī tāvaj jñānaṃ tāvat kriyā hi sā*
1.4. *susūkṣmaśaktitritayasāmarasyena vartate
cidrūpāhlādaparamo nirvibhāgaḥ paras tadā*

When he remains absorbed in the experience of nothing but the bliss of consciousness—since his will, cognition, and action are so great⁴⁶—at that time, due to the state of unity of the three very subtle powers, he is paramount in the delight of consciousness, nondistinct, (and) supreme.⁴⁷

As long as the erroneous condition of the world of transmigration, in which Śiva's oneness is not recognized, does not arise, Śiva-nature is "so great," i.e., is as it is described earlier.⁴⁸ Accordingly, all five powers definitely exist, although in a unified form, at that time, since they are able to produce the objects associated with worldly activity.⁴⁹

For instance,⁵⁰ in the *parāparā* condition, *prakāśa*, which consists of the inherent reflective awareness "I,"⁵¹ is independent, has a blissful form because

⁴⁶*Tadicchā tāvatī tāvaj jñānaṃ tāvat kriyā hi sā* may be more literally translated, "since his will is so great, (his) cognition is so great, (and his) action is so great." This is meant to suggest that the three powers are as described in ŚD 1.2. His will expands unchecked (*aniruddhechchāprasara*), and his powers of cognition and action are expanding (*prasaraḍḍḥkriyā*). Utpaladeva suggests that the use of these pronouns indicates that the powers appear sequentially. See the commentary, below.

⁴⁷Here, I follow Gnoli's translation in part: "When He is in the form of a lysis in the experience of his conscious beatitude to the exclusion of all else—in this state, indeed, He is at once will, knowledge, and action—then these three powers, which are in their most subtle form, are in a state of perfect union within Him. In this state, Śiva is freed of distinctions, resolved in His conscious beatitude, in His supreme form." See Gnoli 1957: 19. These two verses are also quoted by Abhinavagupta in MŚV 22cd–24ab. See Hannerer 1998: 62–63. They are also quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 62 of Singh's edition). Cf., also, ŚSū 1.6: *śakticakrasaṃdhāne viśvasaṃhāraḥ*. "The universe is contracted when the wheel of powers is united."

⁴⁸See Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 1.2, where he interprets the verse in question to refer to Śiva as possessing delighted consciousness, etc.

⁴⁹The pentad of powers are at rest, in unity, prior to the manifestation of the universe, and they manifest the universe when they are active. As Kaul notes, because a cause can be inferred from its effect, and because one can experience the phenomenal world, one can infer that the powers that create that world exist prior to its creation. See Kaul's note 5, p. 6 of the KSTS edition: *kāryeṇa kāraṇānumānam*.

⁵⁰As Kaul notes, Utpaladeva here begins with the *parāparā* condition, the first condition manifested after the *parā* condition, in the process of building the argument that all conditions equally are possessed of the same Śiva-nature (*śivatā*) that exists at the highest level. Kaul says: "Here [Somānanda] considers first of all that the *parāparā* condition has consciousness and bliss as its nature" (*tatrāḍau parāparāvasthāyās cidānandatām samarthayati*).

⁵¹The theological view mentioned here is central to the Pratyabhijñā as Utpaladeva articulated it and is by now rather well known. It is the doctrine that, by nature, the universe is made up of Śiva's consciousness, which consists of both the light of consciousness (*prakāśa*) and its self-awareness or self-revealing aspect (*vimarśa*). Here, the term *pratyavamarśa* is used essentially synonymously for *vimarśa*, excepting that, as Torella notes, it emphasizes slightly the notion of "introjection and return to the subject." (See Torella 1994: xxiv n.) This consciousness sees itself in the form of the universe, as a supreme self or "I" that is identical to the individual self or *ātman*. For more on the nature of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, see Dyczkowski 1987: 59–75.

it is complete,⁵² and is made up of delighted consciousness.⁵³ The very same⁵⁴ is independence, the principal nature of Śiva.

He expresses this with *cidāhlādamātrānubhavatallaya*, an exocentric compound meaning: “one whose experience, that is, whose shining forth, is in nothing but the bliss of complete consciousness and not in an external entity, and for that very reason⁵⁵ is absorbed in the same.” With this, he has described “whose consciousness is delighted.”⁵⁶ As for will, cognition, and action, they become apparent in relation to different objects, etc.⁵⁷

In the *parā* condition, on the other hand, his true nature shines forth simply as “I am complete.”⁵⁸ By shining forth as such, it is itself a cognition; because it is in the form of an apprehension,⁵⁹ the very same is an action; (and) will is also fully established as his nature, because he⁶⁰ agrees to it.⁶¹ That is why he says “his will is so great.”⁶²

⁵²It is possible that *pūrṇatva* should be taken with what precedes it: “it is independent because it is complete.”

⁵³Utpaladeva wishes to indicate that all of Śiva’s powers exist in the *parāparā* condition. He here refers to the powers of consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*), the first two of the five powers. He deals with the remaining three powers, will, cognition and action, below. (Cf. also ŚD 1.2b: *sphuran nirvṛtaciḍ vibhuh*.) Though Somānanda consistently refers to three powers, he—according to Utpaladeva, at least—implicitly refers to the presence of the remaining two with the term *nirvṛtaciḍ*. (Cf. the Introduction, section 7.) For Utpaladeva’s definition of the *parāparā* condition, see ĪPK 3.1.5 and the ĪPVṛ on the same.

⁵⁴This refers to *prakāśa*.

⁵⁵Since one only experiences one’s own consciousness, one is absorbed in it and in nothing else.

⁵⁶See ŚD 1.2. This suggests that the term *nirvṛtaciḍ* refers both to Śiva’s absorption in his own nature and to the joyous experience he has therein. Both of these ideas are captured in the word *nirvṛta*, which suggests something complete, quiescent and joyous.

⁵⁷In other words, these powers cause distinct forms to appear, this beginning subtly in the *parāparā* condition and in coarse form in the *aparā* condition. However, they exist in an unmanifested unity in the *parā* condition.

⁵⁸See also ĪPV ad ĪPK 4.14 for a description of the *parā* condition.

⁵⁹I am unsure of my translation of *saṃrambharūpatva*. The word *saṃrambha* suggests active energy, even anger, as well as the notion of a grasping or a laying hold of some object. The idea is that, insofar as consciousness grasps, apprehends, objects of cognition, it involves an action, the act of cognition.

⁶⁰This refers to Śiva.

⁶¹This is to say that Śiva agrees to perform the action in question.

⁶²This passage shows both that all of Śiva’s powers inhere in his very nature and that, in manifestation, each power is inherent in the one preceding it. Thus, Utpaladeva has said that action is derived from cognition, which in turn is derived from Śiva’s inherent nature (*svasva-bhāva*). Here, Utpaladeva seems to suggest that, in that the power of action (*kriyā*) is integral to Śiva’s nature, will, being integral to that—one has to will an act to perform it—is also inherent in Śiva.

One should note (as explained in the Introduction, section 6) that the commentary treats the text in an awkward manner: instead of dealing with these three powers in the order in which they appear in the text, Utpaladeva begins with the power of cognition, treating the power of will last, and one should note that this is a strategy he also employs in the ĪPK. (See ĪPK 1.1.2, 1.1.4–5.) In fact, Utpaladeva does not mention the power of will before 1.5.7, where he in essence makes the same point about manifestation that Somānanda asserts in this first chapter of the *Śivadṛṣṭi*: *cidātmaiva hi devo ’nāhsthītam icchāvasād bahiḥ / yogiva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet*.

Moreover, (the neuter) *tāvat* (ŚD 1.3d), which must be construed with (the feminine word) *kriyā*, denotes the nature.⁶³ Alternatively, the word *tāvat* in *tāvaj jñānam* (ŚD 1.3c), being in a transformed feminine gender, refers to *kriyā*, while the second *tāvat* near the end (ŚD 1.3d) means that a sequence (of powers) exists, beginning with the *parāparā* condition.⁶⁴

For the same reason,⁶⁵ it is appropriate to speak of (the existence of) will and the rest even when different objects do not exist,⁶⁶ because there is no change in the (aforementioned) agreement, shining forth, and apprehension insofar as they are always *prakāśa*.⁶⁷ He expresses this with “due to the state of unity of the three very subtle powers.”⁶⁸ The extreme subtlety (of the three powers) results from his not contemplating the distinctions (when he resides in the *parā* condition), since there is nothing to desire, etc. (in that condition.) For this very reason, he says that there is a state of unity of the powers, and he is paramount in the delight of consciousness because he is by nature the state of shining forth as nothing but complete consciousness.

This very state of being nondistinct, moreover, is called the supreme condition, because when he remains thus, he is supreme.⁶⁹

1.5–6ab

He (next) says that the aforementioned⁷⁰ Paraśiva condition, which is devoid of objects of cognition, etc.,⁷¹ and is pure, also exists in the other condition.⁷²

⁶³Utpaladeva here accounts for the word *tāvat* in ŚD 1.3d. He suggests that it appears in the neuter gender because it reflects the nature (*svarūpa*) of the entity in question, *kriyā*. Since *svarūpa* is a neuter word, Somānanda is justified in using the neuter form, *tāvat*. It may be that Somānanda uses the neuter form simply for metrical reasons, however.

⁶⁴In this alternative interpretation, Utpaladeva suggests that *tāvat* in ŚD 1.3c should be construed first with *jñāna* and then, by the rules of anaphora (*anuvṛtti*), it should be construed in the feminine gender with *kriyā*. Accounting for *tāvat* in ŚD 1.3d, Utpaladeva suggests that it indicates the sequentiality of the powers in the *parāparā* condition and below.

⁶⁵That is to say, given that these powers, by nature, exist in Śiva, the following obtains.

⁶⁶This is to say that it is appropriate to speak of their existence even in the *parā* condition.

⁶⁷In the *parā* condition, Śiva exists in a state characterized by the experience “I am complete.” Utpaladeva suggests that the three powers exist at this level because there is cognition there in the form of a “shining forth”; *kriyā* is implied in the cognitive act; and will is implied in that Śiva assents to the act in question—that is, he wishes to perceive that which he comes to know through the act in question. It is to these powers that he refers when he speaks of “agreement, shining forth, and apprehension.” (Cf. the explanation of Somānanda’s “Settled Opinion” [*śīdhānta*] in section 5 of the Introduction.) Thus Utpaladeva makes two points in this passage. The first is that the three powers, will, cognition, and action, exist even in Śiva’s supreme condition. The second is that these powers are, as it were, in a potential form in that condition. They exist there insofar as they are made up of *prakāśa*, but they are not yet in the process of producing worldly entities.

⁶⁸This is a reference to *susūkṣmaśaktitritayasāmarasya*, found in ŚD 1.4a.

⁶⁹Cf. ŚD 2.45cd and following for a discussion of whether the *paśyanti* of the grammarians’ system can be considered to be “nondistinct” (*nirvibhāgā*).

⁷⁰*Tathābhūta*^o in *tathābhūtajñeyādīsūnyasuddhaparaśivāvasthā* refers to the Śiva-nature (*śivatā*) described in ŚD 1.3–4, and my translation, although idiomatic, means to capture this fact.

⁷¹The word “etcetera” (*ādī*) in *tathābhūtajñeyādīsūnyasuddhaparaśivāvasthā* refers to cognition (*jñāna*) and the cognizer (*jñātr*). See Utpaladeva’s commentary, below: *jñānajñeyānābilajñātrsvarūpa-saṃsparsāḥ*.

⁷²This refers to the *aparā* condition.

- 1.5. *na paraṃ tadavasthāyāṃ vyavasthaisā vyavasthitā
yāvat samagrajñānāgrajñātr̥sparśāsv api*
1.6. *sthitaiva lakṣyate sā ca tadviśrāntīyā tathā phale*

This particular condition⁷³ is situated not only in that condition,⁷⁴ but it is fully established even at those levels at which there is contact with the cognizer prior to every cognition, and it also appears in the fruit⁷⁵ (of a cognition), because one rests there.⁷⁶

In this way, the restriction⁷⁷ exists not only when the *parāparā*, etc., are simply not manifested, but even in the *aparā* condition.⁷⁸ The *parā* condition also exists at those levels because, prior to any form of cognition, mental elaboration, etc.,⁷⁹ i.e., in the condition in which they are about to arise,⁸⁰ there necessarily is mutual contact, in their (shared) nature, of the cognition, the thing cognized, and the pure cognizer.⁸¹ Although, as with the state of deep sleep, the *parā*

⁷³The term *vyavasthā* refers to the condition in which Śiva is supreme (*para*), as Somānanda states in ŚD 1.3–4.

⁷⁴That is, at the level of Paraśiva, the *parā* condition (*parāvasthā*).

⁷⁵Utpaladeva interprets *phala* to refer either to the “result” of the cognition or the “conclusion” of the cognition. I have literally translated *phala* with “fruit” in an attempt to capture both of these meanings. See Utpaladeva’s commentary, below.

⁷⁶That is, one rests one’s awareness at the initial moment of cognition. See also: ŚD 1.7cd–8 and 1.9–11ab.

⁷⁷Utpaladeva here offers *niyama* as a synonym for Somānanda’s *vyavasthā*, which refers to the condition in which Śiva is supreme (*para*).

⁷⁸“*Parāparā*, etc.,” refers to the *parā* and the *parāparā* conditions. In other words, one counts the levels moving upward, as it were, excluding the coarse, *aparā* condition. Somānanda has discussed the Śiva-nature of the former in ŚD 1.3–4, and in his commentary on ŚD 1.3–4, Utpaladeva dealt with the same in relation to the *parāparā* condition.

⁷⁹Utpaladeva here refers to “mental elaboration” (*vikalpa*) as the first in a list of various types of cognition (*jñānas*). Mental elaboration is the form of cognition that takes as its object not some particular entity, such as a pot, but the general concept of the entity in question, the universal (*sāmānya*) notion “pot.” (See ĪPK 1.2.1–2 and Torella 1994: 215, fn. 21.) As such, it is the first cognition involving a complete distinction of subject and object in the cognizer’s awareness, as it is the first type of cognition to appear in the *aparā* condition. (See ĪPK 1.6.1 and Torella 1994: 128.) This definite cognition is also predicated on the agent of cognition recognizing the object in question, “jar” for example, as an entity that is different from other objects, “table” for example. (See ĪPK 1.6.3 and Torella 1994: 131.) The other major type of cognition in the *aparā* condition consists of the perception of the specific entity appearing in front of the cognizer (*svalakṣaṇa*), i.e., “this red pot.” Somānanda and Utpaladeva also consider the significance of this type of cognition in the grammarians’ theory of cognition, for which see ŚD 2.48cd–49, as well as the corresponding passages of the ŚDVṛ.

⁸⁰Utpaladeva here suggests that, prior to any cognition, the agent and object of cognition, as well as the cognition itself, must be undivided. Utpaladeva also addresses this issue in some detail in the ĪPK, although he does not explicitly refer to this moment prior to cognition. He instead addresses the issue in terms of the unity of the light of consciousness (*prakāśa*). See in particular ĪPK 1.8.10 where Utpaladeva refers to the unity of cognitions (*saṃvit*), based on the unity of *prakāśa*, which he identifies with the one, unitary cognitive agent (*pramātr̥*).

⁸¹I am not entirely sure of my translation of *jñānajñeyānābilajñātr̥svarūpasamsparsā*. Note that Utpaladeva uses similar language in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.23: *śivarūpasamsparsavirahitāḥ*.

condition does not exist at that time,⁸² since the condition of the cognizer is such that he possesses a subtle body, the *parā* condition nevertheless exists when he rests somewhere on the parts prior to cognition.⁸³

Note that [the cognizer] does not rest at the level of the means of knowledge, either, because he is distracted even there by objects of cognition, consisting of the movement of the breaths.⁸⁴ Therefore, he rests only prior to cognizing the objects of cognition, the breaths, etc.⁸⁵ In reality, the *parā* condition is fully established in the one experiencing the state prior to deep sleep,⁸⁶ and it appears because *prakāśa* not appearing is a contradiction in terms.

It also appears in the fruit as well, that is, when another cognition, “I know this,” comes about, which is the result of the means of cognition, because at

⁸²That is to say, in the moment just prior to a cognition, at which time the cognition, the object of cognition, and the cognizer are unified.

⁸³As Kaul notes, the *parā* condition does not exist in even the state of deep sleep, this because a trace of the individual sense of self exists there. Similarly, the *parā* condition cannot exist in cognition, because of the distinction of agent, object, and act of cognition. As such, the *parā* condition exists *prior* to the cognitive act. (See Kaul’s note 3, p. 8 of the KSTS edition.) The distinction between the first moment of cognition, on the one hand, and the *parā* condition, on the other, is subtle. Utpaladeva compares the former with the state of deep (which is to say dreamless) sleep. In the ĪPK he suggests that deep sleep is the state in which Śiva’s agency exists at the level of *sūnya*, the void. (See ĪPK 3.2.13.) At this level, one has only the faintest sense of individuality, but one has no contact whatsoever with objects of cognition, and neither mental nor physical capacities are active. It is a state similar to the moment at which the universe is dissolved (*pralaya*) at the end of the cosmic cycle, the difference being that one retains a faint trace of one’s karmic impulses (*saṃskāra*) in deep sleep, while even these faint karmic impulses are annihilated in the *parā* condition. (See ĪPK 3.2.15.) In his commentary on ĪPK 3.2.14, Utpaladeva defines this cognitive agent-as-void (*sūnyapramāṭrī*) as the living being (*jīva*) who enlivens the five sense-capacities (*buddhindriyas*), and these five capacities, along with the three internal organs, the intellect (*buddhi*), the ego (*ahaṃkāra*), and the mind (*manas*), constitute the *puryaṣṭaka*. (In the same passage, he also suggests that the *puryaṣṭaka* is associated with the five breaths.) It is in this sense that the cognizer can be said to possess a body in deep sleep, as he does in the moment prior to cognition. This slight sense of self therefore distinguishes both deep sleep and the moment prior to cognition from the *parā* condition, but the former are similar to the *parā* condition insofar as one does not differentiate between the act of cognition, the objects of cognition, and the cognizer, either in deep sleep or in the moment prior to cognition.

⁸⁴The Pratyabhijñā, as Utpaladeva explains it, recognizes five breaths. The first two, the out-going (*prāṇa*) and in-going (*apāna*) breaths, are present in the waking state and the state of dreaming sleep. The third breath, the *samāna* or “equal” breath, or in other words the “breath” between the in-going and out-going breaths, exists at the level of deep sleep. The *udāna* dwells at the level of the “fourth state,” which, according to Torella, “constitutes going beyond ordinary existence,” and it exists at the level of the *sadāśivatattva* and the *īśvaratattva*. Finally, the *vyāna* breath consists of the stabilization of this fourth state, at which point “differentiation is completely dissolved.” (See Torella 1994: 207–209, esp. 209, fn. 35. See also ĪPK 3.2.19–20.) I think Utpaladeva here wishes to suggest that there is “rest” at the level of the fifth breath, *vyāna*, because he has said that it is at this level that the flow of the breaths is stopped: *turyāṭite dikkālānavacchede pūrṇe pravāhatām hitvātinirbharāvastho vyānasamjñah* (ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 3.2.20). Note also that three manuscripts (G, P and R) read *pramāṇaspaṇḍātmaka*^o for *prāṇaspaṇḍātmaka*^o.

⁸⁵This is to say that he rests prior to any state of awareness at which even the subtlest subject-object dualism exists. See ĪPK 3.2.13–15, the *Vṛtti* on the same, and Torella 1994: 204–205, fn. 24.

⁸⁶Cf. ŚSū 1.7: *jāgratsvapnasusuptabhede turyābhogasamvit*. “The consciousness that is the expanse of the fourth state exists in the division of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep.” My translation is based on that of Dyczkowski (1992¹: 27).

that time [the cognizer] rests in pure cognition, which is completely delighted. Alternatively,⁸⁷ “(and it also appears) in the fruit (of a cognition), because one rests on that” means that, just as at the beginning of every cognition, so (the *parā* condition) also (exists) in the fruit, that is, at the conclusion (of a cognition), because [the cognizer] rests only there. Without resting there,⁸⁸ an object cannot be fully known.

“Completeness” of cognitions is (meant) in the sense of all types of cognitions, because cognitions are turned inward only in the middle condition.⁸⁹ By contrast, all of them have the same unitary and pure Śiva-nature at their initial and last points. Moreover, one should study this in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.⁹⁰

1.6cd–7ab

Summarizing the real existence of the pentad of powers (as it exists) at all times, [Somānanda] says:

evaṃ na jātucit tasya viyogas tritayātmanā
1.7. śaktiyā nirvṛtacittvasya tadabhāgavibhāgaḥ

In this way, he, whose nature is delighted consciousness, is never separated from his three powers, whether they are unified or distinct.

In this way, that is, in the way explained earlier,⁹¹ he, whose nature is delighted consciousness, i.e., whose being in the form of consciousness is

⁸⁷In both the preceding and following, Utpaladeva has interpreted *tadviśrānti* as a locative determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound in which *tat* refers to the *phala*, the final part of a cognition. In the preceding, he interpreted *phala* as referring to the result of a cognition, suggesting that the *parā* condition is fully established in a second cognition, “I know this.” In what follows, Utpaladeva alternatively interprets *phala* to refer to the conclusion of a cognition.

⁸⁸The pronoun (*tat*) in *tadviśrānti* refers to both the second cognition and to the conclusion of the first cognition, as this reflects the double meaning Utpaladeva finds in “the fruit” (*phala*) of the cognition.

⁸⁹The word *samagra* (ŚD 1.5c) has two possible meanings in the context in which Somānanda uses it: it can refer either to (1) the “entire” cognition or (2) to “every” cognition. Here, Utpaladeva explains that Somānanda uses the word in the latter sense and not the former; in other words, the term *samagra* in *samagrajñānāgrajñānāṅgaśarīrasādaśā* (ŚD 1.5cd) does not refer to “the entire” cognition but to “every” cognition. Utpaladeva elaborates by noting that not all stages of a cognition are identical: the middle stage is different from the first and last stages in that it is at this stage that the cognition is “turned inward” or in other words is self-illuminating. (It is precisely at this middle stage that the *parā* condition appears *not* to be manifested, because it is at this stage that the content of a cognition appears, and an apparent duality is manifested.)

⁹⁰As mentioned in the Introduction, Utpaladeva generally explains cognition (as well as manifestation) in terms of the internal and apparently external appearance of *prakāśa*, while Somānanda relies more heavily on the notion of a series of powers, as well as the three conditions, the *parā*, *parāparā*, and *aparā*. As such, while Utpaladeva does not explicitly refer to the “initial and last points” of cognitions, he describes them in the ĪPK in terms of their internality and externality, which in turn correspond to unity with and apparent separation from the self, respectively. This is probably what Utpaladeva had in mind in here referring the reader to the ĪPK. See ĪPK 1.8.1–11, esp. 1.8.7–10.

⁹¹That is, in the manner explained in ŚD 1.5–6ab.

incontestable,⁹² is never separated from the three powers, will, cognition, and action.

Thus, though one might suspect that, solely in the *parā* condition, (the powers of) will, etc., do not exist, because there is nothing (there) to be wished, etc., [Somānanda] makes it clear that they do exist (there) by explicitly referring twice to consciousness and bliss, (which makes this clear) because he (already) established that the powers of consciousness and bliss exist in all conditions, the *parā*, the *aparā*, etc.⁹³

Because one (merely) speaks about the powers being distinct when objects of cognition, etc.,⁹⁴ exist,⁹⁵ he, i.e., the agent of cognition, is not separated from the (three) powers, will, etc., whether the powers are unified or distinct, that is, whether they are at the level of being in the *parā* condition or the *aparā* condition.⁹⁶

1.7cd–8

How the five powers exist when differentiated needs to be addressed. [Somānanda] explains this in the order in which they are manifested:⁹⁷

yaḍā tu tasya ciddharmavibhavāmodajṛmbhayā
 1.8 *vicitraracanānānākāryasṛṣṭipravartane*
bhavaty unmukhitā cittā secchāyāḥ prathamā tuṭiḥ

The first moment of will, however,⁹⁸ occurs when, due to the expansion of the joy of power,⁹⁹ which is the nature of his consciousness, consciousness becomes eager to undertake the creation of multiple objects, a variegated arrangement.

⁹²Utpaladeva here explains that *nirvṛtacittva* is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound.

⁹³The sentence in question is complex and difficult to translate. Utpaladeva here suggests that Somānanda must have a reason to refer twice to the powers of consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*āhlāda*/*ānanda*) in ŚD 1.3–4, once in 1.3b and once in 1.4c. Utpaladeva here suggests that the repetition (*anuvāda*) is meant to indicate that the powers of will (*icchā*), cognition (*jñāna*), and action (*kriyā*) exist both in the lower conditions and in the *parā* condition: because the powers of consciousness and bliss exist in all conditions, the fact that Somānanda mentions them twice implies that will, cognition, and action, like consciousness and bliss, exist in every condition.

⁹⁴The term *ādi* here refers to the physical entities and so on that become fully manifested in the *aparā* condition. Objects of knowledge (*jñeyas*) are manifested in a subtle form in the *parā*/*aparā* condition, beginning at the level of the *Sadāśiva tattva*.

⁹⁵That is to say, in the *aparā* condition.

⁹⁶Note that the commentary clarifies that the pronoun *tat* in *tadabhāgavibhāga* (ŚD 1.7b) refers to the powers (*śaktis*).

⁹⁷Literally, *kramaṇa* means “sequentially.”

⁹⁸I take the word *tu* to suggest a contrast with what was said in ŚD 1.6cd–7ab. There, Somānanda stated that the three powers, will, etc., are eternally present in Śiva. Here, by contrast, he emphasizes the “first moment” of will, when the sequence of the powers commences, and the powers begin to be differentiated.

⁹⁹Utpaladeva glosses *vibhava* with *pañcakṛtyanirvṛttiyogyatā*, the “capacity to complete the five actions.” Somānanda’s use of this term is interesting, for it suggests something powerful, omnipresent, and developing or evolving, all qualities of Śiva.

Ciddharmavibhavāmodajrmbhā means “the expansion—the development as the universe—of (the power of) joy, i.e., wonder¹⁰⁰ in the form of reflective awareness,¹⁰¹ which is associated with the power—the suitability for completing the five actions¹⁰²—that is the nature, i.e., the natural state, of Śivabhaṭṭāraka in the form of consciousness.” As I have said in a *stotra*-verse:

Appearing on your own, you make everything appear. Reflecting on (your own) form, you reflect on the universe. What you yourself make vibrate,¹⁰³ according to your own desire, shines forth as the universe. (ŚSt 13.15)

When with the aforementioned expansion—here¹⁰⁴ referred to as a vibration—acting as the cause, *cittā*, i.e., pure consciousness, is eager—that is, it (merely) behaves as if looking outside (itself), though in reality it looks to itself, since, there being no second, it is completely independent—to undertake, as is his nature,¹⁰⁵ the creation of the multiple objects, which is perceived by making variegated (Śiva,) the one who has a fixed nature, this by means of *māyā*, the noncognition of non-duality, then, that moment is the first part of the will, which is delimited by a minute period of time.

In this way, [Somānanda] also shows that those ordinary people¹⁰⁶ who wish to climb to the level of supreme reality may here encounter the entire aggregate of powers,¹⁰⁷ but there is no contact with temporal distinction beyond the *māyātattva*.¹⁰⁸ Alternatively, temporal distinction would also exist above *māyā*,

¹⁰⁰The term here used is *camatkāra*.

¹⁰¹Literally, *tathāsvarūpaparāmarśarūpa* means “in the form of reflective awareness, the nature of which is thus [i.e., is *camatkāra*].”

¹⁰²The “five actions” (*pañcakṛtya*) are Śiva’s five activities: creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*), preservation (*sthiti*), destruction (*saṃhāra*), obfuscation (*nigraha*), and favor (*anugraha*). See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.11cd–13ab, where he enumerates the five powers as follows: *sargasthitipralayānugrahatirodhānalakṣaṇa-pañcaprakāraṃ kṛtyam*.

¹⁰³*Ghūrṇase*.

¹⁰⁴“Here” refers to the ŚSt., verse 13.15, quoted above.

¹⁰⁵That is to say, it is Śiva’s nature to create multiple objects.

¹⁰⁶The term here used is *vyavahartṛ*, which refers to those who act in the world.

¹⁰⁷ŚD 1.7cd–8 describes the first moment of will in Śiva’s creative act. Insofar as Śiva himself is the only agent, anyone acting in the world engages the same initial moment of will.

¹⁰⁸Here, Utpaladeva contrasts “ordinary people” (*vyavahartṛ*), who reside in the *aparā* condition, to those agents who reside above the *māyātattva*, namely: the Mantramahēśvaras, who reside at the level of the third *tattva*, the *sadāśivatattva*; the Mantreśvaras, who reside at the level of the fourth *tattva*, the *īśvaratattva*; and finally, the Vidyēśvaras, who reside at the level of the fifth *tattva*, the *suddhavidyātattva*. Sometimes the last of these are said to reside at the level of *māyā*, the sixth *tattva*, in which case one should not understand this passage to refer to them. (For more on the various types of agents in the Pratyabhijñā, see ŚD 1.41cd–43. See also ĪPK 3.2.1–20, especially 3.2.3 and 3.2.6–9.)

Utpaladeva here mentions this distinction to remind the reader that, for Śiva, there is no temporal distinction, though there is such a distinction for agents residing at lower levels of existence. Kaul quotes ĪPK 2.1.2 in this context, which reads as follows: *sakramatvaṃ ca laukikyāḥ kriyāyāḥ kālasaktitaḥ / ghaṭate na tu śāsvatīyāḥ prābhavyāḥ syāt prabor iva*. Torella translates, “Succession pertains to ordinary action, which is dependent on the power of Time; it is not, however, admissible for divine eternal action, as it is not for the Lord.” The point is that as soon as Śiva’s powers are thought to appear in stages, a temporal distinction exists, and this distinction is nonexistent for Śiva in his highest state. See Torella 1994: 153.

because the *parāparā* condition exists there.¹⁰⁹ It is for this reason that [Somānanda] said “the (first) moment,”¹¹⁰ and I have explained all of this in my *Pratyabhijñā*.¹¹¹

1.9–11ab

- 1.9. *sā ca dr̥ṣyā hṛduddēse kāryasmaranakālataḥ
praharṣāvedasamayē darasaṃdarśanakṣaṇe*
1.10. *anālocanato dr̥ṣṭe visargaprasarāspade
visargoktiprasaṅge ca vācane dhāvane tathā*
1.11. *eteṣv eva prasaṅgeṣu sarvaśaktivilolatā*

That,¹¹² moreover, can be seen in the area of the heart from the moment one remembers something that should be done; at the time of (receiving) delightful news; the moment one sees something frightening; when one sees something unexpectedly; at the time of orgasm and in the event of expressing it;¹¹³ when reading; and when running. All of the powers are active¹¹⁴ in these very events.¹¹⁵

That,¹¹⁶ moreover, can be seen in the heart-region in the form of the subtle power of eagerness when one remembers something forgotten that should be done, which one intended to complete earlier, as well as on the occasion of a delightful announcement, such as the birth of a son; the very moment fear, i.e., danger, appears; when one sees unexpectedly, i.e., suddenly, something one

¹⁰⁹Literally: “because, above *māyā* [i.e., the *māyātattva*], the particular condition is of the form of the *parāparā*.” The *parāparā* condition exists at the levels of the *sadāśivatattva* and the *īśvaratattva*, the third and fourth of the thirty-six *tattvas*. If agents residing at these levels experience temporal distinction, then the time they experience is very subtle: duality in its coarsest form is not manifested prior to the *aparā* condition, and any distinction in the *parāparā* condition is mental, as it were, rather than physical in nature.

¹¹⁰That is, he referred to a *tuṭi*. When stages exist, temporal distinction must exist.

¹¹¹For Utpaladeva’s discussion of the appearance or otherwise of temporal (and spatial) distinctions to agents in the *aparā* condition and above, see ĪPK 2.1.1–8.

¹¹²This refers to the first moment (*tuṭi*) of will.

¹¹³That is, when one makes a sound in the moment in question.

¹¹⁴The Sanskrit term in question, *vilolatā*, suggests that the powers become, literally, “unsteady, tremulous.” This stands in contrast to the quiescent state described in ŚD 1.3–4, in which Śiva’s powers stood in a perfect state of unity (*sāmarasya*).

¹¹⁵Parallel passages to ŚD 1.9–11ab are found in VBh 69, 70, 71, and 118; and in SpKā 22. The ŚD passage in question is also reflected in part in Bhāskara’s ŚSūVā ad ŚSū 3.6. See also ĪPK 1.5.19: *sākṣātkāraḥṣaṇo ’py asti vimarśaḥ katham anyathā / dhāvanādyupapadyeta pratisaṃdhānavarjitam*. Utpaladeva here suggests that running and other activities could not occur without reflective awareness (*vimarśa*). According to Torella, the idea is that there is no moment that is devoid of “discursive articulation,” even the first moment of a cognition or a rapid action. (See Torella 1994: 125, fn. 41.) This of course reflects the notion expressed so famously by Bhartṛhari in VP 1.131–132, quoted in part at ŚD 2.10, that nothing exists devoid of speech. This in turn also directly contradicts the position of Dharmakīrti and Dignāga, about which see Torella 1992. Note also that Somānanda’s understanding of the present as expressions of the first moment of will is reflected in part in—or, at the least, is not contradicted by—ĪPK 1.5.10, which suggests that will (*icchā*) is a form of reflective awareness.

¹¹⁶As in Somānanda’s verse text (*mūla*), the feminine pronoun (*sā*) here refers to the first moment (*tuṭi*) of will.

wishes to see; in orgasm¹¹⁷ and likewise in the event of expressing orgasm;¹¹⁸ when reading a book rapidly; and when running. On these very occasions, all of the powers are active, i.e., become interwoven, in the order mentioned earlier.

1.11cd–13ab

“How is he eager for this object,¹¹⁹ which, being pleasurable and painful, is impure and therefore should be avoided?” To eliminate this doubt, [Somānanda] says:

kutsite 'kutsitasya syāt katham unmukhateti cet
 1.12. *rūpaprasārarasato garhitatvam ayuktimat*
pañcaprakāraḥṛtyoktiśivatvān nijakarmaṇe
 1.13. *pravṛttasya nimittānām apareṣāṃ kva mārgaṇam*

If you ask how someone pure could be eager for something impure,¹²⁰ (we reply:) because he savors the expansion of (his own) form, contemptibility is not appropriate (for the universe).¹²¹ Given that it is said that it is Śiva's nature to perform the five types of activities, what need is there to search for other motives, when he is engaged in his own conduct?¹²²

It is not appropriate that the object in question,¹²³ which has his form, is impure, because the Lord savors the development of his own nature, which becomes the various objects,¹²⁴ these being made of the nonperception of

¹¹⁷The Sanskrit here reads *caramadhātuvisargasthāna* and more literally may be translated “where the last element is emitted.”

¹¹⁸This refers to the moment when one gasps in the act of sexual union (*visarjanīyabhāṣaṇaprasaṅga*).

¹¹⁹The object in question is the universe that Śiva creates.

¹²⁰Gnoli translates *kutsita*, which literally means “low, despised,” with “impure,” and I here follow his translation. The point of the objection in question is simply to ask why a perfect God would involve himself in an imperfect, impure universe. See Gnoli 1957: 20–21. Note that use of a similar term (*kutsā*) is found in Bhāskara's ŚSūVā ad ŚSū 1.13.

¹²¹Kaul glosses *rūpaprasārarasatas* with *svārūpaprasaraṇam evāśyānandāsvāda ity atah*, meaning “because he relishes bliss only by expanding his nature.” This is to say that, given that Śiva creates the universe as he sees fit, it is illogical to claim that entities in the world are contemptible. His eagerness (*aunmukhya*) should therefore be understood always to be directed toward auspicious entities, regardless of how they are received in the mundane world. The VBh also challenges the norms of purity, suggesting conventions of (physical) purity are in fact impurities. (The implication of the verse seems to be that one without such conceptions of purity and impurity is delighted and, one presumes, therefore free.) See VBh 123: *kiṃcijjñair yā smṛtā śuddhiḥ sāśuddhiḥ śambhūdarśane / na śucir hy aśucis tasmān nirvikalpaḥ sukhi bhavet*.

¹²²Literally, *pañcaprakāraḥṛtyoktiśivatvāt* means “because Śiva-nature is stated for one who has five types of activities.” This is a reference to Śiva's five activities or *krtyas*. See Utpaladeva's commentary, below.

¹²³The term in question (*kāryabheda*) refers to “a particular object” and could also refer to a particular action. In this context, however, the referent is the universe.

¹²⁴The term in question (° *citrakāryatā*°) could also refer to actions rather than objects, though this seems less likely given the similarity of the language here with that of ŚD 1.8ab: *vicitraracanānānākārya-sṛṣṭipravartane*.

his complete nature, (the nonperception being) produced by the power of *māyā*.¹²⁵

For example, in the *parāparā* condition, when he exists in the form of Sadāśiva and Īśvara,¹²⁶ it is (his) universality in the form “I am the universe” that appears in consciousness.¹²⁷

Since nothing can be brought to light that does not consist of consciousness,¹²⁸ his very nature also exists in the *aparā* condition, where one sees dualistically “I perceive this pot” or “this is a pot.”¹²⁹ However, by dint of the power of *māyā*, one is not aware of non-duality (in the *aparā* condition).¹³⁰ Thus, his nature expands fully everywhere. Therefore, how could it be contemptible?

Only erroneous nonawareness of (Śiva’s) non-duality is impure, and that¹³¹ does not exist, because it consists merely of a nonperception,¹³² and nothing new is manifested.¹³³

¹²⁵Everything is always nothing but Śiva himself, even if it appears otherwise, and for this reason, it is improper to speak of something as impure. The language used here (*māyāśaktikṛtapūrṇa-svarūpākhyātimaya*^o) is not uncommon in the ŚDVṚ. See also, for example, Utpaladeva’s commentary on the ŚD 1.1 (*māyāśaktikṛtaikyākhyātyā*) and ŚD 1.7cd–8 (*māyiyābhedākhyāti*^o), as well as Utpaladeva’s commentary on 1.11cd–13ab: *abhedāparāmarśanam eva bhrāntirūpaṃ kutsitam, tac ca na kiñcid akhyātirū-pamātravāt*. See the Introduction, section 13, under the subsection entitled “Bhartṛhari’s *avidyā* and Utpaladeva’s *abhedākhyāti*.”

¹²⁶The *parāparā* condition exists at the levels of the third and fourth *tattvas*, the *sadāśivatattva* and *īśvaratattva*, respectively.

¹²⁷In that this cognitive act presupposes a subject-object distinction, it implies dualism. However, the duality is subtle at this level, being more mental than physical.

¹²⁸Literally, the Sanskrit reads “the fact of being illumined would not arise without the fact of being made up of consciousness” (*cidātmakatām vinā prakāśamānataiva nopapadyate*).

¹²⁹The former indicates the act of perception, the latter the understanding resulting from it. Compare the present passage with ĪPK 1.4.7: *yā ca paśyāmy aham imaṃ ghaṭo ’yam iti vāvasā / manyate samavetaṃ sāpy avasātari darśanam*. “And the determinate cognition—‘I see this’ or ‘this is a pot’—conceives of the perception as connected with the cognizer.” ĪPK 1.4.7 deals with the nature of memory, but the importance of this passage in the present context is the use of the pair of expressions, “I see this” and “this is a pot.” Torella 1994: 110, fn. 20 suggests that the difference between the two expressions is the apparent absence of the notion of self in the latter, i.e., in the experience (*anubhava*). In both cases, however, the experience has inherent in it a knower. See also Matilal 1986: 315ff. for a discussion of the nature of verbalization of experience.

¹³⁰Literally, *abhedāparāmarśa* means “there is no reflective awareness of non-duality (there).”

¹³¹Kaul suggests that this term (*tat*) refers to impurity (*kutsitavta*): *tat kutsitavtam. tathā ca kutsitam svarūpavyatiriktvāt syād iti*. I take *tat* to refer to *abhedāparāmarśanam* by the standard rules of anaphora.

¹³²It is not the case that non-duality is ever absent, though it is true that one sometimes does not see it. However, the failure to see non-duality is in reality nothing whatsoever, because it consists of the absence of correct perception and not the presence of something erroneous.

¹³³In other words, everything that appears in the temporal world existed in a premanifested state in the *parā* condition. Thus, the Pratyabhijñā does not have to explain the manifestation of a new, different, and unreal universe. Instead, the universe is simply Śiva himself, because the nature of consciousness is such that it appears. Cf. ŚD 2.28cd–31, 2.34–35, 2.39, and 2.79–80. The language used here is similar to that of Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.24–25, where Utpaladeva suggests that cognition is an action (*kriyā*) involving the appearance of a new (*apūrva*) form (*rūpa*). This apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that, in the present context, the topic addressed concerns the nature of Śiva’s creative power in manifesting the universe, while the latter passage addresses the nature of cognition for an individual in the everyday world. Although from an ultimate point of view nothing new is ever created in the world, it is nevertheless possible for the everyman to cognize previously unseen entities. See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.24–25 and notes thereon.

Moreover, the one who is made up of consciousness¹³⁴ has as his nature the universe, because entities exist insofar as they are nothing but pure consciousness, just as reflections are real (insofar as they appear) in a mirror.¹³⁵ All of this, moreover, is illuminated with skill in my *Īśvarapratyabhijñāṭikā*.¹³⁶

Since he is Śiva, that is, the one who is said to have five types of activities, his activities being of five kinds, viz., creation, maintenance, dissolution, favor and concealment,¹³⁷ he is engaged in conduct that is his own, that is, he is bent upon that (activity) the form of which is expansion in the form of the *tattvas*, etc.¹³⁸ So, what need is there to search for motives, compassion and so on? In other words, one ought not to question why he proceeds in this way, for there is simply no good reason to question his motives.

Thus, [Somānanda] has established that the realm of (Śiva's) eagerness is truly not impure.¹³⁹

1.13cd–17

Now, to clarify by way of example, [Somānanda] says:

gacchato nistaraṅgasya jalasyātitaraṅgitām

1.14. *ārambhe dṛṣṭim āpātya tad aunmukhyaṃ hi gamyate
vrajato muṣṭitām pāṇeḥ pūrvaḥ kampas tatheksyate*

1.15. *bodhasya svātmaniṣṭhasya racanām prati nirvṛtiḥ
tadāsthāpravikāso yas tad aunmukhyaṃ pracakṣate*

1.16. *kiñciducchūnatā saiva mahadbhiḥ kaiścid ucyate
tasyecchā kāryatām yātā yaḥ sa jāyate*

1.17. *aunmukhyasya ya ābhogaḥ sthūlah secchā vyavasthitā
na caunmukhyaprasaṅgena śivaḥ sthūlatvabhāk kvacit*

¹³⁴This is, of course, a reference to Śiva.

¹³⁵The analogy in question concerns that of a mirror and the entities appearing in it. The entities appearing in the mirror are real and multiple, but their appearance in no way diminishes the singular nature of the mirror itself. In the same manner, the universe is real, according to the Pratyabhijñā, insofar as it is a reflection of Śiva's very form, which is consciousness, but the appearance of the universe does not diminish Śiva's unity, the former existing only in the form of the latter. See also ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.4.19, where reference is made to the same analogy.

¹³⁶The ĪPT is of course lost, excepting in fragments that have been edited and published by Torella in recent years (for which see Torella 1998, 2007¹, 2007², 2007³, and 2007⁴.) See instead, e.g., ĪPK 1.5.10 and Utpaladeva's *Vṛtti* on the same.

¹³⁷In the present passage, Utpaladeva suggests that *pañcaprakāraḥkṛtyokti*^o is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound meaning that *pañcaprakāraḥkṛtyoktiśivatvāt* could be literally translated "because there is Śiva-nature for the one whose activities are said to be of five types."

¹³⁸The word "etcetera" (*ādi*) in *tattvādirūpaprasaraṇarūpa* refers to the manifestation of different agents, worlds (*bhuvanas*), and so on. See ŚD 1.29cd–33 and ŚD 1.34. See also ŚD 1.39–41ab.

¹³⁹Since everything is Śiva himself, nothing is impure, and therefore Śiva does not turn his attention toward any impure entity. He only turns his attention to that which interests him. Moreover, given his dynamic nature, that to which Śiva turns his attention is in reality Śiva himself in the form of consciousness.

One understands eagerness when one casts a glance at the first movement of waveless water becoming extremely rough, and one sees it in the initial trembling of a hand becoming a fist. Consciousness that is self-contained¹⁴⁰ gains a delight from (the act of) creation; one speaks of eagerness as the first budding of that condition.¹⁴¹ Certain great men say that it is a minimal swelling. Will is the result of it,¹⁴² because of which the one possessing will manifests himself. The coarse extension of eagerness is will (fully) manifested, but Śiva never shares in being coarse on the occasion of eagerness.¹⁴³

When water that is initially waveless becomes extremely rough, its subtle, initial trembling appears as a form of eagerness, and so does the initial, very subtle trembling of a hand becoming a fist. In the same way, one speaks of eagerness as the first budding,¹⁴⁴ that is, the first moment of manifestation, of the capacity to create, which is but the mere desire to create the universe on the part of a self-contained, complete consciousness.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the first moment of manifestation exists even in (the power of) delight, because it¹⁴⁶ unfolds as the nature of the noncognition of non-duality.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁰Consciousness in this state is not focused on external, distinct entities, but rather is in a perfectly quiescent state.

¹⁴¹That is, it is the first budding of *nirvṛti*'s condition.

¹⁴²That is, will (*icchā*) is the result of *aunmukhya*. Here I follow Utpaladeva's commentary: *tasyaunmukhyasyecchā kāryā*. Somananda has already said that eagerness is the first stage of will (*icchā*). See ŚD 1.7cd–8.

¹⁴³ŚD 1.17cd is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 63 of Singh's edition).

¹⁴⁴Note that Utpaladeva here analyzes the term *pravikāsa* (ŚD 1.15c), suggesting it should be understood to mean *prathamam vikāsa*, thereby glossing the prefix *pra* with *prathamam*.

¹⁴⁵The compound, *abhilāṣamātraranānāyogyatāyāh*, is more literally translated "because of the capacity for creation, which is merely desire." This is a reference to the fact that Śiva creates by directing his consciousness to attend to various, diverse phenomena. Leaving his supreme, quiescent state, described in ŚD 1.3–4, Śiva's consciousness becomes aware, in stages, of multiple entities, the result of which is the creation of the universe. He does this simply because he wishes to do so (ŚD 1.11cd–13ab); there is no other reason for creation.

¹⁴⁶That is, delight (*nirvṛti*).

¹⁴⁷Here, I understand "delight," *nirvṛti*, to refer to the power of "delight" that Utpaladeva equates with the power of bliss (*ānandaśakti*) in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.19–20ab. In other words, even the basic power of Śiva's consciousness, the pure delight that is his nature, appears in the first moment of manifestation, this insofar as "delight" is the nature of manifestation (which appears in the form of the noncognition of non-duality). Remember that *aunmukhya*, "eagerness," constitutes the first movement of will, and Utpaladeva considers it to be the appearance of "delight" that is delimited by the object in question. As such, "delight" is fully present in the first movement of consciousness toward manifestation, and it is this that Utpaladeva here wishes to express. Cf. ŚD 1.39b and Utpaladeva's commentary on the same for the place of delight in the process of manifestation. There it is described as a desire to create the world that exists by dint of Śiva's apparent separation from bliss, due to his nonperception of his unitary nature. Note that all four manuscripts of the commentary in my possession read *abhedākhyātiḥ dhar-matvena*. Only K^{cd} reads *abhedākhyātidhar-matvena*, and one suspects that Kaul silently emended the text here.

This same eagerness is described as a minimal swelling by Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna in the *Tattvagarbha(stotra)*,¹⁴⁸ and (it is described) with words such as “a swell” and “a wave” by others still.

Of it, i.e., of eagerness, the result is will. Indeed, the extension of it—its latter part, which is capable of producing the effects beginning with (the power of) cognition,¹⁴⁹ which is expanded, solid and hence, because the budding of the (first) stage of creation becomes solid, is coarse—is will (fully) manifested.¹⁵⁰

Śiva, moreover, unlike a seed,¹⁵¹ does not share in being coarse as a result of his connection with eagerness, called a “swelling,” etc.;¹⁵² in reality, the one whose nature is consciousness¹⁵³ is never coarse, be it when the will, etc., do not exist in manifestation,¹⁵⁴ or on any other occasion, because entities (in the world), conceived of as reflections, do not add anything to the nature of

¹⁴⁸The TGSt is now lost. The verse to which Utpaladeva here refers the reader is the one I have labeled TGSt passage #2. See section 14 of the Introduction under the subsection entitled “Known and Heretofore Unidentified Passages of the *Tattvagarbhastotra*.” See also note 209 of the Introduction, where I consider the possibility that Somānanda obliquely mocks Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna in the present passage.

¹⁴⁹The term *ādi* here refers to the power following in the sequence after the power of cognition, i.e., the power of action.

¹⁵⁰In other words, the power of will (*icchā*) is the product of eagerness (*aunmukhya*); it, in turn, produces the power of cognition (*jñāna*), etc.

¹⁵¹This is a typical example of the *satkārya* theory of causal relation, the doctrine that the effect is inherent in the cause. A seed, in generating a plant, progressively grows to become a sprout, a stem, etc. These later developments exist in potential form in the seed, but the seed ceases to exist as a seed once the process of manifesting the plant commences. Thus, Utpaladeva here suggests that the Pratyabhijñā adheres to a *satkārya* theory insofar as it understands the result of action to be inherent in the cause—what Śiva sees is inherent prior to appearing in his consciousness—but he suggests that the Pratyabhijñā position is different from the materialist *satkārya* doctrine insofar as the Pratyabhijñā suggests that the result of the action in no way transforms the cause.

¹⁵²As Gnoli mentions, the term *ucchūnatā* refers to the development of a seed into a sprout (a typical example of the *satkāryavāda*, about which see note 151, above). Somānanda can therefore be read implicitly to compare Śiva’s act of creation to that of a seed becoming a plant, as Utpaladeva here makes the analogy explicit. See Gnoli 1957: 20.

¹⁵³Although *cidātman* literally means “whose nature is consciousness,” Utpaladeva uses this term here and elsewhere to refer to Śiva. See, for example, ĪPK 1.5.7 and the *Vṛtti* thereon.

¹⁵⁴The term *icchādyasadbhāve* literally means “if/when there is no real existence of will and the rest.” It refers to the condition in which will (*icchā*) and Śiva’s other powers are in a premanifested condition. This occurs in the *parā* condition, in which the universe, which is coarse in form, is not manifested. Kaul glosses the term with *nirākāṅkṣatādasāyām*, which echoes the language Utpaladeva has used to describe the nature of Śiva’s consciousness: *nirvṛtā vedyanirākāṅkṣā pūrṇā cid yasya saḥ [Śivah]*. (See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.2.) One should therefore take the passage in question to refer to the unmanifested state of the powers as opposed to their utter nonexistence.

consciousness,¹⁵⁵ nor is the manifestation of his nature an error. All of this is stated in my *Ṭīkā*.¹⁵⁶

1.18

Not even a conventional duality exists there,¹⁵⁷ because there is no cessation to the awareness that things are thus. For this reason, [Somānanda] says:

1.18. *goh stanāt pātataḥ kṣīre vikāras tata eva hi
na ca na kṣīram ity eṣa vyapadeśo 'sti tatkṣaṇam*

Indeed, a change occurs in milk just after it falls from the cow's udder, yet it is not said not to be milk at that instant.¹⁵⁸

A change occurs in milk just after, that is, immediately after, it falls from the cow's udder. Yet it is not the case that, at that instant, one is not aware that it is milk. Inasmuch as awareness is one, there is always oneness.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵Note that I read *cidātman* twice, with both what precedes and what follows it (*dehalidīpavat*), and I understand the term to be an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound (referring to Śiva) when read with what precedes it, and a determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound when read with what follows it. The point of this passage is to suggest that Śiva is not made coarse because of the cognitive contact he has with the world. The reason for this is that the world he creates is merely a reflection of his consciousness, and as such it does not add anything to him. The world does not exist in some form that is different from Śiva, but rather it exists in the form of Śiva's consciousness, reflecting on itself. For this reason, there is nothing in the world to "taint" Śiva's purity.

¹⁵⁶Utpaladeva here refers to his *Īśvarapratyabhijñāṭīkā* (ĪPT), also called the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*. The text, as already noted (see ŚDVṚ ad ŚD 1.11cd–13ab and my notes thereon; cf. note 17 of the Introduction), is now lost, excepting in fragments. See instead, e.g., ĪPK 2.4.18–19 and in particular the *Vṛtti* on 2.4.19, where Utpaladeva invokes the metaphor of the mirror: *ekātmano vibhedaś ca kriyā kālakramānugā / tathā syāt kartṛtaivaivaṃ tathāpariṇamattayā. na ca yuktam jaḍasyaivaṃ bhedaḥbhavedavirodhataḥ / ābhāsabhedād ekatra cidātmani tu yujyate*. "The differentiation of a unitary entity is action, occurring in temporal succession. In this way we necessarily return to our thesis of an agent subject, as being that which becomes modified in the various forms. But this is not possible for an insentient reality, because differentiation would conflict with unity, given the manifold forms of manifestation. On the contrary, it is possible in the case of a conscious unitary reality." (Translation Torella's. See Torella 1994: 185–186.) The *Vṛtti* on ĪPK 2.4.19 reads: *jaḍasyā-bhinnaātmano bhedenāvasthiter virodhād ayuktam, svacche cidātmany ekasminn evam anekapratībimbadhāraṇenāvirodhād yujyate*. "This is not possible for an insentient reality, because its nature which is single would conflict with its appearing in differentiated forms. On the contrary, it is possible for an absolutely limpid [*svaccha*], unitary, conscious reality, because there is no conflict here between its unity and its capacity to receive manifold reflections." (Translation Torella's. See Torella 1994: 186.)

¹⁵⁷The term in question, *evamādi*, here translated simply with "there," is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound referring to Śiva and literally meaning "in one whose beginning is thus." That is, it refers to the universe that is manifested in the form of consciousness, the existence of which is generated with the first movement of Śiva's will, with *aunmukhya*.

¹⁵⁸Literally, the Sanskrit says, "yet it is not called 'not milk' at that instant." The moment in question is the one immediately following the fall of the milk from the cow's udder.

¹⁵⁹The issue at hand is the unity of Śiva, which persists even when his consciousness reflects the multiple, changing universe. Utpaladeva here suggests that proper awareness allows one continuously

1.19–20ab

In this way, [Somānanda] has said that there is an eagerness of will,¹⁶⁰ and now, to prove that, he says:

1.19. *yata icchati taj jñātum kartum vā secchayā kriyā*
tasyāḥ pūrvāparau bhāgau kalpanīyau purā hi yā
 1.20. *tatkarmanīrvṛtiprāptir aunmukhyaṃ tad vikāsītā*

Since he desires to know or to do something, the activity is by means of will.¹⁶¹ Two parts of it, an earlier one and a later one, must be distinguished. Indeed, the earlier one is eagerness, the obtainment of delight in the object in question. It is expanded.¹⁶²

Since it is said that the Lord desires either to know or to act, [Somānanda] expresses the verbal form of it as “activity by means of will,” that is, activity in the form of will.¹⁶³

Two parts of it, i.e., of will, an earlier one and a later one, must be distinguished, because he refers to will as an action, and an action must be divided into earlier and later parts.¹⁶⁴ Will, etc., share the same nature to an even greater

to recognize Śiva’s oneness, for it continues to appear as long as one is aware of it. Just as milk begins to change the very moment it leaves the cow, yet, despite this transformation, one nevertheless sees it as milk for some time after that moment, so too one can recognize Śiva’s unity, even while the transformations of the universe, appearing as reflections of his consciousness, are under way. As long as one is aware of this unity, it will appear, just as milk naturally appears to be milk for some time, despite the immediate and continuous changes in its makeup. Of particular note is the fact that the example Somānanda here employs, that of the transformation of milk, is a paradigmatic example of the *satkārya* theory of causation, the theory of the real pre-existence of an effect in its cause. Here, Somānanda emphasizes not the causal relation but the continuity of the nature of the entity that is produced, by analogy suggesting that the apparent transformations of the contents of consciousness are epiphenomenal to their existence *qua* being consciousness.

¹⁶⁰Somānanda has suggested that eagerness (*aunmukhya*) produces will (*icchā*), and the latter is the coarse form of the former. See ŚD 1.17ab: *aunmukhyasya ya ābhogaḥ sthūlah secchā vyavasthitā*.

¹⁶¹Since Śiva desires to know or act, he engages the act of desiring in doing so. For this reason the power of will (*icchā*) leads to the action (*kriyā*) in question.

¹⁶²ŚD 1.19–20ab is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 63 of Singh’s edition).

¹⁶³In other words, since it is said that Śiva *wishes* to know or act, to do either implies a preceding action of desire.

¹⁶⁴This is an axiom of the Grammarians, for which, see Iyer [1969] 1992: 330–335. Gnoli suggests the same: “Action, according to the grammarians, is formed by a series of distinct moments ordered towards a single end.” (See Gnoli 1957: 20.) Kaul does so, as well, quoting Bhartṛhari’s famous definition of action found in VP 3.8.4, which reads as follows: *guṇabhūtair avayavaiḥ samūhah kramajanmanām / buddhyā prakalpitābhedaḥ kriyeti vyapadiśyate*. (See Kaul’s note 1, p. 17 of the KSTS edition.) It is not at all clear that Somānanda knew Bhartṛhari’s definition of action, however, about which see my Introduction, notes 60 and 180. Finally, Utpaladeva also refers to action as having earlier and later parts, for which see IPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.2.9.

degree in the *śakti* condition,¹⁶⁵ and it is therefore taught that there is ultimately only one power: “there is only one empowered one.”¹⁶⁶

In speaking about their arising, however,¹⁶⁷ (Somānanda says that) eagerness is that which exists in the earlier part of the will, i.e., the obtainment that is the delight in the object in question.¹⁶⁸ To be precise, eagerness is delight limited by the object; the power of bliss is unlimited, pure delight.¹⁶⁹

He (further) says that it, i.e., eagerness, is expanded, i.e., is the first budding of consciousness.¹⁷⁰

1.20cd–21

anantaram hi tatkāryajñānadarśanaśaktitā

1.21. *jñānaśaktis tadartham hi yo 'sau sthūlah samudyamah
sā kriyāśaktir uditā tataḥ sarvaṃ jagat sthitam*

Following that is the power of cognition, the fact of having the power to perceive the cognition of the object in question. Following that¹⁷¹ is

¹⁶⁵ Utpaladeva has just suggested that the power of will implies an action insofar as wishing or willing is itself an action. More generally, each power implies the presence of the others, even when they appear in the sequence of manifestation. Here, Utpaladeva suggests that the shared nature (*anyonyātmaitā*) of the powers is stronger, as it were, at the level of the *śaktitattva*, the second of thirty-six *tattvas*, which exists in the perfectly non-dual state of the *parā* condition, than it is at the level of the lower *tattvas*. If the powers of action and will intermingle in the *parāparā* and *aparā* conditions, he argues, so much more is it so in the *parā* condition. Utpaladeva apparently raises this issue here to suggest that the sequence that appears to exist is not ultimately real, that ultimately will is utterly undivided, as all the powers are ultimately one, as well (about which see below).

¹⁶⁶ In other words, by the time one reaches the level of the *śivatattva*, only one power remains. The overlapping pairs of powers are utterly collapsed at the level of Śiva, where they exist in *posse* in the one whose nature is delight, the unrestrained form of *nirvṛti*. Note that Somānanda also made a similar point in ŚD 1.3–4, where he described Śiva’s powers as a perfect unity. This quotation remains untraced.

¹⁶⁷ The preceding passage discussed the nature of the powers in the *parā* condition. Here, Utpaladeva addresses the nature of the powers as they are manifested. As Utpaladeva mentioned in his *avataraṇikā* to ŚD 1.7cd–8, Somānanda discusses the powers in the order in which they are manifested, and *aunmukhya* is the first in the series.

¹⁶⁸ Utpaladeva indicates in the commentary that *tatkarmanirvṛtīprāpti* should be understood to be a locative determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound composed of two parts, each of which (*tat-karma* and *nirvṛtī-prāpti*) should be understood to be descriptive (*karmadhāraya*) compounds.

¹⁶⁹ In the premanifested state, Śiva’s delight (*nirvṛti*) is indistinct. It is not directed toward anything in particular. When Śiva begins to manifest phenomena in his consciousness, his power of bliss is directed toward something more particular. This is the *karmāvachchinnā nirvṛti*, delight defined by the object in question. It exists insofar as an unlimited delight exists prior to it, from which the qualified one is born. See also Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.22, as well as my Introduction, section 5, for a discussion of the types of “delight” (*nirvṛti*) and their inclusion in Somānanda’s theory of the overlapping pairs of powers.

¹⁷⁰ The idea expressed here is paradoxical. Though Śiva manifests entities by limiting his consciousness, by concentrating his attention on distinct entities, in doing so he “expands” his consciousness by directing it toward new entities. Compare the language used here, *cidāsthāpravikāsa*, with that of ŚD 1.15cd: *tadāsthāpravikāso yaś tad aunmukhyaṃ pracakṣate*.

¹⁷¹ Utpaladeva glosses *tadartham*, more commonly meaning “therefore, on that account, with that object, for that end,” with *anantaram*. I follow his gloss.

a coarse arising called the power of action. From that the entire world is established.

After that is the cognition of the object, i.e., of the universe, which is Śiva's¹⁷² very existence in the form of the power of illumination; unbeknown to any (mundane) perceiver, it appears as an object in the mind, as it were, since it is the power of cognition.¹⁷³

After that is the power of action, an arising, directly related to will, that results in the birth of the appearance of the coarse objects that can be known by any agent of cognition.¹⁷⁴

The end (of manifestation) comes from that alone, because the worldly objects are obtained from it. This he says with the phrase, "from that the entire world is established."

I.2.2

The fact of being in the form of power exists in this way not only when the world is created, but it exists in this way in the moment when each and every pot is produced, as well. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.22. *evaṃ sarvasamutpattikāle śaktitrayātmatā
na nirvṛtā na caunmukhyaṃ nirvṛttaṃ nāpi nirvṛtiḥ*

Similarly,¹⁷⁵ the threefold power does not cease in the moment anything is created, nor does eagerness cease to exist, nor does delight.

Will, cognition, and action truly exist in the moment pots, etc., are produced. The same is true for eagerness, which is the first part of will in the form of a particular delight that is limited by an object;¹⁷⁶ nor does the other delight,¹⁷⁷ in the form of unlimited bliss, cease to exist: this is because, if it were absent, the

¹⁷²Here I take *cidātman*, literally "the nature of consciousness," to be an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound referring to the one who possesses the nature in question. In other words, I take the compound to refer to Śiva.

¹⁷³In other words, at this stage, only Śiva is aware of the object of cognition, which is, as it were, mental in form and thus not cognizable by other agents in the world. One should note that Somānanda does not explain the matter in this way, as he nowhere refers to these two stages of creation, one in which the world is imperceptible to agents in the world, and a second when it is. See the Introduction, section 6, esp. note 76.

¹⁷⁴This stage contrasts with the previous, which, as Utpaladeva has explained, involves the appearance of an object that cannot be known by any mundane perceiver (*sarvapratiṭipattiṅnām avedyam*). See above.

¹⁷⁵This is to say, in the same manner as described in ŚD 1.19–21.

¹⁷⁶The language here used (*karmāvachchinnaviśiṣṭānirvṛtirūpa*) reflects that of Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 1.19–20ab: *icchāyāḥ purobhāge yā tasmīn karmani tatkarmanīṣṭhā nirvṛtiprāptiḥ, tad aunmukhyam, karmāvachchinā nirvṛtir aunmukhyam*. When Śiva desires to know or to act, he focuses his will on a particular entity. The delight (*nirvṛti*) that is the nature of his consciousness is thereby limited, focused.

¹⁷⁷See the commentary on ŚD 1.19–20 for an explanation of the two types of *nirvṛti*.

delight of specification would not exist, just as the knowledge of a particular pot and so on would not exist if (the general) knowledge (“pot”) did not exist.¹⁷⁸ It is for this reason that he used the word “obtainment” (ŚD 1.20a) earlier in saying that delight acquires particular forms.¹⁷⁹

Yet, the word “delight” (also) indicates “the power of complete consciousness” to refer to the five powers.¹⁸⁰

1.23

No object would arise if even one power were absent. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.23. *yad ekataraniryāṇe kāryaṃ jātu na jāyate
tasmāt sarvapaḍārthānāṃ sāmarasyaṃ avasthitam*

Because no object whatsoever is generated in the absence of one of the two,¹⁸¹ it follows that the state of unity exists for every object.

Since [Somānanda] says that no object would exist at any time in the absence of, that is, upon the loss of, one of the two, i.e., one of the powers, it follows that the *śivatattva*, which is made up of all the *tattvas*, is employed in the moment any object is produced. Therefore, (for objects,) there is never an absence of full contact with Śiva’s form.¹⁸²

“State of unity” means that the flavor of the contact with the Supreme Lord is absolutely unbroken even when each and every entity is created, as it is at the very beginning of the great creation.¹⁸³ That means that even a potter who

¹⁷⁸In other words, the general form must exist in order for the specific form to exist. This is analogous to the manner by which language denotes meaning, according to Bhartṛhari: words denote the class (*jāti*) of entity in question, as well as the particular entity. For example, by uttering the word “pot,” the hearer understands the idea of a pot, the “pot-ness” (*ghaṭatva*) of the pot. Only with this does he understand the particular pot in question, perhaps the one to which the speaker draws his attention by uttering the word “pot.” Similarly, the general form of “delight” must exist when the specific form is manifested. Without it, the specific form could not exist.

¹⁷⁹As there are two type of *nirvṛti*, a general and unlimited one and a particular and delimited one, Somānanda can speak of the latter as delight (*nirvṛti*) that is acquired by association with a particular object. The general form of delight, however, is unlimited, and it exists prior to the specific one, as just explained here. See also Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.19–20ab.

¹⁸⁰This statement is meant to contrast with the immediately preceding one. First, Utpaladeva mentions that delight takes particular forms, becomes delimited by particular objects. Here, he suggests that the word *nirvṛti* in ŚD 1.22d refers to the power of complete consciousness, which may be taken to refer to all of the powers.

¹⁸¹That is, in the absence of either eagerness (*aunmukhya*) or delight (*nirvṛti*). Note that Gnoli takes this to refer to the three powers. See Gnoli 1957: 20. This reading is supported to a certain extent by Utpaladeva, who glosses “one of the two” (*ekatarā*) with “one of the powers” (*śaktibheda*), though he also refers specifically to the suffix *tara* as referring to *aunmukhya* and *nirvṛti*. (See the commentary, following.) Somānanda may mention only the two because he treats the first three powers in ŚD 1.22.

¹⁸²Utpaladeva uses similar language in his commentary on ŚD 1.5–6ab: *jñānajñeyānābilajñātr-svarūpasamsparsā*.

¹⁸³This refers to the moment Śiva begins to create the universe.

makes a pot is Śiva endowed with all his powers, but out of ignorance of this one thinks that the potter makes the pot.

The use of the suffix “of the two” in “of one of the two” refers to the pair, eagerness and delight.¹⁸⁴

I.24–25

All of the powers exist not only in the moment when pots and so on are produced but also in the moment when one apprehends them.¹⁸⁵ Thus, [Somānanda] says:

- 1.24. *ghaṭādigrāhakāle 'pi ghaṭam jānāti sā kriyā
jānāti jñānam atraiva niricchor vedanakṣatiḥ*
1.25. *aunmukhyābhāvatas tasya nivr̥ttir nivr̥tīm vinā
dveṣye pravartate naiva na ca vetti vinā citam*

Even in the moment one apprehends, e.g., a pot, the cognition of the pot is an action.¹⁸⁶ Cognition exists here, as well, in the form “he cognizes.”¹⁸⁷ **There can be no perception for someone who has no will.**¹⁸⁸ **Were eagerness not to exist, that**¹⁸⁹ **would desist. In the absence of delight, one never engages in that which is reviled,**¹⁹⁰ **nor does one perceive in the absence of consciousness.**¹⁹¹

In the moment one cognizes pots, etc., the cognition of the pot, i.e., the appearance of knower and object of knowledge in the form of a pot (on the one hand,) and (an agent,) Devadatta, (on the other,) which are distinguished by the

¹⁸⁴Here, Utpaladeva explains the reason for Somānanda’s use of the comparative suffix *-tara* in the expression *ekataraniryāna*, here used in lieu of the superlative suffix *-tama*. The suffix is normally used to refer to a choice between one of two entities, not one of many entities. Now, insofar as eagerness and delight are the last of the powers mentioned in ŚD 1.22, it makes sense grammatically, by standard rules of anaphora, to understand the present passage to refer to them. Theologically, however, one would expect Somānanda to suggest that no object could be generated in the absence of *any* of the powers, including the triad of powers, will, cognition, and action. The logic of the present passage, if it is anything more than an explanation for Somānanda’s inelegant (or, perhaps, imprecise) expression, might be to suggest that *nivr̥tti* refers to the unlimited form of “delight,” while *aunmukhya*, “eagerness,” being the first movement toward manifestation, stands as a shorthand for all the remaining powers.

¹⁸⁵In other words, Utpaladeva suggests, all the powers exist not only when Śiva creates the universe, but also when individual agents within the universe perceive it and act within it.

¹⁸⁶Literally, the passage says that “it is an action that cognizes the pot.” That is to say that the power of action (*kriyāśakti*) exists at that time, because cognition is an action.

¹⁸⁷That is, the particular action in question is a cognitive act, as is indicated by the form of the verb, which indicates that one actively cognizes some object, the verb being an active, transitive verb in the present tense. Therefore, cognition involves both the power of action (*kriyā*) and the power of cognition (*jñāna*).

¹⁸⁸The power of will (*icchā*) therefore must be present in cognition.

¹⁸⁹The referent of the pronoun is ambiguous; it refers either to the agent or the perception. See Utpaladeva’s commentary, below.

¹⁹⁰That which is reviled (*dveṣya*) is the everyday world of transmigration (*samsāra*). This is a manner of speaking about the everyday world. It is, according to Gnoli, “what one wants to abandon (*heya*), the limited knowledge, the *samsāra*, etc.” (See Gnoli 1957: 21.)

¹⁹¹ŚD 1.24–25 is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 62 of Singh’s edition).

variegation that is caused by the noncognition of the non-duality of consciousness, that [cognition of the pot],¹⁹² being a sequential, new form, is an action called cognition, which becomes divided into earlier and later parts.¹⁹³ It does not arise only in the moment one proceeds to say “I know.”¹⁹⁴

Since it has the form “he cognizes,” this makes it clear that the cognition consists of an action here as well.

Perception would not arise for someone who has no will, i.e., for one who is devoid of intentions, because he would not be guided by the mind.¹⁹⁵ Will is nothing but cognition imbued with one’s intentions. Moreover, the first part of that act of willing is eagerness,¹⁹⁶ which is delight in a particular act.¹⁹⁷ Therefore, were eagerness not to exist, that, i.e., either the cognitive agent or the perception, would desist, because one does not engage in that which is reviled in the absence of delight in the act, in the form of eagerness.

¹⁹²The relative pronoun, *yat*, on line 222 of the present edition of the first chapter of the ŚDVṛ (p. 19, line 15 of the KSTS edition) appears by epanalepsis.

¹⁹³The language here, *yat kramikam apūrvaṃ rūpaṃ sã jñānalakṣaṇā kriyā pūrvāparibhūtāvayaṅvā*, echoes that of Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.12–13ab (*na tv apūrvaṣya kasyacit prathā*) and ŚD 1.19–20ab: *pūrvāparau bhāgau kalpaniyau pūrvāparibhūtāvayaṅvatvāt kriyāyā icchāyāḥ kriyātvābhidhānena*. (See also an earlier portion of the same passage of the commentary: *tad ākhyātapadam icchayā icchālakṣaṇām kriyām āha*). Regarding the former passage, Utpaladeva suggested in his commentary on ŚD 1.11cd–13ab that Śiva does not manifest any unprecedented (*apūrva*) entity. Here, however, because the everyman, Devadatta, is the agent in question, previously unknown entities can be perceived. (Cf. ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.3.1–2.) Regarding the latter passage, we are here told that action is made up of a sequence of earlier and later stages. However, Somānanda has mentioned here an action characterized by *cognition*, as opposed to the earlier action characterized by will. The action characterized by will, mentioned earlier, refers to Śiva’s act of wishing to know or act. Here, the action is characterized by cognition in that the act results in the agent knowing something previously unknown. The first combination, action with will, relates to Śiva’s creative capacity; the second combination, that of action with cognition, relates to Śiva’s reflective capacity.

¹⁹⁴In other words, the cognition, being an action, exists in (two) parts, or stages, this by the rule that an action must involve a series of events directed toward a single end (about which see, note 164, above, in the present chapter of the translation). The first part is the cognition itself, the second the moment in which one becomes fully aware of the cognition. This latter stage, in which one becomes fully aware of what the cognition reveals, is referred to in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.5–6ab as the fruit or result of the cognition. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.11cd–13ab. It is also possible that the present passage refers to the notion that there is more to cognition than the acquisition of a piece of knowledge, but rather that all cognitions involve the very process of manifestation that generates an apparent division between agent and object of cognition, which occurs prior to and is (obviously) a prerequisite for mundane cognitions.

¹⁹⁵Literally, *manasānadhīṣṭhānāt* means “because of want of superintendence by the mind.” Utpaladeva here refers to the process of cognition at the mundane level of the individual agent, whose faculties of sense (*jñānendriyas*) must be directed by the mind (*manas*), as per the standard system of the dualist Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika schools.

¹⁹⁶It is possible, if unlikely, that *icchākriyāpūrvabhāga* is declined in the locative, indicating the locus of eagerness (*aunmukhya*).

¹⁹⁷For the relationship of *nirvṛti* to the act of knowing, see ŚD 1.20ab (*tatkarmanirvṛtiprāpti*) and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereon. In the same passage, Somānanda has suggested that Śiva’s will implies an action: desiring. It is in this sense that will is here said to be an action. *Tatkarmanirvṛti* here refers to the delight (*nirvṛti*) that is limited by the object in question (*karmāvacchinnā nirvṛtiḥ*). See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.22 for a description of unlimited bliss (*ānandaśakti*) and the aforementioned delight associated with an action, i.e., *aunmukhya*.

Nor does an agent, whose nature is complete, pure knowledge, perceive pots, etc., in the absence of consciousness in the form of the non-dual power of reflective awareness, because objects are differentiated within consciousness.¹⁹⁸ That alone is the power of consciousness, the general¹⁹⁹ power of delight in the form of bliss.²⁰⁰

1.26–29ab

Anticipating the objection that Śiva-nature does not exist in the moment of cognition, [Somānanda] says:

- 1.26. *buddhiṃ vinā kathaṃ bodhaḥ sā buddhiḥ prakṛteḥ prajā
na ca tasya tayā yoga iti ced aparasthitau*
1.27. *sā buddhir yat punaḥ sūkṣmaṃ sarvadikkaṃ vyavasthitam
jñānaṃ bodhamayaṃ tasya śivasya sahaḥ sadā*
1.28. *nyāyādibhir na tulyatvaṃ tair hi yā prakṛti matih
tasyā evātmadharmatvam iṣṭaṃ na parabodhake*
1.29. *eṣa eva hi vijñeyo nyāya icchāṃ prati sphuṭam*

If you object by asking how there can be understanding in the absence of the intellect, the intellect being produced from matter and not connected to it,²⁰¹ (we reply:) that is the intellect that exists in the *aparā* condition. By contrast, the subtle, all-pervasive (power of) cognition, which is pure understanding,²⁰² is eternally Śiva's natural state. It is not the same as that of the Naiyāyikas and others, because they only contend that material knowledge is a quality of the (individual) self, not of the supreme knower. Of course, the same argument clearly should apply to (the power of) will.²⁰³

Objection: How can understanding, that is, the cognition “he knows,” being an activity of the intellect, exist without the active intellect? The intellect,

¹⁹⁸Put differently, it is only in consciousness that one sees the diverse objects. Therefore, consciousness must exist when one cognizes a pot. Literally, *saṃvinnīṣṭhatvād viṣaya vyavasthitinām* means “because the distinguishing of objects rests in consciousness.”

¹⁹⁹Here, Utpaladeva is differentiating the universal form of delight from the form that is delimited by the object with which it is associated. See ŚD 1.22 and Utpaladeva's commentary thereupon.

²⁰⁰Compare the present passage (*saiva cicchaktiḥ sāmānyā nirṛtiśaktir ānandarūpā*) with ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.19–20ab: *karmāvachinnā nirṛtir aunmukhyam, anavachinnā nirṛtimātram ānandaśaktiḥ*.

²⁰¹The demonstrative pronoun (*ta*) here refers to the *śivatattva*, according to Utpaladeva, for which, see below.

²⁰²Utpaladeva glosses *bodhamaya* with “pure understanding” (*bodhamātra*); I translate following his gloss.

²⁰³In other words, one can argue that the power of will, like the power of cognition, relates to the supreme agent, not simply to individual, monadic agents. ŚD 1.26d–27 is quoted in PTV ad PT 3–4 (p. 23 of Singh's edition), reading *avasthitam* for *vyavasthitam* in ŚD 1.27b.

moreover, originating from *prakṛti*,²⁰⁴ is insentient, and it, that is, the untainted *śivatattva*, which possesses all of the powers,²⁰⁵ is not connected to it.

If you object in this manner, then we reply: not so. That is the intellect of cognitive agents who have subtle bodies,²⁰⁶ which exists in the one-faceted²⁰⁷ *aparā* condition, which is the noncognition of non-duality.²⁰⁸

By contrast, there is the (power of) cognition of (Śiva) the one who resides in his completeness in the *parā* condition; for this reason it is subtle, i.e., non-dual; (and) it must be taught to be unknowable; hence, it is all-pervasive, i.e., undivided in space and time, pure consciousness in an unknowable form. It is eternally Śiva's natural state²⁰⁹ because it truly exists, even when the material intellect comes to light, since the latter would not exist in the absence of the former.²¹⁰

Objection: Even if this were so, one (merely) attains parity with the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, etc., if one understands Śiva to be the basis of cognition, for they hold that cognition is inherent in the (individual) self, and Śiva (on your view) exists in the form of the (very same, monadic) self.²¹¹

Because the (followers of the) Nyāya, etc., could say as much (Somānanda replies): it is not the same as theirs, because they refer to the dualistic cognition of the intellect²¹² in the material, dualistic condition, but not in Īśvara, the supreme knower.²¹³

²⁰⁴This refers to the insentient, material nature of the intellect. As in the Sāṅkhya, the Pratyabhijñā accepts that the intellect (*buddhi*) is material, an evolute of materiality (the *prakṛtitattva*), and the Pratyabhijñā also accepts a form of the *prakṛtitattva* of the Sāṅkhya, though they count it as the thirteenth, rather than the second, *tattva*. On the Sāṅkhya formulation of the *tattvas*, see, e.g., Larson 1969: 192–220.

²⁰⁵That is, will (*icchā*), etcetera.

²⁰⁶The term in question is *puryaṣṭakapramātr*. A descriptive (*karmadhāraya*) compound, the term literally refers to “subtle-bodied cognitive agents.” See Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 1.5–6ab and the notes thereon (esp. note 83) for further explanation of the *puryaṣṭaka*.

²⁰⁷The term *ekarasā* literally means “a single/unitary flavor.”

²⁰⁸Utpaladeva has repeatedly asserted that the *aparā* condition and the concomitant duality is nothing but the nonperception of non-duality. See Utpaladeva's commentary on, for example, ŚD 1.11cd–13ab (*māyāśaktikṛtapūrṇasvarūpākhyātimaya*^o); ŚD 1.7cd–8 (*māyiyābhedākhyāti*^o); the passage farther on in Utpaladeva's commentary on 1.11cd–13ab (*abhedāparāmarśanam eva bhrāntirūpaṃ kutsitam, tac ca na kiñcid akhyātirūpamātratvāt*); and ŚD 1.1 (*māyāśaktikṛtaikyākhyātyā*).

²⁰⁹Kaul suggests that the term here translated, *sahaja*, refers to Śiva's nature, which is such that it reflects on itself: *sahajam svarūpapatyavamarśasvabhāvam, nānyat*.

²¹⁰The idea is that the intellect of the individual would not exist in the absence of Śiva's power of cognition. By extension, the present passage evokes the notion that no particular instance of knowledge exists without a corresponding, general one, as no cognition of a pot can exist without the general knowledge of “pot,” for example. Compare the passage in question—*tatsadbhāvāt tad vinā tadabhāvāt*—to Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 1.22: *tadabhāve viśeṣanirvṛter abhāvād yathā bodhābhāve viśiṣṭaghaṭāḍibodhasya*.

²¹¹See ŚD 1.2: *ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu sphuran nirvṛtaciḍ vibhuḥ / aniruddhechchāprasaraḥ prasaraḍḍṛk-kriyāḥ śivaḥ*.

²¹²Literally, *buddhibhedātman* means “(cognition) the dualistic nature of which is the intellect.”

²¹³Insofar as Īśvara is the supreme deity according to the Nyāya, etc., he is analogous with Śiva in the Pratyabhijñā. The argument here expressed suggests that, while the Naiyāyikas, etc., understand the intellect to be associated with the individual cognizer, the authors of the Pratyabhijñā understand it ultimately to be connected with God, the supreme agent.

That is why [Somānanda] says that the same argument clearly should apply to (the power of) will.²¹⁴ The will that those others conceive of as a thought in the mind is based on the individual nature of consciousness and is only dualistic; it is, by contrast, not the nature of the Supreme Lord, nor is it (even) located in the *parāparā* condition.²¹⁵

1.29cd–33

[Somānanda] says that the condition of the *śivatattva* is such that it consists of all of the *tattvas*:

tad evaṃ prasṛto devaḥ kadācic chaktimātrake
 1.30 *bibharti rūpam icchātaḥ kadācij jñānaśaktitaḥ*
sadāśivatvam udrekāt kadācid aiśvarim sthitim
 1.31. *kriyāśaktisamābhogāt kadācit sthūlavedanāt*
vidyātva vidyeśānatvamantramantresvarātmatām
 1.32. *ātmapracchādanakriḍāṃ kurvato vā kathañcana*
māyārūpam itityādiṣaṭtrimśattattvarūpatām
 1.33. *bibhrad bibharti rūpāni tāvatā vyavahārataḥ*
yāvat sthūlaṃ jaḍābhāsam saṃhataṃ pārhivaṃ ghanam

Thus, God comes forth in this way at a certain time. Sometimes,²¹⁶ he assumes a form, through (the power of) will,²¹⁷ in the one possessed of pure power. Sometimes, through the power of cognition, (he assumes) the nature of Sadāśiva,²¹⁸ due to an abundance (of that power of cognition).²¹⁹ Sometimes, because the power of action rules supreme, (he assumes the form of) the Īśvara state.²²⁰ Sometimes, because perception is coarse, (he

²¹⁴In other words, the Pratyabhijñā equates the individual agent's power of will with that of Śiva. The Naiyāyikas, etc., do not.

²¹⁵In other words, the choices made by individuals, according to the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, are made at the level of an individual's intellectual deliberations. They do not involve a direct access to the very nature of the divine, as does any act of volition, according to the Pratyabhijñā. Unlike in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the Pratyabhijñā maintains that every act is willed and performed by Śiva himself. Thus, by considering the possibility that, according to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, will is not associated with the *parāparā* condition, one should understand Utpaladeva to weigh the status of will in those schools by the measure of his own system of thought. These other schools do not recognize the existence of the *parāparā* condition, etc.

²¹⁶Following Utpaladeva's commentary, I translate *kadācit* (ŚD 1.29d) twice, once with what precedes it and once with what follows (*dehalīdīpavat*).

²¹⁷See the commentary, below, for Utpaladeva's two interpretations of *icchātaḥ*.

²¹⁸This is a reference to the third of the thirty-six *tattvas*, and there is a slight subject-object distinction at this level. Here, one experiences "I am this," but "I-ness" is emphasized slightly over "this-ness." This is the level at which Mantramahēśvaras reside. See Pandit 1997: 73–74.

²¹⁹Note that Kaul glosses *udrekāt* with *jñānaśakter udrekāt*.

²²⁰The *īśvaratattva* is the fourth of the thirty-six *tattvas*. At this level, there is a slight distinction of subject from object, though, unlike at the level of Sadāśiva, "this-ness" is here emphasized slightly over "I-ness." This is the level at which Mantresvaras reside. See Pandit 1997: 73–74.

assumes) the nature of *Vidyā*,²²¹ the *Vidyēśvaras*, the *Mantras*, and the *Mantrēśvaras*.²²² Alternatively, *māyā*, belonging to (Śiva,) the one who is somehow playing the game of self-concealment, assumes the nature of the thirty-six *tattvas*, beginning with that which is called form,²²³ and thus assumes as many forms as are discussed, down to the coarse, compact, solid earth, which has an insentient appearance.

Therefore, the Supreme Lord, Śiva, whose two powers, consciousness and delight, penetrate his nature,²²⁴ who consists of *prakāśa* and bliss and is complete, comes forth in this way, i.e., according to the sequence articulated earlier,²²⁵ at a certain time, i.e., in the first place.²²⁶

In the one possessed of pure power, i.e., in eagerness, the first part of will that is closely associated with the objects of sense²²⁷ and consists of delight, which is to say in the condition found at the beginning of the *parāparā* condition, he assumes a form that accords with that [power], one on which those who meditate must concentrate,²²⁸ sometimes (he does this) through (the power of) will,

²²¹ *Vidyātva* here refers to *suddhavidyā*, the fifth of the thirty-six *tattvas*, which is the last of the pure *tattvas*.

²²² *Vidyēśvaras* reside at the level of either *mahāmāyā* or *suddhavidyā*. Also called *Mantras*, this group of beings “sees the Self as omniscient, omnipotent, pure and infinite Consciousness, but considers objective existence to be different from the self.” (See Pandit 1997: 189.) *Mantrēśvaras* reside at the level of the *īśvaratattva*. According to Pandit, they “see objective existence as their own self.” (See Pandit 1997: 166.)

²²³ As Utpaladeva explains, the present passage refers to the enumeration of the thirty-six *tattvas*, of which the most coarse levels constitute material form, the earth, etc. Somānanda suggests that the power of “illusion” (*māyā*) creates these levels “beginning with form” because it is common practice to count the thirty-six *tattvas* beginning with the thirty-sixth, the earth-*tattva*, rather than with the first *tattva*, the *śivatattva*. Note that I take *ityādiṣaṭtriṃśattattvarūpatām* to be a single compound. The KSTS edition suggests that there are two compounds: *ityādi ṣaṭtriṃśattattvarūpatām*.

²²⁴ It is possible that the past participle (*anupraviṣṭa*) in the compound (*svarūpānupraviṣṭacinnirvṛtirūpaśaktīdvaya*) has a passive and not an active meaning, in which case one could translate, “whose two powers, consciousness and delight, are penetrated by his nature.” The compound in question is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound.

²²⁵ That is, according to the sequence of Śiva’s powers as enumerated in ŚD 1.7cd–21, namely: *aunmukhya* (ŚD 1.7cd–11ab), *icchā* (ŚD 1.13cd–17), *jñāna* (ŚD 1.20c–21a), and *kriyā* (ŚD 1.21a–c). In addition, Śiva is of course “one whose consciousness is delighted” (*nirvṛticit*) by virtue of this being his very nature.

²²⁶ This is a reference to the *śivatattva*, the first of the thirty-six *tattvas*. Thus, Utpaladeva appears to suggest that the first *tattva* is created, while also suggesting elsewhere that the first *tattva* is the nature of all the thirty-six *tattvas*. In other words, he both suggests that the *śivatattva* is one with Śiva himself, in all his diverse forms, and that the same *tattva* is the product of a form of Śiva that transcends all the thirty-six *tattvas*. I understand this to be an expression, therefore, of Utpaladeva’s pantheism, one that, as noted in the Introduction, does not appear in Somānanda’s oeuvre.

²²⁷ Note that “closely associated with the objects of sense” is a translation of *viśayān anuṣakta*, which the KSTS edition prints as a single compound (*viśayānanuṣakta*) with precisely the opposite meaning: that which is not closely associated with the objects of sense.” This interpretation does not accord, however, with the notion that eagerness, *aunmukhya*, is the form of delight (*nirvṛti*) that is delimited by the object in question, this per the system of overlapping pairs of powers posited by Somānanda and explained in the Introduction. See the Introduction, section 5.

²²⁸ This is a reference to the second of the thirty-six *tattvas*, the *śaktītattva*. It is unclear, however, why Utpaladeva here describes this level as one on which one should concentrate.

i.e., because he has the power of will as his nature.²²⁹ Alternatively, (construe *icchātas* as follows:) after he has reached the form of will, he assumes a form, as before, that accords with it.²³⁰

Sometimes, moreover, he assumes the form of *Sadāśiva*,²³¹ because he is in the form of the power of cognition. The cognition, however, exists as an action, this as a result of the predominance, in the previously stated manner (of the power of cognition at the level of the *sadāśivatattva*).²³²

And sometimes he assumes the *Īśvara* state,²³³ because the power of action rules supreme, that is, because it has reached its full extension.²³⁴

Sometimes he assumes the nature of Mantras, etc., in accordance with the condition of the cognitive agents who are located in the *parāparā* condition²³⁵ and have as their nature a form of understanding that encompasses without exception the various agents and objects of knowledge.²³⁶

²²⁹The present passage constitutes Utpaladeva's first interpretation of *icchātas* (ŚD 1.30a). He here suggests that Somānanda uses the term to say that Śiva manifests himself in the manner that he does because he is by nature the power of will.

²³⁰Here, Utpaladeva is offering a second interpretation of the term *icchātas* in ŚD 1.30a. According to the first interpretation, the term in question describes how Śiva assumes the form in question: he does so because he exists in the form of the power of will. Here, Utpaladeva suggests that the force of the suffix (*-tas*) suggests the moment after which Śiva acts: after having reached the form of the power of will, he then assumes a form that conforms to it. In other words, the first interpretation emphasized Śiva's nature as will, while the second interpretation emphasized the sequential process of manifestation by which Śiva creates the universe. Note also that this second interpretation suggests that Utpaladeva here understands the "form of will," i.e., the manifestation of the power of will (*icchāśakti*), to occur at the level of the *śaktitattva*. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, where a chart in the notes maps the formulation of the schema in question.

²³¹This refers to the third of the thirty-six *tattvas*, the *sadāśivatattva*.

²³²What is meant is that while the level of the *sadāśivatattva* is primarily one at which the power of cognition is present, the power of action also exists there in a latent form, this because the power that is predominant in one *tattva* exists in a nascent form in the preceding and hierarchically superior one. Thus, the power of action exists in a nascent form in the third *tattva*, the *sadāśivatattva*, even though the power of cognition is predominant there and despite the fact that the power of action is predominant at the level of the *īśvaratattva*, the fourth of the thirty-six *tattvas*. As Kaul suggests, Utpaladeva may therefore be understood here to refer, with *prāguktanaya*, to his commentary on ŚD 1.20cd–21, where he describes the sequential arising of the powers of cognition and action, as well as the principle that a subsequent power in the sequence of powers exists in potential form in the stage prior to it. See Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 1.20cd–21. See also Kaul's note 5, p. 24 of the KSTS edition: *antaḥkaraṇa iva vedyaṃ iti nayena*. This sequence, of what I have described as Somānanda's theory of overlapping pairs of powers, was outlined in section 5 of the Introduction, as well. Cf. also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, where Utpaladeva suggests that the power of action is present in a latent form in the *sadāśivatattva*.

²³³This refers to the *īśvaratattva*, the fourth of the thirty-six *tattvas*.

²³⁴This stands in contrast to the status of the power of action at the level of the *sadāśivatattva*, where it is present only in a nascent form.

²³⁵The *parāparā* condition comprises the *sadāśivatattva* and the *īśvaratattva*, the third and fourth of the thirty-six *tattvas*. See ĪPK 3.1.5 for Utpaladeva's definition of the *parāparā* condition.

²³⁶The agents residing in the *parāparā* condition, i.e., at the level of the *sadāśiva*- and *īśvaratattvas*, are non-dual agents. The only diversity apparent to them is extremely subtle and, as it were, mental rather than physical. They know in their consciousness a slight subject-object distinction, but it exists in a sort of premanifested state. As such, agents in the *parāparā* condition encompass all agents and objects of knowledge, and it is to this that Utpaladeva here refers.

The fact that the object perceived, i.e., the universe, is coarse is nothing but the differentiated state of the absolute,²³⁷ and the cognitive agents,²³⁸ although they have consciousness as their nature,²³⁹ are coarse, because, since Śiva wills it so, they suffer from duality. Hence, perception is also coarse, and this is the state of Vidyā.²⁴⁰ And others hold that Vidyā is *mahāmāyā*,²⁴¹ because duality appears (in it).

Sometimes, Śiva,²⁴² who is somehow—because it is his nature—only playing the game, that is, making an illusion in the form of the world of transmigration, which consists of the self-concealment that is characteristic of the noncognition of non-duality, has his power of *māyā*, it being the source of the *aparā* condition,²⁴³ assume in a general form²⁴⁴ the nature of the thirty-six *tattvas*, the lower²⁴⁵ *tattvas* of which being referred to as form, and thus [*māyā*] also assumes their specific forms, as many as are brought about according to this well-known way of discussing them. Let there (also) be other, rather more obscure ways of discussing them,²⁴⁶ for the objects of Īśvara's creation are not restricted,²⁴⁷ but the fact that all of those²⁴⁸ have his nature cannot be denied, as this much can be logically proven. This is what we propose.²⁴⁹

²³⁷The term in question, *ekānta*, literally meaning the “only end or aim,” likely refers to Śiva. What is meant is that the coarse nature of the absolute is merely the state of differentiation appearing in the one, unitary Śiva. It is not really coarse (*sthūla*), but rather is Śiva himself. Thus, *ekāntabhinnatā* serves to contrast the multiplicity of the world with the innate unity of Śiva.

²³⁸This refers to the cognitive agents at the level of manifestation in question.

²³⁹See the commentary and relevant notes, above.

²⁴⁰Vidyā refers to the *śuddhavidyātattva*, the fifth of the thirty-six *tattvas*. In this passage, Utpaladeva has suggested that the object in question (i.e., the universe), the agent who perceives it, and the perception itself are all coarse (*sthūlatva*), i.e., dualistic, at this level. The level of the *śuddhavidyātattva* is commonly associated with the first budding of duality, in the system of the thirty-six *tattvas*, and it is to this idea that Utpaladeva here refers.

²⁴¹There are two views regarding the location, as it were, of the form of “illusion” that creates the apparently external, dualistic universe (*mahāmāyā*). Some suggest that it exists as an interstitial level between the *śuddhavidyā*- and *māyātattvas*, while others suggest, as mentioned here, that *mahāmāyā* is another name for the *śuddhavidyātattva*. The important point here is that the level in question is “coarse” insofar as it involves the presence of the appearance of duality.

²⁴²The text literally refers to the one who plays a game, but the reference to Śiva is unambiguous.

²⁴³I read *aparāvasthābijabhūtā* as a single compound, though the KSTS edition prints them as distinct words: *aparāvasthā bijabhūtā*.

²⁴⁴The adverbial term here translated is *sāmānyena*.

²⁴⁵Literally, the text refers to the “first” *tattvas*, but the implication is that the lower levels are being described, as one often counts the *tattvas* beginning with the lowest one, the earth-*tattva*.

²⁴⁶That is, there may be other legitimate ways to describe the *tattvas*.

²⁴⁷In other words, Īśvara is capable of producing whatever universe he wishes to produce, even if it is not the one to which the mundane perceiver is accustomed.

²⁴⁸This refers to the hypothetical *tattvas* mentioned in the hypothetical schemes other than that of the thirty-six. In other words, all the levels of reality, be they represented by the scheme of thirty-six *tattvas* or otherwise, have Śiva's nature. This is an essential fact: Śiva is not delimited by the schemes by which we describe him.

²⁴⁹Cf. ŚDVṛ to ŚD 1.2, where Utpaladeva proposes that the ŚD aims to prove the validity of the way Somānanda speaks of Śiva, while Śiva-nature remains unaffected by the language used to describe it. Cf., also, the *avatarāṅikā* to ŚD 1.3–4.

The thirty-sixfold enumeration extends²⁵⁰ down to the earth, i.e., the earth-*tattva*; nothing is found after it here.²⁵¹ Thus, the earth-*tattva*, because it is (entirely) coarse, stands at the end.

An object,²⁵² the particular attribute of which is brought about by many ancillary causes, is more coarse than its cause, and it is not subtle because it is more developed (than its cause). Although great, a cause, such as the source of material existence,²⁵³ is very subtle.²⁵⁴ Thus, insofar as everything is connected to *prakāśa*, since everything is made up of consciousness, everything, from Śiva²⁵⁵ down even to the white-colored water *tattva*, should be regarded as a cause.²⁵⁶

On the other hand, as much as this is the case²⁵⁷ even at the (level of the) earth(-*tattva*), a difference exists (there), even though its²⁵⁸ nature is *prakāśa*,²⁵⁹ because it is the pure noncognition of the non-duality of the light of consciousness.²⁶⁰ Therefore, he says it has an “insentient appearance,” an exocentric compound meaning it is one “whose appearance, i.e., form, because dark, is insentient, i.e., is not *prakāśa*.” It is compact because its nature consists of the

²⁵⁰The verb *pūryate* literally means “is filled.”

²⁵¹“Here” (*atra*) refers in this instance to the system of classification at hand, that of thirty-six *tattvas*. The earth-*tattva* is the last of the thirty-six.

²⁵²The term *kārya* can also refer to the effect of a cause (*kāraṇa*).

²⁵³The present term, *pradhāna*, probably refers to *mūlaprakṛti*, the source of material manifestation, according to the Sāṅkhya, and the thirteenth of thirty-six in the Śaiva system of the *tattvas*. It is also possible that this term should be taken to refer to the power of illusion (*māyā*), however. On *mūlaprakṛti* in the Sāṅkhya, see Larson 1969: 192–197.

²⁵⁴In other words, one might object that that which causes the creation of the universe is not very subtle, because that which it creates is not subtle. The response given is that, even though that which causes the universe is great, it is nevertheless very subtle. Thus, the *tattvas* each are causes, the preceding one of the one following, even if they are not the most subtle of entities in existence.

²⁵⁵Literally, the text reads “the fact of being real,” which suggests a reference to the highest *tattva*, the *śivatattva*.

²⁵⁶The water *tattva* is the thirty-fifth *tattva*. Excluding the last *tattva*, the earth-*tattva*, every *tattva* is the cause of the following one. Reference to the white color of the water *tattva* calls forth the classification of the Naiyāyikas, etc., who associate particular colors and qualities with particular elements. Note that my translation is slightly free, here, as the text literally refers to the thirty-fifth *tattva* as “one whose color shines forth as white,” this with an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound: *suklaprakāśavarṇa*.

²⁵⁷In other words, as much as everything is a cause, this insofar as everything is Śiva in the form of consciousness, the following obtains.

²⁵⁸That is, there is a difference between the earth-*tattva* and the thirty-five *tattvas* above it, even though the former is by nature *prakāśa*, as are the other thirty-five.

²⁵⁹As Kaul notes, this is because nothing appears that is not *prakāśa*: *tat pārthivaṃ tattvaṃ nāprakāśaḥ prakāśata iti nyāyena prakāśātmatve 'pi citprakāśaikyākhyātimātrāṅ pṛthag evāsti*. See note 4 on p. 26 of the KSTS edition.

²⁶⁰The earth-*tattva* is different from the other *tattvas* insofar as it marks the last stage of manifestation. As such, it is not merely the noncognition of non-duality, but rather it is, as it were, the limit or the lowest form of that which Śiva manifests. Here, then, Utpaladeva points to the earth-*tattva* as the de facto limit of manifestation. It represents the stage at which consciousness is entirely unaware of the fact that it is an undivided whole. But insofar as consciousness is cognizant of this noncognition, consciousness is still conscious. Paradoxically, then, it is at this level that consciousness is fully aware of its not being aware of its ultimate unity.

array of the five objects of experience,²⁶¹ which consist of the (five) physical entities beginning with ether.²⁶² It has no interstices in it²⁶³—that is, it is the last object—because nothing more can be added (to it).²⁶⁴ For the same reason, it is solid, because many [entities] are compressed (in it); it blocks others from occupying its space; it is totally intolerant of mixing with anything else;²⁶⁵ it is nourishing of dualistic vision,²⁶⁶ (and) it is placed at the end (of the *tattvas*).

I.34

After that,²⁶⁷ he himself creates as objects the worlds, etc., which are the innumerable powers of these very beings.²⁶⁸ Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.34. *tathā nānāśarīrāṇi bhuvanāni tathā tathā
visrjya rūpaṃ grhṇāti protkrṣṭādhamamadhyamam*

In like manner, he produces the many bodies, (and) the various worlds and assumes their forms, be they the highest, the lowest, or in between.²⁶⁹

Thus, he comes forth as a form, as the thirty-sixfold object in the form of the *tattvas*, which is fit to extend the expansion of the universe. In the same way, i.e., by means of these same *tattvas*, he produces as objects the bodies of Gods, etc.,²⁷⁰ and the worlds. The former are brought about not directly from the creator, but in the form of men who are born and dwell in the world of transmigration—(indeed,) he himself produces²⁷¹ the Gods, etc., by means of the form of such beings as one’s father and mother, since, in the manner stated

²⁶¹These are: sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell.

²⁶²Again, reference is here made to the materialists’ conception of the elements, according to which the earth is the lowest of the five and includes all of the qualities of the preceding four, as well as a fifth, taste.

²⁶³This is a gloss of *saṃhata*, “compact.”

²⁶⁴The term here translated is *saṃparkāntarāsambhava*, more literally meaning “because it is not possible for there to be another addition.”

²⁶⁵This is again to say that nothing else can be added to the earth-*tattva*, or in other words it is the last level of manifestation, according to this thirty-sixfold system of classification.

²⁶⁶I take *paripuṣṭadvaitadṛṣṭi* to be a neuter exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound. Kaul counts it as part of a larger compound: *paripuṣṭadvaitadṛṣṭīpariyantaniviṣṭam*.

²⁶⁷That is, after creating the thirty-six *tattvas*, he does the following.

²⁶⁸This refers to the Vidyēśvaras, Mantras, etc., who are mentioned in the previous passage, ŚD 1.29cd–33. The idea is that Śiva first creates the basic elements of creation, and he appoints these various beings, who in turn use their powers to create the various worlds, etc.

²⁶⁹Note that I here translate the singular “form” (*rūpa*) with the plural, this to render the present in idiomatic English.

²⁷⁰The word “etcetera” (*ādi*) here refers to human beings and the beings who dwell in the *parāparā* condition, the Mantras, etc.

²⁷¹Here I read the absolutive (*visrjya*) a second time, this to make sense of the clause beginning with *kevalam*. It is only Śiva who produces the bodies of the Gods, etc.: even if one is born of one’s own parents, it is in reality Śiva himself who causes the creation of the child who is born of those parents.

in the *Pratyabhijñā*,²⁷² no one else creates anything;²⁷³ the latter (are brought about) in the form of places where they live. He then assumes the form of the highest, etc., i.e., the forms of Gods, humans, and those born of animals.

1.35

He assumes (the form of) the bodies, worlds, and mental impressions that mutually conform to one another.²⁷⁴ Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.35 *sthānānurūpato dehān dehākāreṇa bhāvanāḥ
ādadat tena tenaiva rūpeṇa pravibhāvyaṭe*

Acquiring (the form of) the bodies that are commensurate with the places and the feelings that are commensurate with the bodies, he appears in these very forms.²⁷⁵

The different activities of these Gods, etc.,²⁷⁶ come about in a commensurate form, and, acquiring (the form of) the bodies, etc., he is seen in, i.e., is brought about by, these same māyic forms.

1.36–37ab

He alone exists even in hell, etc., as a result of failing to cognize his own true nature.²⁷⁷ Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.36. *kriḍayā duḥkhavedyāni karmakārīṇi tatphalaiḥ
saṃbhatsyamānāni tathā narakārṇavagahvare*
1.37. *nivāsīni śarīrāṇi grhṇāti paramēśvaraḥ*

Playfully, the Supreme Lord assumes (the form of) the bodies in which suffering will be perceived, which perform (sinful) acts and then, dwelling in the abyss of the ocean of hell, will be consumed by their fruits.

²⁷²See in particular ĪPK 2.4.21 and his *Vṛtti* on the same, where Utpaladeva says that causality, agency, and action are only Śiva's will. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.4, where Utpaladeva explains the nature of causality, arguing that all action, including creation, must be authored by a single, unitary God.

²⁷³The idea presented here is echoed elsewhere in Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 1. See, for example, Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 1.1: *paratvena prathamapurūṣaprayogo kiñcidrūpatvena kṛtrīmāhambhāvasya kartṛtāmātram tattvam iti darśanārthaḥ*. Compare with the present passage: *parasyākiñcītkaratvāt sa eva*.

²⁷⁴In other words, mental impressions correspond with the body in which they are experienced, just as the bodies correspond with the world in which they dwell.

²⁷⁵I here follow Gnoli's translation, in part: "The bodies which he assumes are commensurate with the planes of reality; similarly, the mental *habitus* which he assumes is commensurate with the bodies. In other words, He assumes their forms which are, accordingly, sublime (the Gods), average (men) or base (animals)." See Gnoli 1957: 21.

²⁷⁶"Etcetera" refers to the beings mentioned in ŚD 1.34, as well as the worlds, the mental states, and so on that accompany them.

²⁷⁷That is to say, when Śiva takes the form of those who are condemned to hell, he has taken on a state of awareness in which he does not recognize his own nature.

Because it is his nature to play by creating the universe, he assumes (the form of) the bodies here²⁷⁸ that will be experienced as having a suffering nature in hell,²⁷⁹ or, they are those in which suffering will be experienced in hell.²⁸⁰ They perform sinful acts, due to the force of *niyatisakti*,²⁸¹ the nature of which is *māyā*, and then, dwelling in the deep, frightening belly of the ocean that is hell, they will reap the fruits of those acts.

The Supreme Lord alone exists, even in hell, and no one at all exists except him. Thus, oneness is fully corroborated.

1.37cd–38

[Somānanda] expresses the same with an example from the everyday world:

yathā nrpaḥ sārvaḥmaḥ prabhāvāmodabhāvitaḥ
 1.38. *kriḍan karoti pādātadharmāṃs taddharmadharmataḥ*
tathā prabhuḥ pramodātmā kriḍaty evaṃ tathā tathā

Just as an omnipotent king, engrossed in the joy of his power, playing, performs the duties of a foot soldier as one whose nature is his²⁸² nature, so also the Lord, whose nature is joy, plays in this way, again and again.

Just as an omnipotent king, penetrated by the wonder²⁸³ of sovereignty, performs uninhibitedly, as a game, the actions of a foot soldier by assuming the nature that is characteristic of him,²⁸⁴ so also the Supreme Lord, being complete and therefore naturally intoxicated by (the power of) bliss,²⁸⁵ plays in this

²⁷⁸The word *iha*, “here,” can be interpreted either to mean that Śiva takes the form of these bodies here in the world or that the bodies perform sinful acts in the world. I have here translated in a manner that reflects the former.

²⁷⁹Here, Utpaladeva suggests that *duḥkhavedya* can be interpreted as a determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound.

²⁸⁰In other words, it is in the body that individuals suffer. Here, Utpaladeva suggests that *duḥkhavedya* can be interpreted as an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound.

²⁸¹The reference here, one not found in the ŚD, is to one of the five “sheaths” or *kañcukas*, the powers by which Śiva constricts his own consciousness so as to create a limited, everyday world. *Niyati* is the fourth of the five, and its function is to limit causal relations. This power follows in the hierarchy of *tattvas* after *kalā* or limitation of action, *vidyā* or limitation of knowledge, and *rāga* or limitation of interest. Following it is *kāla* or that which limits time. See Pandit 1997: 71–79, esp. 76. See also ĪPK 2.3.6.

²⁸²That is, he acts as if he has the nature of one who is a member of the infantry.

²⁸³As he does in his commentary on ŚD 1.7cd-8, Utpaladeva here glosses “joy” (*āmoda*) with “wonder” (*camatkāra*).

²⁸⁴That is, he assumes the nature that is characteristic of the foot soldier.

²⁸⁵The KSTS edition reads *ānandaghūrṇitais*, but all four manuscripts of the edition (G, J, P & R) record the compound in the nominative case (*ānandaghūrṇitas*), an adjective describing the Supreme Lord (*parameśvara*). I here accept the reading of the manuscripts and translate accordingly, as it makes little sense to describe the modes as intoxicated by bliss. Note that Utpaladeva uses language similar to the term in question, namely *ghūrṇita*, in his commentary on ŚD 1.7cd–8. There, he equates Somānanda’s *jṛmbhā*, “expansion,” with *ghūrṇana*, “vibration.” The point is that the modes (*prakāra*) of consciousness are made active by Śiva’s power of bliss. It is in this light that one should understand Utpaladeva’s definition, in what follows, of play (*kriḍā*) as vibration (*spanda*). Cf., also, e.g., TĀ 26.24ab: *iti jñātvā guruḥ samyak paramānandaghūrṇitaḥ*.

way, that is, similarly to this [king], with the various modes that are proper to the various beings. Play is vibration seeking out joy.²⁸⁶

1.39–41ab

To summarize the aforementioned *tattvas*, beginning with (the) *śakti(-tattva)*, [Somānanda] says:

- 1.39. *itthaṃ śivo bodhamayaḥ sa eva paranirvṛtiḥ
saiva conmukhatām yāti secchājñānakriyātmatām*
1.40. *saiva śāktaśarirādināarakāntaṃ hi bhūtataḥ
prasūyate svacidrūpapramukhaṃ pārvīvāntakam*
1.41. *padārthatvena bhagavān sarvatraiva tadātmatā*

Thus, Śiva is made up of consciousness;²⁸⁷ he alone is supreme delight, and that alone becomes eagerness,²⁸⁸ which becomes²⁸⁹ will, cognition, and action.²⁹⁰ Most assuredly, that²⁹¹ is itself the state of existing as a living being, which he produces as those (beings) beginning with bodies that are made of power²⁹² and down to those dwelling in hell.²⁹³ The Lord (also) produces,²⁹⁴ as things,²⁹⁵ that which begins with the one in the form of his consciousness²⁹⁶ and ends with the earth(-*tattva*).²⁹⁷ His nature is truly omnipresent.

²⁸⁶ Utpaladeva here defines play (*kriḍā*) technically: it occurs when Śiva amuses himself through his pulsating consciousness.

²⁸⁷ Kaul suggests that this is a reference to ŚD 1.2. See Kaul's note 1, p. 29 of the KSTS edition: *ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu iti nayena*.

²⁸⁸ As Kaul suggests, this is a reference to the stage of manifestation described in ŚD 1.7cd–8. See Kaul's note 3, p. 29 of the KSTS edition: *yadā tu tasyetyādinā*.

²⁸⁹ The verb *yāti* should be read twice, with both what precedes and what follows it.

²⁹⁰ The present passage refers to eagerness becoming fully manifested, not to the power of delight (*nirvṛti*) becoming the three powers—will, cognition, and action—directly, as the syntax of the present, telegraphic passage would allow. See ŚD 1.13–17 and Utpaladeva's commentary thereon concerning this stage of manifestation. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.19–20ab, where Utpaladeva describes eagerness as the first budding of consciousness.

²⁹¹ As in ŚD 1.40ab, the syntax here is ambiguous. Utpaladeva's commentary suggests that the feminine pronoun (*sā*) in ŚD 1.40c accords with *bhūtataḥ* (ŚD 1.40d), but I understand it to refer to the immediately preceding stage in the sequence of manifestation, the state of being (° *ātmatā*) will, cognition, and action. This interpretation mirrors the syntax of 1.40ab, where the subject of the verb is properly understood to be *unmukhatā*, not *paranirvṛti*. In both cases, the standard rules of anaphora suggest the interpretations supported in the present translation.

²⁹² This is a reference to Vidyās, etc. See ŚD 1.31b–d. These beings do not have material bodies, but rather they have bodies made purely of *śakti* or power.

²⁹³ For Śiva as the one occupying hell, see ŚD 1.36–37ab, above.

²⁹⁴ Following Utpaladeva's gloss, the verb *prasūyate* should be employed twice in this verse, once here, and once with *śāktaśarirādināarakāntaṃ* in ŚD 1.40ab.

²⁹⁵ The term here used is *padārtha*.

²⁹⁶ This is a reference to the first of the thirty-six *tattvas*, the *śivatattva*.

²⁹⁷ See ŚD 1.29cd–33.

In the aforementioned manner,²⁹⁸ the Lord Śiva is always²⁹⁹ one whose form is pure consciousness, is complete, autonomous, and blissful.

Then, by dint of the power of *māyā*, i.e., by not perceiving himself,³⁰⁰ he, as if separated from bliss, becomes the *tattvas* in order to be established in the form of a desire to create the world.³⁰¹

Because that³⁰² is an action,³⁰³ it becomes eagerness, the first portion of [desire],³⁰⁴ and that becomes, in order, will, cognition, and action.³⁰⁵

Having so much agency,³⁰⁶ he produces, i.e., he himself is born in, the form beginning with bodies made out of power³⁰⁷ and down to the ones dwelling in hell,³⁰⁸ and that is the state of existing as a living being, i.e., the manifestation of beings.

The Lord (also) produces a form, referred to by various others as a “thing,” that begins with the *śivatattva* in the form of his own pure consciousness, and ends with the earth-*tattva*.³⁰⁹ Thus, his nature is truly omnipresent, and [Somānanda] will state the proof (of this, later on).³¹⁰

²⁹⁸Śiva is said to be one whose nature is delighted consciousness in ŚD 1.2. Note that Utpaladeva’s commentary opens with “in the aforementioned manner” (*anenoktaprakāreṇa*), which serves to gloss “thus” (*ittham*), found in ŚD 1.39a.

²⁹⁹The commentary here reads *sadaiva*, which might suggest that ŚD 1.39b should read *sadaiva parānirvṛtiḥ*, rather than *sa eva parānirvṛtiḥ*. None of the manuscripts that I have consulted attests to this reading, however.

³⁰⁰This is a reference to the oft-mentioned nonperception of Śiva’s non-dual nature. Here, Utpaladeva might be referring to Śiva’s manifestation as the first of the *tattvas*, the *śivatattva*.

³⁰¹Śiva, though he exists in the form of perfect bliss, can choose to desire to create something. In doing so, he sets in motion the creation of the universe. As mentioned elsewhere, the power of bliss is pure delight, while the power of delight (*nirvṛti*) may also be associated with, delimited by, some object that Śiva chooses to engage, in which case it is known as “eagerness” (*aunmukhya*), the first stage of will (*icchā*). See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.22. Cf. ŚD 1.7cd–8, 1.19–20ab and 1.29cd–30a and the commentatorial passages thereon. That Śiva is said by Utpaladeva to become the *tattvas* suggests that Śiva stands beyond the thirty-sixfold schema, despite the identification of the *śivatattva* with all of the *tattvas* (for which, see supra, note 226 of the present chapter of the translation). In other words, the present passage amounts to an expression of Utpaladeva’s pantheism, which, as noted in the Introduction (section 6), is not found in the ŚD, which is an expression of Somānanda’s strict pantheism.

³⁰²This refers to the desire, just mentioned, to create the world.

³⁰³See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.19–20ab for the identification of will as an action.

³⁰⁴See ŚD 1.7cd–8.

³⁰⁵See ŚD 1.19–21.

³⁰⁶That is to say that the form in question has limited agency.

³⁰⁷See ŚD 1.31.

³⁰⁸See ŚD 1.36–38.

³⁰⁹See ŚD 1.29cd–33. The present passage again distinguishes Śiva from the thirty-six *tattvas* (about which see supra, notes 226 and 301 to the present chapter of the translation), though one should note that it is possible that *nijacinmātrarūpaśivatattvādīpārthivatattvāntam* means to identify Śiva with the first *tattva*, it being possibly translated as follows: “beginning with the *śivatattva*, the form of which is his own pure consciousness, and extending down to the earth-*tattva*.”

³¹⁰See the fourth chapter of the ŚD, which begins: *athedanīm pravaktavyam yathā sarvaṃ śivātmakam*.

I.41cd-43

To point out that there are five (types of) agents in the created world of beings, [Somānanda] says:

svaśivatvam ivājānan paśvātmaṣṭapadeśataḥ
 1.42. *tadrūpatvena vā paśyan sthitaḥ śānta iva kvacit*
kevalaśaḍṛḍhatvena kvacit kevalaśambhutā
 1.43. *aprabuddho niṣkalaś ca kvacit pralayaakevali*
ātmabodhi vikalavat kvacid vijñānakevali

As if not knowing his own Śiva-nature, he exists as one who is designated a bound soul, or, seeing himself as having that nature, he sometimes exists as if he were peaceful. Sometimes, he exists as the solitary Śambhu, (seeing himself) as the one confirmed to be the solitary Īśvara.³¹¹ Sometimes he is an unaware and undivided Pralayaakevalin.³¹² Sometimes, aware of his own self, (but otherwise) similar with the Pralayaakevalin, he is a Vijñānakevalin.³¹³

As if not knowing his own Śiva-nature, he is designated as a bound soul; for, it is the noncognition of the non-duality of his nature, which is made by the power of *māyā*, that is established as the nature of the world of transmigration, which takes form as the objects and agents of cognition.³¹⁴ Of these,³¹⁵ the agent of cognition is a bound soul, i.e., is consciousness delimited by a subtle body. That alone, since it is limited, is the monadic being;³¹⁶ because it has consciousness as his nature, it is eternal and lacking of a material form; it is ignorant because he abandons his universal nature; because it is not independent, it is devoid of

³¹¹Note that I here follow Utpaladeva's commentary, wherein it is suggested that the present passage refers to the firm conviction, held by the Vaiśeṣikas and others, that there exists a solitary deity, Īśvara, who is the efficient cause of the universe.

³¹²This is a reference to beings that rest in *śuṣupti* or deep sleep. They are affected by only one of the three impurities or *malas*, namely, *āṇavamala* or the impurity of limited agency. They are not affected by the impurity of limited action (*kārmamala*) or the impurity that creates diversity (*māyiyamala*). See Pandit 1997: 170.

³¹³According to Pandit, Vijñānākalas are "aware of their pure and infinite Consciousness, free from all psychic and physical coverings, but do not yet experience awareness of their divine potency or the powers of Godhead." In other words, they are not limited by the three impurities, except perhaps a very slight trace of *āṇavamala*, but they also have not yet reached the stage of total awareness as the absolutely non-dual Śiva. See Pandit 1997: 189.

This fivefold classification of agents (*pramāṭṛs*) is of interest because it is at variance with other systems of classification, notably the sevenfold one sometimes put forth by Pratyabhijñā writers, such as Utpaladeva. For more on the types of agents in tantric Śaivism, see Pandit 1997: 39–52. See also ĪPK 3.2.1–13 and Torella 1994: 199–200, fn. 11.

³¹⁴The terms here used for agents and objects of cognition are *grāhaka* and *grāhya*, respectively.

³¹⁵*Tatra* is partitive, here.

³¹⁶The term here used is *aṇu*.

the quality of (independent) action and is not the Lord;³¹⁷ inasmuch as it enjoys as an object of perception that the nature of which is the subtle body, which appears to be distinct, it reflects on the means to enjoyment; (but) it exists in the bowels of *māyā*, because it is made from *māyā*.³¹⁸

It is not appropriate (however) that Śivabhṭāraka is ignorant of his own Śiva-nature, because his nature is always free of impurity, this because the impurities themselves do not arise in the absence of that [Śiva-nature], since he presides over them.³¹⁹ Thus, it is due to the force of the power of *māyā* that he becomes, in that very moment,³²⁰ a monadic being who is ignorant of that [Śiva-nature].³²¹ This is how the pair of impurities, *āṇava* and *māyīya*, arise, and the *kārma* impurity is caused by them.³²²

He says “as if” in the phrase “as if (not knowing) his own Śiva-nature” and says “is designated” to state the nature of ignorance, but in reality no division

³¹⁷ Utpaladeva here echoes KT 1.15: *paśur nityo hy amūrto jño niṣkriyo nirguṇaḥ prabhuh / vyāpi māyodarāntastho bhogopāyavicintakaḥ*. The ŚDVṛ here reads: *sa eva parimitavād aṇuś caitanyātmatayā nityo 'mūrtaś ca, viśvātmātātyāgenājñāḥ, svātantryāt kriyāgūnarāhito 'niśvaraś ca, vedyapuryaṣṭakātmāni bhinna iva rāgitayā bhogopāyavicintakaḥ, māyākṛtatvān māyodarāntasthaḥ*. Cf. PTV, p. 91 (Singh's edition) for Abhinavagupta's quotation of the same verse. His commentary thereon is as follows: *sa paśur apy anena jñātamātreṇa, vidhānam jñā ca yaśya sa kartā jñātā ca viśayasamgatakaranaṃ prati jāyate. yajanaṃ cāsyāpūrṇam api pūrṇam bhavātīti sarvamayatvād dhrdayaśya*. To say that a bound soul is devoid of action is to suggest that it is ultimately only Śiva who acts. Utpaladeva has said as much in suggesting that the agent who pays homage to Śiva has no true agency of his own, he being merely “possessed” by Śiva (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.1), as he has indicated elsewhere (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.23) that, e.g., it is Śiva who makes a pot, not the potter, since all agency is ultimately Śiva's alone.

³¹⁸ This is to say that consciousness limited by a subtle body is complex. On the one hand, it knows only the delight (*nirvṛti*) of Śiva's nature, his consciousness, because it sees itself as an agent capable of achieving desired ends, etc. On the other hand, it is a state limited by ignorance of the true, unlimited nature of Śiva's consciousness, and it is thus bound by (and in) *māyā*.

³¹⁹ Utpaladeva has already stated (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.11cd-13ab) that “Only erroneous nonawareness of (Śiva's) non-duality is impure (*kutsita*)” (*abhedāparāmarśanam eva bhrāntirūpaṃ kutsitam*). The present passage should be understood to reflect this maxim: Śiva by definition is omniscient, is self-aware consciousness, and thus he cannot be defiled by the impurity of ignorance. It is rather his own free will that obfuscates his nature, allowing for the “impurities” of ignorance to arise.

³²⁰ This refers to the moment when he designates himself a bound soul (*paśu*).

³²¹ That is to say it is only due to his own power of illusion (*māyāśakti*) that he is apparently ignorant of his own Śiva-nature.

³²² The first impurity, *āṇavamala*, limits the individual's freedom, creating a limited agent out of limitless consciousness. Utpaladeva describes it as follows: *svātantryahānir bodhasya svātantryasyāpy abodhatā / dvīdhānavam malam idaṃ svasvarūpāpahānitaḥ* (ĪPK 3.2.4.) Torella translates: “Consciousness that is devoid of freedom and, vice versa, freedom devoid of consciousness; these are the two forms of maculation—so called because it obliterates one's own true nature—called *āṇava*.” (See Torella 1994: 198.) The second of the two mentioned here, *māyīyamala*, is the impurity that creates the subject-object dichotomy out of the same limitless consciousness. Finally, the third impurity, *kārmamala*, is that which determines one's birth and experiences. See ĪPK 3.2.5: *bhinnavedyaprathātraiva māyākhyam janmabhogadam / kartary abodhe kārmaṃ tu māyāśaktyaiva tattrayam*. Torella translates: “There being *āṇava* maculation [*atriava*], the apparition of a cognizable reality differentiated (from the subject) constitutes the maculation called *māyā*; that, then, which in a subject endowed with agency, but lacking the full light of consciousness, determines births and experiences the karmic maculation. All three are solely the work of the power of *māyā*.” (See Torella 1994: 198.)

of agent and object of cognition exists whatsoever. This is also investigated with precision in my *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.³²³

Sometimes, by dint of the power of *vidyā*, also called *mahāmāyā*,³²⁴ seeing himself as having that nature, i.e., Śiva-nature, he, being one who perceives his universal nature completely, is as if peaceful. Here also, he uses the expression “as if” to say that the peaceful nature is a type of cognition, but in reality he is not separated from his universal identity. The term “as if” should be applied in the same sense in what follows as well.³²⁵

And, because the power of *vidyā* is gradated,³²⁶ i.e., because of duality, he sometimes exists as what is firmly conceived of, in the Vaiśeṣika and other schools of thought, as none other than the solitary Īśvara, a division of Śiva sometimes called the solitary Śambhu.

Sometimes he becomes a Pralayakevalin, one made up of nothing but knowledge located in a particular condition, one who is an unwithered bound soul,³²⁷ who is unassociated with the objects of cognition that are established by the impurity called “*māyā*.”³²⁸

Elsewhere, he is aware of himself but is not associated with a subtle body, and, unassociated with objects of cognition, like the Pralayākala, not being in contact with the *kārma* impurity, he exists in the form of a Vijñānakevalin.³²⁹

Note that I take *tatprabhava* to be an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound. This suggests that *kārmamala* is created by the first two impurities, which seems to be slightly problematic. Utpaladeva states that all of the impurities are created by *māyā*, and one would rather expect them to come forth sequentially, rather than the first two effecting the third. The idea seems to be that *kārmamala*, which Utpaladeva labels as that which effects experience in the world of transmigration (for which, see ĪPK 3.2.10: *devādināṃ ca sarveṣāṃ bhavināṃ trividhaṃ malam/ tatrāpi kārma evaikam mukhyaṃ saṃsārakāraṇam*), is the result of limited agency and subject-object dichotomy. In other words, the first two impurities should perhaps be understood as prerequisites for the world of transmigration, directly caused by the third.

³²³See ĪPK 1.4, esp. 1.4.8, where Utpaladeva explains memory in terms of the unity of consciousness. See also, e.g., ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.1, where Utpaladeva describes Maheśvara as *akaṇḍitagrāhakākaṇḍitagrāhyatanmelanācamatkāropabhr̥ṃhita*. More generally speaking, the entire ĪPK can be said to be an effort to prove such unity of agent and object of cognition in the form of non-dual consciousness.

³²⁴See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.29cd–33 and my notes on the same. He there mentions the two views regarding the location, as it were, of *mahāmāyā*: it either exists at an interstitial level, between the *śuddhavidyātattva* and the *māyātattva*, or it is a synonym for the *śuddhavidyātattva*.

³²⁵In other words, the reader should understand Somānanda to suggest that Śiva is “as if” Śambhu, a Pralayākala, and a Vijñānākala, though the particle in question (*iva*) is not repeated in Somānanda’s treatment of these states of being.

³²⁶Again, *vidyā* should be understood to refer to the *śuddhavidyātattva*.

³²⁷The Pralayakevalin, though bound, stands at the level of the *śuddhādhvan*, the pure *tattvas*, and is not fettered by the impurities that affect those trapped in the world of transmigration. It is for this reason that Utpaladeva describes this bound soul (*paśu*) as “clean” or “unwithered” (*amlāna*).

³²⁸See ĪPK 3.2.8.

³²⁹See ĪPK 3.2.6–7 for a description of the same.

1.44–45ab

Thus, he is established by the force of will. [Somānanda] expresses this with an illustration that is taken up by many thinkers:³³⁰

- 1.44. *yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpopapattitā
na cāsti sādhanam kiñcin mṛdādicchām vinā prabhoh*
1.45. *tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate*

Just as various forms can arise by the will of yogis, and there is no extrinsic means whatsoever, be it the clay, or something else, apart from the Lord's will, in the same way, it is the Lord's will that arises as reality.

By the mere will of yogis various forms, houses and so on, can arise. Supply “by (the power of will) reaching the state of having visible³³¹ action as its nature.” Moreover, unlike carpenters and so on, they require no extrinsic means whatsoever, such as clay or wood, beyond the Supreme Lord's will; for they create by entering into him in that form. In the same way, it is only the Lord's will that brings forth the universe in the form it has.

1.45cd–46ab

[Somānanda] mentions an observable³³² example:

- drśyante 'tra tadicchāto bhāvā bhītyādiyogataḥ*
1.46. *tatra mithyāsvarūpaṃ cet sthāpyāgre satyatedrśam*

By his will, entities are seen here that are associated with fear, etc.³³³ If you argue that they³³⁴ have an erroneous nature, I will establish the reality of such entities later on.³³⁵

³³⁰Utpaladeva himself refers to this example. See ĪPK 1.5.7: *cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahih / yogiva nirupādānam arthajātam prakāśayet*. Utpaladeva's *Vṛtti* thereon reads: *cittattvam eva iśvaratvāt svātmariūpatayopapannābhāsanam anantaśaktitvād icchāvaśān mṛdādikāraṇam vinaiva bāhyatvena ghaṭapaṭādīkam artharāśim prakāśayet*. ĪPK 2.4.10 is perhaps an even closer parallel with the present: *yoginām api mṛdbije vinaivechhāvaśena tat / ghaṭādi jāyate tat tat sthiraśvārthakriyākaram*. Cf. ŚD 3.35–37. Note that Kaul suggests that it is rather Bhaṭṭadivākaravatsa whom Somānanda has in mind. See Kaul's note 1, p. 32 of the KSTS edition.

³³¹The term here translated is *upapatti*.

³³²Kaul glosses *drśta* with *pratyaksasiddha*.

³³³Note that, following all four manuscripts of the commentary (G, J, P, and R), I understand ŚD 1.45d to read *bhāvā bhītyādiyogataḥ*, rather than *bhāvāḥ kāmādiyogataḥ*, the reading *post correctionem* of K^{cd}. Note also, then, that prior to Kaul's correction in the errata, the reading of K^{cd} accords with the one that I accept.

³³⁴Literally, the text reads “in that” (*tatra*), i.e., in such entities. See Utpaladeva's commentary, below, for a similar use of the word *tatra*.

³³⁵As Gnoli notes, this verse challenges Dharmakīrti's position concerning the nature of erroneous cognition: “According to Dharmakīrti, the yogin, in his meditation, can have direct, i.e., non-discursive forms of knowledge. These experiences are caused by the force of the yogin's mind, by his power of reflection (*bhāvanā*). The same thing, Dharmakīrti says, can be seen in ordinary life. ‘He who is blinded by intense desire, by sorrow, by fear, by drunkenness, by dreaming of thieves, etc., can see, as clearly as if they were before him, things that, in reality, do not exist.’” (Gnoli here quotes PV 3.282. See

Moreover, by association with desire, sorrow, fear, etc., various entities are seen appearing in plain sight. These are caused solely by the Lord's will,³³⁶ because the force of the feelings (one has) toward such entities results from penetration by the fact of being Īśvara;³³⁷ nor do they, i.e., thieves and so on, appear in an erroneous form,³³⁸ as I will clearly prove the reality of such entities later on.³³⁹

1.46cd–47

Similarly, he will also explain the following, later on. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

evam sarveṣu bhāveṣu yathā sā śivarūpatā
 1.47. *nīrūpatā nirvṛtir vā śaktitritayayogitā*
sacittvaṃ samsthitaṃ nityaṃ kathanīyaṃ tathāgrataḥ

Similarly, I will explain later on how Śiva-nature, formlessness, delight, the fact of being connected to the three powers, and the state of being consciousness eternally abide in all entities.

In verse 1.41, [Somānanda] already said that by being the *tattvas* everything has Śiva-nature. Now, (Somānanda says that) he will have to explain, later on, how Śiva-nature,³⁴⁰ along with the formlessness that exists together with the limited forms, this because their form is that [Śiva-nature],³⁴¹ delight,³⁴² the fact of being connected to will, etc.,³⁴³ and the fact of being consciousness, i.e., the fact of not being insentient,³⁴⁴ abide—are properly established³⁴⁵—even in entities such as pots and cloth.

Gnoli 1957: 28.) On Somānanda's view that even erroneous cognitions are real, see ŚD 4.7cd–11ab and 4.13cd–31. The fourth chapter of the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, and to a lesser extent, the third chapter, also deal in general with the issue of the ontological reality of all entities, for which discussion, see ŚD 4.6–7ab, 4.11cd–13ab and 4.33cd–39ab.

³³⁶Literally, “it is the Lord's will alone that is the cause there/in this” (*tatra bhagavadicchaiva kāraṇam*).

³³⁷This refers to Śiva as the supreme being and not to the *īśvaratattva*.

³³⁸This is a reference to and refutation of Dharmakīrti's assertion that imagined phenomena, the appearance of thieves, etc., are false appearances.

³³⁹See ŚD 4.7cd–11ab and 4.13cd–31. See also: ŚD 4.6–7ab, 4.11cd–13ab and 4.33cd–39ab.

³⁴⁰See chapter 4 of the ŚD.

³⁴¹In other words, even apparently delimited entities are in reality “formless,” because they are in reality nothing other than Śiva himself. The present passages probably should be taken to refer to the various matters taken up in the fifth chapter of the ŚD.

³⁴²See chapter 5, particularly ŚD 5.6 and 5.37, as well as ŚD 7.35–36.

³⁴³See chapter 3 of the ŚD.

³⁴⁴See chapter 5, particularly ŚD 5.101.

³⁴⁵Here, Utpaladeva glosses “abiding in” (*saṁsthita*) with “properly established” (*samyag eva sthitam upapannam*), thus providing an etymological explanation of the former term. He thus suggests that the *upasarga* (*sa*) of *saṁsthita* stands for *samyak* (“proper”), and that *sthita* means *upapanna* (“established”).

1.48

This being so,³⁴⁶ what follows? [Somānanda] says:

1.48. *evam sarvapadārthānām samaiva śivatā sthitā
parāparādibhedo 'tra śraddhadhānair udāhṛtaḥ*

Thus, all things have the very same Śiva-nature. Those adhering to faith here³⁴⁷ refer to the division into the *parāparā* (condition), etc.

What is meant is that the very same Śiva-nature of things exists, from Paraśiva all the way down to pots, etc., neither less nor more, the (only) restriction for all being that it does not excel the one whose form is complete consciousness, and, as a result of experiencing such a state of unity, there is a certain order. And thus, because Śiva's form exists in a state of unity in everything, the division of entities into the *parāparā* (condition), etc., in the form of purity and impurity, which consist of the noncognition of that [state of unity], is (merely) expressed. Those³⁴⁸ belong to the people on account of their just believing (in them) without reason, but the objects are in no way pure or impure.

1.49

[Somānanda] says that, in this way, everything is real:

1.49. *evam bhedātmakam nityam śivatattvam anantakam
tathā tasya vyavasthānān nānārūpe 'pi satyatā*

Thus, the *śivatattva* is the nature of the divisions,³⁴⁹ is eternal, and endless. Thus, because he is so disposed, his real nature exists in the various forms, as well.

By the aforementioned sequence,³⁵⁰ it is the nature of the divisions, but the multiple things are not separate from it. The things also have its nature. For this reason, it is endless, i.e., if distinct things really existed, it would have an end, because it would not extend beyond their forms. Thus, because his nature is so disposed, his, i.e., the Supreme Lord's, absolutely real nature exists in the various forms, as well, i.e., in the (form of the) universe. This is conclusive.

³⁴⁶That is to say that, given that Śiva-nature, etc., exist in all things, the following obtains.

³⁴⁷The word *atra* here could either mean "here [in our system]" or "here [in the world]."

³⁴⁸Literally, *tatra* means "in that," and it refers to purity and impurity.

³⁴⁹This is to say, as Gnoli notes, that Śiva is indistinguishable from that which appears to be distinct.

See Gnoli 1957: 22.

³⁵⁰See ŚD 1.39–41ab.

Chapter Two of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti*: The Arguments against the Grammarians

2.1

To say that only the non-dual Īśvara¹ doctrine (of the Pratyabhijñā) adheres to reason, while the non-dual doctrine of the Supreme-Brahman-as-speech does not, [Somānanda] says the following in beginning to refute the non-duality of speech accepted by the grammarians:

2.1. *athāsmākaṃ jñānaśaktir yā sadāśivarūpatā
vaiyākaraṇasādhūnām paśyanti sā parā sthitiḥ*

Now, what for us is the power of cognition in the form of Sadāśiva is for the honorable grammarians *paśyanti*, the supreme state.²

Even if *paśyanti*, reflecting the universe in the form of sound, is fully endowed with the state of being in the form of the power of action, she nevertheless is very far from having the form of Paramaśiva, even if one appeals to the fact that her having the form of the power of cognition is implied by the primacy of perception in the word *paśyanti*.³ And that is not the highest state: it

¹ By Īśvara is here meant Śiva, not the *īśvaratattva*, the fourth of the thirty-six *tattvas*.

² The present passage is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 44 of Singh’s edition).

³ Note that words for seeing and sight often refer to the power of cognition, and, of course, *paśyanti* literally means “seeing.” (See ŚD 1.2 and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereupon, for example, where the term *dr̥k* refers to the power of cognition.) The argument of this passage runs as follows. (1) Insofar as *paśyanti* reflects the universe in the form of sound, she must have such a form as to be possessed of the power of action, i.e., the power to create the universe. (2) However, she is not equivalent in status to Paramaśiva, despite the fact that the Pratyabhijñā claims that Paramaśiva is the one who manifests the universe. This power exists in a seminal form in Paramaśiva, along with the powers of will and of cognition. (3) Now, insofar as the term *paśyanti*, “seeing,” implies an act of knowing or of cognition, the grammarians might argue that *paśyanti*, like Paramaśiva, also has a form that is possessed of the power of cognition. Be this as it may, however, Utpaladeva suggests that this still fails to elevate her to the level of Paramaśiva, because in the Pratyabhijñā the power of cognition exists at the level of the *sadāśivatattva*, the third of thirty-six *tattvas*.

is the *parāparā* condition here [in our system], because the power of cognition has Sadāśiva as its form. Nevertheless, they understand her as the supreme condition.⁴

What is more, when she has Sadāśiva as her form, that does not mean that the power of action, for its part, is absent, as it is said:

Cognition and action exist at what is called the Sāda(-level).⁵

Because power and the one who possesses the power are identical,⁶ Sadāśiva is endowed with the power of cognition. The one whose power of action is increased is called Īśvara.⁷

For the same reason Śiva,⁸ consisting of the power of will, in as much as he is (fully) endowed with the power of the independence of consciousness, is, at the highest level, Paramaśiva.⁹ In addition, it is possible that there is an additional *tattva* here in the interval (between the *Śivatattva* and the *Śaktitattva*) related to

The argument as presented here is somewhat awkward, because Utpaladeva begins by acknowledging the existence of the power of action in *paśyanti*. The verse, however, identifies her with the power of cognition and the *sadāśivatattva*. Utpaladeva is quick to add (for which, see below) that the power of action, though only fully manifested at the level of the fourth *tattva*, the *īśvaratattva*, also is present in a nascent form in the *sadāśivatattva*. Thus, Utpaladeva suggests, the grammarians' *paśyanti* is analogous to the *sadāśivatattva*, where the power of cognition is prevalent, but the power of action is also present in a nascent form. He makes the case for this by first considering the creative, active element of *paśyanti*, allowing for her to be elevated only as high as the level at which action is nascent and cognition prevalent.

⁴The term *parāvasthā* stands in contrast to the *parāparā* condition mentioned above.

⁵This quotation remains untraced. While the power of action is normally associated with the next *tattva*, the *īśvaratattva*, Utpaladeva here suggests that it exists in a seminal form at the preceding level, that of the *sadāśivatattva*. See Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 1.29cd-33 for more on the inheritance of the powers of cognition and action in the *sadāśivatattva*. Cf., also, ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 3.1.2 and Torella 1994: 190, fn. 4 for the various interpretations of the term here translated. Finally, see the Introduction, section 5, for a discussion of the system of overlapping pairs of powers articulated in the ŚD.

⁶Cf. ŚD 3.3cd: *śaktiśaktimātor bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varṇyate*.

⁷Utpaladeva here explains the difference between the power of action at the levels of the *sadāśivatattva* and the *īśvaratattva*. Though the power of action exists (in a nascent form) at the level of the *sadāśivatattva*, it is predominant at the level of the *īśvaratattva*. Note that there is an implicit reference here to ŚD 1.30b-d: *kadācij jñānaśaktiṭaḥ / sadāśivatvam udrekāt kadācid aiśvaram śhitim*. Note also that I take *udriktakriyāśakti* to be an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound.

⁸Utpaladeva might refer to the *śivatattva* here with the term *śiva*.

⁹Insofar as the power and the one possessing it are identical, Paramaśiva and the *śivatattva*, made up of the power of will, are identical.

(Śiva's) eagerness and delight.¹⁰ Whether it exists or not is not a matter to be discussed here in the primary commentary.¹¹

This is why, even after examining the higher powers, [Somānanda] says “he assumes the nature of the thirty-six *tattvas*.”¹² In any case, the restriction is that the ultimate truth of Śiva's non-duality is not broken.¹³

Even on the path which is beyond *māyā*,¹⁴ [the Lord] enters into the *tattvas* that are referred to as the *parāparā* condition, which arises by dint of Īśvara's will, who is known from scripture.¹⁵ This is so because the noncognition of the Supreme Lord's non-duality¹⁶ is always the same, even when one is not in

¹⁰The classification to which Utpaladeva refers might best be summarized in the following chart:

(NUMBER) TATTVA	LEVEL OF SPEECH	CONDITION	POWER(S)
(1) <i>śiva</i> (=Paramaśiva)		<i>parā</i>	all the powers in a unified state
(1a) the “intermediate” <i>tattva</i>			<i>aunmukhya</i> and <i>nirvṛti</i>
(2) <i>śakti</i>			<i>icchā</i>
(3) <i>sadāśiva</i>	<i>paśyanti</i>	<i>parāparā</i>	<i>jñāna</i>
(4) <i>īśvara</i>	<i>madhyamā</i>		<i>kriyā</i>
(5) <i>śuddhavidyā</i>	<i>vaikhari</i>	<i>aparā</i>	
(6) <i>mahāmāyā</i>			
(7-11) the “sheaths” or <i>kañcukas</i>			

Note that, in ŚD 1.19–20ab, Somānanda suggests that there are two parts of divine will, the first being, according to Utpaladeva, eagerness (*aunmukhya*) in the form of delight (*nirvṛti*). However, according to Utpaladeva's commentary, the pure form of *nirvṛti* exists prior to this and is associated with the power of bliss. Note also that Utpaladeva differentiates Śiva from all of the thirty-six *tattvas* in a number of places, this reflecting his panentheism, while Somānanda, with his strict pantheism, does not do so. See the Introduction, section 6. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.29cd–33 (esp. my note 232) and ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.39–41ab, esp. my note 301. Thus, that the chart identifies the first *tattva* with Paramaśiva suggests, in this instance, the nature of the system as Somānanda and not Utpaladeva knew it.

¹¹As noted in the Introduction (section 6), Utpaladeva does not employ these terms, *aunmukhya* and *nirvṛti*, in a technical manner in his ĪPK, nor does he explicitly refer to the powers of eagerness (*aunmukhya*) and delight (*nirvṛti*). This passage therefore can be read to refer obliquely to this discrepancy, not to say contradiction, between the theological systems of teacher and student. Utpaladeva, moreover, here seems to suggest that this difference is trivial: both agree on the basic manner in which Śiva manifests the universe.

¹²In other words, Utpaladeva understands Somānanda not to emphasize the importance of these intervening *tattvas* (along with the powers of *aunmukhya* and *nirvṛti*, with which they are associated and about which Utpaladeva has nothing to say in his ĪPK) over and above the fact that Śiva manifests the universe in the form of the thirty-six *tattvas*. The quotation in question is ŚD 1.32cd–33ab: *māyārūpam-itītyādisattriṃsattattvarūpātām / bibhrad bibharti rūpāṇi tāvatā vyavahārataḥ*.

¹³In other words, Utpaladeva here affirms the consistency of doctrine in the Pratyabhijñā: both he and Somānanda adhere to a doctrine of Śiva's non-duality.

¹⁴This is a reference to the *śuddhādhvan* or the pure “road” corresponding to the first five *tattvas*.

¹⁵This mention of Īśvara is not meant to refer to the *īśvaratattva* but to Paramaśiva. Utpaladeva uses the term in the same manner in, e.g., the *avataraṇikā* to ŚD 2.1. See above. As Kaul has noted, the point made here is that even these *tattvas* are subordinate to Paramaśiva. This means that any equation of *paśyanti* with one of the *tattvas* of the *śuddhādhvan* locates her at a level subordinate to Paramaśiva. (See Kaul's note 3, p. 38 of the KSTS edition: *tena nātra paratattvashitir ity arthaḥ*.)

¹⁶One manuscript (G) records *parameśvarābhedākhyāteḥ* for *parameśvarabhedākhyāteḥ*, and I accept this reading. The latter reading does not accord with Pratyabhijñā theology, and anyway there are many parallel readings in the ŚDVṛ attesting to the noncognition of the non-duality (*abhedākhyāti*) of Śiva.

contact with the world of transmigration, because *kārmamala* does not increase when even *Vidyā* appears.¹⁷

[Somānanda] uses the expression “honorable” in the phrase “the honorable grammarians” in order to proclaim their stupidity. Indeed, even if *paśyanti* also had a supreme form,¹⁸ as it is said:¹⁹

“and she is still in concentration”;²⁰

“and she is pure”;²¹

“and she is the one for whom the appearance (of all objects) is becalmed”²²

—or even if she has some other form exceeding this—she nevertheless possesses the power of sequence, given that she is the cause of sequence, “sa-ra” and “ra-sa,” arising in *madhyamā*.²³ As it is said:²⁴

¹⁷Vidyā refers to the *śuddhavidyātattva*, the fifth of the thirty-six *tattvas* and the lowest of the five so-called pure *tattvas* (*śuddhādhvan*). Utpaladeva here suggests that Śiva may be said to enter into or “assume the form” of even those *tattvas* that exist above the level of *māyā*. In making this assertion, he uses technical language. It is always Śiva who “enters into” the various levels, because it is his nature to do so: the noncognition of his very non-duality is always the same, and it is a function of the nature of his consciousness. (See the Introduction, section 13, the subsection entitled “Bharṭṛhari’s *avidyā* and Utpaladeva’s *abhedākhyāti*.”) This applies even to the pure levels, at which there is no contact with the world of transmigration (*saṃsāra*). Furthermore, the reason for this is that *kārmamala*, the impurity associated with limited action, is the same at all of the levels, just as its source is the same, even when at the level of the *śuddhavidyātattva*.

¹⁸The VPVṛ of course mentions just such a supreme form of *paśyanti*, for which see, e.g., VPVṛ ad VP 1.159. Cf. edition of Iyer 1966: 216 and Iyer [1969] 1992: 144.

¹⁹These and the immediately following quotations are found in the commentary on VP 1.159. The relevant passage of the VPVṛ reads as follows: *pratisamḥṛtakramā saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyanti. sā calācalā pratilabdhasamādhānā cāvṛtā ca viśuddhā ca, sanniviṣṭajñeyākārā pratilīnākārā nirākārā ca, paricchinnārthapratyavabhāsā saṃsṛṣṭārthapratyavabhāsā praśāntasarvārthapratyavabhāsā cety aparimāṇabhedā.*

²⁰Here, I follow Iyer’s translation. Kaul glosses *pratilabdhasamādhānā ca* with *kevalaśabdārtharahitasvarūpasamāhitiḥ*, “she is a contemplative state [*samāhiti*] whose nature is devoid of the meaning of the word alone.” Iyer also notes that the VPP glosses this word with yogic terminology, viz.: *pratilabdhasamādhānā cety avikṣiptā yoginām śabdapūrvayogena samāhitatvāt*. See Iyer 1965: 125 and 128.

²¹According to Iyer, “Vṛṣabha explains *viśuddhā* in two ways: (1) free from all differentiation, as Yogis see it, (2) free from all corrupt forms, as grammarians know it.” See Iyer 1965: 128. Kaul glosses with *grāhyagrāhakahakallolarahitā*, i.e., “separated from the waves of objects and agents of perception.”

²²The reading of the text, *praśāntapratyavabhāsā ca*, is at slight variance with *praśāntasarvārthapratyavabhāsā*, the reading found in the printed edition of VPVṛ ad VP 1.159. All of the ŚD manuscripts bear the same reading, however, and I have therefore not emended the text. See edition of Iyer 1966: 215. Note that it is also possible that *praśāntapratyavabhāsā* means “in whom the appearance (of all objects) is becalmed.”

²³The argument here is that sequence must exist in a potential form in *paśyanti*, because it is impossible for it to be manifested at the *madhyamā* level if it is not latent in *paśyanti*, which manifests it. Because sequence exists in latent form in it, *paśyanti* cannot be supreme. Sequence appears at the *madhyamā* level, though only mentally in the form of the sequence of syllables (“sa-ra” versus “ra-sa”). When combined with the vital breath (*prāṇa*), speech becomes fully manifested in the form of *vaikhari*, everyday speech. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 149–151. See also VPVṛ ad VP 1.159: *madhyamā tv antaḥsaṃniveśini parighitakrameva buddhimātropādānā.*

²⁴That is, they say that *paśyanti* possesses the power of sequence (*kramaśakti*). The following is a quotation of VPVṛ ad VP 1.159, though it is slightly at variance with the reading in Iyer’s published

pratiṣaṃhṛtakramāpy antaḥ saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyanti

Although she is the one in whom sequence is contracted, *paśyanti* is penetrated by the power of sequence, even when non-duality exists.²⁵

Therefore, she is not the complete, ultimate condition. So, how can she exist as the form of the supreme state, the form of the Supreme Brahman, the form of Brahman-as-Speech?

2.2

Accordingly, [Somānanda] says that they say the following:

2.2. *ity āhus te paraṃ brahma yaḍ anādi tathākṣayam
tad akṣaram śabdarūpaṃ sā paśyanti parā hi vāk*

They say the following. The supreme Brahman, which is beginningless and endless, imperishable, whose form is speech, is *paśyanti*, supreme speech.²⁶

They say the following. The supreme Brahman in the form of consciousness, which is beginningless and without end, is imperishable, i.e., unchanging, (and) is one whose form is speech; and this is itself supreme speech, called *paśyanti*. Were it not to have speech as its form, even the light of consciousness,²⁷ called the Supreme Brahman, would not appear; for, she reflects on herself,²⁸ and they say that illumination is nothing but reflective awareness.²⁹

2.3

In addition, [Brahman] is the very self. This [Somānanda] formulates as follows:

2.3 *sa evātmā sarvadehavyāpakatvena vartate
antaḥpaśyadavasthaiva cidrūpatvam arūpakam*

edition. Iyer's edition reads: *pratiṣaṃhṛtakramā saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyanti*. Since all of the manuscripts for the ŚD witness the same reading, I have not emended the text.

²⁵Compare this to Iyer's translation, which I have consulted in this instance. See Iyer 1965: 125. See also VP 1.167ab: *avibhāgā tu paśyanti sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā*.

²⁶Kaul distinguishes between the two terms, *akṣaya* and *akṣara*, by suggesting that the former means "without an end" (*akṣayam antarahitam*) and the latter means "free from mental constructs" (*akṣaram kalpanojjhitam*). ŚD 2.2 paraphrases VP 1.1.

²⁷The Sanskrit here reads *citprakāśa*. The term *prakāśa*, so fundamental to the Pratyabhijñā, was probably borrowed from Bhartṛhari (see Torella 1994: xxiii–xvi), where it is used to describe *vāc*. It refers to "knowledge or consciousness," and it is *pratyavamarśini*, that which reflects on itself. See, Iyer [1969] 1992: 108. See also the Introduction, section 6.

²⁸The term in question is *pratyavamarśini*.

²⁹As in the Pratyabhijñā, Utpaladeva understands Bhartṛhari's *paśyanti* to be self-reflective: it consists of consciousness as light (*prakāśa*) that illumines itself. Thus, the "illumination" (*prakāśana*) is a "reflective awareness" (*pratyavamarśana*). For an explanation of the nature of consciousness in this view, see Dyczkowski 1987: 59–75. The commentary here echoes VP 1.132. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.8cd–11, which also echoes the same passage of the VP.

It is the very self that pervades the entire body, the very state of seeing internally. It has consciousness as its form, (and yet) it has no form.

The state of internal seeing, whose form is that of being one who enjoys, is devoid of a cognizable form,³⁰ (and) has consciousness as its form, i.e., is pure consciousness. They say it is the very self that pervades the entire body, i.e., the one who, situated in the seat of its enjoyments, enjoys worldly delights.³¹

2.4ab

It alone is the omniscient, supreme self. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

2.4. *tāvad yāvat parā kāṣṭhā yāvat paśyaty anantakam*

The supreme goal exists to the degree to which it sees the endless.³²

From intensity of practice, the goal is reached, i.e., it becomes pure seeing, since it sees the entire, unending universe, in consequence of which the goal of her³³ act of seeing is fulfilled.

2.4cd–5

Because nescience is quieted at that very moment,³⁴ it is the supreme reality. Thus [Somānanda] says:

akṣādivṛttibhir hinam deśakālādīsūnyakam
2.5. *sarvataḥ kramasamhāramātram ākāravarjitam*
brahmatattvaṃ parā kāṣṭhā paramārthas tad eva saḥ

Devoid of the activity of the senses, devoid of space, time, etc.,³⁵ being nothing but the complete contraction of sequence, (and) devoid of form, the *brahmatattva* is the supreme goal. It alone is the supreme reality.

³⁰This is a gloss of *arūpaka*, “it has no form,” in ŚD 3d.

³¹This is a reference to Bhartṛhari’s suggestion that the *śabdabrahman* embodies the form of the individual enjoyer, without becoming separate from himself. The use of the terms “enjoyer” (*bhoktr*) and “worldly delights” (*bhoga*) reminds one of similar terminology in non-dual Śaivism. See VP 1.4 and the commentary thereon.

³²This is a reference to the accomplishment of the highest state, that of *paśyanti*, or, as Utpaladeva puts it “pure seeing” (*paśyanty eva*). The *ātman* reaches the highest state of existence, or in other words attains enlightenment, when it sees the entire, endless universe, presumably as a unitary whole. (This is Chaturvedi’s interpretation, for which see Chaturvedi 1986: 35.)

³³The feminine genitive pronoun (*asyāḥ*) apparently refers here to *paśyanti*; thus, Utpaladeva here seems to suggest that it is the goal of *paśyanti*’s seeing that is fulfilled.

³⁴That is, this occurs in the moment when *paśyanti* becomes pure seeing. This clearly refers to the aforementioned attainment of the “supreme goal,” which suggests that nescience (*avidyā*) is quieted only when *paśyanti* sees in a purely non-dualistic manner.

³⁵The term *ādi*, “etcetera,” in *deśakālādīsūnyaka* refers to *jāti* or class. See Utpaladeva’s commentary, below.

At that time,³⁶ there is no use for the means (of knowing), the senses, etc.,³⁷ the eye, etc., in the activity of illumining objects, nor is there any distinction by space, time, or class. For the same reason, the *brahmatattva* is nothing but the complete quieting of sequence—be it spatial or temporal—for sequence per se means *saṃsāra*, and for this reason, it is devoid of every form of object and agent of cognition.³⁸ Hence, since nothing superior exists, it is the supreme goal, and when it is reached,³⁹ it is nothing but⁴⁰ the supreme reality in the form of *paśyanti*.

2.6

And it alone is also as follows, as [Somānanda] says:⁴¹

2.6. *āste vijñānarūpatve sa śabdo 'rthavivakṣayā
madhyamā kathyate saiva bindunādamarutkramā*

That is speech, which resides in a state of knowledge because of the (speaker's) desire to convey meaning. The same is called *madhyamā*, because of the sequence of breaths, *bindu* and *nāda*.⁴²

³⁶The present refers to the moment when Brahman becomes pure seeing. This is a reference to the state described in ŚD 2.4ab.

³⁷I am unsure to what the word “etcetera” (*ādi*) here refers, though it probably refers to the intellect.

³⁸The Sanskrit here reads *sarvagṛāhyagrāhākākaravarjita*, a gloss of *ākāraravarjita* (ŚD 2.5b). The terms *grāhya* and *grāhaka* are common in non-dual Śaivism, as they are in Bhartṛhari's works (though it should be mentioned that, although these terms are not unknown to Somānanda, they are much more prevalent in Utpaladeva's commentary than in the *mūla*). Like consciousness in the non-dual Śaivism of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, Bhartṛhari's *paśyanti* both reveals and is revealed, that is, it both cognizes objects and is experienced as the object of cognition. See VP 1.56. The terms are also common in Buddhist Sanskrit. See, e.g., PV (*pratyakṣa* chapter) 3.215.

³⁹The present expression (*prāptam tat*) echoes that of the commentary on ŚD 2.4ab: *kāṣṭhā prāptā sā paśyanti eva bhavati*.

⁴⁰Utpaladeva reads the emphatic, enclitic particle *eva* with *saḥ* and not *tat*, as the word order of 2.5d suggests.

⁴¹The point made in this passage is that, just as Brahman itself reaches the highest state, it also issues forth as the various levels of speech, *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, etc.

⁴²The *madhyamā* level of speech is the level at which the breaths emerge. This is the stage of speech in the pre-articulated but conceptually formulated state. At this level the sounds that ultimately produce everyday speech are formulated. It is at this level that sequence appears in a nascent form, only to be fully manifested at the level of mundane speech, called *vaikhari*. Bhartṛhari most commonly uses the term *nāda* synonymously with *dhvani*, referring to the sounds that manifest speech. In some places, however, he seems to suggest that *nāda* is a type of sound manifested by the *dhvanis* and is a gross form or accumulation of them. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 175. See also VP 1.49: *nādasya kramajanmatvān na pūrvo na paraś ca saḥ / akramaḥ kramarūpeṇa bhedavān iva jāyate*. For a description of *madhyamāvāk* see VPF ad 1.142: *mādhyaṃā tv antaḥsaṃniveśini parigrhitakrameva buddhimātropādānā. sāv tu sukṣmaprapñavrttitanugatā kramasamhārabhāve 'pi vyaktaprāṇaparigrahaiva keśāṃcit*. The term *bindu* appears only once in the VP and not in the technical sense used by the Pratyabhijñā. See VP 2.158c. It therefore appears that Somānanda has a peculiarly tantric understanding of the grammarians' hierarchy of levels of speech. One possible source for this (not uncommon) formulation of levels of sound is the VBh, where *nāda* and *bindu* are frequently listed. See, e.g., VBh 12a for a reference to Bhairava as being made up of *nāda* and *bindu* (*nādabindumaya*).

That alone, in the form of *paśyanti*, is speech, which resides in a state of mental knowledge that is characterized by the desire to speak, i.e., the desire to produce meaning. The same, moreover, is called *madhyamā* speech, because it comes forth, sequentially, by means of the *prāṇa* and *apāna* breaths, (respectively) called *bindu* and *nāda*. As [Bhartṛhari] says:

The one [*paśyanti*] remains eternally steadfast for everything in the interval between *prāṇa* and *apāna*.⁴³

2.7–8ab

Also, it resides in the following, as [Somānanda] says:⁴⁴

2.7. *saṃprāptā vaktrakuharam kaṅṭhādīsthānabhāgaśaḥ*
vaikhari kathyate saiva bahirvāsanayā kramāt
 2.8. *ghaṭādirūpair vyāvṛttā gṛhyate cakṣurādīnā*

Having reached the cavity of the mouth in the different places of articulation, the throat and so on,⁴⁵ she is called *vaikhari*. On account of an impression of externality, the same, in turn, is manifested⁴⁶ by forms such as pots, (and) is perceived by the senses.

Here, too, one must construe: she, i.e., *paśyanti*, reaches the cavity of the mouth as a result of the sequence of the breaths, *bindu* and *nāda*.⁴⁷ [Bhartṛhari] says as much:

Note that Padoux (1990¹: 214-215, fn. 113) has suggested that ŚD 2.6d (*bindunādamarutkramāt*) should be read with ŚD 2.7, not with what precedes it. As such, he suggests that the sequence of *bindu* and *nāda*, which is identified with the breaths, *prāṇa* and *apāna*, should be understood to produce articulated speech (*vaikhari*) and not the speech found at the level of a mental formulation (*madhyamā*) and described in ŚD 2.6. This interpretation contradicts Utpaladeva's, as Padoux has noted. My own view is that the terms here should be understood to refer to the initial expansion in the creative process, beginning with the *bindu* that is described as the highest level, and thus there is no contradiction in Utpaladeva's commentary as a result of the fact that he claims that the sequence of *nāda* and *bindu* create both *madhyamā* and, following it, *vaikhari* speech. (Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.6 and 2.7.) Note also that it is also possible, though one would think it unlikely, that one should understand the compound found in ŚD 2.6d as including as its first member a coordinative (*dvandva*) compound of three members, the last, *marut*, referring to the breaths that are created by *nāda* and *bindu*.

⁴³The present passage is a quotation of VP 1.1.161cd. Note that the present quotation refers not to *nāda* and *bindu* but to the *prāṇa* and *apāna* breaths, which according to the Pratyabhijñā interpretation of Bhartṛhari correspond, respectively, with the former. Following Vṛṣabha, it is possible to interpret the above to mean that *paśyanti* is established in the absence (*antara*) of the *prāṇa* and *apāna* breaths. See Iyer 1965: 128.

⁴⁴This is to say that Brahman, being that which achieves the goal of enlightenment (ŚD 2.4–5), and being that which is manifested as *paśyanti* and *madhyamā* speech (ŚD 2.6), also becomes manifested as *vaikhari* speech and as the apparently external entities in the world.

⁴⁵Kaul quotes the following, verse 13 of the *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā*, to enumerate the places of articulation: *aṣṭau sthānāni varṇānām uraḥ kaṅṭhaḥ śiras tathā / jihvāmūlaṃ dantāś ca nāsikoṣṭhau ca tālu ca*.

⁴⁶*Vyāvṛttā* literally means “split asunder, opened.” Utpaladeva glosses with *virvṛttā*, “opened, uncovered.” See below.

⁴⁷In other words, one must understand that it is Brahman in the form of *paśyanti* that becomes *vaikhari* speech, just as it becomes *madhyamā* speech (ŚD 2.6).

The breath first manifests the phonemes, and then is reabsorbed in those same phonemes.⁴⁸

Then, having reached the cavity of the mouth at the different places of articulation, the throat and so on, being in the form of distinct phonemes, “ka,” etc., she is called *vaikhari*:

When breath is released in the places of articulation, *vaikhari* speech, guided by the activity of the breath of those who use speech, produces full-fledged phonemes.⁴⁹

And after that,⁵⁰ on account of an impression, in the form of nescience, of external objects, the same speech, in turn, is manifested by forms such as pots and cloth, (and) is reduced to being that which is perceived⁵¹ by (the organs of sense,) the eye, etc.

2.8cd–11

Next, [Somānanda] refers to them as saying:⁵²

yasmāt tair ucyate sadbhir evaṃ vastupravṛttaye
 2.9. *anādinidhanam brahma śabdātattvaṃ yad akṣaram*
vivartate rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ
 2.10. *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte*
śabdabrahmani niṣṇātaḥ paraṃ brahmādhigacchati
 2.11. *avibhāgā tu paśyanti sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā*
ityādivākyaṛacanais tair evaṃ pratipāditam

As a result, the good people say the following about the appearance of things:⁵³ “Brahman, which is beginningless and endless, has speech as its true nature, (and) is imperishable, appears as the objects. The activity of the world exists because of that”; “there is no understanding in the world that is not connected with speech”; “the one deeply versed in *śabdabrahman* obtains the supreme Brahman”; “and *paśyanti* is nondistinct, (and) is in every way one whose sequence is contracted.” They have declared this much by constructing utterances such as these.

⁴⁸This is a quotation of VP 1.118cd. Utpaladeva quotes this half-verse to prove that Bhartṛhari accepts that *paśyanti* reaches the cavity of the mouth through the breaths, which first arise at the *madhyamā* level.

⁴⁹This is a quotation of VP 1.165.

⁵⁰That is to say that this occurs following the emanation of gross speech.

⁵¹The term in question, *grāhyabhāva*, could be translated: “it becomes that which is grasped [i.e., cognized].”

⁵²ŚD 2.9 is a quotation of VP 1.1. ŚD 2.10ab is a quotation of VP 1.131ab. ŚD 2.10cd is a quotation of MBh (Śāntiparvan) 12.224.60cd and is echoed in part in VP 1.22cd (*tad vyākaraṇam āgamyā paraṃ brahmādhigamyate*); the same is also quoted in VBh 38cd. Finally, ŚD 2.11ab is a quotation of VP 1.167ab.

⁵³I am unsure of my translation of *vastupravṛtti*. Note that one manuscript (G) has *svābhidheyapratitaye* written above the term in question, while another (J) records *sābhidheyapratitaye*.

As a result, the good people, i.e., the honorable—which is to say the foolish—grammarians, have declared that the form of *paśyanti*⁵⁴ is the following, i.e., has the form (here) stated:

Brahman,⁵⁵ which has speech as its true nature, is imperishable, (and) is beginningless and endless, appears as the objects of the universe, i.e., assumes in itself their unreal form.⁵⁶ *Vivarta* is the state of acquiring an unreal, distinct, and disparate form;⁵⁷ [Brahman] appears⁵⁸ because of it.⁵⁹ Activity, i.e., the variety of arrangements of entities, beings, worlds, etc., exists because of that appearance.⁶⁰

And: There is no understanding of “pot,” “cloth,” etc., in the activity of the world that is devoid of denotative speech. Without its having the form of speech, even the light of the *brahmatattva* would not shine forth.⁶¹ (Bhartṛhari says:) “Indeed, she reflects on herself.”⁶²

And: The one deeply versed⁶³ in this kind of Brahman, being in the form of *paśyanti*, called speech, has obtained the supreme Brahman.

And: [Brahman] in the form of *paśyanti* is devoid of the distinction of agent from object of cognition and of sequence, and *paśyanti* is nondistinct and is one whose spatial and temporal sequences are contracted.

Since [Somānanda] says “such as these” (ŚD 2.11C), he says that they have (also) said this much with the previously quoted utterances concerning *madh-yamā*, *vaikhari*, and so on.

2.12ab

This view is now being disputed, as [Somānanda] says:

2.12. *tadvicārāya rāddhāntaḥ sampraty eṣa vidhiyate*

To dispute this, the following doctrine is now laid out.

⁵⁴It is possible that *paśyantirūpa* should be taken with *śabdatattva*, etc., following it. See below.

⁵⁵If one construes *paśyantirūpa* with what follows it, i.e., *śabdatattva*, etc., then one should understand *paśyantirūpa* to be an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound referring to Brahman who “has the form of *paśyanti*.”

⁵⁶This line seems to echo that of the VPP. Compare the present phrase (*tadasatyarūpam ātmany upagacchati*) with the commentary of the VPP: *tatrānyarūpopagārahitety ekasyābhinmasyānyarūpopagārahitā anyarūpasvikāro nyagatasya rūpasya svātmani samdarśanam vivartaḥ*.

⁵⁷This is a reference to the VPVṛ ad VP 1.1: *ekasya tattvād apracyutasya bhedānukāreṇāsatyavibhaktānyarūpopagārahitā vivartaḥ*. See also the VPP on the same, quoted in fn. 56, above.

⁵⁸As above, the verb in question is *vivartate*.

⁵⁹That is, as a result of the aforementioned state.

⁶⁰“Appearance” is a translation of *vivartana*.

⁶¹Utpaladeva here makes reference to VP 1.132, as he did in his commentary following ŚD 2.2.

⁶²This is a quotation of VP 1.132: *vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāsvati / na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśini*. “If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification possible.” (Translation Iyer’s. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 111.) See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.2.

⁶³Kaul glosses *niṣṇāta* with *kṛtābhyaśa*, “one who is practiced.”

Our settled opinion,⁶⁴ which will be set forth to dispute what the grammarians have said, reaches the highest sophistication, because it makes use of reason.

2.12cd–13ab

To continue, [Somānanda] says:

ādau tāvad indriyatve sthitā vāk karmasaṃjñāte
2.13. *tasyātmataḥ brahmatā vā vaktum śakyā na sādhubhiḥ*

To begin with, speech is an organ of action. The honorable ones are not able to say that it⁶⁵ has the nature either of the self or Brahman.

First of all, the very appropriateness of what they say is questionable. For instance, speech being an extremely coarse organ of action, the intellect must also be employed in knowledge;⁶⁶ (thus,) its nature⁶⁷ must be connected to that which resides at the highest level, viz., either to the self or the *brahmatattva*. Hence, those honorable ones—honorable in the same sense as before—are simply not able to say that it has such a nature.⁶⁸

2.13cd–14ab

Because it⁶⁹ is located in nescience, it is not fitting that it is the supreme reality to the exclusion of (the other organs of action, viz. :) hands, feet, etc. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

indriyatve 'pi sāmānye pānyāder brahmatā na kim
2.14. *tatra cet sūkṣmakalanā sarvatra kalanāgrataḥ*

⁶⁴This is a somewhat idiomatic translation of the term *siddhānta*. Somānanda began the chapter (ŚD 2.2–11) by presenting his opponent's view, or the *pūrvapakṣa*, namely, the doctrine of the grammarians as he understood it. The balance of the chapter is dedicated to defeating it in the process of proving his own view, the *uttarapakṣa* or *siddhānta*.

⁶⁵*Tasya* here refers to the fact of being an organ of action (*indriyatva*). See Utpaladeva's commentary and my notes thereon.

⁶⁶This is to say that, because speech is as an organ of action, the intellect (*buddhi*), which organizes and directs the organs of action, must be deployed for one to use speech. As such, one must determine whose intellect is employed, that of Brahman or of the individual self (*ātman*). Somānanda has addressed this issue at ŚD 1.26–29ab.

⁶⁷Utpaladeva here refers to the nature of the intellect.

⁶⁸That is, the grammarians are not able to say whether speech, being an organ of action, is associated with the *ātman* or Brahman, this because they cannot associate the intellect that guides it with either. The reason for this is simply the fact that they do not recognize any entity superior to speech, but, as Utpaladeva here explains, the *buddhi* must intervene to direct speech, and it in turn must belong to an agent. None of this is possible in the grammarians' system. Therefore, Utpaladeva suggests, it is not possible for the grammarians to argue that speech is supreme.

⁶⁹That is, speech (*vāk*) is located in nescience.

Why don't the hand, etc., have Brahma-nature, even while they are equally organs (of action)? If you argue there is a subtle touch⁷⁰ there,⁷¹ (we reply:) there is a (subtle) touch in every case, about which see below.⁷²

If you argue that speech has Brahma-nature, because it is a form of subtle *paśyantī*, and therefore you have answered our question,⁷³ (we reply:) that fact of having a real form exists in every case, be it for the hand and the rest,⁷⁴ or for pots and so on,⁷⁵ as will be developed later on.⁷⁶

2.14cd–15ab

Now, you might argue that, despite the designation of speech (as an organ of action), it is superior in the state of meditation, because it rises internally to the places of articulation—the heart, throat, palate, the interval between the eye-brows, the mind, and so on—whereas this is not the case for the hand, etc. About this, [Somānanda] says:

antaḥ kramo hṛdādeś cet prāṇādeḥ kiṃ na satyate
2.15. *sarvasyāntaḥparāmarśapūrṇatāsti pravartane*

If you argue an internal sequence exists, beginning with the heart, (we reply:) why aren't the outgoing breath and the rest real? When anything commences, the internal reflective awareness is complete.

(Reply:) *Prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna*, etc.,⁷⁷ would also be real, because they rise to the heart, etc.

Moreover, internal reflective awareness exists for any object at the moment of its manifestation. Indeed, it is not the case that, in the condition they take

⁷⁰The present is a tentative translation of *sūkṣmakalanā*. The idea clearly is that speech is more subtle than the other organs of action.

⁷¹The implication here is that speech would therefore have either Brahma-nature or the nature of the self, while the other organs of action would not. See Kaul's note 3 on p. 46 of the KSTS edition: "And therefore, it is of the nature of the self, or of Brahman" (*tataś cātmatā brahmatā vā*).

⁷²See ŚD 2.89–91. Somānanda offers further criticism of the grammarians' privileging of speech above the other organs of action in ŚD 2.36.

⁷³My translation is idiomatic. Literally, the text reads "therefore, this has been stated" (*tenaiśoktā = tenaiśā [vāco brahmatā] uktā*). That is to say that the grammarians have said that speech has Brahma-nature (*brahmatā*), and therefore, contrary to Somānanda's criticism in ŚD 2.13ab, they are able to say whether the organ of speech was associated with Brahman or the individual soul (*ātman*): it is associated with Brahman.

⁷⁴The present expression refers to the five organs of action, viz.: (1) speech (*vāc*); (2) touch (*hasta/pāṇi*); (3) motion (*pāda*); (4) voiding the bowels (*pāyu*); and (5) the power of reproduction (*upastha*).

⁷⁵"Etcetera" (*° ādi*) here refers to entities appearing in the world.

⁷⁶See ŚD 2.89–91.

⁷⁷That is, the five breaths, the last of which is *vyāna*. On the function of the breaths in Śaiva tantrism, see, e.g., Pandit 1997: 29–38.

to be *paśyanti*, there is some measure of reflective awareness of speech but not of the thing to which speech refers, this simply by virtue of (*paśyanti*'s) unity. Therefore, this should be true for everything.⁷⁸

2.15cd–16ab

Now, they might argue that speech is superior because it provides magical powers, etc.⁷⁹ Thus, [Somānanda] says:

atropāsanayā siddhir devatāyogiteti cet
2.16. *yogaśāstreṣu sarveṣāṃ devatāsiddhiyogitā*

If you argue that the power of being associated with the deity is derived from worshiping it,⁸⁰ (we reply:) all are associated with Gods and powers in the Yogaśāstras.⁸¹

They (might) say that those learned men who worship speech and understand it have power, and the Goddess of speech is the tutelary deity there. Therefore, it is real.⁸²

⁷⁸Somānanda here addresses a potential objection. The grammarians might argue that the organ of speech is different from the other organs of action, because it rises through the body, and speech is the only organ of action to undergo such a process. Somānanda refutes this argument in two ways. First of all, while the criterion in question distinguishes speech from the other organs of action, it does not distinguish it from the breaths: they follow the same ascending path in the body. Second, in Bhartṛhari's system everything exists in a non-dual state at the level of *paśyanti*, including the agent (*grāhaka*) and object (*grāhya*) of cognition, as well as denotative speech (*vācaka*) and the object it denotes (*vācya* = *artha*). Thus, anything that is manifested first exists in *paśyanti*. In other words, the "internal reflective awareness" (*antaḥparāmarśa*) exists equally in all entities, because all entities are manifested by *paśyanti*, which is reflective awareness (it is *pratyaavamarśini*). Therefore, the grammarians cannot distinguish speech, which is a form of *paśyanti*, from the entities it is said to manifest in and as the world.

⁷⁹The word "etcetera" (*ādi*) probably refers to the fact that speech can lead both to enjoyments in this world and the next (*abhyudaya*) and to spiritual liberation (*niḥśreyasa*), for, according to the grammarians, there is spiritual merit to be gained in speaking properly. See VP 1.144.

⁸⁰That is, one gains the powers and the spiritual benefits associated with the goddess of speech. See Utpaladeva's commentary, following.

⁸¹Though Somānanda does not quote the text, one might expect that he has YS 3.1 in mind: *deśa-bandhaś ca cittasya dhāraṇā*. See also Vyāsa's commentary: *nābhicakre hṛdayapuṇḍarīke mūrḍhni jyotiṣi nāsikāgre jihvāgra ity evamādiṣu deśeṣu bāhye vā viśaye cittasya vṛttimātreṇa bandha iti dhāraṇā*. More likely, however, is that Somānanda had in mind the sort of practices found in Āgamic texts such as the *Vijñān-abhairava*, which echoes the notion that any worldly entity can be the object of yogic contemplation. See, e.g., VBh 74: *yaṭra yaṭra manas tuṣṭir manas tatraiva dhārayet / tatra tatra parānandasvarūpaṃ sampravartate*. (Cf. ŚD 7.79: *yeṇa yeṇendriyeṇārtho gṛhyate tatra tatra sā / śivatā lakṣitā satyaḥ tad dhyānam api varnyate*.) See also the Introduction, section 10.

⁸²The argument made is rather straightforward: since one gains powers (*siddhi*) by focusing on speech, speech must be real, and superior, and it must therefore be associated with the nature of Brahman.

This, too,⁸³ is not so. There are tutelary deities in the *Yogaśāstras*, etc.,⁸⁴ as there also are powers that result from the concentration of the sense organs⁸⁵ on the gross elements. Hence, the same would apply there.⁸⁶

2.16cd–17

Therefore, they should consider the following. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

tasmād dhirāṇyagarbhādiyogasāṅkhyetiḥāsātām
 2.17. *vihāya śāstraracanaṁ jātucin na virājate*
pāṇyādīndriyavan naitad brahma vāgindriyaṁ bhavet

Therefore, having first set aside the fact that the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya of Hiranyagarbha and the others are established tradition,⁸⁷ the composition of a learned work is not at all illuminating. The speech-organ is not Brahman, just as the organ of touch and so on are not.⁸⁸

Therefore, having first set aside the traditional nature of that, the learned work that must be made to explain in detail the meaning stated in it, which exists in the form of the history of the *Yogaśāstra* and the Sāṅkhya that was revealed

⁸³The force of *api* seems to be to suggest that the present argument, like the one presented in ŚD 2.14cd–15ab, is not compelling.

⁸⁴The word etcetera (*ādi*) refers to the various treatises on yogic practice.

⁸⁵It is also possible that the term in question, *karāṇa*, refers to yogic postures, though this seems unlikely. The argument put forward is that one can concentrate on various elements, by means of the various organs of action—not simply speech—to acquire powers.

⁸⁶In other words, the various objects of concentration recognized in the *Yogaśāstras* should be considered to be as legitimate as the first of the five organs of action, speech (*vāc*). Thus, if the grammarians argue that speech is eminent, this because magical powers can be acquired by worshipping it, then they must be understood either to contradict the long-standing tradition that powers are attainable through contemplation on various objects, or they must recognize that the present is not a criterion that distinguishes speech. It is, primarily, the latter point that Somānanda wishes to make.

⁸⁷*Hiranyagarbhādiyogasāṅkhyetiḥāsātām vihāya* literally means “having set aside the fact that the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya of Hiranyagarbha and the others are tradition.”

⁸⁸The argument here amounts to a straightforward appeal to tradition. The Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools do not recognize the organ of speech as Brahman, and, thus, neither should the grammarians. Mention of Hiranyagarbha is probably meant to refer to Kapila, one whom tradition considers a founder of the Sāṅkhya, he being one who is not infrequently referred to by the name in question. See Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 7, 111–112, and esp. 119, where the authors note that Vyāsa’s *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* 1.25 identifies Kapila as Hiranyagarbha and as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. The same name is also applied to Patañjali, however, about which see *ibid.*: 166.

In this passage, Somānanda appeals to the tradition of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga on slightly different grounds than he did in ŚD 2.15cd–16ab. Here, he suggests that the schools in question do not recognize the organ of speech as Brahman. Previously, he suggested that, while the Sāṅkhya and Yoga recognize multiple objects of concentration, the grammarians recognize only speech. This appeal to tradition is noteworthy because, if Iyer is right that Bhartṛhari and the grammarians were interested in developing a generally acceptable system of thought, to be held in common by every brahminical tradition, this critique would have struck home. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 219.

by Brahman, etc., the composition of a *śāstra* according to one's own judgment is not illuminating.⁸⁹

And thus the organ of touch, etc., since they are not established as such in the beginningless *śāstras*, do not appear in the form of Brahman,⁹⁰ but rather only in consequence of it. It is the same for speech, as well.

2.18–20ab

Considering an enquiry into how the Sāṅkhya and the rest are beginningless, [Somānanda] says:⁹¹

2.18. *athocyate prakriyāsau sāṅkhyādiracitā na sā*

tattvomeṣasprasarane bhavet sambandhabhāginī

2.19. *vimarśānubhavenaiṣā yathā vāk prathamam śrītaḥ*

lakṣyate bodharūpeṇa na tathā caraṇādikam

2.20. *iti cec carcyatam tāvat paśyanti yujyate yathā*

Now, you might argue that this characterization, fashioned by the Sāṅkhya and the rest, is not associated with the manifestation of reality. Unlike

⁸⁹Here, Utpaladeva suggests that the argument put forward by Somānanda goes so far as to suggest that the contents of the *śāstras* of the Yoga and Sāṅkhya schools constitute a tradition that may be traced back to Brahman. Utpaladeva therefore seems to understand Somānanda's reference to Hiraṇyagarbha as a reference to the primordial deity, who is said to have authored the Vedas. It is possible, and more likely in my view, that Somānanda meant the name Hiraṇyagarbha to refer to Kapila, who tradition claims, along with Āsuri, is a sort of divinized founder of the Sāṅkhya school. (See note 88, above.) Regardless, Utpaladeva's point is this: that because these works refer to various paths to power, whether by concentration on the sense organs, on the gross elements, or otherwise (see ŚD 2.15cd–16ab), the uniqueness of speech supported by the grammarians can find no support in these authoritative works. Somānanda will next consider the possibility that the opponent will not recognize the scriptural authority for these *śāstras*, for which, see ŚD 2.18–20ab.

Note that the text here reads in a manner that suggests that everything from *itihāsarūpam* to *śāstram kāryam* is an interpolation. The text here expresses a general maxim defining the nature of a *śāstra*, and it interrupts the flow of the commentary and Utpaladeva's gloss on the compound (*hiranyagarbhādiyo-gasāṅkhyetiḥāsatām*) found on ŚD 2.16c–d. One therefore suspects that this is very possibly a scribe's note that found its way into the text. All four manuscripts of the commentary, along with K^{ed}, witness the passage in question, however, and I have therefore left it in the edition of the text that accompanies the present translation.

⁹⁰This is to say that the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools have not described the organs of action as such.

⁹¹Kaul suggests that the present objection is based on the notion that the schools in question, being the product of human authorship, should not be considered more authoritative than the Veda, where speech is identified with Brahman. (See, supra, ŚDVṛ at ŚD 2.16cd–17 and, esp., notes 88 and 89.) For this argument, see Kaul's note 8 on p. 48 of the KSTS edition: "Objection: it must be the case that the Vedas are authoritative, since they were advanced by Brahman, and it is also stated there that Brahman is speech, and therefore what fault is there in (accepting) this? On the other hand, the Sāṅkhya, etc., since they were advanced by Kapila and others, only have authority similar to our own *śāstra*. How can what is said in these possess authority; for it is (only) there that the nature of speech as an organ (of action) is thoroughly considered. Having assimilated this doubt, [Utpaladeva] says: 'Considering an enquiry'. (*nanu cāstu brahmapraṇītatvād vedasya prāmāṇyam, tatra ca vāg brahmety api kathitam tatas ca katham atra virodhaḥ, sāṅkhyādeḥ punaḥ kapilādipraṇītatvād asmādiyaśāstravad ādimattvam eva, katham taduktam prāmāṇyam bhajet, tatra hi sarvatra vāca indriyatvam eva samarthitam ity āsāṅkām garbhikṛtyāha sāṅkhyāder apiti.*)"

motion, etc.,⁹² one has recourse to speech first of all,⁹³ through ones experience of reflective awareness; (for) it appears in the form of consciousness. (Reply:) You first must discuss how *paśyanti* is appropriate as “seeing.”⁹⁴

(Objection:) That speech is an organ of action is the characterization found in the settled opinions of the Sāṅkhya, etc.⁹⁵ Hence, it is merely an idea associated with those who promulgate it, but it has no bearing on the design of consciousness, the supreme reality;⁹⁶ nor is this characterization associated with considerations of the supreme reality.⁹⁷

For instance, all objects become established in consciousness; nonappearing entities⁹⁸ simply do not exist. Moreover, consciousness that is devoid of reflective awareness is not consciousness at all, and thus the reflective awareness that one experiences as the nature of the essence of all reality consists of nothing but words.⁹⁹ Therefore, how can hands, etc., compete with speech? Indeed, objects first become real in the form of consciousness, and consciousness, the nature of which is reflective awareness, is first of all¹⁰⁰ penetrated by speech alone, and not by hands, feet, etc.¹⁰¹

Reply: Even so, it is one thing to say that consciousness, the nature of which is reflective awareness, consists of speech alone, but that you must first reflect on *paśyanti* in light of its own nature and name, which means (you must reflect) on how *paśyanti* is indeed appropriate as “seeing,” is something else.¹⁰²

⁹²The word etcetera (*ādi*) refers to the organ of motion and the other organs of action. Note that Somānanda normally mentions the organ of touch (*hasta*) when referring to the organs of action (*karmendriya*) other than speech. Here, he refers to the organ of motion, usually referred to as *pāda*, for metrical reasons.

⁹³*Prathamam*, “firstly,” refers to the beginning of existence, the creation of the universe. See Utpaladeva’s commentary, below.

⁹⁴This is, of course, the literal meaning of *paśyanti*. Utpaladeva justifies the present translation in his commentary (for which see below), a strictly literal rendering of which would be “you must first discuss how ‘seeing’ is appropriate.”

⁹⁵“Settled opinions” is a translation for *siddhānta* in *sāṅkhyādisiddhānta*. For reference to the organization of the *tattvas* and of speech as an organ of action (*karmendriya*), see, e.g., Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 49–65.

⁹⁶In other words, the authors of these schools merely talk about the status of speech as an organ of action, but they do not offer an explanation of the power of speech as the creative power that manifests the universe.

⁹⁷Utpaladeva here comments on *tattvomeṣaprasaraṇa* in ŚD 2.18c.

⁹⁸The term in question, *asamvidīta*, refers to that which is not manifested in consciousness.

⁹⁹Utpaladeva here glosses and explains *vimarśānubhava* in ŚD 2.19a. The term here used is *abhilāpamaya*, and this, indeed, represents with some accuracy Bhartṛhari’s notion that there is no experience devoid of understanding.

¹⁰⁰That is, one has access to it at the very beginning of creation.

¹⁰¹Utpaladeva here represents the grammarians’ argument as anticipated in ŚD 2.19b–d. Mention of “hands, feet, etc.” is in reference to the organs of action other than speech.

¹⁰²Utpaladeva here concedes the grammarians’ argument that the universe is made up of self-reflective consciousness. He argues, however, that they have simply laid claim to the idea that consciousness is made up of speech. They have yet to prove it. To do so, he suggests, they must explain the nature of *paśyanti*. Somānanda dwells on these points for the balance of the chapter.

2.20cd–21ab

To discuss her nature and name, [Somānanda] says:

vartamānasamārūḍhā kriyā paśyantyudāhṛtā
2.21. *dr̥ṣiḥ sakarmako dhātuḥ kiṃ paśyantiti kathyatām*

The verbal form “*paśyanti*” is in the present tense, (and) the verbal root “to see” is transitive, so, do tell, what does *paśyanti* see?

Indeed, the word *paśyanti* refers to the action of seeing occurring in the present tense and fixed in an agent whose nature is speech, and the verbal root “to see” is transitive, i.e., it expresses an action that has an object. Therefore, one must investigate the object that she sees here.¹⁰³

2.21cd–22ab

Considering that very point,¹⁰⁴ [Somānanda] says:

yady ābhāsān bahirbhūtāṃs tān sato 'py asato 'pi vā
2.22. *satyatve darśanabhraṃśo hy asatyē satyatā katham*

If (she sees) external appearances, (she sees them) either (to be) real or unreal. If¹⁰⁵ they are real, your view falls to pieces;¹⁰⁶ if unreal, how can she be real?¹⁰⁷

If she sees appearances externally,¹⁰⁸ in the form of pots, cloth, etc., then one must deliberate on whether they are real or unreal.

¹⁰³“Here” (*atra*) could mean either “here in the world” or “here in this [the grammarians’] school of thought.”

¹⁰⁴That is, considering the nature of the objects of sight. Kaul glosses: *kiṃ karmeti*.

¹⁰⁵The emphatic particle (*hi*) is here used as a verse-filler, and I have thus left the term untranslated.

¹⁰⁶Kaul glosses the term in question, *darśanabhraṃśa*, with “destruction of one’s own view” (*svamata-pracyuti*).

¹⁰⁷The etymology of the term *paśyanti* suggests that something is being seen, and therefore one should inquire as to the nature of the object of sight. Here, Somānanda considers the possibility that *paśyanti* sees appearances (*ābhāsas*) external to herself. If these appearances exist, then the system can be faulted for contradicting its own doctrine of *vivarta*. If, on the other hand, the grammarians say that they do not exist, then *paśyanti*, which is “seeing,” does not really see anything, and as a consequence is not really “seeing” (*paśyanti*).

¹⁰⁸In Utpaladeva’s system of thought, the term here used, *idantā*, is contrasted with *ahantā*, the former referring to external entities, the latter to internal ones. While, as is noted in the Introduction, Somānanda does not make regular use of these terms, they are commonly used by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. See, for example: ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.3, where Utpaladeva describes the creation of the universe as the cognition of entities that appear as if they are external to oneself (*idantayā*); ĪPK 3.1.8, where Utpaladeva uses the term to describe the (false) identification of oneself with the body, etc.; and ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 3.1.5, where the *parāparā* condition is described as one in which one’s awareness of both is balanced.

In the former, the ones who maintain that *vivarta* is by nature the state of acquiring unreal, distinct, disparate forms cannot say that they are real for fear that their view would fall to pieces.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, *paśyanti* is not real when the object of sight is unreal, she being (in this case) something that sees unreal objects of sight.¹¹⁰

2.22cd–23

The doctrine of nescience is inappropriate as well. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

gr̥hṇāty athāvidyayā vā sāpy asyāḥ katham āsthitā
 2.23. *satyā vāsāv asatyā vā satyatve darśanakṣatiḥ*
asatyayāpi satyasya sambandho 'tiva durghataḥ

Now, you might instead argue that she cognizes by means of nescience.¹¹¹ How does she have recourse to it? It is either real or unreal. If it is real, your view is destroyed.¹¹² Also, a connection of something real¹¹³ with something unreal is exceedingly difficult to accomplish.¹¹⁴

First, she must have an erroneous nature if she sees something unreal, even (if she sees) by dint of beginningless nescience.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁹In other words, if the grammarians claim the appearances are real, they would contradict their definition of *vivarta* as the appearance of multiple and unreal entities in the world. Note that the language here is similar to that in the commentary on VP 1.1. Cf. also Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 2.8cd–11.

¹¹⁰Put differently, how can *paśyanti* be “the seeing one” if the appearances she sees do not exist?

¹¹¹Somānanda here considers the possible argument that *paśyanti* has a true perception, through (or perhaps of?) *avidyā*, which presents the appearance of *vivarta*.

¹¹²Presumably, this is, as with the discussion of real appearances in ŚD 2.21cd–22ab, due to the fact that to claim that *avidyā* is real contradicts the grammarians' very understanding of *avidyā*, as described in the following.

¹¹³It remains unclear why the present term is masculine/neuter and not feminine in gender. I take this to be the expression of a general rule, but Somānanda refers to the entity with which there is no connection with the use of a feminine pronoun that, by standard rules of anaphora, should be properly understood to refer to *avidyā*. Perhaps *satya* refers to Brahman (in the form of *paśyanti*).

¹¹⁴Iyer points out that Bhartṛhari, at least in the *mūla* verses of the *Vākyapadiya*, never uses the term *avidyā* in a technical sense. Somānanda nevertheless associates this term with Bhartṛhari. It remains unclear whether he was aware of differences between the arguments in the *mūla* and the *vṛtti*, or if he even had access to the commentary. And, as Iyer argues, the authors of the Pratyabhijñā apparently do not consider the two to have been written by different authors, for the ŚD and ŚDVṛ refute the positions of “the grammarians” by attacking ideas that are recorded in both the *Vākyapadiya* and the *Vṛtti*. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 18–36, esp. 34. Note that Chaturvedi understands this verse to consider the two alternatives (*vipakṣas*) in question, being real and being unreal, to apply to *paśyanti* and not to *avidyā*. See Chaturvedi 1986: 53.

¹¹⁵This could mean that *paśyanti*, as the one who sees, errs if she sees something unreal as though it were real, even if what is seen comes to *paśyanti* by way of *avidyā*. It is also possible that this means to suggest that, insofar as what appears is ultimately the product of *paśyanti*, the erroneous nature (*mithyātva*) of what is seen implies that its source ultimately possesses the same nature.

Moreover, she cannot be connected to nescience, for nescience is unreal by the very fact that it is considered to be an absence of knowledge,¹¹⁶ and a connection, consisting of a union with a form, is not logically possible with something that does not exist.

2.24ab

It is, moreover, not logically possible for *paśyanti* herself to be unreal. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

2.24. *asatyā yadi paśyanti paśyanti brahma citratā*

If you argue that *paśyanti* is unreal, it is a wonder that *paśyanti* is Brahman.¹¹⁷

If you argue that *paśyanti* is unreal, then what you mean when you say that *paśyanti* is the *brahmatattva* is amazing.¹¹⁸

2.24cd–25ab

[Somānanda] also says something else:

bahirbhāvān visrjyādau paścāt paśyati sātha kim
2.25. *satyā srijaty asatyāni vicitram abhidhīyate*

Now, do you argue that she first produces external entities and then sees them? (If so:) She, being real, creates unreal forms. That's what you call a wonder.

Since no other reality exists, are entities in the world¹¹⁹ produced by *paśyanti* herself, and, having produced them, i.e., having acquired their nature,¹²⁰ does she then see them? For this alone is fitting.¹²¹

¹¹⁶That is, nescience, *avidyā*, is considered to be the absence of knowledge, *vidyā*, this being an analysis of *a-vidyā* as an “alpha-privative” or *nañ-tatpuruṣa* compound (about which see A 6.3.73–77). Cf. ŚD 2.34–35 and the commentary thereon. See also the Introduction, section 13 under the subsection entitled “Bhartṛhari’s *avidyā* and Utpaladeva’s *abhedākhyāti*.”

¹¹⁷Here, Somānanda continues with the argument from the preceding. In ŚD 2.22cd–23, he dismissed the possibility that *avidyā* is real, and then considered the negative consequences of *avidyā* being unreal. Here, he considers the possibility that *paśyanti* is unreal. An unreal *paśyanti* would resolve the problems associated with a real entity cognizing unreal objects, a problem considered below, in ŚD 2.24cd–25ab. This is not possible, however, for the obvious reason stated here.

¹¹⁸Cf. ŚD 2.2. See also the commentary on ŚD 2.4cd–5, 2.6, and 2.8cd–11, where Utpaladeva refers to Brahman “in the form of *paśyanti*” (*paśyantirūpa*).

¹¹⁹I take *viśve* to be a locative, singular noun (“in the world”) glossing *bahis* in *bahirbhāva* (ŚD 2.24c). It could also be the nominative plural form of *viśva* pronominally declined, *viśve bhāvāḥ* meaning “all entities.”

¹²⁰Utpaladeva here describes the entities in question as *labdhasvarūpa*, which he contrasts with *alabdhasvarūpa* in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.25cd–26ab.

¹²¹In the grammarians’ non-dual system, Brahman alone exists in the form of *paśyanti*. As such, only it can be the source manifestation. More importantly, objects must have the same nature as Brahman—they must exist in the form of *paśyanti*—given that Brahman (in the form of *paśyanti*) is the only truly existent entity.

On this view,¹²² she, being real, produces unreal forms, but this is amazing because it is impossible. This is so because she would acquire an unreal nature, since, according to the reasoning of the *satkāryavāda*, a cause is not different from its effect;¹²³ (it would be amazing) even were she to create unreal things, because she would be impure, this insofar as she would be one who produces something unbecoming of herself.¹²⁴

2.25cd–26ab

Moreover, since creation (according to the grammarians) is neither for play nor for any other reason, [Somānanda] says:

jñātān srjaty asau tān vā neti jñāteṣv adarśanam
2.26. *ajñāteṣu na srṣṭiḥ syād iṣṭaṃ kriḍādikaṃ na ca*

One can say¹²⁵ that she either produces known entities or she does not. If they are known, there is no act of seeing;¹²⁶ if they are unknown, there would be no creation. Nor do you maintain that it is a game, etc.

Moreover, one can (only) create either previously known or unknown entities.

Regarding the former, what can she see when, prior to creation, the entity in question has not (yet) acquired its nature?¹²⁷ Hence, she should create nothing but unknown entities. Therefore, the alternative that she creates known entities is impossible.

¹²²Here, I translate *tatra* idiomatically.

¹²³Three manuscripts (G, P, and R) read *kāryāvvyatireka* for *kāryavyatireka*, and by Professor H. Isaacson's suggestion, I adopt this reading. According to the *satkāryavāda*, the effect is inherent in the cause, and thus the nature of the two are related. Milk is the source of curds but never something unrelated to it, as honey is unrelated (causally and in the composition of its nature) to milk, for example. It is therefore impossible, according to this principle, for *paśyanti*, which is real, to produce unreal objects. On causality in Bhartṛhari, see Iyer [1969] 1992: 216–217. See also Aklujkar 1990: 121–172, esp. 124–125.

¹²⁴The present expression is a counterfactual construction. It means to suggest that, even if Somānanda were to concede, for the sake of argument, that *paśyanti* could manifest unreal entities, this would nevertheless remain a problematic position to hold. The reason for this is, simply, that according to the *satkāryavāda*, that which produces something unreal would itself have to have essentially the same nature, i.e., unreality. This amounts to being impure.

¹²⁵The present expression is a rendering of *iti* (ŚD 2.25c).

¹²⁶An entity cannot be seen prior to its creation, because it has no form, etc., prior to creation. *Adarśana* can be read with both what precedes and what follows it (*dehalidīpavat*), or simply with what precedes it, viz.: *jñāteṣu* (ŚD 2.25d). If the latter, it is as I have translated here. It also can be read with *ajñāteṣu* (ŚD 2.26a), as Utpaladeva notes in the commentary. In this case, it literally means “(this is) not the view,” which is to say that the grammarians do not adhere to the view that *paśyanti* creates unknown entities.

¹²⁷An object has no nature prior to its creation, this simply because it does not exist prior to its creation. Thus, to suggest that *paśyanti* creates objects of cognition that exist in some definite form—have acquired a particular nature—prior to their creation involves a contradiction in terms. There could be nothing to be known prior to their creation. Note that Utpaladeva uses the same term, without the negative prefix (*labdhasvarūpa*), in his commentary on ŚD 2.24cd–25ab.

Regarding the latter—the creation of unknown entities—this is not your view, by which is meant that you don't accept that.¹²⁸ Even if (you accepted the creation of) unknown entities, how could those who know something create it prior to knowing it?¹²⁹

How, moreover, could creation be purposeless? Indeed, you do not maintain that creation is simply the play of the creator, or that creation is his nature.

2.26cd–28ab

Again considering the thesis and its antithesis, [Somānanda] says:¹³⁰

tāni dr̥ṣṭvānusrjati sṛṣṭvā vānuprapaśyati

2.27. *paśyantyāḥ satyarūpāyās tatsatyatve na darśanam*

asatye satyadr̥ṣṭyaiva paśyantyāṃ malinātmatā

2.28. *asatyān satyarūpā vā katham srjati kalpyatām*

Having seen¹³¹ them, she produces them afterward, or having created them, she sees them afterward. (Both are flawed:)¹³² If they are real, your view of *paśyanti*, which has a real form, is contradicted; (and if they are unreal,) *paśyanti* would have an impure nature simply because something real sees something unreal. Also: why she, having a real form, creates the unreal [objects] must be considered.

You must concede either that, having first seen, i.e., having first cognized, those various things, she produces them afterward, or having first produced

¹²⁸Here, Utpaladeva suggests that *adarśana* is a *nañ-tatpuruṣa* compound (the so-called “alpha-privative” compound), meaning literally “(this is) not the [i.e., your] view.”

¹²⁹The one who manifests something must know what is being manifested prior to making it appear. Gnoli’s translation of the *mūla* makes this clear: “Né d’altra parte si può ammettere emissione nei riguardi di cose ignote (poiché la creazione deve essere preceduta da un’idea di quello che si vuole creare).” See Gnoli 1959: 66.

¹³⁰Somānanda has in ŚD 2.25cd–26ab asked whether *paśyanti* first knows or first creates the objects she sees, this in order to argue that, in either case, *paśyanti* as the grammarians understand her cannot logically be thought to create the objects in question. Here, again mentioning these two possibilities, Somānanda questions the ontological status of the objects in question and suggests that, whether *paśyanti* is aware of the entities first or creates them first, the ontological status of those entities is problematic.

¹³¹Somānanda here uses a word for seeing (*dr̥ṣṭvā*) in the sense of knowing. Two manuscript (P and R^{P.c}) read *dr̥ṣṭāni srjati* for *dr̥ṣṭvānusrjati*, and while I do not accept this reading, it points to a synonymy between seeing and knowing. *Dr̥ṣṭāni* is synonymous with *jñātān* (ŚD 2.25c) insofar as both words refer to “(previously) known” entities, the difference in gender being explained by the fact that the former, neuter adjective refers to “things” (*vastūni*), while the latter, masculine adjective refers to “objects” (*arthān*). It is for this reason that Kaul glosses *dr̥ṣṭvā* with *avabuddhya*.

¹³²Kaul notes that the grammarians’ view is flawed in both cases (*ubhayam api mithyātvena kathayati*), and Gnoli translates accordingly: “In tutti e due i casi, se voi ammettete che la Veggente, la quale é reale, vede cose reali, venite meno al vostro sistema. Se d’altra parte la Veggente vede come reali cose irreali non sarebbe certo piú immune da impurità (*malinātmatā*).” See Gnoli 1959: 67.

them, she sees them afterward. The word *anu* here means “afterward”; alternatively, the word *nu* is (used) in the sense of a deliberation.¹³³

(Both are flawed:) The very fact that she sees is not logical. That is to say, she is real, and if the objects she sees are real, then your view is contradicted—that is, you do not accept that,¹³⁴ because the result would be dualism.

Now, if you argue that they are unreal, then, just as she is impure when she creates real things, so it would also be the case when she creates unreal things, her erroneous nature being absolutely primary.¹³⁵

And, once again, you must reflect on why precisely *paśyanti*,¹³⁶ being real, produces unreal objects, even if it is not for divine play, etc.

2.28cd–30ab

Although mentioned earlier, [Somānanda] again considered the thesis and antithesis of their view regarding the creation of that which is real or that which is unreal, this in order to communicate the unwanted consequence concerning the perception that is obtained through nescience.¹³⁷ Having done so,¹³⁸ [Somānanda] says the following in order to consider whether creation, which is made by nescience, simply has no (logically coherent) cause:¹³⁹

¹³³Here, Utpaladeva refers to two possible interpretations of the verse, depending on how one breaks up the words in the sentence. One must understand the verse twice to include either the verbal prefix *anu* or the particle *nu*, in ŚD 2.26c and 2.26d. (One can interpret the long vowel (*ā*) in *dṛṣṭvānusrjati* and *vānuprapaśyati* to have assimilated the initial short *a* of the verbal prefix *anu*, or one can assume that there was no connection (*sandhi*) of two vowels in either place, the final long *ā* of *dṛṣṭvā* and *vā* simply preceding the separate particle *nu*.) It is most likely that Somānanda intended the reader to understand the verbal prefix (*upasarga*) *anu* to augment each verb: “he created (them) afterward [*anusrjati*],” “he becomes aware (of them) afterward [*anuprapaśyati*].” The use of *nu* would highlight that the present questions whether *paśyanti* first creates or cognizes the objects in question.

¹³⁴In other words, holding such a position would contradict the grammarians’ own view.

¹³⁵According to the *saikāryavāda*, as Utpaladeva suggested in his commentary on ŚD 2.24cd–25ab, the effect of an action is inherent in the cause. By this principle, the properties of the entities that *paśyanti* creates inhere in potential form in *paśyanti* herself. Thus, she is “impure” insofar as these qualities inhere in her. Note, however, that in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.24cd–25ab, Utpaladeva only mentioned the impurity of *paśyanti* from seeing unreal entities.

¹³⁶Though I have not done so, the reading of the commentary, *satyā sā paśyanti*, might suggest that we should emend the reading of *vā* (ŚD 2.28a) in the verse to *sā*, as *paśyanti* appears here in the commentary to be a gloss of *sā*.

¹³⁷Somānanda twice asks whether, according to the grammarians, *paśyanti* first sees or first produces the entities that make up the universe: in ŚD 2.24cd–25ab he considers the possibility that *paśyanti* produces external entities and then sees them. In 2.25cd–26ab he asks whether *paśyanti* produces known entities or unknown entities. Note that I take *avidyāparyāptaparyālocanāprasaṅgadānāya* to be a single compound; the KSTS edition reads *avidyāparyāptaparyālocanā prasaṅgadānāya*.

¹³⁸This is a rendering of the force of the locative absolute, viz.: *asatyasatyasargadarśane prāgukte ’py avidyāparyāptaparyālocanāprasaṅgadānāya punarvikalpīte*.

¹³⁹What follows is a critique of the doctrine of nescience. Somānanda attacks its connection to *paśyanti*, arguing it cannot be proven logically, whether one argues that it is the nature of either *paśyanti* or of another entity. This leaves the possibility that nescience is independent, and that it creates the phenomenal world for no particular reason.

avidyāsyāḥ svadharmah kiṃ paradharmo 'thavā bhavet
 2.29. *svadharmatve 'syā mālinyaṃ paradharme 'pi kasya sā*
parasya śāstrāniṣṭasya svatantrā vā tathāpi sā
 2.30. *svātantryād durnivāraiva svatantraḥ kena vāryate*

Is nescience her nature, or is it the nature of another?¹⁴⁰ If it is her nature, then she is impure. If, on the other hand, it is the nature of another, (then) to what other entity, which is not accepted in your *śāstra*,¹⁴¹ does it belong? Alternatively, it is independent. Even then it is, on account of its independence, very difficult to remove: by whom is an independent entity restrained?¹⁴²

Is nescience the nature of *paśyanti* or is it the nature of something else?

If it is her nature, (then,) having nescience as her nature, she would be impure.¹⁴³

Alternatively, if it is the nature of another, (then) to what other one does the nature belong? For, you do not hold in your *śāstra*, a doctrine of non-duality, that something other than Brahman exists.¹⁴⁴

Now, you might argue that nescience is absolutely independent and not the nature of anything. Even then, it would be very difficult to interrupt due to its independence, for by what other is an independent entity removed, and by what is it introduced? That is to say, it would not be absolutely independent.¹⁴⁵

Now, if you argue that it is independent when introduced, but is removed by the actions of another than itself, we reply: no, because a lack of independence arises as a result of it being possessed of a conditional introduction (into existence, one present) when the cause of its removal does not (yet) exist.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰Kaul points out that the nature of a thing cannot be separated from the thing possessing that nature: *dharmah svabhāvaḥ, svabhāvaś ca svabhāvīno 'vyatiriktah*.

¹⁴¹This is to say that the grammarians do not accept that any entity other than *paśyanti* exists.

¹⁴²In other words, if nescience (*avidyā*) is not the nature of either *paśyanti* or another entity, but is instead an independent entity, then by virtue of being independent it cannot be thrown off. The grammarians, however, argue that the veil of ignorance is thrown off with enlightenment, and, according to Somānanda, this would not be possible if it were entirely independent.

¹⁴³The point here is that, if the nature of *paśyanti* is nescience (*avidyā*), then *paśyanti*, like *avidyā*, is by nature unreal and illusory.

¹⁴⁴It is possible that one should instead construe *brahmanah* with what precedes it, understanding it to stand outside of the *iti*-clause rather than within it, as I have translated, above. On this alternative interpretation, one could translate as follows: "For you do not hold in your *śāstra*, a doctrine of the non-duality of Brahman, that some other object exists."

¹⁴⁵That is, if an entity were either removed or introduced by another entity, it would not be independent.

¹⁴⁶In other words, two options exist for an *avidyā* that exists separately from *paśyanti*. It could be utterly independent, but then it would be impossible to stop. On the other hand, it could be introduced, as it were, by *paśyanti*, or by Brahman in the form of *paśyanti*, and subsequently removed by the same. In this case, then, it could not be an independent entity, but could only be one that exists only while that which causes it to cease to exist is absent.

2.30cd–31

Reflecting on the ineffability of nescience, [Somānanda] says:

tattvāṅyatvair avācyā vā yady avidyābhidhiyate
 2.31. *paśyantiyā lakṣitāsau vā na vā yadi na lakṣitā*
paśyanti jāḍyam āyāti lakṣitā tarhi lakṣitā

Alternatively, if you say nescience cannot be described as real or otherwise, (we reply:) it is either seen by *paśyanti* or not. If she does not see it, *paśyanti* is reduced to insentience. If seen, then it is not ineffable.

If you argue: “things indeed can be described by the qualities of things—reality, falsity,¹⁴⁷ eternality, perishability, and so on—but nescience, having no inherent nature, is not a thing, so how can it designate something possessing its own nature,” then we reply as follows.

Not being an object, it (nevertheless) is either seen by *paśyanti* or not.

If it is not seen, then “seeing” [*paśyanti*] is reduced to insentience, which means that it would be “nonseeing,”¹⁴⁸ because it would not see anything.¹⁴⁹

Now, if you argue that she sees it, then we reply that it is definitely seen, i.e., it is definitely observed. To put it plainly: since it appears only because another considers it, (and) since it is scrutinized by it, it can also be described.

The plural number of “as real or otherwise” is in the manner of *śauṅḍa*, *ardharca*, etc.¹⁵⁰

2.32

That it would be impossible to discuss it is a further consequence of its ineffability. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

2.32. *avācyatvena bhavatām tasyā rūpaṃ kuto gatam*
alakṣitasvarūpāyā avidyātvaṃ katham sthitam

Since it is ineffable, how do you know it’s form? How would the fact of being nescience be established for that which has an unseen form?¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Literally, the Sanskrit here means “being otherwise (than being real)” [°*anyatva*°].

¹⁴⁸ The term here used is the alpha-privative (*nañ-tatpuruṣa*) compound, *a-paśyanti*.

¹⁴⁹ Given that, in Utpaladeva’s understanding of the grammarians’ system, everything in the world appears because of nescience, if *paśyanti* does not see nescience, then it does not see anything. Literally, *sarvadarśanābhāvāt* means “because of the nonexistence of seeing anything.”

¹⁵⁰ Here, Utpaladeva wishes to explain the plural declension of *tattvāṅyatva*, a coordinative (*dvandva*) compound of only two words that normally would be declined in the dual, not the plural. It appears that the point here made is that, just as Pāṇini declines in the plural the words *śauṅḍa*, *ardharca*, and others similarly used, this because they stand for a series of words, so *tattvāṅyatva* may also correctly be declined in the plural, because it stands for a series of qualities, as Utpaladeva’s commentary indicates. (Utpaladeva glosses *tattvāṅyatva* with a long coordinative [*dvandva*] compound: *tattvāṅyattvanityatvānityatvādi*.) See: A 2.1.40 (*saptamī śauṅḍaiḥ*) and A 2.4.31 (*ardharcāḥ pūmī ca*).

¹⁵¹ This is to ask how so much could be established for nescience (*avidyā*). *Alakṣitasvarūpā* is a feminine exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound referring to *avidyā*.

Since it is also ineffable when it is not seen, how, i.e., by what means of knowledge, do you know its form, since it,¹⁵² too, is not seen? In addition, how would even the fact of its being nescience be determined when, it being one whose nature is not seen, it is ineffable?

2.33ab

Considering (the possible objection) that it can be inferred, [Somānanda] says:

2.33. *bhedabuddhyanumānāc cel lakṣitā tarhi lakṣitā*

If you argue that it is known through an inference made from the awareness of multiplicity,¹⁵³ then we reply that it is known.

If you argue that, because (the creation of) a multiplicity of beings cannot otherwise be accomplished, nescience is known as such a state of things,¹⁵⁴ which means it is known by inference,¹⁵⁵ then we reply that, this being so, it is definitely known. Thus, why do you say it is unknowable and ineffable?

2.33cd

To say it is not established even in this way, [Somānanda] says:

na cānumānam iṣṭam te 'py avasthetyādidūṣaṇāt

You don't even accept inference, given that you find fault with it in VP 1.32.¹⁵⁶

You don't even accept that inference is correct knowledge, as you say the following and more:

The establishment of entities through inference is exceedingly difficult, because of differences of condition, location, and time in the various powers.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵²That is to say, the form.

¹⁵³Kaul recasts the objection in the following manner: "Indeed, how could there be knowledge of multiplicity without nescience? Thus, nescience must come into existence" (*bhedajñānam hi kuto 'vidyām vinā sambhaved iti hy avidyā sambhavaty eva*).

¹⁵⁴This is to say that *avidyā* can be known to be that which makes multiplicity possible.

¹⁵⁵The argument here presented suggests, on the basis of the existence of a multiple universe, that nescience can be proven by inference: insofar as there must be something that causes the appearance of this multiple universe, and since there is no other explanation for its existence, one can infer the existence of nescience, which created it.

¹⁵⁶That is to say that Bhartṛhari does not accept that nescience (*avidyā*) can be known inferentially, as, according to Iyer, Bhartṛhari admits the validity of inference in everyday, mundane affairs, but not in ontological matters. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 84–85. Note that *api* in ŚD 2.33d is *bhinnakrama*, appearing out of the regular word order.

¹⁵⁷This is a quotation of VP 1.32. The powers (*śaktis*) in question are those by which Brahman, according to Bhartṛhari, creates the universe. For more on *śakti* in Bhartṛhari's thought, see Iyer [1969] 1992: 108–123, esp. 108–110.

Like¹⁵⁸ for a blind man moving quickly on an uneven road, (guided only) by the touch of his hand, falling is likely for one for whom inference is primary.¹⁵⁹

Indeed, if it were capable of proving the tenability of things, it¹⁶⁰ would not be inferior to direct perception, but it has no validity whatsoever given that it does not have this capability.¹⁶¹

2.34–35

2.34. *satyā vā syād asatyā vā na madhyāyāḥ samanvayaḥ
vidyā na bhavaty evaṃ tattulyā kācid āpatet*

2.35. *satyaiva yadi vidyānām abhāvas tarhi sūnyatā
sūnyayā bādhyate citraṃ paśyanti darśanātmikā*

It either must exist or not exist; there can be no intermediate [nescience].¹⁶² If you say “it is nonknowledge,”¹⁶³ it follows from this that it would be something absolutely real that is similar to it.¹⁶⁴ If you argue that it is the nonexistence of knowledge, then it is void; (and) *paśyanti*, whose nature is seeing, is obstructed by that which is void, which is amazing.

Satyā means *sati sādhu*, that is, it means “existing.”¹⁶⁵ What [Somānanda] means is that nescience must either exist or the opposite of that, not exist. No intermediate [nescience] is possible since, given that existence and nonexistence are mutually exclusive in nature, no third quantity is possible.

¹⁵⁸The comparative particle (*iva*) is situated out of the normal word order (*bhinnakrama*), referring to the blind man and not to his touch.

¹⁵⁹The present passage is a quotation of VP 1.4.2.

¹⁶⁰The pronoun in question refers to inference (*anumāna*).

¹⁶¹In other words, a proof established via inference would be equally valid to one accomplished on the authority of direct perception. However, because the grammarians do not accept the validity of inference to prove the existence of ontological truths, they cannot appeal to it in proving the existence of nescience.

¹⁶²Kaul glosses the term *madhyāyāḥ* with “that which both exists and does not exist” (*madhyāyā iti sadasadubhayātmikāyāḥ*), and he quotes the following: *asattve ca niśiddhe 'syāḥ satvām eva balād bhavet / sadasadvyatirikto hi raśir atyantadurlabhaḥ*, which is echoed in Utpaladeva’s commentary: *na madhyāyāḥ sambhavaḥ sadasatoḥ parasparābhāvarūpatvān na tṛṭiyarāśisambhavo yataḥ*. I am unsure of the source of this quotation.

¹⁶³This is to say that *a-vidyā* is a *pariyudāsapraśedha*, a negative compound indicating what something is not, while affirming the existence of the entity in question as something other than that which is negated.

¹⁶⁴That is, *a-vidyā*, “nonknowledge,” would be different from but in some way similar to knowledge (*vidyā*). Kaul has noted that ŚD 2.34c–35a refutes the possibility that nescience exists, and ŚD 2.35a–b refutes its nonexistence, or in other words the present considers the possibility that *avidyā* is a *pariyudāsapraśedha* (about which see the immediately preceding note), while the latter considers the possibility that it is a pure negation (*prasajyapraśedha*). See Kaul’s note 2, p. 57 of the KSTS edition.

¹⁶⁵The suffix *yāt* in *satyā* is used to mean existing. See A 4.4.98: *tatra sādhuḥ*.

For instance, if you say “this nescience is not knowledge,” it follows from this, i.e., from the exclusion of knowledge,¹⁶⁶ that it, appearing as having the nature of the entire universe, is not a pure negation.¹⁶⁷ And thus, nescience, being of the nature of the universe, would be something absolutely real that is similar to knowledge. And thus, it would not be ineffable, nor would non-duality exist.¹⁶⁸

Even if you argue that nescience is a pure negation,¹⁶⁹ is the nonexistence of knowledge, i.e., of correct cognitions, then it is void, i.e., it is pure cessation. To put it plainly, it is nothing at all. And therefore, your hypothesis, called *paśyanti*, the nature of which is correct cognition, is obstructed by a void, i.e., by that which is without form. This is amazing.

The error of dualism is the result of nothing but correct seeing¹⁷⁰ being blocked, because something that has no form¹⁷¹ does not have the power to block something, which means that this is impossible.¹⁷²

Moreover, you do not hold that *paśyanti*, whose nature is speech, is, in the manner described in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*,¹⁷³ a power of the Supreme Lord,

¹⁶⁶The Sanskrit here reads *vidyāparyudāsa*.

¹⁶⁷The Sanskrit here reads *pratiśeḍhamātrarūpā*. The idea here expresses is that nescience, which according to the grammarians appears as the very form of the universe, would have to be something other than knowledge if it were labeled “nonknowledge,” this simply because the universe is apparently present, and nescience must possess some sort of nature in order to cause the universe to appear. See the following, esp. note 168.

¹⁶⁸In the aforementioned, Utpaladeva considers the possibility that *avidyā* is a *paryudāsapratīśeḍha*. Thus, the negative particle is used here in a manner similar to the way it is used when someone says “bring a non-brahmin here.” By referring to someone who is not a brahmin, the negative particle conveys to the hearer that the speaker is asking for anyone other than a brahman to be brought. He also knows, by the context and the phrasing of the expression, that what is meant is that another human being should be brought, and not a horse or some other sort of animal. This sort of negation contrasts one entity with another; it does not simply negate the existence of the entity in question. Thus, Utpaladeva here considers the possibility that the grammarians consider nescience, which appears in the form of the universe and all the entities found therein, to be something real that is similar to knowledge, just as one would assume that to bring a “non-brahmin” suggests that one should bring someone similar to a brahmin, e.g., a human being of another *varṇa*.

¹⁶⁹The term here used is a *prasajyapratīśeḍha*, a “pure negation.” Kaul offers the following example: “a not-partaking-in-the-*śrāddha* brahman is one who does not partake in the *śrāddha*” (*aśrāddha-bhojī brāhmaṇaḥ śrāddhe na bhunkte*). In other words, a *prasajyapratīśeḍha* implies nothing other than negation.

¹⁷⁰The term here used, *samyagdarsana*, literally means “correct seeing,” as translated, but of course refers more specifically to correct cognition, words for seeing and knowing being closely related, as is noted elsewhere in the present translation.

¹⁷¹The term in question, *akiñcīdrūpa*, is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound.

¹⁷²Something must exist to block *paśyanti*, because something that has no form does not have the power to impede something that does have form. Insofar as *paśyanti* is “seeing,” i.e., knowing, she cannot be considered to be identical with nescience. Yet nescience, or something like it, must exist, this being inferred by the fact that *paśyanti* is blocked. Therefore, two entities must exist, *paśyanti* and nescience.

¹⁷³This is to say that the grammarians do not conceive of the nature of the power of “seeing” (*paśyanti*) in the manner that Utpaladeva conceives of Śiva’s power of consciousness. This is explained in what Utpaladeva says next, and in my notes on the same. See also IPK 1.5.6 and ŚD 1.44–45ab for the Pratyabhijñā conception of Śiva as the one wielding the creative power of consciousness.

because you fail to accept Īśvara.¹⁷⁴ Rather, speech is established (on your view) as that which expresses meaning, which is subtle because it is not different from that which is expressed by speech, and it is in this way that [*paśyanti*] has speech as her nature.¹⁷⁵

2.36

Even if it were not (merely) an organ of action, that would not make speech, which is itself of the nature of wind, the supreme reality, just as the hand, etc.,¹⁷⁶ are not, because they are of the nature of the earth (etcetera). For this reason, [Somānanda] says:¹⁷⁷

2.36. *pānyādeś ced dharādyātma vāco vāyvātmatā na kim
sindhūśabdādivac chabdo na paśyantyādike bhavet*

If you argue that the nature of the hand and the rest is the earth, etc., (we reply:) doesn't speech have wind as its nature?¹⁷⁸ **Sound, like the sound of the ocean, for example, cannot come into being in *paśyanti*, etc.**

A mere sound, like the sound of the ocean, for example, cannot exist in *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, and the rest.¹⁷⁹ It is the same in this case,¹⁸⁰ since there is no “seeing” in it.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁴Mention here of *īśvara*, as is sometimes the case elsewhere in the commentary, is not meant to refer to the fourth *tattva*, the *īśvaratattva*, but rather to Śiva as the Supreme Lord (*paramēśvara*).

¹⁷⁵This is to say that, according to Utpaladeva, the grammarians do not accept a form of the divine that fully transcends the subject-object dichotomy found in speech, as do the authors of the Pratyabhijñā. Since the nature of speech implies a distinction between what is said and what is denoted by the same, the grammarians' view falls short of a perfect non-dualism, and this in a word is the criticism that Somānanda levels against the grammarians. See the Introduction, section 13, esp. the subsection entitled “Somānanda's Arguments against the Grammarians' *paśyanti*.” For the Pratyabhijñā's view of God as the wielder of the creative power of consciousness, see ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 1.5.6; cf. ŚD 1.44–45ab.

¹⁷⁶The word etcetera (*ādi*) refers to the other organs of action.

¹⁷⁷In ŚD 2.12cd–17, particularly 2.12cd–14ab and 2.17cd, Somānanda argues that speech is merely an organ of action (*karmendriya*), and just as the other organs of action are not Brahman, neither is speech. Here, he will argue that, even if he were to concede that speech is *not* merely an organ of action, it nevertheless does not follow that it is supreme. Rather, like touch, etc., speech is material, and material entities are quite inferior to *paśyanti* as the grammarians describe it.

¹⁷⁸Kaul explains: “If the hand and so on, (because of) having the earth-*tattva* and so on as their *ātman*, i.e., nature, are not accepted as Brahman, then it is also this way for speech” (*dharādītatvaṃ pānyāder ātmā svabhāvo na brahmatayābhīyupagamyate, tathā vāg apiti*).

¹⁷⁹This refers to *vaikharī*, the lowest level of speech.

¹⁸⁰That is to say, it is the same with speech (*vāc*), the organ of speech.

¹⁸¹If the grammarians argue that the organs of action other than speech, the hand and so on, are material entities by nature, and on this basis are not supreme, then, Somānanda argues, the same must be said of speech. A mere sound, such as the sound of the ocean, is material. It manifests in a material environment: indeed, the ocean produces sound, and in doing so it has no connection to conceptual meaning per say. This means that the sound in question is merely a material phenomenon and, as such, cannot be said to arise from the supreme any more than any other material phenomenon can. As such, a mere sound is not imbued with cognitive power of any sort, with “seeing” (*paśyanti*). The same, moreover, must be said of the organ of speech. A mere sound produced by a human voice is material and contains no “seeing.” It is the product of an organ of action. Consequently, there is no basis for elevating the organ of action associated with sound above the other organs of action.

2.37

Thinking that (they might argue) nescience obstructs *madhyamā* and not *paśyanti*, which is real, [Somānanda] says:

2.37. *atha madhyamayā bāhyā bhāvā grāhyā hy avidyayā
tasyā eva hi saṃyogo buddhyā saṃkalpanātmanā*

Now, you might argue that, through nescience, *madhyamā* cognizes external entities,¹⁸² because it alone is connected to the intellect, which has a conceptual nature.

(Objection:) By dint of nescience, the speech called *madhyamā* cognizes the externally—the distinctly—appearing entities. It¹⁸³ alone is connected to the intellect, which has a conceptual nature, i.e., consists of the act of coming to know objects, because only it appears in the mind, the path of the out-going and in-coming breaths. *Paśyanti*, however, does not.¹⁸⁴

2.38

[Somānanda] says that this, too, is wrong:

2.38. *tatrāpi madhyamā kasya kāryam paśyantyavasthayā
sā janyā hetunā kena śabalām janayed asau*

(Reply:) Even then, of what is *madhyamā* the effect? (Grammarians:) It is produced by the condition of *paśyanti*. (Reply:) How could she produce the variegated [*madhyamā*]?¹⁸⁵

(Reply:) Even then, i.e., even when one accepts that *madhyamā* is connected to nescience, the former being established at the level of the intellect, which

¹⁸²Note that *hi* (ŚD 2.37b) is used merely as a verse-filler, and I have not rendered it in translation.

¹⁸³This refers to *madhyamā*, not to *avidyā*.

¹⁸⁴The argument here proposed is that *paśyanti* has no contact with nescience. Instead, an intermediate level of speech, *madhyamā*, has contact with it. This second level of speech, being associated with the mind, as well as the vital breaths, is taken in by the illusions of nescience, while, according to the present argument, *paśyanti* is not. (Chaturvedi understands the passage in a similar manner, for which see Chaturvedi 1986: 50–51.) Note that, according to Bhartṛhari, *madhyamā* is speech associated with the mind; it is speech that is not yet articulated, but that is already formulated mentally. Sequence exists in it, but in a subtle form, and *madhyamā* is associated with the vital breaths (*prāṇa*), but in a subtle form and at a stage that precedes articulation. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 66–67, 144 and 150. At the *madhyamā* level, speech is divided into the object denoted by speech (*vācya*) and the speech that denotes the object (*vācaka*). (See *ibid.*: 150.) Here, speech is “purely mental and is not audible to others. It is accompanied by the subtle function of breath (*prāṇa*) and so it appears to have sequence. Being one with the mind, which is sequence-less, it is also sequence-less, but appears to have sequence.” (See Iyer *ibid.*: 66–67.) Also: “In the second, *Madhyamā* stage, the word and meaning are differentiated from each other, but each one is still a unity.” (See *ibid.*: 67.) See also VPV† ad VP 1.159 for a description of *madhyamā*.

¹⁸⁵Literally, “by what cause [*hetu*] does she produce the variegated?” In the following passage (ŚD 2.39), Somānanda will reject the possibility that *paśyanti* could be either the efficient (*nimittakāraṇa*) or material (*samavāyikāraṇa*) cause of *madhyamā*.

appears as the duality of object and agent of knowledge,¹⁸⁶ *madhyamā* speech is, being an effect since it is ephemeral,¹⁸⁷ produced, i.e., accomplished, by the very condition of *paśyanti*. This is because no other cause exists, as per the rule stating “[speech], moreover, can be the effect of the previous speech alone.”¹⁸⁸

Moreover, this being so, how could she, being of a pure nature, produce *madhyamā*, which is variegated, i.e., besmeared by the multiple objects of cognition?

2.39

[Somānanda] says that its production is in no way appropriate:

2.39. *na hi tasyā nimittaṃ vā kāraṇaṃ samavāyī vā
nimittatve prthaktvaṃ syāt samavāye tadātmatā*

Indeed, she is neither its efficient nor its material cause. If she were the efficient cause, it would be distinct; if the material cause, then she would have the same nature as it.

The force of the word “she” (ŚD 2.38d) should be understood in the present verse.¹⁸⁹ She, i.e., *paśyanti*, is not simply the efficient, heterogeneous¹⁹⁰ cause of it,¹⁹¹ nor is she the material cause, neither by being of the same class as nor by being unseparated from it.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶Utpaladeva here describes *madhyamā* as located at the level of the intellect, which is described as “that which appears as the duality of object and agent of knowledge” (*vedyavedakadvaitāvabhāsin*). Bhartṛhari frequently describes *madhyamā* speech as the level at which speech is divided into denotative speech (*vācaka*) and the objected denoted by it (*vācya*). See Iyer [1969] 1992: 150. Somānanda, however, does not use these terms with any frequency, although Utpaladeva does, for which see, e.g., ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.2, 1.24–25, and 1.29cd–33. The terms are also frequently used in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ.

¹⁸⁷That is, it only appears when it is produced by its cause. Thus, since it exists occasionally (*kadācidbhāva*), it must be the effect of some cause.

¹⁸⁸The source of this quotation has yet to be traced.

¹⁸⁹In other words, one must understand *asau*, “she,” to be the logical subject of the sentence. The commentary here tells the reader to supply the word in question from the previous verse.

¹⁹⁰*Vijātiya* here suggests that *paśyanti* cannot be the efficient cause of *madhyamā*. The efficient cause is normally different in nature from the effect, as, for example, the wheel on which a pot is made is a cause that is different from the pot that is fashioned on it. (By contrast, the earth out of which the pot is fashioned, the material cause, is not heterogeneous, but is the same type of entity as the effect, the pot.)

¹⁹¹Kaul adds: “That which in the accomplishment of its effect has multiple accessory causes and is separate (from what it creates) is called the ‘efficient’ cause, a loom, for example, in the production of cloth” (*yaṭ kāryasiddhau bahūpakārakam asaṃbaddhaṃ ca, tan nimittākhyam kāraṇam yathā paṭotpattau vemādi*).

¹⁹²Kaul adds: “That which in the production of an effect is permanently connected (to it) is a material cause, for example the earth in the production of a pot, or milk (in the production) of curds” (*yaṭ kāryotpattau nityam eva saṃbaddhaṃ tat samavāyikāraṇam yathā ghaṭotpattau mṛttikā, dadhni vā kṣīram*). There are two possible types of material causes. The cause can either be of the same class of substance (*sajātiya*) as the effect, or it can be the very same substance (*avibhāga*) as the effect. An example of the former is milk that becomes curds. An example of the latter is thread that is woven into a cloth.

If she were simply the efficient cause, there would be dualism.¹⁹³ If, on the other hand, she were the material cause, in the same way that milk is the material cause of curds, the two¹⁹⁴ would acquire the state of not being different substances, since the forms of a material cause and its effect are of a kind.¹⁹⁵ The two would then be neither the same nor different, temporal disparities notwithstanding.¹⁹⁶

On the other hand, if she were the material cause, in the manner of the threads of a cloth, *paśyanti* and *madhyamā*, like the threads and the cloth, would have an identical nature, because they would not be manifested as distinct entities.¹⁹⁷

2.40–41ab

And thus, having stated the logical fault,¹⁹⁸ [Somānanda] says that even the state of seeing fails to be produced in either of the two:¹⁹⁹

2.40. *tathāpy avidyayā yogaḥ paśyanti ātmānam eva cet
andhamūkaṃ jagad bāhye sarvam eva bhaviṣyati*
2.41. *indriyāder manovṛtteḥ sarvasyā eva lopitā*

Even so,²⁰⁰ she is connected to nescience. If you argue that *paśyanti* sees herself and nothing else, (we reply:) the entire world would (consequently) become blind and dumb to external objects.²⁰¹ Absolutely all mental activity, which is initiated by the senses, would be destroyed.

¹⁹³In other words, there would be two distinct entities, the cause (*kāraṇa*), i.e., *paśyanti*, and the effect (*kārya*), i.e., *madhyamā*. Like the loom and the cloth it produces, the two would be utterly distinct if *paśyanti* were simply the efficient cause of *madhyamā*. See also Kaul's note 7, p. 61 of the KSTS edition: "because the cause and the effect are distinct" (*kāryakāraṇayoḥ prthaksthitatvāt*).

¹⁹⁴This refers to *paśyanti* and *madhyamā*, as is suggested by the fact that *upadānopadeya* is declined in the dual, the compound in question referring to the "material cause and (its) effect."

¹⁹⁵Literally, the two "have a single continuum as form." Utpaladeva here considers the possibility of *paśyanti* being a material cause that is of the same class of substance (*sajātīya*) as its effect, *madhyamā*.

¹⁹⁶In other words, the two would be of a kind, in the manner of milk and curds, regardless of the time elapsed in, e.g., the transformation from milk to curds, or, in the present context, the transformation of a unitary entity into an apparently diverse universe.

¹⁹⁷Utpaladeva here considers the possibility of *paśyanti* being a material cause that is the very same substance (*avibhāga*) as its effect, *madhyamā*.

¹⁹⁸That is to say, having shown that it is logically impossible for *paśyanti* to be either the efficient or material cause of *madhyamā*, he says the following.

¹⁹⁹Utpaladeva here suggests that the following shows that neither *paśyanti* nor *madhyamā* can be understood to have cognitive powers when either is under the influence of *avidyā*. This argument, like the preceding, constitutes a response to the grammarians' possible objection (found on ŚD 2.37) that nescience (*avidyā*) is contacted by *madhyamā* speech and not *paśyanti*.

²⁰⁰That is, even if *paśyanti* cannot logically be shown to be either the material or efficient cause of *madhyamā*, she is nevertheless connected to it. It is also possible that Somānanda here wishes to suggest that even if nescience is in contact with *madhyamā* alone, and not with *paśyanti* (as suggested in ŚD 2.37), this does not mean that *paśyanti* is not affected by nescience (*avidyā*), this because she must be a material cause of *madhyamā* if the grammarians are to avoid the fault of dualism, and, as explained in the commentary, this means that she relates to nescience in the same manner as does *madhyamā*.

²⁰¹Utpaladeva glosses *bāhya* with *bhinne* 'rthajāte, and I follow his gloss in my translation. See the commentary, below.

Because *paśyanti* is either the same (class of) substance as²⁰² or is identical with *madhyamā*, she, like *madhyamā*, suffers the fault of being connected to nescience, (which is a fault) because she loses her purity.²⁰³

Now, you might argue that *paśyanti* is absolutely pure: since she does not see objects as distinct entities but rather (sees them) in the form of her own self, she therefore does not suffer the fault of being connected to nescience.

(Reply:) Even if this were so, it would also be so for *madhyamā*, because of her identity with it.²⁰⁴ It²⁰⁵ being thus, the entire world would become blind to, i.e., incognizant of, the external, i.e., distinct, mass of objects, and would become dumb, as well, because there would be no acquired knowledge from utterances, etc.,²⁰⁶ since no one would be able to hear, if one were to subscribe to your view.

It is not now like this, however. Therefore, pressing hard on the fact that this is opposed by direct experience, [Somānanda] says: all mental activity, first set in motion by the organs of knowledge, the eye, etc.,²⁰⁷ supported (as well) by the eye, etc.,²⁰⁸ (and) focused on distinct objects,²⁰⁹ would be destroyed and useless, and direct experience would be contradicted.²¹⁰

2.41cd–42ab

Again considering something else, [Somānanda] says:

paśyanti kiṃ śarīre 'ntar bahiḥ sarvatra vā sthitā
2.42. antar avyāpitā tasyā bāhye kiṃ madhyamādīnā

²⁰²Compare the present expression (*ekayogakṣematva*) with Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD 2.39: *abhinnaḥyogakṣematā*. The meaning of the expression is that two entities share the same fate; they are linked: the term is etymologically associated with the practice of yoking cattle together (presumably to a single stake).

²⁰³She must serve as one of the two types of material causes, because, as indicated in the commentary to the previous passage, she cannot be the efficient cause of *madhyamā*, as this would lead to dualism; nor can she not be the cause, because of the rule that a level of speech is produced only by the speech preceding it. See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.38.

²⁰⁴For this reason, *madhyamā*, like *paśyanti*, would see objects as identical with the self, rather than seeing them as distinct entities.

²⁰⁵That is, *madhyamā* being, like *paśyanti*, incognizant of the variegated entities in the world, the following obtains.

²⁰⁶The term *vyutpatti* should be taken to stand in contrast to *pratibhā*, innate knowledge, instinct. It refers to acquired knowledge and is sometimes used to describe the process of learning to use language. It could also be taken to mean "education."

²⁰⁷The present passage offers an analysis of the compound *indriyādi* (ŚD 2.41a). Utpaladeva here indicates that it is an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound describing "mental activity" (*manovṛtti*), literally meaning "that which is first set in action by the organs of knowledge, the eye, etc."

²⁰⁸This is a reference to the organs of knowledge, the *jñānendriyas*.

²⁰⁹This is a free translation of *bhinnārthaviśayā*, which, being an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound, literally means "having distinct things as its objects."

²¹⁰If *madhyamā* speech, the level at which word and meaning are first differentiated and at which duality begins to form, were identical to *paśyanti*, then, as is the case at the level of *paśyanti*, these very distinctions would be dissolved, thereby destroying the world as one experiences it.

Does *paśyantī* exist internally within the body, or is she established externally everywhere? Internally, she is not all-pervasive; if externally, of what use is *madhyamā*, etc.?

Does *paśyantī* exist internally within the body, i.e., at the level of egoity,²¹¹ or is she also established externally and therefore everywhere?

If the former is proper, she is limited; if the latter, what is the use of distinguishing her from speech in the form of *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*, given that she pervades the *madhyamā* level, as well as that [level] which is made up of the external objects of knowledge?²¹²

2.42cd

prasaren nādabindvādisāpekṣā ced anīśvari

If you argue that she proceeds with the assistance of *nāda*, *bindu*, etc.,²¹³ (we reply:) she is not autonomous.

If you argue that *paśyantī*, operating with the assistance of *bindu* and *nāda* in the form of the out-going and in-going breaths, proceeds with creation and dissolution (of the universe), then we reply: even so, she would be neither all-pervasive nor even non-dual. This means that she is not autonomous.

²¹¹The expression here used (*ahantābhumi*) makes use of a technical term, *ahantā*, which in the Pratyabhijñā is contrasted with *idantā*. Once multiplicity begins to become apparent in the world, one begins to distinguish oneself from other entities. “I-ness” (*ahantā*) refers to that which one considers to be oneself, “that-ness” (*idantā*) to that which one considers external. Although Somānanda does not make regular use of these terms, Utpaladeva does, as does his grand-disciple, Abhinavagupta. See, e.g., ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.3, ĪPK 3.1.8, and ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 3.1.5. Cf., also, ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.2.1cd–2.2ab (and note 108), where Utpaladeva makes use of the term *idantā*.

²¹²*Idantāvedyamayi* here refers to *vaikhari*, which extends all the way to the point of appearing as distinct objects in the world. See ŚD 2.7–8ab.

²¹³The word “etcetera” (*ādī*) possibly refers to sound (*dhvani*). It is likely that Somānanda here is referring to a positively tantric interpretation of the VP: Bhartṛhari does not explicitly make this correlation between *nāda* and *bindu* on the one hand and the two breaths on the other, nor does he use these terms to explain the manifestation of sound. (George Cardona, personal communication, May 2004.) Bhartṛhari does suggest, however, that the manifestation of speech takes place because it is manifested by gross sound (*nāda*). See VP 1.100: “Just as a connection is accordingly accomplished between the perceiver and the thing perceived, it is exactly the same for *sphoṭa* and *nāda*, although they are that which manifests and that which is manifested” (*grahaṇagrāhyayoḥ siddhā yogyatā niyatā yathā / vyaṅgyavyayājakabhāve ’pi tathaiva sphoṭanādayoḥ*). Note that the connection is not permanent, the implication being that there is a specific restriction (*niyati*) between eye and color, etc., and so also between *sphoṭa* and *nāda*. See also VP 1.149–150: “Since coarse sound [*nāda*] is created sequentially, that nonsequential [speech] that is neither prior nor posterior is created as if it has parts, in a sequential form. Just as a reflection that appears elsewhere seems to move because of the activity of the water (in which it is reflected), so that is the condition of *nāda* and *sphoṭa*” (*nādasya kramajātatvān na pūrvo na paraś ca saḥ / akramah kramarūpeṇa bhedavān iva jāyate. prati-bimbanṁ yathānyatra sthitaṁ toyakriyāvāśāt / tatpravṛttim ivānveti sa dharmah sphoṭanādayoḥ*). Bhartṛhari mentions the term *bindu* only once in the *Vākyapadīya* (VP 2.158cd): *bindau ca samudāye ca vācakah salilādīṣu*. For the tantric use of the terms, *nāda* and *bindu*, see Padoux 1990^o: 86–124. Cf. Kāvīrja 1945–1946.

2.43–44ab

2.43. *pratidehaṃ pṛthak kiṃ sā sarvatraikyena vā sthitā
nānātvam tatpṛthaktvena tadaikyāt samaśabdatā*

2.44. *śariraiḥ pravibhāgaś cet tāny asatyāni te sthitiḥ*

Is she established separately in each body, or everywhere as one? She would be multiple as a result of being established separately; there would be unity of speech as a result of her being unitary. If you argue that the bodies divide her, (we reply:) your view²¹⁴ is that they are unreal.

Moreover, she, i.e., *paśyantī*, must exist separately in each body or as one and the same in every body.

If she exists separately, there would be many *paśyantīs*, and therefore there would be no non-duality.

When she is unitary, (then,) because every living being would be connected to the same *paśyantī*, a particular utterance, arising in the places of articulation that were struck by the breaths directed by the efforts of just one speaker,²¹⁵ would be uttered by absolutely everyone, even by those who are sitting silently. Otherwise, she would not be unitary, because, as a result of somewhere failing to produce the same effect, her nature would be divided.²¹⁶

Now, you might argue that, although she is unitary, she, like a crystal, is divided by the bodies.²¹⁷

We reply: not so. Your view stipulates that they²¹⁸ are unreal,²¹⁹ and, to put it plainly, something unreal, i.e., something that has no form,²²⁰ cannot be of service anywhere.

²¹⁴Kaul glosses the term in question, *sthitī*, with “the restriction of your *śāstra*” (*śāstraniyama*).

²¹⁵My translation of *ekatrāpi vaktari tatpūrvaka*^o is idiomatic. Literally, this means “(directed by the efforts) dependent on him, although in a single mouth.” The compound *X-pūrv(ka)* is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound that can come to mean “dependent on X”; in other words, it can be synonymous with *X-apekṣā*. Here it is used adjectivally in a descriptive (*karmadhāraya*) compound, describing the efforts in question. They are (articulatory) efforts “dependent on him” that, “although located in a single mouth,” are uttered by all. The translation here is meant to capture this meaning in idiomatic English.

²¹⁶If *paśyantī* were unitary, then anything uttered by one person would be uttered by everyone. If *paśyantī* produced sound in one place but not another, then as a result of producing different phenomena in different places, *paśyantī* would be divided as well. I have emended the text here, replacing the masculine, genitive pronoun, *tasya*, with a feminine, genitive pronoun (*tasyāḥ*) that refers to *paśyantī*. Otherwise, the sentence would suggest that the particular sound, and not *paśyantī*, would not be unitary as a result of not universally producing a single effect.

²¹⁷The argument here considered suggests that, just as the various objects that are placed near a crystal change or “divide” the appearance of the same, so too does *paśyantī* appear differently when different bodies come into close proximity with her. Kaul explains, “The meaning is: just as a crystal [*sphaṭīkaratna*], although unitary, appears differently by nature, because it takes on the colors of the various [entities], so also does *paśyantī*” (*yathā sphaṭīkaratnaṃ svarūpata ekam api tattadrāgoparāgeṇa bhedenāvabhāśate, tathā paśyantī apīty arthaḥ*). Note that Utpaladeva might refer here to VP 3.3.40–41.

²¹⁸This refers to the bodies.

²¹⁹Kaul refers the reader to VP 1.1cd to support this claim.

²²⁰The present expression, “that which has no form” (*akīñcidrūpa*), is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound.

2.44cd–45ab

*avibhāgetyādikena lakṣaṇena sulakṣitā*2.45. *paśyanti yadi varṇyeta lakṣaṇam tadvilakṣaṇam*

If you argue that *paśyanti* has been described properly with attributes such as “she is without distinction,”²²¹ (we reply:) the attribute (in question) is an attribute that is absent²²² from her.

Moreover, if you say *paśyanti* has been described properly—by avoiding definitions that are too narrow or too broad²²³—with attributes such as:

avibhāgā tu paśyanti sarvataḥ samḥṛtakramā (VP 1.167ab)

and *paśyanti* is nondistinct, (and) is in every way one whose sequence is contracted,²²⁴

then we reply: the attribute (in question), being absent from [*paśyanti*], is just too marvelous. This is a mockery, since an absent attribute is the attribute of an attribute insofar as it is absent.²²⁵

2.45cd

Regarding this, [Somānanda] says:²²⁶

avibhāgā katham sā syād yataḥ paśyanty asau smṛtā

How could she be nondistinct, since you consider her to be “seeing?”

Given that you consider *paśyanti* to be directed toward distinct objects of sight, how could she be nondistinct, since the consequence of this would be

²²¹ See VP 1.167ab, and ŚD 2.11ab, where Somānanda quotes this passage. See also ŚD 2.45cd and ŚD (and ŚDVṛ ad) 2.48cd–49.

²²² I take *vilakṣaṇa* in *tadvilakṣaṇa* to refer to an “absent attribute,” or, perhaps, to a “nonattribute.”

²²³ The Sanskrit reads *suṣṭhv avyāptiyavyāptiparihāreṇa lakṣitā*. This is a gloss of *sulakṣitā*, interpreting the prefix (*upasarga*) *su*, literally meaning “good, well,” to refer to the fact that the description is neither inadequate in extent (*avyāpti*) nor overly general (*atīvyāpti*). Note that Somānanda contrasts *sulakṣitā* (ŚD 2.44d) with *vilakṣaṇa* in ŚD 2.45b.

²²⁴ As noted above, this is a quotation of VP 1.167ab. The second half of the verse reads: *svarūpajyotiḥ evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyini*. Iyer translates this as follows: “It is the Inner Light, the subtle word, imperishable.” (See Iyer 1965: 126.)

²²⁵ I remain unsure of my translation of this passage, which reads: *yato vilakṣaṇam lakṣaṇasya yal lakṣaṇam tadvigamāt*. I think the idea is as follows. If an object is said to be, e.g., “not blue,” then “not blue” is not an attribute of the object in question. All that has been said of the object in question is what it is not. Instead, “not blue” describes “blue;” it tells us that the color is absent. As such, “not blue” conveys an attribute, i.e., absence, of the attribute in question, i.e., of blue, which does not really describe the object in question.

²²⁶ Somānanda here comments further on the grammarians’ description of *paśyanti*, in particular the one found in VP 1.167ab, concentrating on their description of her as a “nondistinct” entity (*avibhāgā*).

that she would not resemble the words you use to describe her, and vice versa.²²⁷

2.46–47ab

For instance:

2.46. *yāni paśyati kiṃ svākyarūpadikkālabhāgāśaḥ
atathā yadi paśyanti mithyā paśyantyudāhṛtā*

2.47. *yathārūpeṇa paśyanti nirvibhāgā katham bhavet*

Does she see those²²⁸ in a manner that accords with their respective forms and physical and temporal locations? If “seeing” is not thus, she would be erroneously called *paśyanti*.²²⁹ How (on the other hand) could *paśyanti* be nondistinct if she sees properly?²³⁰

One should supply “that she set out to see”: does she see those objects of sight that she set out to see in a manner that accords with their respective forms and physical and temporal locations? For this is appropriate.²³¹

If, however, “seeing” is not thus, i.e., if she is otherwise, then *paśyanti* is erroneous, i.e., exists in the form of an erroneous cognition; alternatively, what is meant is that *paśyanti* is erroneously called *paśyanti*.²³² However, she would then be undivided, because the distinct objects of sight would not exist.²³³

²²⁷The Sanskrit reads *yato lakṣyalakṣaṇapadayor anyonyavirahah*, and my translation is idiomatic. More literally, the passage means “there is [i.e., would be] a mutual distinction of the word for the attribute and the thing described thereby.” Given that the grammarians say that *paśyanti* sees distinct objects, she must register this diversity in herself (ŚD 2.46–47ab). As such, she must have within her, as it were, the distinctions that she sees. Therefore, she cannot be called “nondistinct.” To do so would be to destroy the concomitance of the word denoting an attribute and the entity possessing it: though *paśyanti* distinguishes between the various objects she sees, she would be described as the absence of such distinction (*avibhāgā*).

²²⁸That is, the objects of sight.

²²⁹Utpaladeva notes that the present expression has two possible meanings, the second being “that which you call *paśyanti* would be erroneous.” I here translate as I do because the concern at hand is the attributes that the grammarians attribute to *paśyanti*, a line of argumentation beginning with ŚD 2.44cd–45ab.

²³⁰I here translate *paśyanti* twice, once as a proper noun and once as a verbal form referring to the act of seeing.

²³¹That is, this is the only appropriate way for *paśyanti* to see the objects in question.

²³²Utpaladeva suggests that ŚD 2.46cd can be read in two ways. First, the passage may be understood to suggest that if *paśyanti* does not see worldly objects in their respective forms, etc., then she is erroneous, because she would not properly see the world. In the second interpretation—wherein *mithyā* is taken adverbially to describe *paśyantyudāhṛtā*—it is the act of calling *paśyanti* “seeing” that is erroneous. Here, as elsewhere, Utpaladeva gives significant weight to the etymological meaning of the term *paśyanti*, as does Somānanda. See also, e.g., ŚD 2.20cd–22ab.

²³³The present expression involves a sort of backhanded concession, for while admitting that *paśyanti* would be undivided (*avibhaktā*) if she were not to see the objects of sight in their respective forms, etc., Utpaladeva indicates that she would be thus only at the cost of sacrificing her nature as seeing: the distinct objects of sight (*bhinnadrīśyavastu*) would not exist in this instance. This line of argumentation constitutes a critique of the grammarians description in VP 1.167 of *paśyanti* as *avibhāgā*, which Utpaladeva quoted in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.44cd–45ab.

On the other hand, in accordance with her nature as “seeing,” *paśyanti*, which conforms to the distinct objects of sight, sees properly, i.e., either in a manner that accords with the forms (in which they appear)²³⁴ or in a manner that does not transgress her nature.²³⁵ As [Somānanda] has said, “how could she be nondistinct?”²³⁶

The derivative *svākya* simply stands for *svaka*, “their own.”

2.47cd–48ab

bhaviṣyantam vartamānam katham paśyanty anāgatam
2.48. *anyadigdeśagenānyadigdeśe saty adarśanam*

How can *paśyanti* see a future entity that has not yet come into existence as an entity that is present? Something in one physical and temporal²³⁷ location cannot see that which exists in another place and at another moment in time.²³⁸

First of all, any agent of cognition, being one who experiences objects that are suitably proximate both physically and temporally, has an experience in

²³⁴The present expression, *yathāsthithena rūpeṇa*, glosses *yathārūpeṇa* (ŚD 2.47a), translated adverbially in the verse with “properly.” The idea here is that *paśyanti* sees the objects of sight (the *dr̥ṣyavastus*) in accordance with their forms. In other words, *yathārūpa* is here understood by Utpaladeva to describe the conformity of *paśyanti*’s seeing to the objects of sight. A second interpretation, one that suggests the adverbial construction in question points to a conformity of *paśyanti*’s seeing to her own nature (as “seeing”), is offered immediately following this one. Note that the verb to see is implied by the literal meaning of *paśyanti*: “the seeing one.”

²³⁵Insofar as she is “seeing,” it does not transgress her nature (*svarūpānatikrama*) to conform to the appearance of the distinct objects of sight. Here, we are given a second interpretation of *yathārūpa* (ŚD 2.47a), which, in the present interpretation, refers to the form of *paśyanti*, as opposed to the form of the objects seen, as was the case in the preceding interpretation (for which see, supra, note 234).

²³⁶In other words, it is asked how *paśyanti* can be described as “nondistinct” when she sees a diversity of objects. Her very name implies that she sees this diversity of objects, moreover, as *paśyanti* is a present, active participle, meaning “seeing,” which of course suggests not only the presence of a subject-object dichotomy, but also the presence of multiple objects of sight.

²³⁷The text here literally reads “space and place.” See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.73cd–74ab for a gloss of the terms in question.

²³⁸Somānanda here is making an argument about the time at which *paśyanti* performs the act of seeing. Insofar as the term *paśyanti* is a present participle, it connotes an act of seeing occurring in a present moment of time and in a fixed location. Yet *paśyanti* must, according to the grammarians, be all-seeing. How, then, it is asked, can she see entities that appear to be spatially and temporally distinct? As the commentary suggests, there are two ways of breaking the *sandhi* in ŚD 2.48ab. The first possibility is that *anyadigdeśagena* should be read as one word, declined in the instrumental, and *saty adarśanam* should be read as two words. The second possibility is that *anyadigdeśage* (ŚD 2.48a) is a word declined in the locative, followed by the negative particle, *na*, and *satyadarśanam* (ŚD 2.48b) is a compound. See the commentary and notes, following.

himself.²³⁹ Regarding this, how could “seeing” see a future object—that which has not come to her,²⁴⁰ i.e., that which she simply has not (yet) reached—as an entity that is present, i.e., in the state of being present, which is to ask how she can be correct seeing.²⁴¹

So, when something is located in one fixed physical space, that which is located in another fixed physical space cannot be seen properly, which means that *paśyanti* is not correct seeing.²⁴² Also: a cognition in one physical and temporal location cannot see the object being cognized when it exists in another place and at another moment of time.²⁴³

And thus, how could *paśyanti*, seeing what is present, i.e., only what is suitably proximate physically, see a future entity that has not come (to her), i.e., that she has not (yet) reached, and is located in another place?²⁴⁴ And you hold that she is omniscient!²⁴⁵

Here, place and time are mutually designatory.²⁴⁶

2.48cd–49

atha sādharmaṇam jñānam tādrk kiñcana paśyati
 2.49. *tathāpi tad vibhedena bhedaṭā tad abhedataḥ*
na kiñcana gṛhitam syāt tathānyā samḥrtakramā

²³⁹The meaning of the present expression remains somewhat obscure to me, but apparently the idea is that the individual experiences entities by being present in his own person.

²⁴⁰Note that I take *tadanāgatam* to be a compound. It is also possible that the present term is not a compound, in which case one would translate “that which has not yet come into existence,” which glosses (on this reading in an unilluminating manner) *anāgata* in ŚD 2.47d.

²⁴¹Kaul glosses: “The meaning is that seeing as present an entity that she has not yet reached is an error” (*aprāptasya vartamānatve darśanam bhrāntir ity arthaḥ*).

²⁴²Utpaladeva here interprets ŚD 2.48ab to read: *anyadigdeśage nānyadigdeśe satyadarśanam*.

²⁴³Utpaladeva here interprets ŚD 2.48ab to read: *anyadigdeśagenānyadigdeśe saty adarśanam*.

²⁴⁴Note that the verb to see is implied in the etymological meaning of *paśyanti*.

²⁴⁵The point of this verse is to suggest that the spatial and temporal limitations implied by the term *paśyanti* challenge the grammarians’ notion that she is supreme: insofar as the term *paśyanti* suggests an act of seeing, it requires the presence of a distinct agent and a distinct object of seeing. Both must be spatially and temporally located. As such, *paśyanti* must be located in a particular place and time. Any entity thus situated cannot be supreme: she would not be able to see spatially or temporally distant objects.

²⁴⁶In other words, whenever Somānanda refers to time, he refers to space as well, and vice versa. Thus, when he says *digdeśa*, which literally means “direction and place,” he should be taken to refer to both space and time. Note that Utpaladeva glossed *anyadigdeśaga*, above, with *anyadigdeśakālagata*, thereby suggesting that *deśa*, “place,” should be understood to refer to *kāla*, “time.”

Now, you might argue that she sees such a one²⁴⁷ that is a generic, indefinite²⁴⁸ cognition. Even so, it²⁴⁹ would be distinct, because they are distinct. If she were undifferentiated,²⁵⁰ nothing whatsoever would be cognized. And (you say) she is also something else, she is *saṃhṛtakramā*.²⁵¹

(Objection:) There exist absolutely distinct cognitions that grasp the spatially and temporally distinct objects.²⁵² She, i.e., *paśyanti*, sees in them such a one that is single, generic,²⁵³ which is able to pervade all of those cognitions;²⁵⁴ it is indefinite, i.e., indeterminate; it is what remains of the determinate cognitions

²⁴⁷Both Kaul and Caturvedi understand the present passage to explain the manner by which *paśyanti* sees future entities. The argument here presented is that she sees the generic properties of the cognitions in question, she sees a cognition that sees the particular cognitions. As such *tādṛk* here refers to the future objects of cognition mentioned in ŚD 2.47cd–48ab. See Caturvedi 1986: 57. Kaul explains (KSTS edition, p. 68) as follows: “[Somānanda] here says that it is with the following concern in mind that he says what is said in ŚD 2.48cd–49: (Grammarians:) it is indeed a cognition of a particular entity which here represents future entities, etc.; but *paśyanti* has a generic form, nor is a representation of a future entity, etc., possible in her [tatra]. Thus, since she is not divided by time, we do not speak of the insane idea that she truly sees an entity of an unknown and different place” (*atrāha viśeṣajñānam hidam yad atra bhaviṣyadādīkālavyapadeśaḥ, paśyanti tu sāmānyarūpā, na tatra bhaviṣyadādīvyapadeśo 'pi sambhvatity akālakalitavān na satyadarśanam ajñātaparāśayasyonmattabhāṣaṇam ity āśankyāha atha sādharmaṇam iti.*).

²⁴⁸Note that Gnoli translates *kiñcana* with “indeterminata.” See Gnoli 1959: 70. I reserve this term for *aniyata*, with which Utpaladeva glosses *kiñcana*, below.

²⁴⁹The pronoun here refers to the generic cognition.

²⁵⁰Somānanda here considers the possibility that the generic (*sādharmaṇa*) cognition is not differentiated from other cognitions. To my knowledge, Bhartṛhari does not conceive of cognition in the manner presented here. He does, however, make a distinction between particular objects, in which the particular qualities (*guṇas*), such as color, reside, and the general class (*jāti*) to which they belong. What Somānanda here proposes is akin to suggesting that, rather than seeing the particular objects, *paśyanti* sees this general class of objects (*jāti*). For example, rather than seeing a particular cow that appears in a particular moment in time, *paśyanti* (which after all is, grammatically speaking, a present participle meaning “seeing”) sees the “cowness” of the cow, which is the same in every cow. (For the concept of *jāti* in the VP see Iyer [1969] 1992: 78 and 101–102.)

²⁵¹Having considered the problems arising from the description of *paśyanti* as “nondistinct” (*avibhāgā*), Somānanda here suggests that problems arise from her being labeled *saṃhṛtakramā*. This is a continuation of Somānanda’s critique of Bhartṛhari’s description of *paśyanti* in VP 1.167ab: *avibhāgā tu paśyanti sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā*. See ŚD 2.44cd–45ab, and following.

²⁵²Following Harunaga Isaacson’s suggestion, I punctuate before rather than following *sā paśyanti*.

²⁵³The adjective in question, *sādharmaṇa*, is contrasted with *asādharmaṇa*, below, and points to the general, universal nature of the cognition in question.

²⁵⁴The compound in question, *sarvatajjñānaprapaṇcanavyāpanakṣama* can be translated more literally with “which is capable of pervading the proliferation of all of those cognitions.” The idea is that it is here proposed that *paśyanti* might not cognize the particular objects directly; she does not see the aforementioned, temporally and spatially distinct cognitions directly, but rather cognizes a general cognition the content of which is the class (*jāti*) of the object cognized, rather than the particular object in itself.

it perceives, blue, yellow, etc.²⁵⁵ She sees that,²⁵⁶ which means *paśyanti* sees everything.

(Reply:) Even so, since the specific, determinate cognitions of blue, etc., are distinct, it²⁵⁷ would also be distinct, that is, be differentiated and not uniform, because it would not be separated from them.²⁵⁸ Accordingly, if this were so,²⁵⁹ nothing whatsoever, future entities, etc.,²⁶⁰ would be cognized, this because *paśyanti*, not being separated from the cognition of a future object, would cognize it²⁶¹ at that very moment.²⁶²

Alternatively, like the cognition of blue, yellow and so on, *paśyanti* herself would be differentiated, because she, too, would be made variegated by the temporally distinct objects,²⁶³ blue, etc.

Now, you might argue that she is not variegated by future entities, etc., but rather knows absolutely no division, as she has pure consciousness as her form. (We reply:) Hence, because she is undifferentiated, she perceives nothing

²⁵⁵ It is also possible that *paridrśyamānanilapitādīniyatajñānottara* means “higher than the determinate cognitions it perceives, blue, yellow, etc.”

²⁵⁶ That is to say that she sees the generic cognition. It is also possible that the neuter pronoun *tat* is nominative and not accusative, in which case *tat paśyati sarvaṃ paśyantīty arthaḥ* would mean “it [i.e., the generic cognition] sees everything [=all of the determinate cognitions], which means *paśyanti* sees everything.”

²⁵⁷ That is, this refers to the generic cognition, the *sādhāraṇa* cognition.

²⁵⁸ That is, it is not separated from the specific cognitions. Utpaladeva here suggests that, even when cognizing the generic cognition rather than the specific cognitions of future entities and the like, *paśyanti* nevertheless sees the specific qualities of the particular cognitions in question, this because she sees the general form of them in the generic cognition in question. As such, the generic (*sādhāraṇa*) cognition is not uniform, but rather is varied in the same manner as the various determinate cognitions are varied. To offer an example: while a cognition of the generic (*sādhāraṇa*) form of the color “blue,” i.e., of the class (*jāti*) “blueness,” allows one not to see the particulars of a specific (*asādhāraṇa*), determinate (*niyata*) cognition of, say, a blue pot, cognition of the class “blueness” nevertheless may be differentiated from that of, say, “yellowness.” The same, moreover, can be said of the lack of temporal distinction in the generic cognition.

²⁵⁹ This refers to the possibility that the generic (*sādhāraṇa*) cognition is indeterminate (*anīyata*).

²⁶⁰ See also ŚD 2.47cd–48ab.

²⁶¹ The present passage refers to the future object mentioned in the compound *anāgatārthajñānāvibhinna*. It is possible that one should read *tat* for *tam* and take the accusative pronoun to refer to the generic cognition (*sādhāraṇajñāna*). See also Kaul’s note 8, p. 68 of the KSTS edition: *tadabhedata ity arthabhāgaṃ vivṛṇoti tathā ceti. ayaṃ bhāvāḥ. viśiṣṭajñānodaye ’pi yaḍi sā sādhāraṇī tarhi tadabhedato viśiṣṭajñānodaye ’py atītānāgatādiviśeṣābhāvāt, tataś ca nānāgatāvekṣaṇam iti kim atra drśyaṃ nāmeti.*

²⁶² This refers to a present moment of time, because *paśyanti* is, grammatically, a present participle referring to the act of seeing. This is an oft-noted problem with the way in which the grammarians describe her, a line of argumentation begun in earnest in ŚD 2.44cd–45ab, and also in ŚD 2.20ab and 2.20cd–21ab. Here, the problem is articulated as follows: If the grammarians are right that *paśyanti* sees only a generic cognition, one that is indeterminate (*anīyata*), unclear as to its differences with other cognitions of, say, other colors, or entities existing in other moments of time, then what it sees is spatially and temporally indistinct. As a result, *paśyanti* would not see anything at all, because she would not distinguish future objects from present ones, etc. Without the mutual distinction of the objects of sight, nothing can be seen.

²⁶³ Literally, °*bhaviṣyadvartamānārtha*° means “the future and present objects.”

whatsoever, in the form of blue, or otherwise. Hence,²⁶⁴ how could she be “seeing?”

And they maintain that *paśyanti* is identified by another attribute: she is *saṃhṛtakramā*.

2.50–51

2.50. *saṃhṛtaḥ krama ity asyāṃ saṃhartā jāyate paraḥ
yayā kramah saṃhṛto vā kim ātmany aparatra vā*

2.51. *ātmanah sakramatvaṃ syād anyatrāparasamgamah
kiṃ pūrvam sakramābhūt sā rūpadvitvam prasajyate*

If *saṃhṛtakramā* means “in whom sequence is concluded,” another who stops it is produced. Alternatively, she is the one by whom sequence is concluded. How? Within herself or elsewhere? (If the former:) She herself would have sequence; when elsewhere, she would be connected with something else. (Objection:) Couldn’t she have sequence at an earlier time? (Reply:) That produces the unwanted consequence of having two forms.

The word *iti* (ŚD 2.50a) should be construed as out of sequence, in this way: “*saṃhṛtaḥ kramo ’syām iti*.”²⁶⁵ Thus, if *saṃhṛtakramā* is an exocentric [*bahuvrihi*] compound with a locative meaning that refers to *paśyanti*—she is the one in whom sequence is contracted—then you will have to rely in this case on another object that stops it.²⁶⁶ This contradicts your own view.

Alternatively, *saṃhṛtakramā* is an exocentric compound with an instrumental meaning—it is by *paśyanti* that sequence is concluded—but in this way, since a locus is needed, there is the alternative that it is concluded either within herself or elsewhere, and when the grammatical construction is: the conclusion of sequence occurs in she herself, she²⁶⁷ herself would have sequence. Now, if you (instead) argue that it occurs elsewhere, (we reply:) she is (thus) connected to a second thing, and that results in the fault of dualism.

Now, you might argue that, because she is sequential at an earlier time, sequence is subsequently concluded, i.e., suppressed, within herself alone, and it is not concluded elsewhere since that would lead to the fault of dualism. (Reply:) Even so, this would occasion the fault of her having two forms, a sequential one and a nonsequential one.

²⁶⁴Kaul glosses: “this means: because there is no action” (*karmābhāvād ity arthaḥ*).

²⁶⁵In other words, Utpaladeva here explains that Somānanda has placed the word *iti* out of the normal word order in the verse, for metrical reasons, and it should be read following *asyām*, even if it appears before it in the verse.

²⁶⁶That is, there must be another who causes the contraction of sequence within *paśyanti*. The possibility that she herself contracts the sequence is considered, below.

²⁶⁷Note that the pronoun in question is not feminine in gender because it refers to the neuter word *ātman*.

2.52

[Somānanda] suspects his opponent will judge that when he said,

How could she be nondistinct, since you consider her to be “seeing?”²⁶⁸

he refuted her nondistinct nature (only) on the basis of the fact that, simply because she sees, she requires an instrument for the act of seeing.²⁶⁹

2.52. *athātmanā sā svātmānaṃ paśyanti nirvibhāgaśaḥ
bhāge karaṇarūpatvāt pāratantryaṃ jaḍātmatā*

Now, you might argue that, seeing herself by means of herself, she is free of every distinction. (Reply:) Because she exists as the instrument in one part, she is dependent on another, (and) has an insentient nature.

(Objection:) Seeing nothing but herself and by means of herself alone, she exists free of every distinction, i.e., free of any distinct, entirely separate part,²⁷⁰ which means she exists as nothing but the powers of object, instrument, etc.²⁷¹

(Reply:) Even under those circumstances, because she exists in the form of the instrument, etc., in one, that is, a second, part the nature of which is the power of the *kāraṅkas*, she herself is dependent on another, and she acquires an insentient nature, because only that which has consciousness as its form possesses an independent nature. This should be examined in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.²⁷²

2.53–54

The opponent says:

2.53. *ātmānam ātmanā hanti devadatto yathā tathā
bhaviṣyaty atra tatrāśya svāṅgair eva vibhāgitā
2.54. hastādeḥ karaṇatvaṃ hi mastakādeś ca karmatā
kartā manaḥsvāvayavi nāmūrtāyā idaṃ punaḥ*

²⁶⁸The present passage is a quotation of ŚD 2.45cd.

²⁶⁹In other words, Somānanda now considers the possible objection that *paśyanti* is herself the instrument for the act of seeing.

²⁷⁰The present phrase, *viśiṣṭād atyantapṛthagbhūtād bhāgān niṣkrāntā*, seems to offer a sort of etymological gloss of *nirvibhāgaśaḥ*, glossing the prefix (*upasarga*) *vi* with *viśiṣṭa* (= *atyantapṛthagbhūta*) and echoing the prefix *ni* with *niṣkrāntā*.

²⁷¹In other words, Somānanda’s opponent might suggest that *paśyanti* is nothing other than the very agent of seeing, and she sees nothing but herself, without any instrument external to herself. In other words, she merely embodies the power of the various *kāraṅkas* necessary for the act of seeing.

²⁷²Entities that are employed by other entities are not considered to be independent. Thus, an instrument of action (*karaṇa*), used by the agent, is dependent on the will of that agent. Therefore, when *paśyanti* is the instrument, she, or at the least a part of her, is not independent. Utpaladeva discusses the independent nature of consciousness in ĪPK 1.5, especially 1.5.13. Cf. ŚD 2.57, as well as the Introduction (section 13), for a discussion of the difference between the point of view rejected here and that of the *Pratyabhijñā*.

Just as Devadatta kills himself by means of himself, so it is here. (Reply:) Under those circumstances, he is divided by his own limbs, for the hand, etc., is the instrument of the action, and the head, etc., is the object of the action. The agent is the “self” who has these limbs and (is connected with) the mind. This, however, is not the case for her, who is immaterial.

(Objection:) “Just as the division between object, etc., exists in Devadatta himself, so it is here.”²⁷³

(Reply:) This is not so. Devadatta has an extended form because he is material;²⁷⁴ he is divided into parts by his own various limbs, i.e., by those things referred to by the word “self” that you used (in the verse).²⁷⁵

Accordingly, the hand, or another limb, furnished with a sword or the like, is the instrument of the action. The head, or the heart, etc., being injured, is the object of the action. The agent is *sva*,²⁷⁶ i.e., the self, connected with the mind. Being connected to the hand, etc., it is he whom you mention as one who has limbs, simply because this is all that it means to be a “self.”

By contrast, you speak of *paśyantī* as being immaterial, as the form of pure consciousness, and, since she is (therefore) not an extended entity, (you say) she does not depend on limbs to act. Hence, she herself must be (partially) insentient, because one part of she herself would be the instrument of action and so on.²⁷⁷

2.55

2.55. *paśyanty adṛṣṭam ātmānam dr̥ṣṭam vādr̥ṣṭatā katham
paśyantyā darśanam dr̥ṣṭe na ca vā hy upapadyate*

***Paśyantī* sees herself as something that has not been seen or as something that has been seen. How could *paśyantī* be that which has not been seen?**

²⁷³That is to say, as in Devadatta, in *paśyantī* too there is a division into object, agent, etc.

²⁷⁴That is to say that, unlike *paśyantī*, a human being is *mūrta*, i.e., has a material form with distinctive parts. *Paśyantī*, if she were supreme and one, could not have such a form. See the Introduction, section 7.

²⁷⁵In saying “Devadatta kills himself [*ātmānam*] by means of himself [*ātmanā*],” the word “himself” (*ātman*) refers not to a single entity but rather to a materially formed, extended entity that has distinct parts. The word *ātman* does not refer to a single entity of the kind that *paśyantī* would have to be if she were supreme.

²⁷⁶Utpaladeva here suggests that *sva* (ŚD 2.54c) means *ātman*, “the self.”

²⁷⁷In the grammarians’ view, like Śiva in the Pratyabhijñā, *paśyantī* is said to be pure consciousness. As such, she is not an extended entity, unlike Devadatta’s material body. Therefore, the grammarains cannot claim that a distinct part of her is the instrument of seeing, etc., unless they admit that a part of her is insentient, or in other words employed by the fully conscious part of *paśyantī*.

And, on the other hand, seeing is certainly not appropriate for that which has been seen.²⁷⁸

Moreover, does *paśyanti* see herself as something that has not been seen previously or as something that has been seen? Neither of the two is suitable since *paśyanti*, which has *prakāśa* as her form, is never not seen, that is, is never not shining forth; and if she herself has been seen, it makes no sense for her to proceed again to the act of seeing.²⁷⁹

Moreover, it is not the case that the nature of *paśyanti* is different at every moment, on which account there would be a use to her (repeatedly) performing the act of seeing (herself) every single moment; nor is her nature limited by space and time.²⁸⁰

2.56

2.56. *paśyantam sā kim ātmānam paśyanti jaḍam eva vā
jaḍe jaḍatvam evāśyāḥ paśyato hy anavasthatā*

²⁷⁸Gnoli translates the second *vikalpa* as follows: “Né d’altronde é ammissibile che la Veggente ripeta l’azione di vedere a proposito di una cosa che é già stata vista.” (See Gnoli 1959: 71. Chaturvedi translates in a similar manner. Cf. Chaturvedi 1986: 60.) Here, Somānanda criticizes the grammarians’ view by noting the problems related to *paśyanti* being the object (*karma*) of the act of seeing. In ŚD 2.56, Somānanda will consider the problem of *paśyanti* being the agent (*kartr*) of the act of seeing. If *paśyanti* is the object of cognition, then she must see herself either as something she has experienced previously or not. If the former, then there is no purpose to seeing herself a second time. If the latter, then *paśyanti*’s status as the light of consciousness would be compromised.

The KSTS edition reads *paśyanty adṛṣtam ātmānam dṛṣtam vā dṛṣtatā katham*. By contrast, I suggest that 2.56b reads *dṛṣtam vādṛṣtatā katham*, allowing one to read the negative prefix (*a-*) with *dṛṣtatā*, viz., *adṛṣtatā*. Otherwise, Somānanda would have twice presented the possibility that *paśyanti* sees herself as a seen entity. Note also that, following Utpaladeva’s commentary, I punctuate after *paśyantyā* in 2.55c and understand it to be declined in the genitive singular, the form being *paśyantyāḥ* prior to the application of the rules of euphonic combination (*sandhi*). I do not understand the word to be declined in the instrumental case, requiring it to be construed with what follows, although this is also possible, and Somānanda might have intended both interpretations. Finally, one should also note that the argument put forward here is similar to the one found in ŚD 2.25cd–26ab, excepting that here the fact that the object in question is *paśyanti* herself is considered. In ŚD 2.25cd–26ab, the argument focused on the creation of the objects, while the question here emphasizes the perception of *paśyanti* in the form of the very objects she sees. Put differently, ŚD 2.25cd–26ab focuses on the identification of *paśyanti* and the means that produces the perception in question, while the present focuses on *paśyanti* as the object of perception.

²⁷⁹According to Kaul, this is because it would lead to an infinite regress, but this does not seem to be what Somānanda intends to say. Rather, the point is that there is little use in seeing something that is already seen. Perhaps Somānanda and Utpaladeva have in mind the (Mīmāṃsaka) definition of a *pramāṇa*, which suggests that a valid means of cognition must reveal something that had not been apprehended previously: *anadhigatārthagantṛ pramāṇam*. See, also, Kaul’s note 4, p. 72 of the KSTS edition: *anavasthā hi tathā syāt*.

²⁸⁰The argument seems to be that, insofar as she is omniscient and omnipresent, a *paśyanti* who has seen herself previously—and there would be nothing else to see—would experience the world in such a manner as never to experience something new. It is, one surmises, for this reason that it is not appropriate for *paśyanti* to see herself as something that has already been seen.

Does *paśyanti* see herself as seeing or as simply insentient? If insentient, then she simply has an insentient nature. (If seeing:) Indeed, there is an infinite regress of ones who see.²⁸¹

Moreover, does she see herself, given that she exists in the form of *prakāśa* and has seeing as her nature, as seeing or as insentient, that is, as not being in the form of *prakāśa*?

If it²⁸² is insentient, she would be insentient as well,²⁸³ but, since her nature is *prakāśa*, the self (she sees) also sees, and it does not see something different, but only (sees) itself. Hence, it also shares in the alternative above,²⁸⁴ which leads to a state of infinite regress, because no condition exists that is a repose from seeing.

2.57

*2.57. kiñcit paśyati vā sūkṣmaṃ tad asmaddarśanānvayaḥ
karmatve pāratantryaṃ syāt tasyā eva nijātmani*

Alternatively, she sees some subtle entity, in which case you adopt our point of view; if she is the object, it is she who would be dependent on her own self as another.

Alternatively, you might argue that she does not see a different,²⁸⁵ coarse object of sight that has a distinct nature, be it blue, yellow, or otherwise, but she instead sees arising as the object of sight some subtle, that is, inconceivable, entity that does not have an autonomous form, i.e., one that does not enter into the seer;²⁸⁶ and she (therefore) does not see—she does not appear as the very form of the agent of seeing—who is made up of the objects of sight,²⁸⁷ i.e., (she does not appear as) what one may call “seeing.”

²⁸¹ Here, Somānanda criticizes the grammarians’ view by noting the problems related to *paśyanti* being the agent (*kartr*) of the act of seeing. In ŚD 2.55, Somānanda considered the problem of *paśyanti* being the object (*karma*) of the act of seeing.

²⁸² The pronoun in question refers to the self (*ātman*) that *paśyanti* sees; for this reason, it is a masculine and not a feminine pronoun (here declined in the locative case).

²⁸³ If *paśyanti* sees herself as an insentient self, then she is by definition insentient.

²⁸⁴ That is to say that when *paśyanti* sees herself she sees herself as “seeing.” This object of cognition, being itself a conscious, seeing agent that sees itself, must either see itself to be sentient or insentient, and so on, ad infinitum.

²⁸⁵ Following Harunaga Isaacson’s suggestion, I read *yadi vā bhavadbhir nānyan nilāpitādi* for *yadi vā bhavadbhir nānyanilāpitādi*. Two manuscripts (G and J) witness this reading.

²⁸⁶ In other words, it is not the case that the object comes to the seer from a distinct, separate place; rather, it is, in this view, inherent in the nature of the seer’s consciousness, just as the contents of a yogi’s vision are inherent in his consciousness.

²⁸⁷ In other words, it is not the case that *paśyanti* sees herself by virtue of being the agent, object, instrument, etc., of seeing, but rather she sees a subtle entity in a manner similar to a yogi “seeing” his own consciousness. (This is the manner in which the Pratyabhijñā describes consciousness, for which see ŚD 1.44–45ab and ĪPK 1.5.7; cf. the Introduction, sections 13 and 14.) This is to say that she does not see in the manner considered on ŚD 2.53–54.

(Reply:) For that reason, you must accept our point of view. You (therefore) must abandon the meaning of (the word) *paśyanti*, which refers to the division of action, agent, object, and time.²⁸⁸

However, if you (instead) accept that she is truly the object of sight, the substratum being she herself in the form of a subtle agent of seeing, (then) the same, unitary self that would be independent (on that view), this because it would be the agent who sees, would be dependent insofar as it would (also) be the object of seeing. This is contradictory.²⁸⁹

2.58–59

- 2.58. *sphoṭa eva hi paśyanti tadanyā vā dvayaṃ bhavet
tadanyatve tadaikyē vā tad aṅgulyagrārūpayā*
2.59. *vākyaḡatyaṭra satyatvaṃ labhyaṭe na viśeṣatā
āptānāptavicāro vā sarvathaiva nivartate*

Paśyanti is either the same as *sphoṭa* or is different from it.²⁹⁰ If she is different from it, that would produce dualism. On the other hand, if she is the same as it, then truthfulness would be obtained here by understanding a sentence in the form “(one hundred herds of elephants reside) on the tip of my finger”:²⁹¹ there would be no distinction (of true from false

²⁸⁸The point is that *paśyanti*, “seeing,” suggests an agent, object and moment of seeing, etc.

²⁸⁹This is so because it would be both dependent and independent. Utpaladeva here argues that the grammarians cannot simply posit that *paśyanti*, “seeing,” sees herself in a manner analogous to the mundane act of seeing: *paśyanti* cannot simply see herself in the same manner as, for example, one is able to see one’s own arm. (This problem was similarly addressed in ŚD 2.53–54.) Moreover, while the grammarians could take the position of the Pratyabhijñā—namely, that all cognition is analogous to the visions of a yogi—they nevertheless would have to explain the meaning of the word “seeing.” See also ŚD 2.81.

²⁹⁰In the present (ŚD 2.58–59) and subsequent (ŚD 2.60–61ab) passages, Somānanda examines the relationship between *paśyanti* and *sphoṭa*. The latter term refers to the denotative power of speech. The grammarians distinguish the meaning of speech from the sounds (the *dhvanis*) that convey that meaning. The former is *sphoṭa*, often referred to variously as the word-*sphoṭa* (*padasphoṭa*), the sentence-*sphoṭa* (*vākya-sphoṭa*), etc. The idea is this, namely, that words and sentences are composed of a number of sounds—words often are composed of multiple syllables, and sentences are often composed of a number of words. Yet, the meaning the given word or sentence conveys is singular. If I say “I am hungry,” for example, a number of sounds, and words, are required to convey a single, unitary idea, the fact of being hungry. The term *sphoṭa* refers to this meaning, conveyed by the sounds comprising the sentence. In the present passage, Somānanda queries the relationship of *sphoṭa* to *paśyanti*: are they identical, or are they distinguishable? The former creates the problem of all propositions being true by virtue of the identity of any expressed *sphoṭa* with *paśyanti*, which must be real. The latter precipitates dualism. In ŚD 2.60–61ab, Somānanda will ask how the real *sphoṭa* could be made perceptible by the ultimately unreal sounds, a position that is held by various thinkers from the time of Bhartṛhari. These arguments, in sum, again call into question the nature of the universe as conceived by the grammarians, this time by pointing to the ontological problems associated with the grammarians’ language philosophy. Note that the emphatic particle *hi* (ŚD 2.58a) here serves as a verse-filler (*pādapūraṇa*).

²⁹¹In other words, by saying “one hundred herds of elephants reside on the tip of my finger” (*aṅgulya- gre hastiyūthaśatam āste*), the statement would refer to something real, as much as any true statement would refer to something real. This would be the case because, if one does not distinguish between *sphoṭa* and *paśyanti*, there would be no distinction between denotative speech and the reality that *paśyanti* sees.

statements). Even the deliberation on (whether something is conveyed by) reliable or unreliable persons would come to a complete halt.

If you accept both *sphoṭa* and *paśyanti* as eternal, then *paśyanti* must either be the same as *sphoṭa*, the difference being merely one of semantics, or (she must be) different from it.²⁹²

Of these choices, there would be dualism if (you accept) the alternative that she is different.²⁹³

On the other hand, if you accept that they are the same, then that [truthfulness] which is associated with *paśyanti*, i.e., the state of being one who sees real objects, would be obtained here, i.e., in the world, by understanding the sentence *sphoṭa* of “one hundred herds of elephants reside on the tip of my finger,” and no (such erroneous) *sphoṭa*, in as much as it would be a real act of seeing called *paśyanti*, could be distinguished from a sentence that is affirmed as true.

However, if (you accept) the alternative that she is different, the fact that *sphoṭa* has an unreal object is not a defect, even though it is real,²⁹⁴ but, given that the *sphoṭa* (that *paśyanti* sees) would be a real object insofar as *paśyanti* is unitary, the (resulting) erroneousness of *paśyanti*'s nature, being in the form of pure consciousness, would be a defect for certain.²⁹⁵

Even the deliberation on whether something is conveyed by a reliable person or conveyed by an unreliable person would then come to a complete halt, because all [utterances], without distinction, would be correct.

[Somānanda] also implies here that, like the multiplicity of *paśyanti* previously described,²⁹⁶ the eternal *sphoṭa* would be multiple, and that results in the destruction of non-duality.

(In other words, the argument seems to be that, while not all *sphoṭas* are true statements, insofar as they would be real by virtue of their identity with *paśyanti*, they would have to denote something real.) As a consequence, it would be impossible to distinguish true from untrue statements.

²⁹² Utpaladeva suggests with “or (she must be) different from it” (*tato vānyā*) that *tadanyā* (ŚD 2.58b) is an ablative determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound.

²⁹³ Following the suggestion of Harunaga Isaacson, I punctuate the commentary as follows: *śabdāmātrabhedāt, tato vānyā. tatra dvaitam syād anyatvapakṣe. aikye vā*. The KSTS edition is punctuated as follows: *śabdāmātrabhedāt, tato vānyā, tatra dvaitam syāt. anyatvapakṣe aikye vā*.

²⁹⁴ Kaḷal explains: “because one accepts nescience” (*avidyopagamāt*). There is no defect in the *sphoṭa* seeing unreal objects that are made apparent by nescience (*avidyā*), this because the *sphoṭa* is, in the view under consideration, not the same as *paśyanti*; however, insofar as *paśyanti* sees the *sphoṭa*, there is a fault in the present argument, as is explained in what follows.

²⁹⁵ One can posit that nescience (*avidyā*) causes unreal objects to exist, which are in turn cognized by the *sphoṭa*, and thus one can posit that *sphoṭa* sees the unreal objects. However, a problem arises with this formulation, for even if *sphoṭa* and *paśyanti* are not identical, as is here suggested, insofar as Brahman in the form of *paśyanti* cognizes the *sphoṭa*, because the latter is real *paśyanti* would see the real *sphoṭa*. Since the *sphoṭa* sees unreal objects, *paśyanti*, in seeing that which registers the appearance of unreal objects, would see erroneously, i.e., it would see that which does not exist.

²⁹⁶ See ŚD 2.43–44ab and Utpaladeva's commentary thereon. There, Somānanda suggests that *paśyanti* would be multiple if she were divided by the various bodies in which she appears. The same would be true of *sphoṭa*.

2.60–61ab

- 2.60. *sphoṭasyāsatyarūpair hi padādyair vyaṅgyatā katham
paśyantiāḥ satyarūpāyā asatyair vyaṅgyatā na ca*
2.61. *tādr̥gvyañjanasāpekṣā sā na kiñcana jāyate*

Indeed, how can *sphoṭa* be made perceptible by words, etc.,²⁹⁷ that are unreal? Nor can *paśyanti*, which is real, be made perceptible by that which is unreal. Depending on such manifestation, she becomes nothing at all.²⁹⁸

How, moreover, can the supremely eternal, real *sphoṭa* be made perceptible by words, phonemes, and sounds that are impure,²⁹⁹ have no nature whatsoever, (and) are powerless and of many different kinds; for if they³⁰⁰ were capable of illuminating the real [*sphoṭa*], they would (also) be real. In addition, even if *sphoṭa* were of the nature of *paśyanti*, it equally would be unreasonable for it to make the unreal perceptible.

Made perceptible by that which is unreal, that is, by that which is of the nature of nescience, as color is (made perceptible) by light, she, being incapable of illuminating herself, would simply be nothing at all, that is, she would be one whose very nature is similar to nescience, this considering the fact that nescience would be the very form of such a manifestation.

2.61cd–62

- paśyanti vā pramāṇena kenāsau pratipādyate*
2.62. *pratyakṣasyāgocaratvād anumānam pradūṣitam*
bhavadbhir eva nāptasyānanubhūtārthavaktr̥tā

Also, by what means of knowledge do you establish *paśyanti*, given that she is out of the range of direct perception? You yourself have censured inference; (and) a reliable person cannot speak about objects he has not experienced.

Also, by what means of knowledge do you establish *paśyanti*?

First of all, direct perception does not apply here,³⁰¹ because she surpasses the range of the eye, etc.,³⁰² and of the mind; nor does inference make her known

²⁹⁷ Etcetera (*ādi*) here refers to the *sphoṭa* of phonemes (*varnasphoṭa*) and of sentences (*vākyasphoṭa*).

²⁹⁸ Somānanda here criticizes the doctrine of the Sphoṭanīyatvavādins, who maintain that the *sphoṭas* are eternal and not different from Brahman. In ŚD 2.78–79ab, he criticizes the view of the Śabdānīyatvavādins, who argue that Brahman is identical with speech, which is eternal, and the *sphoṭas* are distinct and ultimately unreal.

²⁹⁹ The term in question, *upapluta*, literally meaning “overflowing,” “afflicted,” etc., connotes the impure nature of the words, phonemes, and sounds that results from the fact that they are unreal.

³⁰⁰ This is to say that if words, etc., were capable of illuminating *sphoṭa*, the following would obtain.

³⁰¹ That is to say, it does not apply with regard to establishing the existence of *paśyanti*.

³⁰² The word “etcetera” (*ādi*) here refers to the other organs of knowledge (*jñānendriyas*).

correctly, because you yourself disparage it in VP 1.32.³⁰³ Not even a reliable person can speak about objects he has not experienced. That, too, is (therefore) not a valid means of knowledge.

2.63–64ab

2.63. *atha svānubhavenaiva paśyantiṃ paśya yuktitaḥ
evam tarhy aparasyāsau paśyanti karmatām gatā*
2.64. *yo hi paśyati paśyantiṃ sa devaḥ paramo mataḥ*

Now, you might argue that one should see *paśyanti* through contemplation, through nothing but one’s own experience. It thus follows that *paśyanti* becomes the object of something else, for you (must) consider he who sees *paśyanti* to be the supreme God.

Now, if you say to me, “see *paśyanti* through contemplation, that is, through the intentness of yogic *samādhi*, with the experience within you as the means of knowing her,” it thus follows that *paśyanti* becomes the object of something else, i.e., of the means of knowledge referred to as one’s own experience, and thus she, whom you accept as the supreme reality, would not be so.³⁰⁴ The reason for this is that he alone who sees (everything,) even that all-seeing one, reaches the highest goal at that time,³⁰⁵ and you must consider him to be God, because he is elevated above everything, and therefore you abandon your view.³⁰⁶

2.64cd–65ab

pratibhā kathitā yā vā sānumānaṃ na tac ca te
2.65. *na cāpi pratipādyasya kādācitkapratikṣaṇam*

Alternatively, you might suppose it to be intuition. (We reply:) That is an inference, and you do not accept that;³⁰⁷ nor is that which is taught seen (only) occasionally.

³⁰³The verse in question reads: *avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānām anumānena prasiādhir atīdurabhā*. For a translation of the verse, see ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.33cd.

³⁰⁴That is to say that she would not be supreme.

³⁰⁵That is to say that he reaches the highest goal when he sees *paśyanti*.

³⁰⁶In other words, the grammarians would have to admit an entity superior to *paśyanti*, which contradicts the doctrine that Brahman exists in the form of *paśyanti*. It is also possible that *tataś ca darśanatyāgaḥ* could be translated, “and following that, he stops seeing.” In other words, he sees *paśyanti*, after which nothing remains to be seen. This is the less likely interpretation, however.

³⁰⁷That is to say that the grammarians do not accept the validity of inference. The present expression could also be interpreted to mean that the grammarians do not accept that intuition is inferential, but this seems the less likely interpretation, as Somānanda has repeatedly suggested that the grammarians do not accept the validity of inference to prove *paśyanti*. See ŚD 2.33 and 2.62b, as well as reference to the same in ŚD 2.78–79ab.

Now, you might argue that intuition is the means of knowing *paśyanti*. We reply: intuition is an appearance³⁰⁸ that has no (precisely definable) cause. Similar to thinking, “there is water in the well,” for example, it is not a valid means of knowledge.³⁰⁹

Now, you might argue that intuition is simply an indefinite condition of the self³¹⁰ in the form, “it informs me thus.”³¹¹ We reply: insofar as one knows some other object because one is certain that a particular condition of the self is invariably concomitant with the thing to be proven,³¹² that³¹³ is simply an inference, and you do not accept that.³¹⁴

However,³¹⁵ when one is not certain of the invariable concomitance, one does not know (the object in question), and logically, the experience, i.e., the intuition, of what the reliable person teaches when he says “see *paśyanti*” might occur at certain times, but not always. And thus, there would exist an interrupted view of her, that is, she would not shine forth continuously, and you do not think that one sees her in time.³¹⁶

³⁰⁸The term in question, *prabhāsana*, is derived from the same verbal root as the word for intuition (*pratibhā*).

³⁰⁹It is likely that Utpaladeva here refers to the practice of intuiting the proper location to dig a well, this in order to illustrate one type of intuition, the one born from practice (*abhyāsa*). As such, this passage might rather be taken to refer to this type of intuition. Note that there are six types of intuition, according to Bhartṛhari: intuition occurring as the result of one’s nature (*svabhāva*), intuition through Vedic learning (*carāṇa*), through practice (*abhyāsa*), intuition resulting from yoga, intuition born from a previous birth (*adr̥ṣṭa*), and intuition through the grace of a special person (*viśiṣṭopahita*). See Iyer [1969] 1992: 86–94.

³¹⁰In other words, it is an indefinite cognition that occurs in the self; it is *ātmasthiti*.

³¹¹In other words, if the grammarians argue that intuition (*pratibhā*) is something that cannot be defined objectively, but only experienced subjectively, then the following response is given.

³¹²That is, it is always present when that which is to be proven, i.e., *paśyanti*, is present, and vice versa.

³¹³This refers to intuition (*pratibhā*).

³¹⁴In other words, the grammarians do not accept the validity of inference to prove *paśyanti*. Alternatively, as indicated in the notes to the relevant verses of the commentary’s source-text (the *mūla*), the present passage could also be understood to suggest that the grammarians do not accept that intuition is inferential in nature. This seems unlikely, however. The point of the present passage is rather to suggest that one knows *paśyanti* by way of inference when intuition functions invariably as the means of knowing her. In the following passage, Utpaladeva considers the possibility that intuition does not function invariably in this capacity. See ŚD 2.61cd–62 and ŚD 2.33cd for further discussion of the use of inferential reasoning by Bhartṛhari.

³¹⁵In the previous passage, Utpaladeva considered the possibility that intuition functions invariably as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for *paśyanti*. Here, he considers the possibility that intuition does not function invariably in this capacity.

³¹⁶Put differently, if intuition is the means of knowing *paśyanti*, and if intuition only serves to show her on an occasional basis, then knowing her only could occur erratically, despite her continuous presence. Thus, when the teacher explains the nature of *paśyanti* to the student, telling him to “see *paśyanti* (which is the highest reality),” one would only see it occasionally, and it would not appear on the occasions when the erratically appearing intuition is absent. This, however, is not what the grammarians themselves say about *paśyanti*, which is described as an entity not seen merely on an occasional basis.

2.65cd–67ab

svātmanātmānam atha cet paśyanti sā bhaviṣyati
 2.66. *tadāniṃ pratipādyasya kim āyātam svavikṣaṇāt*
vaktavyam eva tasyāpi paśyantim paśya yā svayam
 2.67. *ātmānam eva jānāti tathāpy asyāsti karmatā*

Now, you might argue that *paśyanti* sees herself by means of herself.³¹⁷ In that case, what would be the use of your teaching, since she reveals herself?³¹⁸ Also, it should only say, “see *paśyanti*, who cognizes herself of her own accord.” Even then, it³¹⁹ would be an object.

If you maintain that *paśyanti*’s seeing is not (proven) by (one’s own) direct experience, etc.,³²⁰ but rather that *paśyanti* sees herself by means of herself, that is, not by means of a separate experience, then we reply: even if this were so, what unforeseen result would you, the teachers, produce with your teaching, since she makes herself known on her own accord?³²¹ And thus, you true teachers³²² would instead have to express your teaching in this way: “see the previously unseen *paśyanti*, which sees herself of her own accord.”³²³ And even so, as before,³²⁴ she would have to be the object of the experience associated with the teaching: she would be that which is seen by an absolutely limited experience, one that is appropriate for the dualistic condition, for she would be limited on account of being taught,³²⁵ the result of which is that the *paśyanti* you consider to be supreme would have fallen (to that dualistic level). Neither is it the case

³¹⁷This is to say that *paśyanti* herself is the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that proves her.

³¹⁸Note that Utpaladeva glosses with “what unforeseen result would you, the teachers, produce with your teachings, since she makes herself known on her own accord?” (*pratipādyasya bhavadbhir upadeṣṭribhiḥ kim apūrvaṃ kāryaṃ svayam eva tasyāḥ prathanāt*). The idea is that a teaching (*upadeśa*) should teach something that is not already patently obvious. Kaul says as much in his gloss, note 7, p. 79 of the KSTS: “For, an instruction has the characteristic of an injunction, because it is something that must be expressed, and it is characterized as something that makes known something (previously) unknown. If it is known just by virtue of itself, then be done with (self-)praise saying you teach something different” (*upadeśo hy avaśyavaktavyatvād vidhilakṣaṇaḥ, sa cājñātājñāpanalakṣaṇaḥ. svayam eva jñāte ’lam anyopadeśakathāvarṇanayā*).

³¹⁹This, according to Utpaladeva, refers to *paśyanti*’s nature, for which see the commentary, below.

³²⁰Here, the word “etcetera” (*ādi*) refers to inference (*anumāna*), the report of a reliable person (*āpta*), and intuition (*pratibhā*).

³²¹If *paśyanti* reveals herself on her own accord, then what is the purpose of crafting a teaching to explain her? She would be self-evident.

³²²Note that Utpaladeva sarcastically refers to the grammarians as “true,” i.e., honest, teachers, following Somānanda’s practice. See, e.g., ŚD 2.1 and the notes thereon.

³²³Cf. ŚD 2.55 and 2.56.

³²⁴See ŚD 2.63–64ab as well as ŚD 2.52–54.

³²⁵I here take the word *pratipādyā*, “the teaching,” to be *bhāvanirdeśa*, i.e., to refer to the state of being in question, “the fact of being taught,” in this case.

that, at that time,³²⁶ the teaching, the teacher, and *paśyanti* are one,³²⁷ because of which the fault of her being an object would not occur.

Moreover, it thus being the case that she is an object, her self-luminosity would be destroyed,³²⁸ and again,³²⁹ it follows that that which illumines her would be primary. Even if her *prakāśa* were not separated from her,³³⁰ she would be impure, because, as a result of “see *paśyanti*, who sees herself by means of herself,” she would embrace the level of *vivarta*.³³¹

With *asyāsti* [Somānanda] refers to *paśyanti*'s nature.³³²

2.67cd–68ab

asatyah pratipādyo 'sminn asatyah pratipādakah
2.68. *asatyasyopadeśatvam asatyena parikṣyate*

(Objection:) The teaching is unreal here; the teacher is (also) unreal.
(Reply:) We scrutinize the fact that something unreal is taught by someone unreal.

(Objection:) Absolutely everything other than *paśyanti*, the proliferation of a teaching, etc., is unreal here, that is, in our view.

(Reply:) How, then, is *paśyanti* proved, and for whom and by what means of knowledge?³³³

2.68cd–69ab

yena sā vā pramāṇena sthāpyate tasya satyatā
2.69. *tatsatyatve dvisatyatvam asatyatve na kiñcana*

³²⁶This refers to the moment when the grammarians teach the nature of *paśyanti*.

³²⁷The term *aikadhya*, here used in the sense of oneness or unity, is slightly uncommon, though it is used with some frequency in Abhinavagupta's long commentary on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñānakārikās*. See, for example: ĪPVV (commentary on the *Tattvasaṃgraha* section), p. 388 (vol. 3) of the KSTS edition.

³²⁸I take *svayaṃprakāśatākṣatiḥ* to be a single compound. The KSTS edition, by contrast, reads: *svayaṃ prakāśatākṣatiḥ*. The idea is that, when *paśyanti* is an object, she does not reveal herself, but rather she is revealed by something else, the grammarians' teaching in this case. This is similar to the line of argument offered in ŚD 2.63–64ab.

³²⁹A similar objection was raised in ŚD 2.63–64ab, where it was suggested that the one seeing *paśyanti* would be supreme.

³³⁰This is to say that even if it were not the case that *paśyanti* were illumined by another, superior entity, the following problem would arise. Note that I render “her” (*tasyāḥ*) twice in the present translation.

³³¹If there is truly only one *paśyanti*, and if she sees herself as distinct and multiple entities, then she must see herself as something that divides herself in some illusory manner, leading to impurity.

³³²In other words, the neuter gender of the genitive pronoun *asya* is explained by the fact that it refers to the nature of *paśyanti*, the term “nature” (*svatūpa*) being neuter in gender, and not to *paśyanti* herself, which is a feminine proper noun.

³³³These questions will be taken up separately in the following pair of passages. In ŚD 2.68cd–69ab, Somānanda considers the problem of an unreal means of knowledge; in ŚD 2.69cd–71, he considers the problems associated with an unreal knower of *paśyanti*.

Also, there is the (question of the) reality of the means of knowledge that establishes her. If it were real, there would be two real entities.³³⁴ If unreal, then there is nothing at all (that can be established).³³⁵

Also, if you maintain that the means of knowledge that establishes her is real, then that incurs the reality of two entities, *paśyanti* and the means of knowing her.

If the means of knowledge were unreal, nothing at all could be established.

2.69cd–71

sādhuśabdasamuccārāt kasya svargādiyogitā

2.70. *paśyantyāś ced avidyātvaṃ tadbhogaunmukhyayogataḥ
madhyamāder jadāyāḥ kiṃ bhogena śabalātmanaḥ*

2.71. *tasmād asādhuḥ sādhuḥ syāc chabdavidyāphalapradaḥ
evaṃ vyākaraṇasyāpi samuccheda upaiti te*

For whom does the uttering of correct speech lead to heaven, etc.?³³⁶ If for *paśyanti*, she would have nescience as her nature, because she would be associated with the eagerness for those enjoyments.³³⁷ If it is for the variegated *madhyamā*, etc., which are insentient, what is the use of the enjoyment?³³⁸ On that account, the proper [speech], which gives the reward for knowing speech, would be improper; in this way, even your grammar would dissolve.

The grammarians have said that the use of correct speech leads to heaven and liberation: “A single word used in accordance with the science (of grammar) becomes a wish-fulfilling cow in the heavenly world.”³³⁹ And:³⁴⁰

The supreme good nature of Prajāpati operates in those men in whom proper, good speech is established. The great energy, which has Prajāpati’s

³³⁴That is, both *paśyanti* and the means by which she is known would be real, thus creating an unwanted dualism.

³³⁵This passage takes up the question of the status of the means of knowledge, the first of two questions Somānanda raises in objection to the grammarians’ position, summarized in ŚD 2.67cd–68ab, viz., that everything other than *paśyanti* is unreal.

³³⁶In this passage, Somānanda considers the problems associated with an unreal agent of action (*karṭṛ*), the second of a pair of questions raised in ŚD 2.67cd–68ab. Somānanda addressed the first, the question of the problems associated with the ontological status of the means of knowing *paśyanti*, in ŚD 2.68cd–69ab.

³³⁷That is, she would be associated with the desire to take up a place in heaven, etc. If *paśyanti* is granted liberation, then she must be bound in the world of transmigration (*saṃsāra*) prior to liberation, which by definition means she is ignorant (*avidyātva*) prior to her enlightenment.

³³⁸The point here made is that the various enjoyments would not have any use because *madhyamā* and the rest are insentient, and an insentient entity cannot enjoy heaven or other rewards. Note that while both *śabalātman* and *madhyamādi* are masculine, *jadā* (ŚD 2.70c) is a feminine adjective that reflects the gender of *madhyamā*.

³³⁹The present passage closely parallels Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*, commentary on A 6.1.84.

³⁴⁰The following is a quotation of VP 1.126–127.

nature, is concealed by the subtle elements alone;³⁴¹ (but,) when wise people die,³⁴² it returns to its own source.

First of all, who is this so-called³⁴³ agent who uses proper speech, to whom the fruit of that [action], called “heaven,” accrues? If *paśyantī*, being intent on that reward, is the agent, she would be impure because, since she would be eager to enjoy heaven, she would (necessarily) be in contact with nescience.³⁴⁴

(Objection:) The conduct³⁴⁵ takes place in the *madhyamā* and *vaikhari* condition(s), at which³⁴⁶ one can perceive what is desired and not desired, because one is eager (there) to acquire and avoid (such entities).

Reply: Not so, for the supreme agent of cognition is separated from the objects;³⁴⁷ thus, this means that the very enjoyment in question could not arise, because, when a dualistic condition exists as a result of *madhyamā* and the rest³⁴⁸ having distinct parts, they³⁴⁹ are insentient insofar as they exist as the variegated form of nescience, and as a result there could be no enjoyment whatsoever that leads to the level of the supreme reality.³⁵⁰

Therefore, a proper word used, which yields enjoyment, etc.,³⁵¹ i.e., the fruit (gained) from the knowledge of proper speech, would on the contrary be improper, that is, impure, because *paśyantī* would acquire an impurity.³⁵² And

³⁴¹Mention of the “subtle elements” (*tanmātras*) here refers to the five elements, speech, touch, form, taste, and smell. They correspond with five organs of sense (*jñānendriyas*) capable of cognizing each. Moreover, they are the subtle qualities associated with the five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*), ether, air, fire, water, and earth. The correlation with the *mahābhūtas* is cumulative: ether reflects the presence of the first *tanmātra*, air of the first and the second, fire of the first three, etc.

³⁴²Literally, “when there is the separation [*bhede*] of wise men [*viāuṣām*] from (their) bodies [*śarīra*].”

³⁴³The present phrase is a rendering of *iti*.

³⁴⁴The point here expressed is that if *paśyantī* herself is the agent who uses proper speech, then she would be expectant of and striving for the rewards associated with the use of proper speech, i.e., heaven and liberation. If this were true, then *paśyantī* would be impure: she would have to be in contact with the world, which requires a connection with nescience. What is more, she by definition would be ignorant, as an omniscient entity does not strive for liberation.

³⁴⁵That is, the conduct that is necessary for acquiring rewards and liberation takes place in a condition inferior to that of the (purportedly) non-dual *paśyantī*.

³⁴⁶Here, following Harunaga Isaacson’s suggestion, I read *iṣṭāniṣṭopalambabhāji* as a compound in the locative, singular, literally meaning “that which takes part in the ascertaining of desired and undesired [entities].”

³⁴⁷That is to say that there is no contact with mundane things at the level of *paśyantī*.

³⁴⁸This refers to *vaikhari*, the third level of speech.

³⁴⁹This refers to *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*.

³⁵⁰The idea here expressed is that, insofar as *madhyamā* and *vaikhari* are insentient, they cannot experience the delight of attaining the rewards conferred on those who use correct speech. They cannot experience heaven, etc., because they are insentient, their insentience being the logical consequence of their being illusory, the very appearance of nescience. Finally, they are nescience itself insofar as they are multiple, variegated. In short, the problem in question is again one of the relationship of the divine agent to the (unreal, according to Somānanda’s read of the grammarians’ view) world he manifests. The divine cannot properly have contact with an unreal world, and he cannot experience the delight of escaping that world when he is not somehow directly involved with that world, as he is in Somānanda’s view.

³⁵¹The term °*ādi* here refers to heaven and liberation.

³⁵²That is to say that she would acquire the impurity of duality.

in this way, because she would make one impure,³⁵³ even your grammar, the fruits of which being as you described them, would dissolve, that is, would be something absolutely to be avoided.

2.72–73ab

2.72. *vaiyākaraṇatām tyaktvā vijñānānveśaṇena kim
bhavatām aprastutena na kevalam ihoditam*

2.73. *vijñānābhāsanam yāvat samikṣāyām udāhṛtam*

Having given up being a grammarian, what is the use of your investigation of cognition, which is not (even) the matter at hand for you?³⁵⁴ It is not only here³⁵⁵ that you state your false knowledge, but you also declare it in the (Śabdadhātu-)samikṣā.

Having given up being a grammarian, which is nothing but the activity of teaching correct words, which cause the cognition of meaning, there is no use whatsoever for your investigation—which is not (even) the matter at hand for you, i.e., which you are not supposed to do—into “correct cognition,” one that your *śāstras*, which aim at spiritual liberation, pursue.

Moreover, it is not only here³⁵⁶ that the learned Bhartṛhari speaks of his false “correct cognition” by referring to *paśyanti*, but he does so in the *Śabdadhātusamikṣā* as well.³⁵⁷

2.73cd–74ab

dikkālādīlakṣaṇena vyāpakatvaṃ vihanayate

2.74. *avaśyaṃ vyāpako yo hi sarvadikṣu sa vartate*

Omnipresence is destroyed by spatial, temporal, and other attributes; for the one who pervades inevitably exists everywhere.³⁵⁸

³⁵³That is to say that she would make the practitioner impure.

³⁵⁴As Utpaladeva explains, grammarians are supposed to concern themselves with grammar, not the processes of cognition and other such philosophical concerns.

³⁵⁵It appears that with *iha*, meaning literally “here,” Somānanda refers to the VP, and perhaps also to it’s primary commentary, the VPVṛ (if Somānanda knew it).

³⁵⁶As in the verse, “here” (*atra*) probably refers to the VP and VPVṛ, the authorship of both being attributed by the Pratyabhijñā authors to Bhartṛhari.

³⁵⁷Note that ŚD 2.73cd–74ab is not a quotation of the ŚDhāSam but a criticism of it. Utpaladeva provides the quotation in full in his commentary.

³⁵⁸Literally, the text says it exists “in all the directions” (*sarvadikṣu*). Here, Somānanda criticizes Bhartṛhari’s description of Brahman in a passage of the ŚDhāSam that is identical to NŚ 1.1: *dikkālādy-anavacchinnānantacīnāmātramūrtaye / svānubhūtyekamānāya namaḥ śāntāya tejase*. (See Iyer [1969] 1992: 10.) In referring to this passage, Somānanda wishes to criticize the grammarians for their inability to explain how their monistic, transcendent Brahman can be manifested in such a manner as to provide a soteriological experience for the individual practitioner. His approach here is rhetorical: he criticizes the terminology that Bhartṛhari uses in the above-quoted propitiatory verse (*maṅgala*). In ŚD 2.74cd–75ab Somānanda questions the possibility of the unity of the practitioner’s experience. He criticizes the possibility that an endless deity can have any experience in ŚD 2.75cd–76, where he also questions the apparent

*dikkālādyanavacchinnānantacinmātramūrtaye
svānubhūtyekamānāya namaḥ śāntāya tejase*

Homage to the image of pure, endless consciousness, which is not limited by space, time, etc., to the one of whom the only means of knowledge is one's own experience, to (the one in the form of) energy, the one who is peaceful.³⁵⁹

As a result of the aforementioned attributes,³⁶⁰ delimitation by space, that is, place,³⁶¹ and time exists, i.e., the fact of being distinguished exists, which is prohibited. This, moreover, is not logically coherent: since the meaning is that there is one who is spatially and temporally limited,³⁶² it must be delimited (by them). Otherwise, it would not be omnipresent, etc.,³⁶³ when all of the spatial, temporal, and other attributes exist; for, the one who pervades inevitably is present everywhere³⁶⁴ and should be eternally delimited by all (moments of) time (past, present, and future).

With (the word) “omnipresence” [Somānanda] has pointed to something that he has not explicitly taught.³⁶⁵

2.74cd–75ab

If they maintain that spatial and temporal limitations do not exist, then they should state as much explicitly and not vaguely, and even that is not viable. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

*svānubhūtir vartamānakālenāsyā vibhāvvyate
2.75. evaṃ kālānavacchedaḥ katham asyodito hi taiḥ*

contradiction in describing the deity as both peaceful and active. Finally, in the same passage he takes issue with Bhartṛhari's reference to a material icon (*mūrti*) as representative of the divine. Somānanda's underlying argument is that the grammarians cannot account for the relationship between an eternal deity and a world of temporally and spatially diverse entities.

³⁵⁹This is NS 1.1, quoted by Utpaladeva to open his commentary on ŚD 2.73cd–74ab.

³⁶⁰Kaul defines a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) as the narration of an entity's peculiar nature: *asādhāraṇas-varūpakathanam lakṣanam*.

³⁶¹Cf. ŚD 2.48a–b and the relevant commentary for the use of the terms here in question, viz., *dik* and *deśa*. Here, Utpaladeva is merely making clear that *dikkāla*^o (ŚD 2.73c; NS 1.1a) means what Somānanda intended it to mean when he twice used the term *dikdeśa* in ŚD 2.48a–b.

³⁶²*Parimitadeśakāla* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound referring to Brahman.

³⁶³“Etcetera” (*-ādi*) here refers to the eternity of Brahman.

³⁶⁴As mentioned above in the notes to Somānanda's text, the term here used, *sarvadiḥṣu*, literally means “in all the directions.”

³⁶⁵This is to say that, just as Brahman's omnipresence is impossible in the grammarians' system, so too is its eternity. Thus, Utpaladeva suggests that by using the word “omnipresence” (*vyāpakatva*) Somānanda secondarily indicates (*upalakṣaṇa*) as much. Therefore, when Somānanda says *dikkālādi-lakṣaṇena vyāpakatvam vihanatyate* in ŚD 2.73cd, he wishes to refer to the destruction of Brahman's omnipresence and eternity both.

The experience one has of it³⁶⁶ appears in the present. Thus, how can they say that it is not limited by time?³⁶⁷

Indeed, the one who dwells in the world of transmigration, the agent of cognition, is located in a moment of time, and it is only in that present moment of time, since he is not situated at that time in the future, etc.,³⁶⁸ that the experience one has of it is observed. Thus, how is it not limited even by temporal distinctions?³⁶⁹

2.75cd–76

anantasyānubhūtiḥ kā paricchedaṃ vinātmanaḥ
 2.76. *anante 'vagamaḥ kutra tejavste śāntatā katham*
asarvagapramāṇaṃ hi mūrtir no lakṣyate cītaḥ

What experience can there be of the endless [Brahman] without its being divided? Where is there understanding in an endless entity? If it is energy, then how can it be peaceful? For, consciousness does not appear as having a limited measure or as an image.³⁷⁰

Since six ontological categories are accepted in the doctrine of the dualists,³⁷¹ space and time must exist.³⁷² Therefore, endlessness must be said to be the cessation of space and time,³⁷³ and thus what experience is there of one of indeterminate physical and temporal location,³⁷⁴ which means that it is not appropriate for the two to be connected to it.³⁷⁵

³⁶⁶That is, of Brahman as described in the ŚDhāSam (NŚ 1.1), where Brahman is said to be “[consciousness] that is not limited by time, space, etc.” (*dikkālādyanavacchinna*^o).

³⁶⁷Somānanda again criticizes Bhartṛhari’s description of Brahman in the ŚDhāSam. See ŚD 2.73cd–74ab and Utpaladeva’s commentary on the same.

³⁶⁸The present passage remains a bit unclear, and my translation reads as if the word order of the text were *tadā bhaviṣyadādīnā* rather than *bhaviṣyadādīnā tadā*.

³⁶⁹It is impossible for Brahman not to be temporally distinguished if one has an experience of it in a particular moment of time. Otherwise, Brahman would cease to exist at certain moments of time, i.e., when one has an experience of it. See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.75cd–76.

³⁷⁰Somānanda continues his critique of NŚ 1.1, here questioning Bhartṛhari’s description of Brahman as endless (*ananta*), the possibility of an energetic (*tejavsta*) deity being peaceful (*śānta*), and the possibility of the existence of a stone image that is “pure consciousness” (*cinmātramūrti*).

³⁷¹That is, in the system of the Naiyāyikas, etc. Kaul glosses “in the doctrine of the dualists” (*bhedavāde*) with “in the thought of the Naiyāyikas, etc.” (*naiyāyikādimate*). Here, Utpaladeva is appealing to the authority of the Nyāya in explaining the nature of the mundane world. The term *dhātu* normally refers to the five elements, the *mahābhūtas*, but later on (in *Yājñavalkyaśmṛti*) a sixth element, Brahman, is added to the head of the list. The six categories, then, are: (1) Brahman, (2) “ether” (*ākāśa*, *kha*), (3) “wind” (*vāyu*, *anila*), (4) “fire” (*agni*), (5) “water” (*jala*), and (6) “earth” (*pṛthivī*, *bhū*). See *YājSmṛ* 3.145ab.

³⁷²Literally, the text says “there must be a connection with space and time.”

³⁷³This present compound, *deśakālaparyavasāna*, could be translated “the limit of space and time.”

³⁷⁴*Aparayasitadeśakāla* is an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound that refers to Brahman.

³⁷⁵In other words, Brahman is not connected with either space or time. Alternatively, the passage in question could mean that the individual’s experience of Brahman and Brahman itself are not connected.

For instance, where in an endless thing, i.e., in what portion, can there be understanding in the absence of such³⁷⁶ division of it, i.e., its nature,³⁷⁷ given that its parts are indeterminate?³⁷⁸ Yet, the cognition of endlessness appears as a grasping determinately only of a thing whose beginning and end and length and width cannot be seen, having first excluded things that can be seen completely, but it is not possible for an endless, undivided form to appear. Indeed, cognition is certainty regarding finite³⁷⁹ forms.

If it has an energetic form,³⁸⁰ (then,) given that it is not the case that it does not appear,³⁸¹ how can it be peaceful? So, what is (the meaning of) this statement: “(homage) to (the one in the form of) energy, the one who is peaceful?”³⁸²

Also, what is the use of figurative speech? Consciousness is not a substance of a limited measure, nor is it an image, i.e., a solid entity. So, why do you say “(homage) to the image of (pure, endless) consciousness?”³⁸³

2.77

2.77. *atraiva śabdanityatvavādino rūḍhatām gatāḥ
anādinātha tenaiva śabdatattvena tulyatā*

Those who profess the doctrine of eternal speech have become famous for this very proposition.³⁸⁴ Now, there is a similarity (of this view) with the very one who is beginningless, who has speech as its true nature.³⁸⁵

Others, themselves grammarians, hold that the eternal [Brahman], which has speech as its nature, is absolutely different from *sphoṭa*, and they are famous for that very proposition.³⁸⁶

³⁷⁶Kaul glosses *iyattā*, literally “the fact of being so much,” with “by space and time” (*deśena kālena ca*).

³⁷⁷Utpaladeva here glosses *ātman* (ŚD 2.75d) with *svarūpa*.

³⁷⁸In other words, it is impossible to experience an endless entity, because there would be no cognizable part of it to cognize. A single, endless entity, because it lacks in every distinction, cannot be registered in experience.

³⁷⁹Literally, the text says “fully concluded.”

³⁸⁰Here, Utpaladeva suggests that the grammarian might argue, in a manner similar to the Śaivas, that the divine appears in many forms because it is active.

³⁸¹*Nirābhāsavābhāva* literally means “the nonexistence of the state of being without appearances.”

³⁸²See NŚ 1.1d, quoted in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.73cd–74ab. The point is that Brahman cannot simultaneously be energetic and peaceful.

³⁸³See NŚ 1.1b, quoted in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.73cd–74ab.

³⁸⁴Literally meaning “in this alone,” I here render *atraiva* idiomatically with “for this very proposition.”

³⁸⁵Somānanda here suggests that the Śabdanityatvavādins, who hold that Brahman is speech but is distinct from *sphoṭa*, can be criticized in the same manner as the Sphoṭanityatvavādins, those who hold that Brahman is speech in the form of *sphoṭa*. See ŚD 2.58–71.

³⁸⁶Literally meaning “in that alone,” I here render *tatraiva* idiomatically with “for that very proposition.”

Now, because of the absence of a means of knowledge, etc., they err in that [view], as well, in a way similar with (the view of) it being in the form of *paśyanti*, being beginningless and endless, (and) being one who has speech as its true nature, or (the view of) it having *sphoṭa* as its nature.

2.78–79ab

Therefore, [Somānanda] says:

2.78. *āptānāptabhāṣitatve viśeṣo nāsti śabdagaḥ
nityatve śabdattvasya vyaṅgyatvaṃ dhvanibhir na ca
2.79. vyomavac cen na tulyatvaṃ sadā vyomny anumeyatā*

Whether uttered by a reliable person or an unreliable person, speech is not differentiated if that which has speech as its true nature is eternal. Nor can it be made perceptible by sounds. If you argue that it is like the ether, (we reply:) there is no similarity. The ether is always inferred.³⁸⁷

Even what is uttered by an unreliable person would similarly be a valid means of knowledge,³⁸⁸ because one cannot differentiate (parts of) eternity.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁷This criticism is meant to parallel the criticism of the Sphoṭanīyatvavādins in ŚD 2.58–62. In ŚD 2.58–59, we are told that if *sphoṭa* is different from *paśyanti*, then dualism persists. On the other hand, if it is identical to the latter, then all *sphoṭas* are equally real, the consequence of which is the fact that any statement, however ridiculous, would be true. Thus, the words of a reliable person would be no better than those of an unreliable person. In ŚD 2.60–61ab, Somānanda argues that, even if the grammarians argue that *paśyanti*, which is real, is identical to *sphoṭa*, they cannot claim that the latter is made perceptible by unreal words and sounds. Finally, Somānanda suggests that speech cannot be inferred in ŚD 2.61cd–62.

The first two arguments—the ones concerning the utterances of reliable and unreliable people and the manifestation of a real entity by unreal ones—are in this passage applied to the arguments of the Śabdānīyatvavādins, those who think that Brahman is speech, but is distinct from the *sphoṭas*. The third argument is also invoked, but Somānanda does so indirectly. Here, Somānanda considers the possible objection that, when Brahman has speech as its nature, it can be known in the same manner as the existence of the ether is known from the sounds that are manifested in it. This, Somānanda argues, is not a good analogy, because the ether is not directly perceived but is inferred. We have already seen that, on Somānanda's view, the grammarians do not accept inference as a valid means of knowledge (ŚD 2.33, 2.62b, and 2.64cd–65ab), except in mundane matters. In addition, it would seem that Somānanda, in arguing that ether is not an entity that appears in one's direct experience, also wishes to suggest that the ultimate goal cannot be the inference of Brahman but rather it must be constituted by a direct experience of it. This last point should be taken in the context of the arguments Somānanda makes concerning the nature of religious experience in ŚD 2.72–76.

³⁸⁸That is, the statement of an unreliable person would be valid in a manner similar to the way in which a statements of a reliable person is valid.

³⁸⁹*Nītyatvāviśeṣāt* may be taken literally to mean "because of the nondifferentiation of eternity." Thus, the present passage suggests that if speech (*śabda*) is eternal and exists in the form of Brahman, as the Śabdānīyatvavādins suggest, then it is impossible to distinguish the words of reliable people from those of unreliable people.

Neither is it appropriate that the eternal [Brahman] could ever be made perceptible by sounds, because, since it always has the same form, the state of being unmanifested would be connected to that which is manifested.³⁹⁰

Now, if you argue that, just as sounds make the ether perceptible, even though it is eternal and unitary, or (just as) pots, etc., (make perceptible) the space in pots, etc., so too is the nature of speech (made perceptible), then we reply: no. There is no similarity here,³⁹¹ since ether is always inferred by the quality of sound, etc., but it is not a visible appearance cognized by direct perception.

2.79cd–80

bhavatpakṣe na kiṃ nyāya eṣa āyāti cec chive
 2.80. *tathā rūpānurūpatvāt prasūteḥ śivarūpataḥ*
satyatvāc ca na tulyatvam ato 'smāt praviramayatām

If you argue: Doesn't the same maxim³⁹² apply to Śiva in your view, (we reply:) because it comes forth in conformity to his form (and) in the form of Śiva and because it is real, there is no similarity. Hence, this [criticism] should be withdrawn from this.³⁹³

If you argue: Doesn't the maxim, the fault of being real and so on, apply to Śiva, as well, in the alternative (view) of your Śaiva non-dualism, as it does to speech (in our system), then we reply: no. When the entire world comes forth from Śiva's form³⁹⁴ in conformity to Śiva's form, and as a result of being connected to all of his powers, it simply exists in the form of Śiva, and for this very reason, it is real, as will be explained in detail.³⁹⁵

Therefore, there is no similarity of Śaiva non-dualism with the alternative (view) that speech is non-dual. Therefore, you must desist from leveling this criticism.

³⁹⁰In other words, the unmanifested (*avyakta*) Brahman would be connected to the manifested (*vyakta*) sounds.

³⁹¹Here, I follow Kaul's interpretation of the term *na* and render it twice. See Kaul's explanation: "The word 'no' in 'then we reply: no' is used in the manner of the crow's eyes. (That is: like a crow, which has wide-set eyes, it looks, so to speak, in two directions simultaneously.) It means that their argument is not logical, and it is used to say that it is not (an argument that is) similar to this (the Śaiva one)." (*tan neti naśabdāḥ kākākṣivad yojyaḥ. tan neti bhavadvacanam ayuktam ity arthaḥ. na hi tulyam atreti yojyam*).

³⁹²The term in question, *nyāya*, is difficult to render exactly. Literally meaning "law, rule, method," it here refers to the manner in which Somānanda has heretofore criticized the grammarians.

³⁹³That is, it should be withdrawn from this, the Śaiva non-dual view. Note that there is an echo of ŚD 1.12ab in this verse.

³⁹⁴With *tataḥ śivarūpāt* Utpaladeva notes the ablative meaning of *śivarūpataḥ* (ŚD 2.80b).

³⁹⁵The present passage refers to Somānanda's long description of the manner in which the world is the real manifestation of Śiva's very form. See chapter 4 of the ŚD.

2.81

Thus, having mentioned this undesirable implication,³⁹⁶ [Somānanda], considering *paśyanti* herself, says:³⁹⁷

2.81. *atha nāmnaiva paśyanti sphuṭam eva jadā tataḥ
jñānaśaktiḥ smṛtā bhāṅgā strīliṅgavyapadeśataḥ*

Now, you might argue that she is “seeing” only by name, that you consider her to be the power of cognition merely because she is designated by the feminine gender. (We reply:) As a result, she is clearly insentient.³⁹⁸

Now, you might argue that, since there is error in associating (the nature of *paśyanti*) with the meaning (of the word) “seeing,” you hold that *paśyanti* is merely a name, i.e., is arbitrarily named, and, by the mere appearance of the feminine gender,³⁹⁹ you consider her to exist in the form of the power of cognition, which is associated with Brahman.

³⁹⁶This passage refers to the proposition, put in the mouths of Somānanda’s grammarian opponents (ŚD 2.79cd–80), that his own view suffers the same faults as that of the grammarians.

³⁹⁷Here, Somānanda considers the possibility that the grammarians will argue that the term *paśyanti* should not be taken literally, as Somānanda has been so apt to do in the preceding arguments. Kaul comments: “There is a possible objection: Be done with raising your objections (to our view, saying), ‘you must explain, what is *paśyanti*?’ For, it is not the case that the meaning (of a word) is always etymological, since there are also words like (the meaningless name) *ḍiṭṭha*. And therefore, the reference here to *paśyanti* is similarly just by the force of common usage, like *kuśala* and so on (for Śiva), and you shouldn’t say: ‘what use is this?’ Nevertheless, she is designated by the word *paśyanti*, because she has the power of cognition as her form, simply because she is referred to in the feminine gender. Refuting this as well, [Somānanda] says ‘Now, you might argue,’ etc.” (*nanu kṛtaṃ bhavaddoṣāropanena kim paśyantiti kathyatām iti. na hi sarvatra yaugiko ’rthaḥ sambhavati. santi hi ḍiṭṭhādāyo ’pi śabdāḥ. tataś ca rūḍhimahimnaiva kuśalādivad atrāpi paśyantinirdeśah. na ca vaktavyaṃ kim anena tathāpi paśyantiśabdena vyapadeśyaṃ, strīliṅganirdeśād eva jñānaśaktirūpatvād asyā ity api nirasayann āhāthetyādi*). Note that, to reiterate, reference here to “*ḍiṭṭha*” is meant to invoke a term—a proper name, in this instance—that has no etymological meaning, but nevertheless possesses denotative power.

³⁹⁸The word order in this verse is unusual. I have translated in the following order: 2.81a, c and d, and, finally, b. There is no reason that Somānanda could not have presented 2.81b for 2.81d, and vice versa, but this is not what is given in the KSTS edition. It is possible that the text is corrupt. All of the manuscripts that I have consulted, however, agree with the reading of the KSTS.

Somānanda here anticipates that the grammarians might argue that *paśyanti* is merely a word, one that does not describe the entity in question, but rather simply refers to the power of cognition. Somānanda responds by pointing out that, if this were the case, then *paśyanti* would have to be insentient. The argument is a rhetorical one (about which, see the Introduction, section 14). If the term in question does not describe the entity in question, then the entity in question cannot be considered to have the qualities that the term denotes, in this case sentience. *Paśyanti*, the present participle of a transitive verb, refers to something that is “seeing,” and by implication, knows or cognizes an object. If, on the other hand, the entity in question possesses the qualities denoted by the term, then the term accurately describes the entity in question.

³⁹⁹In other words, it is not the meaning of the term in question that suggests she is Brahman’s power of cognition, but merely the gender of the term in question that suggests as much.

As a result, this fails because, being unassociated with seeing, she is consequently insentient, and, as you know,⁴⁰⁰ something insentient cannot be the power of cognition.⁴⁰¹

2.82–83

2.82. *śabdasya viṣayākhyasya miśratvenendriyasya tu sarvadarśanavijñānaśūnyatā padavedinām*

2.83. *yaśmād anādinidhanam śabdātattvaṃ parā hi vāk paśyantyā varṇyamānatve haste grāhyaikatāpatet*

By conflating speech, which is cognized as the object, and the organ, the knowers of words⁴⁰² are ignorant of every (other) philosophical view,⁴⁰³ since, in describing *paśyanti*—“indeed, (Brahman,) beginningless and endless, it has speech as its true nature, is (*paśyanti*,) supreme speech”—there arises⁴⁰⁴ the consequence that the hand would be one with its object.⁴⁰⁵

By conflating, i.e., by identifying, speech, the cognition of which⁴⁰⁶ is in the form of the object, that is, the object of the action (of seeing), and the organ that knows it,⁴⁰⁷ which is well-known as the instrument of the action in the form of

⁴⁰⁰“As you know” renders the flavor of *iti*.

⁴⁰¹In other words, the entity called *paśyanti*, because it is not associated with the qualities suggested by the meaning of the term, is not “seeing,” but rather is insentient. For this reason, *paśyanti* cannot be the power of cognition.

⁴⁰²This is a reference to the grammarians. It suggests that the grammarians should focus on explaining language, rather than philosophical matters. See ŚD 2.72–73ab.

⁴⁰³Utpaladeva glosses *vijñānaśūnyatā* with *ajñānatā*, which Kaul glosses with *anabhijñatvam*, and I follow this interpretation in my (slightly free) translation. *Sarvadarśanavijñānaśūnyatā padavedinām* could more literally be translated, “the knowers of words are devoid of an understanding of every (other) philosophical view.” In identifying the organ and the object of cognition, the grammarians contradict every other philosophical understanding of the matter.

⁴⁰⁴I interpret 2.83d to read *haste grāhyaikatāpatet*, not *haste grāhyaikatā patet*, meaning that I understand the verb to be *āpatet*, not *patet*.

⁴⁰⁵Somānanda here suggests that the grammarians identify Brahman-as-speech, the object of cognition, with *paśyanti*, which is that which cognizes speech. The identification of the two is justified on the basis of Somānanda’s interpretation of the grammarians’ view of Brahman: it is both “one who has speech as its true nature” (*śabdātattva*), as it is described in the first verse of the *Vākyaopadiya*, and it is identical with *paśyanti*, who is “supreme speech” or *parā vāk*. The former is that which is cognized (*grāhya*), the latter that which cognizes (*grāhaka*), and thus, the two are equated. Put differently, Somānanda here suggests that the grammarians identify *paśyanti* with *śabda*, the instrument of action, as opposed to *vāk*, the organ of action. In doing so, they identify the instrument and the object of action, which is unheard of in Indian philosophy.

⁴⁰⁶Here, the relative pronoun, *yaśya* is an objective genitive, not a subjective genitive. Note also that the commentary here glosses *ākhyā* with *pratīti*. As the terms are virtually synonymous, and given that I have uniformly translated both with “cognition” throughout, I have not rendered this gloss in the translation, though the reader should be aware of its existence.

⁴⁰⁷Literally, *tasyendriyasya* means “the organ (of knowing) of it.” In other words, I take *sa* to be a possessive genitive referring to *śabda*, and my idiomatic translation is meant to reflect as much.

speech—since they say that the two⁴⁰⁸ are one when they say things like “beginningless and endless”—the knowers of words, i.e., the grammarians, achieve thereby—by that conflation—an ignorance of every (other) philosophical view. For it is not the case in any philosophical view, be it that of the Sāṅkhya or another, that the mundane⁴⁰⁹ organ (of action) and object (of that action) are thought to be identical.

And in this way, in describing speech as supreme, beginningless and endless, unitary—the last because theirs is a non-dual doctrine—even the hand, that is, the organ of action, is consequently the same as that which it grasps, i.e., the object (it grasps).

2.84–88

Even if you say that *paśyanti* is Brahman’s power of cognition, then in as much as you accept that, you also have to accept another⁴¹⁰ that is more subtle. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

- 2.84. *paśyanti hi kriyā tasyā bhāgau pūrvāparau sthitau
etad draṣṭavyam ity eṣo vimarśaḥ pūrvato bhavet*
2.85. *yathā kartuḥ kulālāder ghaṭaḥ kārya itidṛśaḥ
vimarśa icchārūpeṇa tadvad atrāpi samsthitam*
2.86. *sā sthitā pūrvatas tasyā icchāyāḥ prasaraḥ katham
yāvan na sūkṣma ullāsaś citaḥ kāryonmukhaḥ sthitaḥ*
2.87. *tasyā api sāmārasye vyavasthāvān sthitaḥ śivaḥ
evam bhavatprakriyāyā api sūkṣmatarā sthitiḥ*
2.88. *sthitā sā na punaḥ satyā vāco vāyugamātmanaḥ
iṣyate brahmarūpatvaṁ ghaṭāder api kathyatām*

Indeed, *paśyanti* is an action that has earlier and later parts. The thought “I should look at this” must be earlier. Just as an agent of action, a potter, etc., thinks such a thought, in the form of a desire, as “I should make a pot,” so it is the same here, as well.⁴¹¹ That [desire] exists first of all. How could that desire come forth before the subtle joy of consciousness, which is eager for the effect of the action, exists? When that, for its part, is in a state of unity, Śiva is established as the one possessed of that condition. In this way, there is a condition more subtle than even the process of creation.⁴¹² You should accept that it exists, and you should not hold that real speech,

⁴⁰⁸Kaul suggests that this dual word refers to Brahman and *paśyanti* as the *śabdattva* and *vāktattva*, respectively. The important point is that one is the cognizer (*grāhaka*), the other the thing cognized (*grāhya*). See also ŚD 2.2–4.

⁴⁰⁹The adjective here used is *vyāvahārika*.

⁴¹⁰The neuter pronoun *anyat* could well refer to Brahman.

⁴¹¹That is, it is the same with regard to Śiva’s reflective awareness (*vimarśa*) prior to manifesting the universe.

⁴¹²See ŚD 1.3–4. This is the quiescent condition of Śiva prior to creation.

**consisting of the movement of air, is of the nature of Brahman. (If you do):
That must also be said of pots, etc.**⁴¹³

Indeed, *paśyanti*, by nature the act of seeing, has an earlier part and a later part, and the earlier is the thought “I should look at this,” the nature of which must be the desire (to act), like that of a potter, etc., in the production of pots, etc.⁴¹⁴

It is the same here, as well: everything exists in this way. In this way, moreover, the desire is the first condition of the act of seeing, and how could that desire, for its part, come forth, in the manner previously explained,⁴¹⁵ in the absence of the extremely subtle joy, characterized by an eagerness for the desired objects of cognition and action that is connected to the nature of consciousness?

As for that [consciousness], as you know,⁴¹⁶ Śiva Bhaṭṭāraka, being without sequence, is established as the one possessed of, i.e., as the locus of, the state of unity—the unity of penetration⁴¹⁷—of consciousness, abiding in the sequence or the absence thereof⁴¹⁸ of delight, eagerness, will, cognition, and action.⁴¹⁹

In this way, that is, even according to your thinking that she is the power of cognition, there also exists another condition, a supreme form, that is more subtle than the process of “seeing” that is characterized by becoming.⁴²⁰ Thus, you must also admit to that [condition], as well, and you should not hold that real speech, consisting of the movement of air, is of the nature of Brahman.⁴²¹ Holding such a view,⁴²² you will have to say the same for pots, etc., as well, there being no distinction vis-à-vis the fact of being manifested.

2.89–91

2.89. *yathā sarvapadārthānām bhagavacchivarūpatā
tadvad vāgindriyasāpi na punaḥ sā parā daśā*

⁴¹³Note that I read the verb *īyate* in ŚD 2.88c twice, once with *sthītā sā* in ŚD 2.88a, and once with *brahmatattvaṃ* in ŚD 2.88c.

⁴¹⁴In other words, a pot maker does not make something out of clay until he chooses to do so. In the same way, one does not look at something prior to having a subtle, internal impulse to do so.

⁴¹⁵This could refer to the process of manifestation described in ŚD 1, esp. ŚD 1.7cd–8.

⁴¹⁶This is a rendering of the force of the particle *iti*.

⁴¹⁷Literally, *samāveśaviṣaya* means “relating to penetration” or “the range of penetration.” Compounds ending in *viṣaya* are often exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compounds, but this one is not.

⁴¹⁸Due to sandhi, one can also read *krama* for *akrama*. Thus, one can translate either “the absence of sequence” or “the sequence.”

⁴¹⁹See ŚD 1.3–4.

⁴²⁰*Bhavalakṣaṇām prakriyām* is a gloss of *bhavatprakriyām* in ŚD 2.87c. More literally, this means, “the procedure concerning/relating to creation.”

⁴²¹The argument made here cuts to the heart of Somānanda’s critique of the grammarians. If the divine is conscious and not inert, then all activity must be preceded by the sort of desire, the volition or will, here described. This simply is the nature of action, which is performed by independent agents of action. See the Introduction, section 5; cf. section 13, subsection entitled “Somānanda’s Arguments against the Grammarians’ *paśyanti*.”

⁴²²That is to say, by holding the view that real speech is Brahman, the following obtains.

- 2.90. *kaṅṭhādau vadane vāyor vyāpāro vāgrutasya sā
karaṇaṃ nādarūpādīśabdasyāsti śivātmata*
2.91. *tasyāpi kathitā pañcatattvadikṣāvidhau kvacit
na vāca iṣyate tadvat tasmāt sarvaṃ śivātmakam*

Just as every object exists in the form of the Lord Śiva, so too does the organ of speech. However, it is not the supreme condition. It is the instrument for the sound of speech, the activity of air in the mouth, in the throat, etc. (Objection:) Speech in the form of *nāda*, etc., also has Śiva-nature, as is said of it in places in the five-*tattva* initiation rite. (Reply:) We do not hold the same for (the organ of) speech. Thus, everything has Śiva-nature.⁴²³

Even if you argue that, just as all objects, within the range of cognition because they enter into consciousness, ultimately exist in the form of the Supreme-Lord-as-consciousness,⁴²⁴ so too does the organ of speech, as well, because it is included among all of the (aforementioned) objects of cognition, this because it would not be real, etc.,⁴²⁵ if it were not an object of cognition, (we reply:) even so, the condition of the organ of speech is not supreme, because it arises by means of the power of *māyā*, that is, by the noncognition of Śiva's non-duality.

This is to say that it is the instrument that does the work of striking the throat, the palate, and so on, i.e., some location in the mouth, with air, which is the cause of the manifestation of speech, called sound, and this is without a doubt a mundane condition,⁴²⁶ consisting of duality.

Now, if you argue that mantric speech, whether coarse in the form of *nāda*, subtle, or supreme, is of the nature of Paramaśiva, then we reply: we accept that this is stated in the five-*tattva* initiation rite, i.e., in the *sāstra* on initiation, but it is not the case that, in this way, speech, i.e., the organ of action, is supreme, nor is it appropriate that the world is made up of it.⁴²⁷ Hence, it is fitting only that everything is comprised of Śiva alone. That is what [Somānanda] has said.

⁴²³Cf. ŚD 1.48. The point here made is that Śaiva non-dualism is correct, while that of the grammarians is not.

⁴²⁴More literally, *cillakṣaṇaparameśvararūpatā* means “the fact of being in the form of the Supreme Lord, whose mark is consciousness.”

⁴²⁵The term etcetera (*ādi*) in the compound *asatvādi* probably refers to the effable nature of speech.

⁴²⁶That is, it is the *aparāvasthā*.

⁴²⁷The initiation by five *tattvas* is a Saiddhāntika rite. An example of this may be found in the eighth chapter of the *Sārdhatriśatikālottaratantra*. (See edition of Bhatt 1979: 62–86.) Although this text does not speak explicitly of the identity of speech with Paramaśiva, it does point to knowledge of the mantras as the path to liberation. See *Sārdhatriśatikālottaratantra* 8.37cd–38ab: *prthivādyaḥjanāḍīr vai śabdādiguṇavāyubhiḥ / ātmādhidevatā mantrāṅ jñātvā muktas tu mocayet*. The point of the present passage, of course, is that the opponent wishes to suggest that Somānanda must accept the supremacy of speech, because the Śaiva scriptures that he takes to be authoritative do so, as well. Somānanda of course rejects this argument, because he distinguishes everyday speech from the divine form of speech associated with Śiva himself. The same issue is taken up again in some detail on ŚD 3.10–15ab.

Chapter Three of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti*: The Arguments against the Śāktas

The (Pratyabhijñā) doctrine of non-duality having been established, [Somānanda], immediately following his consideration of *paśyanti*, now turns his attention to philosophically proximate¹ proponents of (a related form of) non-dualism.² Accordingly,³ they say:

¹The term here used, *svayūthya*, literally means “one’s possession” or “belonging to one’s own troop/herd.” Kaul glosses with *svasamānajāti*, “those being of the same class as one’s own.”

²Note that Kaul suggests that Somānanda does so not to contradict the Śākta point of view, this by glossing *pratidanim ārambhaḥ* with *na tu nirākaraṇam ity arthaḥ*. My reasons for disagreeing with this assessment is, simply, that it is clear that the Śāktas in question, namely Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna and those who followed him, adopted to a substantial degree the philosophy of Bhartṛhari and the grammarians, in particular the doctrine of the supremacy of the feminine power, *paśyanti*, something Somānanda finds utterly untenable. Proof of the acceptance of the doctrine of *paśyanti* by the Śāktas criticized by Somānanda herein may be found in ŚD 3.9 and the ŚDVṛ on the same passage, where Somānanda says as much explicitly; in ŚD 3.15cd–16ab, where Somānanda considers a potential counterargument from the Śāktas, one based on the assumption that *paśyanti* is the means to liberation; and in ŚD 3.30cd, where Somānanda considers another objection of his Śākta opponents, who suggests that Śiva must be identical with *paśyanti* insofar as he is experienced in/as the universe, an objection answered in ŚD 3.85cd–86ab and 3.86cd–88ab. Finally, the reader is asked to compare ŚD 3.10a, where Somānanda argues that speech cannot be more than an organ of action, with ŚD 2.12cd–13ab and ŚD 2.89–91, where he leveled the same argument against the grammarians.

Somānanda, then, does in fact criticize the Śāktas represented by Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna in the present chapter. This does not mean, however, that he is opposed to all those who worship the goddess as the supreme deity. In fact, Somānanda’s position is rather this, that to praise *śakti* as supreme is proper, because Śiva and his powers are identical. Thus, when worshipping the goddess, one honors Śiva by implication, the two being identical in every way. As the identity of the power and the possessor of it is central to his view of the nature of reality, Somānanda has no place criticizing those who worship Śiva by way of honoring his form as power (*śakti*). He can, however, strongly criticize the Śākta who does not conceive of the goddess in this manner, as he has indeed done when suggesting (ŚD 3.4–5ab) that the Śāktas’ system would suffer the fatal fault of *reductio ad absurdum* in the absence of the recognition of *śakti* as a name for Śiva, for example. Simply, Somānanda is not antagonistic to those worshipers of the goddess-as-*śakti* who understand her to be identical with Śiva. At the same time, he is highly critical of those Śāktas who truly believe that the goddess-as-*śakti* is supreme to the exclusion of Śiva. Those claiming the supremacy of *paśyanti*, the feminine divine in the form of “seeing” (i.e., the power of cognition), of course fall into the category of philosopher-theologians who have earned themselves Somānanda’s unbridled scorn. Cf. the Introduction, section 14. Note that my translation of *pratidanim ārambhaḥ* with “now turns his attention to” is idiomatic, the passage literally meaning “now commences with (his consideration of).”

³In other words, *tathā ca* should be understood here to mean that the Śāktas say the following in accordance with their fidelity to non-dualism.

*yasyā nirupādhiḥ yotirūpāyāḥ śivasamjñāyā
vyapadeśaḥ parāṃ tām tvām ambāṃ nityam upāmahe*

We worship you constantly, Ambā, you who are the supreme mother, the form of limitless light, the one whom people call “Śiva.”⁴

3.I

Regarding this, [Somānanda] says:

*3.1. atha śakteḥ parāvasthā yair bhaktyā parigiyate
yuktyā prakāśito devas tataḥ śaktidaśā yataḥ*

Now, those who out of devotion proclaim that the supreme condition belongs to śakti promote God under a pretense, because the śakti condition immediately follows him.

It is simply (an act of) devotion to speak of the object that one thinks of as *śakti* herself as the form of the supreme condition,⁵ because there otherwise would be no way to specify the gender (of her name, *śakti*),⁶ for it⁷ is not separated from Śiva,⁸ since there is no possessor of power other than him;⁹ although being defined by a distinction (of her from him), this by dint of the signification (of

⁴The quotation is from the *Tattvagarbhasotra* (TGSt) of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, which is now lost. My translation substantially follows that of Dyczkowski (1992¹: 123). On the source of the quotation, see Dyczkowski 1992¹: 53; Torella 1994: xiv; and Sanderson 2007¹: 418, fn. 629. Cf. the Introduction, section 14.

⁵The meaning of the present passage—*śaktivenaivābhimatasyārthasya parāvasthārūpābhidhānam bhaktir eva*—is complex. Utpaladeva here is careful to indicate that the object (*artha*) praised by the Śāktas as the supreme condition is *thought* by them to be the goddess in the form of *śakti*. It is not in fact *śakti* but rather the supreme Śiva who is the possessor of the power(s) in question, according to Somānanda. What this means is that Utpaladeva constructs the present passage to suggest both that the Śāktas praise a form of the supreme condition and that they wrongly consider her to be the goddess, *śakti*, to the exclusion of her identity with Śiva.

⁶Kaul glosses: “This means: ‘in the absence of the masculine gender being the unmarked one’” (*sāmānyam puṃlīṅgam vinety arthaḥ*).

⁷This refers to the devotion, *bhakti*. To worship power, *śakti*, involves worship of Śiva himself by implication, this because there is no distinction between the power and the possessor of the power (ŚD 3.2cd) in the Pratyabhijñā. See, supra, note 2.

⁸The text literally refers to the “possessor of power” (*śaktimant*) in the compound *śaktimadabhinnā*, which can refer to Śiva alone and none other.

⁹The argument here put forward is that one cannot conclude that reference to the feminine divine involves a distinction of her from Śiva, no more than a distinction may be made between a power and the possessor of that power, the two being identical in the Pratyabhijñā. Rather, the use of the feminine gender is merely the result of the conventions of grammar: the use of the feminine gender must be the result of a transformation from the unmarked, masculine gender of the name of the deity. In other words, worship (*bhakti*) of the supreme in the form of a feminine deity involves merely the semantics of the gender of the various words for the divine. It is not, Utpaladeva suggests, the result of differentiating the feminine *śakti* from the masculine Śiva. Moreover, if reference to the supreme form of the divine as a feminine deity necessarily involved a distinction of the goddess from Śiva, then there would be no way

her name), it¹⁰ is able to point to the one immediately preceding her, because she is dependent on him.¹¹

Because they themselves say that the *śakti* condition is “a minimal swelling,”¹² etc., one that immediately follows him, i.e., follows after the supreme condition, the ones who praise the supremacy of *śakti* promote God, i.e., Śiva, under a pretense, that is, by means of (the) genuine non-duality (of Śiva and *śakti*), by means of (the expression of devotion to) that [*śakti* condition], it being a quality he possesses, he being based in himself, independent.

There is, moreover, absolutely no reason to enter into questions regarding the feminine gender, which is the marked gender; for masculinity is the unmarked gender of both the feminine and masculine [genders], while the neuter [gender], it not being a way of speaking of the state of being empowered,¹³ does not merit examination when one refers to the Lord of the universe in such a(n empowered) form. Thus, the power and the possessor of it are associated with the masculine [gender] in order to express (their) non-duality.

3.2ab

3.2. *tathā tadvyapadeśaś ced vyapadeśaḥ śivātmakaḥ*

Thus, if you argue that a reference is made to him, the reference is related to Śiva.¹⁴

to differentiate the grammatical genders of the various Sanskrit terms in question. This is so, because a difference in gender would always necessitate a difference in the very nature of the entity in question. For example, in this view any reference to Śiva's powers, the powers being referred to by a term (*śakti*) that is feminine in gender, would immediately suggest that they are utterly distinct from Śiva, whose name is masculine in gender.

¹⁰That is, the act of devotion.

¹¹In a manner similar to Somānanda's overlapping pairs of powers (see the Introduction, section 5), the argument here put forward suggests that *śakti*, power, is directly related to the agent who possesses it, namely Śiva, as the former exists in a latent form in the latter.

¹²Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, we are told, refers to *śakti* in this way. See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.13cd–17. Cf. the Introduction, section 14.

¹³Note that I understand the long *ā* of *śaktatā* to assimilate an initial short *a*, the so-called alpha-primitive, of the following term. In other words, I understand the compound to be composed of the following three words: *śaktatā-aparyāya-rūpa*. Thus, it speaks to the fact that the neuter gender is *not* used to refer to the state of being empowered. To understand the compound not to include the alpha-primitive would of course be to understand the compound to carry precisely the opposite meaning.

¹⁴Here, Somānanda argues that, insofar as the Śāktas refer to *śakti* as one “people call Śiva,” this demands that Śiva is also the referent, this on the argument that the masculine gender is primary, the feminine being a modification of it. In other words, he is appealing to a norm of grammar to argue that even the statement of the Śāktas points to the supremacy of Śiva, not the supremacy of the goddess. The reference to *śakti* as one called Śiva is, of course, found in what I have labeled TGSt passage #1, which was quoted by Utpaladeva in his introduction to ŚD 3.1, above.

Thus, if you maintain that the feminine gender makes reference to Paraśiva himself,¹⁵ then that reference, according to the aforementioned rule,¹⁶ is itself actually¹⁷ a name for Śiva.

3.2cd–3

[Somānanda] says absolutely no difference exists:

na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekiṇī
 3.3. śivaḥ śaktas tathā bhāvān icchayā kartum idr̥śān
 śaktiśaktimātor bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varṇyate

Śiva does not exist apart from śakti;¹⁸ *śakti* is not different (from Śiva). And Śiva is empowered to create such¹⁹ entities at will. In Śaivism, no difference whatsoever between power and the one possessing the power is described.²⁰

Even if Śiva does not exist apart from, i.e., absent of, *śakti*, are they one? To this, [Somānanda] says, “*śakti* is not different (from Śiva).”²¹ For instance, even in the everyday world, no difference (between Śiva and his power) exists as a result of the manifold diversity (that is the universe itself), for Śiva is empowered to create such ones, i.e., those created with difficulty, by his mere will,²² no difference of power from the one who possesses it, since it is not present, is ever

¹⁵Utpaladeva here suggests that *tadvyapadeśa* in ŚD 3.2a is a genitive determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound, with the pronoun *tat* referring to Paraśiva.

¹⁶As Kaul notes, the aforementioned rule is the one that suggests that, according to the Sanskrit grammarians, it is the masculine gender that takes precedent, the feminine gender being a modification of it: *pumllīṅgaṃ sāmānyam iti nyāyāt*. See p. 96, fn. 1 of the KSTS edition.

¹⁷This is a possible translation for *kārya*, “made, or done, fit right, etc.”

¹⁸As Kaul suggests, this is to say that there is no reason to assume use of the feminine gender indicates a distinction between Śiva and his power: “He (here) indicates his own final view, viz., that no mutual difference between the two [i.e., Śiva and *śakti*] is tenable, because of which a name in the feminine gender would have to be used (to distinguish *śakti* from the masculine Śiva)” (*na cānayoḥ parasparam bhedo yukto yena strilīṅgavyapadeśo 'py upapatsyata iti svamatena siddhāntayati*). See p. 96, fn. 2 of the KSTS edition. In other words, because Śiva is, according to the Pratyabhijñā, identical to his powers, reference to *śakti* does not differentiate her from him simply by virtue of reference to her with a term of the feminine gender. See, supra, note 2.

¹⁹The Sanskrit, *idr̥śa*, literally means “endowed with such qualities.” See the commentary for Utpaladeva’s gloss: *atiduṣkara*, i.e., “those created with difficulty.”

²⁰The present passage closely echoes VBh 18. Cf. ŚSū 1.17.

²¹Utpaladeva here exercises the commentator’s prerogative to explain in greater detail what he suggests is implied in the *mūla*, the source text on which he comments. Here, he wishes to account for the apparent redundancy of ŚD 3.2cd. It is not sufficient, he suggests, merely to state that Śiva is never found apart from his power, for to do so might suggest that the latter is a mere instrument of the former. He suggests, then, that the second quarter-verse (*pāda*) makes it clear that the two are mutually inseparable, which is to say they are identical.

²²In other words, at the moment of the manifestation of the universe, there is no distinction to be made between Śiva and the powers he uses to manifest reality. The two are one and the same. If there is no distinction between Śiva and his powers in this apparently dualistic condition, then there is never under any circumstances any distinction to be made of the one from the other.

described in Śaivism, whether with respect to mutual difference or any other,²³ as it is elsewhere in the philosophical systems that lack authority.

3.4–5ab

Pondering this itself, [Somānanda] says:

- 3.4. śakter eva svatantratvāt kartuṃ bhāvān vicitrakān
 sāmārthyam yađi kalpyeta tan nāmānantyam eva vā
 3.5. bhede hi śaktiḥ kiṃ kāryam karoty uta ca śaktimān

If you conceive of śakti's very capacity to create variegated entities as being the result of her independence, then (śakti is) a name (for Śiva); otherwise, it is simply an infinite regress. For, if they are different,²⁴ what object could śakti make, and what about the one possessing śakti?

Regarding this,²⁵ it is a fatal error if the instrument of action belongs to one who is unempowered.²⁶ If she is empowered, then, she being connected to another power, śakti has to be a name for Śiva himself, who is the basis of power.²⁷

Now, if you argue that it is to a(nother) power that the real, undivided śakti is connected,²⁸ then we reply: it is that distinct śakti that must create the object.

²³The term *avāntara*, “mutual difference,” refers to the type of difference whereby both A is not B and B is not A. The particle *api* is here used to impart the notion that all forms of difference, be it mutual difference or another, are ruled out in the examination of the relationship of power and the possessor of it.

²⁴Following the commentary, it is clear that *bhede*, a locative absolute construction comprised of a single word, refers to the possibility that a difference exists between the power and the possessor of the power in question.

²⁵This is to say that the present passage considers the fact that there is no difference between Śiva and his powers, as was mentioned in ŚD 3.3cd.

²⁶According to Kaul, such a position would allow anything to be created from even a mere void, the cause of any entity being devoid of the capacity to create the given entity. Kaul glosses: *sūnyād api sarvabhāvotpattiḥ syāt. anīṣṭāpattiḥ prasāṅgah*. See p. 97, fn. 3 of the KSTS edition.

²⁷Here, Utpaladeva comments in ŚD 3.4a–c, suggesting that if the Śaktas understand śakti to be that which creates, then she must either be empowered (*śakta*) or not. In the case of the former, śakti would merely be a name for Śiva, i.e., for the possessor of power, and thus the Śaktas' worship of the goddess is done merely out of devotion and not to distinguish her from Śiva (the two being anyway identical according to Śaiva theology). On the other hand, Utpaladeva suggests that it is impossible for the śakti that creates to be devoid of power, meaning it is illogical to conceive of śakti as anything other than another name for Śiva, the possessor of power. To conceive of her otherwise would demand that one consider the power to create to be devoid of agency. As Kaul suggests, it is the very fact of being empowered that is not different from Śiva's nature, because there would be no discussion of being empowered unless there is some connection to śakti. Kaul glosses: *tad eva śaktatvaṃ yat svātmani śaktiyavicchedaḥ, śaktisamavāyam vinā śaktatvasyaivānirvāhāt*. See Kaul's note 4, p. 97 of the KSTS edition.

²⁸Note that I understand *satyābhinnaśaktiyogas* to be a single compound, while K^{ed}. records the same as two separate words, viz.: *satyā bhinnaśaktiyogas*.

Otherwise, how could an unempowered [*śakti*] create?²⁹ (However:) if [the latter power] is (also) empowered, infinite regress would result from conceiving of another *śakti*, because there would be no end (to the empowered powers).³⁰

3.5cd–6ab

Moreover:

śaktimān eva śaktiḥ syāc chivavat karaṇārthataḥ
3.6. *śakteḥ svatantrakāryatvāc chivatvaṃ na kvacid bhavet*

Śakti, like Śiva, must be no one other than the possessor of power, because there has to be an instrument of action.³¹ Śiva-nature would not exist anywhere as a result of śakti being possessed of an independent effect of action.³²

As for *śakti*, she, acting as a result of being associated with another power, must be none other than the possessor of power,³³ this is so because an instrument of action that is the cause of creation must exist, which means that this is so because she must be an agent, as is Śivabhattachāra.³⁴

²⁹In other words, it is the second *śakti* that must create the object in question, not the first, which is not independently empowered in this view, but is only powerful insofar as it is the possessor of the second *śakti*. Thus, the second *śakti*, which must be empowered, creates the object. Yet, this second power, being like the first, itself is empowered only by being dependent on another, a third, *śakti*. This, in turn, must depend on a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*. On the other hand, if what we have labeled the second power is instead conceived of as belonging to what we have labeled the first power, the two being identical entities distinguished only by the semantics of discussing them, then what we have labeled the first power is simply Śiva by another name. The first power is thus a perfect analog for Śiva, because its identity and function are identical to those of Śiva.

³⁰Utpaladeva, glossing Somānanda, here wishes to suggest that there can only be two *śaktis*, one that accomplishes some action, and another that possesses or wields the first. He wishes to suggest that the Śāktas pay homage to the first *śakti*, the possessor of the latter one, which is to say they pay homage to the possessor of power (*śaktimant*), i.e., to Śiva by another name.

³¹In other words, on the view that *śakti* is supreme, *Śakti* must be a name for Śiva, because there must be an agent who wields the powers in question, who directs them and moves them according to his/her will. In the absence of such an agent, there can be no instrument that is employed to create anything. There would only be an infinite regress of powers relying on other powers, as argued above in ŚD 3.4–5ab.

³²The idea here expressed is simply this: there is no conceivable way for “power” (*śakti*) to create the universe in the absence of a creator, an agent who possesses the power(s) in question. This is so because the nature of Śiva, being the agent who possesses the powers and exercises his will, would exist nowhere. There would be only a chaos of powers, an infinite regress of powers depending on other powers to create the objective universe. Simply, there must be an order to the functioning of the powers, a “Śiva-nature” that shapes all reality.

³³The idea here explored relates to the hypothesis that only *śakti* creates, without the participation of Śiva. In such an instance, *śakti* would herself be empowered (*śaktā*), lest she be impotent (see, supra, ŚD 3.4–5ab), and thus she must be connected to some additional power (*śakti*) that is under her control.

³⁴Put differently, there must be some agent who wields the powers. If *śakti* is not considered the possessor of power, then there would be no cause for creation, no agent choosing how and when to act.

Moreover, the independent, self-reliant effect of *śakti*'s action would not have a basis in anything else.³⁵ Thus, Śiva-nature would not exist anywhere at all.³⁶ This is not appropriate for a Śaiva philosophy of those who are philosophically proximate (to our Śaiva non-dualism).³⁷

3.6cd

muñcato 'pi nijāṃ śaktiṃ svātantrye jñānam āpatet

As for him, if he, freeing his own power(s), were independent (of *śakti*), his (power of) cognition would be compromised.³⁸

If one were to accept Śivabhaṭṭāraka as freeing, i.e., as being separated from, (his own) power(s) . . . in reality, there being independence . . . [the cognition] acquires . . . the nonexistence of the state of being established as the object of cognition, because it does not cause the object of cognition to appear, and that . . .

Alternatively, if his own power were relinquished . . . for, that independence . . . cognition would exist in that very manner . . . due to the power being separated from the one possessing it, cognition would exist only with respect to a single object; [Somānanda] in this way refers to the possessor of power as something that arises from the cognition of that single object, the essence of the everyday world, empowered, one that is similar to that [cognition].³⁹

³⁵Utpaladeva here wishes to suggest, following Somānanda, that the production of an effect of action (*kārya*) by a power (*śakti*) in the absence of a possessor of the power in question (*śaktimant*) implies that the effect would be independent. It would not be linked to the agency and therefore the volition of the possessor of the power who has reasons for creating what he does. As a result, there would be no particular order to the universe, which would merely be a vortex of powers producing results. An effect that is not independent, then, is one that is not merely “self-reliant” (*svanibandhana*), but is linked to the intelligent design, as it were, of the agent who created it.

³⁶That is, Śiva-nature would not exist anywhere, because the effect of the action would be entirely independent, totally separated from the volition of the possessor of power, the agent, who the Śāktas are here imagined not to accept.

³⁷Utpaladeva would like again to suggest that the differences between the two schools must simply involve questions of semantics. The Śāktas cannot truly conceive of *śakti* as existing in the total absence of Śiva, for to do so, as we have seen, would lead to infinite regress (ŚD 3.4), and moreover the goddess as *śakti* would essentially perform all the functions of Śiva-the-possessor-of-power. In the absence of a possessor of power, the effect of action would not be linked to any volition of the its creator. It would be independent. The universe, as a result, would be chaotic. Therefore, the Śāktas must accept that their *śakti*, the goddess as power, must be a possessor of power, an agent. The difference, in short, is either a matter of nomenclature, not of true philosophical differences, or the Śāktas espouse an illogical, unfounded view of the existence of an endless chain of pure power.

³⁸In other words, if one considered Śiva to be autonomous on the basis of his being separated, albeit willfully, from his own power, the following would obtain. Note that the possibility of *śakti* existing in the absence of Śiva was considered in ŚD 3.5cd–6ab; the present passage considers the possibility of the existence of Śiva without his powers. Note that the commentary to the present passage survives only in fragments.

³⁹The pronoun (*tat*) in *tatsamāna* refers to the aforementioned “cognition” (*pratīti*).

3.7ab

Therefore, [Somānanda] says:⁴⁰

3.7. *na himasya pṛthak śaityaṃ nāgner auṣṇyaṃ pṛthag bhavet*

Coldness is not separated from snow, heat cannot be separated from fire.⁴¹

Power, i.e., the fact of being empowered, is a quality of one who is empowered thereby, and a quality cannot be separated from the one who possesses it, just as the cold and hot touch of snow and fire, respectively, are not known in their absence.⁴²

3.7cd–8

mantrastambhanatāyāṃ hi nāsau vahnis tadocyate

3.8. *hemādivad bhāsvaram tad dravyaṃ tair vyabhicāritam*

yady auṣṇyavyatirekatve dr̥ṣṭānto dāhakāśrayāt

Indeed,⁴³ (one might object that) a fire is not said to be one when in the state of being paralyzed by a mantra. Like gold, etc., it⁴⁴ is a brilliant substance.⁴⁵ If you argue that these⁴⁶ prove the erroneousness of our argument, (we reply:) the example would be a valid one if they were missing their heat, because fire depends on being something that burns.⁴⁷

⁴⁰In other words, having considered the negative consequences of imagining *śakti* to exist apart from Śiva (ŚD 3.5cd–6ab), on the one hand, and Śiva apart from *śakti* (3.6cd), on the other, Somānanda now says the following.

⁴¹Cf. VBh 19 for a parallel passage associated with heat and fire. (The same is quoted in Dyczkowski 1987: 99, fn. 2.)

⁴²It is not possible to know a cold or a hot touch in the absence of a cold or a hot substance. Similarly, entities that are by nature cold or hot do not appear absent of such inherent qualities. Simply, power and the one possessed of it are one and the same entity.

⁴³Kaul suggests that the gist of this passage is to refute the argument that it is possible to consider an entity devoid of its power. For example, the opponent suggests, there are instances of fire that is devoid of heat, this state being the result of a spell cast on the fire. Nevertheless, the opponent suggests, the entity in question continues to be “fire,” even absent its power, its capacity to burn. Not so, replies Somānanda, because fire is what fire does, and fire absent its heat would not be fire per se, but rather it would be some sort of brilliant object, as is gold. It would no longer be fire as such. The emphatic particle *hi* is connective with the previous half-verse, suggesting the present passage (ŚD 3.7cd–8) will support the aforementioned (ŚD 3.7ab) notion that fire is never separated from its heat, nor snow its cold touch.

⁴⁴The present refers to fire in the absence of its power to burn.

⁴⁵That is to say, it is not fire absent its heat. It is merely a brilliant object. Fire without the capacity to burn is no fire at all.

⁴⁶This, following Utpaladeva’s commentary, refers to gold, etc., or in other words the various “firey” substances associated with the element of fire that nevertheless do not possess the capacity to burn.

⁴⁷There are two parts to the present argument. In the first, Somānanda considers the possibility that his opponent will suggest that a fire that has had its capacity to burn removed by a mantra can serve as an example of an entity that exists apart from its power. (This is a possibility that neither Somānanda nor Utpaladeva doubts in the present discussion, it should be added.) Somānanda’s reply is to suggest that fire in that condition is no longer fire, but rather is merely a brilliant substance, like gold. That is, fire absent its heat is akin to one or another of the substances found in the world that is associated with *tejas*, the gross element (*mahābhūta*) of fire. (All entities are said to be associated with one or another

(Objection:) One can say that a fire whose heat is paralyzed by a mantra is a possessor of power that exists in the condition of being separated from its power.⁴⁸ Reply: Not so.⁴⁹ This is not the nature of fire: when that does not exist,⁵⁰ the heat of the fire is not found, in consequence whereof the fire, although it is made up of light, is, like gold, etc., a brilliant substance at that time.

Now, if you argue that the possessor of a power can be said to be separated from its power in precisely these, i.e., in such examples as gold, which consist of nothing but light, the gross element called fire, we reply: not so.⁵¹ There is no fault (in our argument), as fire, being hot only insofar as it burns, is used as an example in the absence of its power; it is not a simple fire.⁵²

3-9

3.9. *śaivaiḥ sadbhir vāca eva paśyantyādikrame sthitāḥ
kalpitās tair aśaivatvam ātmanaḥ pratipāditam*

The good⁵³ Śaivas who imagine that speech itself abides⁵³ in the sequence beginning with *paśyanti*⁵⁴ prove themselves not to be Śaivas at all.

Besides, those good ones who espouse the doctrine of (the supremacy of) *śakti*, although they are committed to the philosophy of Śaivism insofar as they say as much when they say “(we worship you constantly, Ambā, you who are the

of the five elements. As such, Somānanda’s first argument is to suggest that fire absent its heat is no longer fire, but is simply an entity associated with the *mahābhūta* of fire.) Next, Somānanda anticipates that his opponent will suggest that the very entities in the world that are linked to the *mahābhūta* of fire, the *tejas*-like entities such as gold, are themselves examples of entities separated from their powers. This is to say that the opponent suggests that all entities based in *tejas* are like fire absent its heat—they are fire devoid of its capacity to burn.

Somānanda replies by suggesting that there is a fundamental difference between fire and such entities. Fire is only fire when it burns. To remove from it the power to burn is to transform it into an entirely different entity. This different entity is akin to gold, which, though associated with the gross element *tejas* is not associated with the power to burn. In other words, it is not possible to suggest that entities like gold have had some capacity removed from them. They have not, because they never possessed the capacity to burn. As for fire, it is simply no longer fire when it is absent its power to burn, but rather is an entirely different entity, a brilliant object, like gold. Somānanda, then, ingeniously dismisses the possibility of removing the power to burn from fire by associating such a modified form of fire with the *mahābhūta* of fire, only subsequently to dismiss the possibility that such entities should be associated with the capacity to burn at all.

⁴⁸Utpaladeva here suggests that *mantrastambhanatā* (ŚD 3.7c) is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound.

⁴⁹I here read the negative particle (*na*) twice, with both what precedes and what follows it (*dehalīdīpavat*).

⁵⁰By the standard rules of anaphora, “that” (*tai*) of “when that is absent” (*tad-abhāva*) should refer to the nonexistence of the nature of fire (*vahnitva*).

⁵¹I here read the negative particle (*na*) twice, with both what precedes and what follows it (*dehalīdīpavat*).

⁵²For an explanation of this argument, see notes 46 and 47, above.

⁵³The adjective in question, *sat*, is apparently used sarcastically, as it is in, e.g., ŚD 2.8c.

⁵⁴That is, in the sequence of speech that includes the three levels highlighted by Bhartṛhari: *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*.

supreme mother,) the form of limitless light, the one whom people call Śiva,⁵⁵ imagine that speech itself, which exists in a sequence of those [stages] named *paśyantī*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*, is the universe. Whence, having begun by saying:

*yāvan nonmeṣabhāg aṇuḥ
na tāvad arthe varteta sa conmeṣaḥ kriyā matā
kriyā ca nānārūpaiva*

As long as the individual does not partake in the expansion of consciousness,⁵⁶ he does not relate to the object; and we maintain that the expansion of consciousness is an action, and an action must have a variegated form, they go on to express their own discord with Śaivism:

*svasvabhāvasthitiṃ muktvā tasmān nānyāsti sā daśā
śive yasyāṃ na vāgrūpaṃ sūkṣmam aprāptasamnidhi*

Having abandoned the fixed condition of its own nature,⁵⁷ the level (in question) is (nevertheless) not different from [that nature], O Śivā, in which exists the subtle form of speech the visibility of which is not yet full-grown.⁵⁸

3.10–12ab

For instance:⁵⁹

*3.10. śaive vāca indriyatvam atha nādādinoditā
tadabhyāse phalāvāptiḥ sūkṣmamantrasvarūpatā*

⁵⁵Utpaladeva here refers to the verse quoted in the *avataraṇikā* introducing ŚD 3.1.

⁵⁶Literally, *nonmeṣabhāk* refers to the one that “does not participate in the opening of the eyes.” This is a reference to Śiva as the yogin who by opening and closing his eyes creates and dissolves the phenomenal universe.

⁵⁷This presumably refers to the abandonment of the nature of the supreme level prior to the manifestation of the universe, the apparent implication being that manifestation requires this abandonment of “the fixed condition of its own true nature” (*svasvabhāvasthiti*).

⁵⁸This pair of passages, clearly taken from the beginning and end, respectively, of a larger excerpt of text to which Utpaladeva would like to direct the reader’s attention, have been labeled by me as TGSt passage #4a and #4b, respectively, in the Introduction (section 14, subsection entitled “Known and Heretofore Unidentified Passages of the *Tāitvagarbhastotra*”). The first passage may be understood to signal the presence in the TGSt of the Spanda notion of the expansion of consciousness associated with Śiva’s act of opening his eyes (*unmeṣa*) and the concept of action as a “variegated form” (*nānārūpā*), this likely being a reference to the grammarians’ famous definition of action (cf. note 164 of chapter 1 of the translation, as well as the Introduction, section 5). TGSt passage #4b, in turn, refers to a subtle form of manifested speech that is apparently difficult to recognize. While this passage apparently offers an argument for a certain continuity of the nature of existence, from some transcendental state to the manifested one, it nevertheless also seems to point to the necessary abandonment of “the fixed condition” of the very nature of some entity—perhaps *śakti*—that subsequently manifests the universe in the form of speech. It seems, then, that the primary concern with the passage in question is the very declaration that the universe is formed of speech.

⁵⁹In other words, the following exemplifies the discord between those who hold that *śakti* is supreme and the view put forward by Somānanda.

- 3.11. *kalpitā kālapādādau nādākhyam yat paraṃ tv iti
parāparādibhedaś ca tatraiva pratipāditāḥ*
3.12. *ity anena varṇitātra vāca eva parātmatā*

In Śaivism, speech is an organ. Objection: In the *Kālapāda* and elsewhere, the attainment of rewards is conceived of as the state of having a subtle mantric nature, when one is practiced in it: “that which is supreme, called *nāda* . . .”⁶⁰ Moreover, the division into the *parāparā* (condition), etc., is taught in the very same [scripture]. Therefore, the supremacy of speech itself is taught by this [scripture].⁶¹

Indeed, in Śaivism, as in the Sāṅkhya, speech is simply an organ of action that exists in the extremely low condition of those people created by Śiva.⁶²

Objection: By saying “for the one whose consciousness is absorbed in *nāda* . . .”⁶³ and so on, [scripture] says that the attainment of rewards, conceived of as the state of having a subtle mantric nature, occurs through speech herself, as in, for example, the *Kālottara*: “the supreme seed (of sound), called *nāda*”; the state of (speech) being divided into the *parāparā* (condition), etc., is declared (therein), as well. Therefore,⁶⁴ speech herself is supreme, according to this, i.e., the Śaiva work (in question); how is this not appropriate?⁶⁵

The word “and” in ŚD 3.11b is added *metri causa*.

⁶⁰We may identify the source of the present quotation as the second verse of the [*Śatika*]-*Kālaṅghāna*, which reads as follows: *nādākhyam yat paraṃ bijam sarvabhūteṣv avasthitam*. (See Goodall 2007: 130.) The same is identical with the *Sārdhatriśatikālotataratantra* 1.5ab. The entire verse in question reads as follows in the *Sārdhatriśatikālotataratantra*: *nādākhyam yat paraṃ bijam sarvabhūteṣv avasthitam / muktidaṃ paramaṃ divyaṃ sarvasiddhipradāyakaṃ*. We may tentatively translate: “The supreme seed (of sound), called *nāda*, which exists in all which exists, leads to liberation, is supreme, divine, that which bestows all powers.” It is likely that it is to this verse that Somānanda’s opponent directs the reader’s attention. Note that because Utpaladeva suggests that the passage in question includes the connective particle *tu* only as a verse-filler, I have not rendered it in translation. See the commentary, below.

⁶¹Cf. ŚD 2.89–91 for an exceedingly similar argument.

⁶²In other words, speech exists only as an organ of action belonging to those beings who Śiva creates after having first created the universe, etc. My translation is idiomatic. The text reads *aṅyatādhas tanadaśāyām*, which literally means “at the extremely low level of progeny.” For the place of speech in the hierarchy of *tattvas* as formulated by the Sāṅkhya, see, e.g., Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 49–65.

⁶³The source of this quotation has yet to be traced.

⁶⁴The commentary here reads *iti tasmāt*. The former is a lemma (ŚD 3.12a) that is glossed by the latter term. This suggests that *ity anena* (ŚD 3.12a) should be understood as two words, the first (*iti*) meaning “therefore” (*tasmāt*), while the latter, as Utpaladeva goes on to gloss, should be taken to mean “by this, i.e., by the Śaiva scripture (in question)” (*anena śaivagrāthana*).

⁶⁵In other words, given that the Śaiva scripture in question suggests that speech is supreme, how can Somānanda and Utpaladeva object to the notion of the supremacy of speech? Note that the scripture in question is one of the Śaiva Siddhānta, the dualist tradition often considered to be inferior in status to the non-dual scriptures followed by practitioners of the Trika and other non-dual schools. See the Introduction, section 12, for a discussion of this phenomenon.

3.12cd–13ab

naitan na vācaḥ kathitaṃ patīśabdasya varṇitam

3.13. *śabdasya viśayākhyasya na kadācid udāhṛtam*

(Reply:) Not so.⁶⁶ This is not said of (the organ of) speech; it describes the one whose name is “The Lord.” It is never said of sound, which is labeled an object of sense.

Reply: This is not so; for, that is not said there⁶⁷ of the organ of speech, which is relegated to (the level of) the bound soul,⁶⁸ nor is supremacy⁶⁹ ever, i.e., anywhere, taught to belong to sound, which is labeled an object of sense. Rather, it⁷⁰ is said to belong to the one who, being made up of great mantras, has a sonorous nature when in the state of being the Lord, i.e., when the fact of being Īśvara is accomplished.

3.13cd–15ab

tathā cāha khetapālaḥ śabdarāśer viśeṣatām

3.14. *svāyambhuvasya tīkāyāṃ bādham ityādinā guruḥ*

tathā mataṅgaṭīkāyāṃ vyākhyāniguruṇoditam

3.15. *mantrāṇāṃ paraśabdānām uktaṃ vāco na jātucit*

Accordingly, the guru Khetapāla says in the *Svāyambhuvaṭīkā* that a special quality exists for the multitude of sounds: “Indeed . . .”⁷¹ Similarly, the guru Vyākhyāni has said in the *Mataṅgaṭīkā* that the same belongs to mantras, to supreme speech, never to (the organ of) speech.⁷²

In his commentary on the scripture *Svāyambhuva* the guru Khetapāla speaks of the multitude of sounds not in its common sense, that is to say, as simple audible sound, but in its special sense as transcendental (sound), since it resides within the power of the agent in the form of the Mantra. He does so in the passage that begins after the challenge “Does the multitude of sounds have a

⁶⁶In other words, Somānanda argues that it is not the case that the Śaiva scriptural sources suggest that the organ of speech (*vāgindriya*) is supreme. ŚD 3.12cd–13ab constitutes Somānanda’s reply to the objection he anticipated in the preceding passage, in ŚD 3.10b–12.

⁶⁷This is to say that so much is not said in the (*Sārdhatriśati*-) *Kālotaratantra*.

⁶⁸“Bound soul” is a translation of *baddhānu*.

⁶⁹The Sanskrit here reads *tat paratva*. It is also possible that the present construction is a compound wherein the demonstrative pronoun refers to Śiva, *tatparatva* in this instance being a genitive determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound meaning “his [i.e., Śiva’s] supremacy.”

⁷⁰The present term refers to “supremacy,” *paratva*.

⁷¹Khetapāla is a name for Sadyojyotiś (about which see Sanderson 2006²: 45, fn. 9). The present quotation may be found in his *Svāyambhuvaṭīkā*, his commentary on the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha*, commentary on 1.3. See note 73, below.

⁷²The *Mataṅgaṭīkā* of Vyākhyāni is lost. The present quotation, moreover, is the primary evidence of the existence of this little-known figure in the history of the Śaiva Siddhānta. See Sanderson (2006²: 80–81, esp. fn. 53) for his discussion of Vyākhyāni and for his translation of ŚD 3.14cd–15ab, which I have here followed in part.

special nature?” with the words “Indeed (it has). There is one (form of sound) that is identical with Śiva and another that is a bond (of the soul).”⁷³

Similarly, the very same special quality is mentioned in the *Mataṅgaṭikā* by the guru named Vyākhyāni. Thus he has said: “. . . of the Mantras at the level of the agent of cognition and of sounds on the highest level, never of the organ of speech. For, the organ of speech is limited to the level of *māyā*. Sound, however, if it has the form of the transcendental sense-datum, being one with the gross element of ether in its transcendental nature, is what is meant by the ‘face’ of the Supreme Lord in the (formulas of the) installation of the five Brahma(mantras).”⁷⁴ This, moreover, is shown in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.⁷⁵

3.15cd–16ab

tatra vā tadupāyatvāt paratvenopacāritā

3.16. *kiraṇeṣu tathā coktaṃ nādabindvādinedṛṣam*

Alternatively, (you might argue,) regarding this:⁷⁶ she is revered as the supreme on account of her being a means. Accordingly, so much is said in the *Kiraṇa* by way of (reference to) *nāda*, *bindu*, and so on.⁷⁷

⁷³The present translation is based on that of Sanderson 2007: 56–57, fn. 27. Filiozat’s edition (1994: 12, lines 2–3) records the passage as follows: *kiṃ ca śabdārāśer viśeṣaś cābādhitāḥ śivātmako ‘nyataras ca pāśātmakah*. As Sanderson notes (2006²: 57, fn. 28), the passage is here corrupt, and the one known to Somānanda and Utpaladeva would have read: *kiṃ śabdārāśer viśeṣo ‘stī. bādham. ekaḥ śivātmako ‘nyaś ca pāśātmakah*.

⁷⁴The present translation, from “Thus, he has said” to “the five Brahma(mantras)” is based on that of Sanderson (2006²: 81, fn. 53). As Sanderson explains therein, Vyākhyāni is here referring to “the Mantra element TATPURUṢAVAKTRĀYA in the sequence ĪŚĀNAMŪRDHĀYA/ĪŚĀNAMŪRDHNE TATPURUṢAVAKTRĀYA AGHORAHRDAYĀYA VĀMADEVAGUHYĀYA SADYOJĀTAMŪRTAYE in the Vyomavāpimantra.” For this, Sanderson refers the reader to the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, Kriyāpāda 1.72c–76b; and to the PTV on PT 26ab (*mūrdhni vaktre ca hṛdaye guhye mūrtau tathaiḥ ca / nyāsam kṛtvā*): *mūrdhādhīni bāhye tathocitarūpāni. vastutaḥ paraṃ brahmarūpābhihitapañcātmakavyomādidharanyanta-satattveśānādisāracidunmeśecchājñānakriyārūpāṇy eva mantralingād yathā mantra* ĪŚĀNAMŪRDHNE TATPURUṢAVAKTRĀYA AGHORAHRDAYĀYA VĀMADEVAGUHYĀYA SADYOJĀTAMŪRTAYE *iii*.

⁷⁵It is unclear to what Utpaladeva refers the reader here. There is no mention of the five-Brahma initiation rite in the ĪPK or ĪPVṛ. There is similarly little discussion of the nature of the *mahābhūtas* or *tanmātras* as they relate to Parameśvara, the Supreme Lord, in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ. Perhaps the reader is referred to ĪPK 3.1.10–11, where Utpaladeva outlines the structure of the external universe, including the gross elements (*mahābhūtas*) or the “sense-data”/“subtle elements” (*tanmātras*), the universe there being said to be the product of the cognition of the knowing subject. (It is there said that there are two types of knowing subjects, moreover, including the limited one and the unlimited Śiva, the former, according to ĪPK 3.1.9, itself ultimately being an object of the latter.) If this is the passage to which Utpaladeva here refers the reader, then one should understand the present passage to point to two levels of sound, one at the supreme level, in the mouth of the supreme Śiva, the other at the mundane level of the individual agent of cognition, who is ultimately the product of Śiva’s very cognition.

⁷⁶Here, *tatra*, literally “there/in that,” should be understood to refer to the question of the supremacy of speech.

⁷⁷Somānanda’s reference to the mention of *nāda*, *bindu*, etc., in the KT may well refer to KT 3.23cd: *nādabindukhamantrāṇuśaktibijakalāntagaḥ*. Goodall (1998: 290–291) translates: “He is in primal unvoiced sound [*nāda*], in almost gross sound [*bindu*], in (the sound of) ether, in (the gross sound of) mantras (that express Śiva Himself), in (the coarser mantra-souls called) *aṅus*, in the power (which controls those), in the seed(-syllables such as Om that precede the enunciation of mantras) [*bija*], in the sound units (of the seeds) [*kalā*], and in the end(-sounds such as the final nasalization of the seed syllable Om).”

Now, you might argue: *paśyanti* herself, by way of devotion, is conceived of as supreme, because she is the means for acquiring speech in the form of the supreme mantra. Accordingly, such⁷⁸ a reverential theme is articulated in the auspicious *Kiraṇasamhitā* by way of (reference to) *nāda*, *bindu*, and so on.⁷⁹

3.16cd

tadupāyāt paratvaṃ ced dipāder apy upāyatā

(Reply:) If you argue that she⁸⁰ is supreme insofar as she is the means,⁸¹
(we reply:) lamps, etc., are also means.⁸²

(Reply:) That⁸³ is expressed differently in the *Kiraṇa*, etc. As you have formulated the question,⁸⁴ the supremacy that would result from her simply existing in the form of a means would exist for even a lamp, etc., because they would wrongly be considered to be supreme on the basis of being means for cognition. Thus, the doctrine of the supremacy of *paśyanti* is not appropriate for these representatives of the (non-dual) Śaiva doctrine.⁸⁵

⁷⁸Note that *evamvidha*, “such/of such a kind,” is a gloss of *idr̥śa* (ŚD 3.16b), translated with “so much,” above.

⁷⁹The idea here expressed is that, insofar as the *Kiraṇatantra* refers to *nāda*, *bindu*, and so on, it implies that *paśyanti* is supreme. Thus, asks the hypothetical Śākta opponent, why is his own declaration of her supremacy problematic? The answer to this objection is given in ŚD 3.16cd. Note that KT 3.23cd does not refer to *paśyanti*, but Rāmakaṇṭha does in his commentary thereon, where he quotes VP 1.166 in support of the notion that *paśyanti* is the equivalent of the supreme level of sound mentioned in the verse of the KT in question. See KVṛ ad KT 3.23cd (Goodall 1998: 84–86, esp. 85; and 292–294, esp. 293).

⁸⁰The present “she” refers to *paśyanti*, the referent of the pronoun (*tat*) in the ablative determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound (*tadupāya*), she being the logical subject of the present, nominal sentence.

⁸¹Note that, following Utpaladeva’s commentary, I have translated *tadupāya* as though the text read *tadupāyatva*, “because she is the means.” Somānanda uses the expression *tadupāyatva* in ŚD 3.15c, and *tadupāya* here is clearly an abbreviation of the same, one that is here used for metrical reasons.

⁸²The present passage serves as a response to the possible objection that speech must be supreme by virtue of being the means to acquiring the power of the mantras. See supra, ŚD 3.15cd–16ab, and Utpaladeva’s commentary on the same. Note that the passage of the KT in question (KT 3.23cd) suggests that Śiva appears in the form of speech so that he may be experienced, known. Rāmakaṇṭha suggests the same in his commentary on the passage in question. See KVṛ ad KT 3.23cd (Goodall 1998: 86, lines 35–36): *tān etān mantrāvasthāviśeṣān pumsām anugrahārthaṃ śarīratayā tadākāradhyeyatvena gato bhagavān*. Goodall (1998: 296) translates: “The Lord resides in [gataḥ] these same [tān etān] particular aspects of mantras (using them) as His bodies, in order to bestow compassion on souls, because their forms are ones on which it is possible to meditate.”

⁸³This refers to “supremacy,” *paratva*.

⁸⁴“As you have formulated the question” is an idiomatic translation of *tatra*, literally “in that” or “regarding that.”

⁸⁵Notice that Utpaladeva here allows for the possibility that the Śākta school in question cannot accept the point of view that Somānanda attributes to them. There is, in other words, a difference in tone apparent here between Somānanda’s and Utpaladeva’s treatment of the Śāktas. Somānanda is rather more willing to discredit his opponent, while Utpaladeva sometimes appears to wish to suggest that the Śāktas could not and therefore do not hold the views Somānanda imagines them possibly to hold, because they could not do so and remain committed to a position that is sympathetic to that of the Pratyabhijñā.

Moreover, per the manner just explained,⁸⁶ the doctrine of an independent power, although mentioned, is not accepted by these [Śaiva scriptural sources].⁸⁷

3.17

3.17. *tasmāt samagrākāreṣu sarvāsu pratipattiṣu
vijñeyam śivarūpatvaṃ svaśaktyāveśanātmakam*

Therefore, Śiva-nature, which consists in being penetrated by his powers, should be understood to exist in every form (appearing) in any cognition.⁸⁸

Therefore, i.e., as a consequence of the inappropriateness of the doctrine that *śakti* alone exists, one should know that the Śiva-nature of the Lord, the possessor of power, exists in absolutely every form that appears in any cognition, i.e., in those (mundane cognitions) produced merely by organs (of knowledge) and the mind. The teaching should be understood to be that [Śiva-nature] is made up of the previously mentioned⁸⁹ state of unity of all of his powers.

3.18ab

3.18. *svaniṣṭhe śivatā deve pṛthivyādāv apidr̥ṣam*

Śiva-nature exists in God, who is self-contained; the same exists in the earth, etc., as well.

Just as Śiva-nature, i.e., the activity⁹⁰ of all the *śaktis*, exists in the Supreme Lord, who is self-contained, i.e., fixed in pure Śiva-nature, so also precisely the same form exists for those (levels of reality) extending as far as the earth(-*tattva*), as well.⁹¹

3.18cd–20

*pinde vā kaṭikāyāṃ vā kiṃ suvarṇatvam iṣyate
3.19. na bhūṣaṇe kuṇḍalādau yathā tatra svaśaktiṭaḥ
rūpakatvaṃ gataṃ hema na śaktyaiva svatantrayā*

⁸⁶ Presumably, Utpaladeva here refers to the fact that speech is of different types, as is argued in ŚD 3.12cd–15ab.

⁸⁷ Reference to the “independent power” is perhaps meant to refer to the use of the term *śakti* in KT 3.23d, quoted above in note 77. It is more likely, however, that Utpaladeva had in mind KT 4.1–2, where it is said that Śiva awakens Ananta, the attendant who does everything for Śiva to run the manifested universe. Cf. KT 3.27, where Śiva is said to awaken Ananta with his power.

⁸⁸ The present verse echoes ŚD 1.5–6ab in part.

⁸⁹ See ŚD 1.3–4ff.

⁹⁰ As noted in ŚD 1.11b, the term here used, *vilolatā*, suggests that the powers are “unsteady, tremulous,” or in other words they are active, *vilolatā* standing in contrast to the “state of unity” (*sāmarasya*) mentioned in ŚD 1.3–4.

⁹¹ The equal presence of Śiva-nature from the highest *śivatattva* down to the lowest of the thirty-six *tattvas* was explained in ŚD 1.39–41ab.

3.20. *tathēcchayā samāviṣṭas tathā śaktitrayeṇa ca
tathā tathā sthito bhāvair ataḥ sarvaṃ śivātmakam*

Can one maintain, on the other hand,⁹² that the nature of gold may possibly⁹³ exist in the ball on the (goldsmith's) mat, but not in the ornament, such as an earring?⁹⁴ Just as gold takes form therein⁹⁵ by virtue of its own power, not as the result of an absolutely independent power, so also the one penetrated⁹⁶ by will and, in like manner, by the triad of powers,⁹⁷ exists in various ways as the (many) entities.⁹⁸ Hence, everything has Śiva-nature.⁹⁹

Indeed, it is not possible to say that the nature of gold exists only in the ball that sits on the (goldsmith's) mat, it simply having yet to acquire a form that is manifested of a part of it as an ornament of one kind or another, or the like, while it does not in the (very ornaments forged out of it,) earrings, etc. Rather, it is only the gold, connected with the power to assume form, that exists equally in every one of them.¹⁰⁰ It is gold that exists as what is referred to as the ball, and the same is the possessor of power that proceeds (into manifestation).¹⁰¹

⁹²“On the other hand” serves to translate the connective particle *vā* that immediately follows *piṇḍa* in ŚD 3.18c. In other words, I take *vā* to connect the present passage with the preceding, here suggesting in a statement contrary to fact what would have to be true for the preceding declaration (in ŚD 3.18ab) to be false—namely, that the same Śiva-nature exists in all entities from Śiva himself to the lowest of *tattvas*.

⁹³“Possibly” serves to translate the second *vā* in ŚD 3.18c.

⁹⁴The question, then, is a rhetorical one: can the product differ fundamentally from its material cause?

⁹⁵That is, the nature of gold exists equally in the earring, etc., as it does in the ball of gold prior to being forged.

⁹⁶The language of “penetration,” as noted earlier, is common in the Pratyabhijñā and appears in particular in the *maṅgala* verse (ŚD 1.1).

⁹⁷The triad of powers refers to will (*icchā*), cognition (*jñāna*), and action (*kriyā*) (for which see ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.6cd–7ab, where Śiva's “triple nature” [*tritayātman*] is glossed by Utpaladeva as having the three powers as its form: *tritayātmamecchājñānakriyārūpayā*). It thus strikes one as redundant for Somānanda to refer to both the triad of powers and to the power of will. With the first reference to will, however, Somānanda likely has in mind the first movement of will, eagerness or *aunmukhya*, which precedes the full expression of the power of will (*icchāśakti*) and arises prior to any activity. Cf. ŚD 1.7cd–8; and see the Introduction, section 5.

⁹⁸My translation here, as in the rendering of Utpaladeva's commentary, is idiomatic. Literally, the passive construction suggests that the various entities establish Śiva in the present condition, which is to say that even in manifesting entities, the manifestations show Śiva to be nevertheless possessed of his powers, will, etc. I have thus translated in the active voice and given agency not to the entities in question, but to Śiva himself. While a slight misrepresentation of the syntax, it is nevertheless justified by Pratyabhijñā theology. See, e.g., ŚD 1.22–23 for an explanation of the equal presence of the powers in Śiva, whether manifested or not.

⁹⁹Compare the present passage to ŚD 1.46cd–47. The analogy of gold to Śiva's consciousness is again used in ŚD 3.44cd–45ab and in ŚD 3.49cd–50.

¹⁰⁰Literally, *sarvatraiva* means “absolutely everywhere.”

¹⁰¹I take *tathā* to mean “and,” and the neuter gender of *śaktimant* indicates that it describes the neuter term “gold” (*suvarṇa*). Thus, the idea is that gold—described by Utpaladeva, above, as *vikārāpattīśaktiyuta*, literally: “connected with the power to assume form”—possesses within it the capacity to take shape. Gold is therefore analogous to Śiva, the one wielding divine powers.

On the other hand, the earring, too, proceeds, in a different manner (into manifestation), it being fully a possessor of power; but it is not an independent power that causes gold to take such a shape,¹⁰² because one does not observe it¹⁰³ separated from that.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the (present) dispute concerns (merely) the name of the power when it takes the form of the gold that is being seen;¹⁰⁵ and, moreover, [Somānanda] mentioned previously that the power of that, too, is what is wished for in becoming the earring, and so on.¹⁰⁶

Thus, like gold, the Supreme Lord himself is possessed of the aforementioned¹⁰⁷ powers of will, etc., and he exists as all things in a variety of forms with all their peculiar characteristics, the *tattvas*, the worlds, cause and effect, etc. Hence, everything has that very Śiva-nature, but the same may not be said of *śakti*-nature.

On the other hand, one speaks of a *śakti*-nature when one has in mind the conventional division of powers: “the entire world is the powers.”¹⁰⁸ In reality, however, nothing but Śiva-nature exists.¹⁰⁹

3.21–25

3.21. *ityukte 'tra samākṣepaḥ pakṣasyāśya vidhiyate*
ādau tāvad vikāritvaṃ śivatattvasya jāyate

¹⁰²Literally, “the fact of being thus” (*tathātvā*), or in other words the fact of having the particular shape in question. Gold appears as such by nature, not as a result of some other power.

¹⁰³This refers to the aforementioned power that is associated with the ornament in question.

¹⁰⁴This refers to the gold that is possessed of the power to appear as the ornament, literally to “proceed (into manifestation).” This is to say that the power of the ornament to appear in the manifested universe cannot be separated from the power of the gold, of which the ornament is made. By analogy, all power exists ultimately in Śiva himself, even though all entities that are manifested in the apparently diverse universe are themselves equally *śaktimant*, possessors of power.

¹⁰⁵In other words, the gold appears as a brilliant object, regardless of what we call it. If one says “this is gold” when observing a ball of gold, and one instead says “this is an earring” when looking at a golden earring, the nature of the gold in each instance is the same, the difference being merely semantic.

¹⁰⁶The present seems to suggest that the power of the gold to take form is based in the volition, the power of will, associated with it. By analogy, all entities are created by Śiva’s very will. This was discussed at length in the first chapter of the ŚD, as well as in the Introduction, section 5.

¹⁰⁷See, e.g., ŚD 1.2–4, 1.6cd–8, 1.19–22, 1.24–25, 1.29cd–33, and 1.39–41ab; etc.

¹⁰⁸The passage in question, according to Torella (1994: xxx, fn. 43), is from the *Śrīmaṅgalāśāstra*, a work included in the list of Bhairavatantras given by the *Śrīkaṅthisaṃhitā*. Cf. ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.5: *vastutaḥ śaktivikāso viśvam*.

¹⁰⁹The present passage apparently suggests that there exists a moment in which Śiva-nature exists, but *śakti*-nature does not. How otherwise to interpret Utpaladeva’s suggestion that everything is possessed of Śiva-nature, while the same cannot be said of *śakti*-nature. Doesn’t this contradict the idea articulated, above (in ŚD 3.2cd–3ff.), that suggests that no distinction whatsoever may be drawn between Śiva and his powers? The only plausible explanation for the present passage, which suggests that one only speaks of the nature of the powers in the manifested universe, is that the present may be attributed to Utpaladeva’s panentheism, for Somānanda surely would not object to expressing the *śakti*-nature of all entities, so long as that nature as power were understood to be fully identical with Śiva himself, who wields the powers.

- 3.22. *nānāvīkārārūpeṇa jadatāivam avasthitā
tathā sāvaṃvatvaṃ ca parādhinatvaṃ eva ca*
3.23. *kṣīravat pariṇāmitve śuddhāśuddhaparāpara-
nyūnatvādi vināśītvam tathollaṅghananiṣkṛtiḥ*
3.24. *yatropari na hastādi neyam īśvarasamnidhau
tatra pādavihārādeḥ sphuṭam eva niṣiddhatā*
3.25. *evam sati samagrasya vyavahārasya bhaṅgitā
tathaivam sampravṛttau tu nimittakalanāpatet*

The aforementioned having been stated, a thoroughgoing critique is now directed at this view. First of all, the *śivatattva* changes.¹¹⁰ As a result of the variegated, changing form, insentience similarly exists (there). Thus, it is composed of parts and it is dependent on others. Given that a real transformation occurs, as with milk, a state of transformation exists (there), one of purity and impurity, difference and similarity, inadequacy, and so on. In addition, the expiation of sin (would be required): it is absolutely clear that walking, etc., is forbidden on the place where the Lord is present, on which there is neither a hand nor another (placed).¹¹¹ This being so, all of everyday existence is disturbed, and, in this way, there arises the question as to the motive for manifestation.¹¹²

Having stated in this way¹¹³ that absolutely everything has Śiva-nature, others, (accepting) this [view] being so,¹¹⁴ challenge this view in various ways.

First of all, this is the major fault: if the *śivatattva*, understood to be made of consciousness and to be forever¹¹⁵ free from growth and deterioration, is the nature of the universe, then it changes, i.e., it acquires a similarity with clay, etc.¹¹⁶

Moreover, as a result of the variegated form of the perceptible objects, the earth(-*tattva*), etc., it is insentient in the condition in question.

¹¹⁰Literally: “the fact that the *śivatattva* has a changing nature is produced (by the Śaiva point of view).”

¹¹¹*Iyam*, a feminine pronoun, should refer either to the feminine abstract noun *niṣiddhatā* in ŚD 3.24d or to °*niṣkṛti* in the preceding verse (3.23d). It is very possible the text is here corrupt.

¹¹²Note that I understand the connective particle (*tu*) found in ŚD 3.25c to be a verse-filler, and I have therefore not rendered it in translation.

¹¹³That is, having described the existence of Śiva-nature in everything from Śiva himself to the lowest form of material existence, the following must be considered. See ŚD 3.18ab and 3.18cd–20.

¹¹⁴Note that I understand *asmin sati* to be a separate locative absolute clause, one meaning literally “this being so” and referring, in a gloss of *atra* (ŚD 3.21a), to the notion that the opponent of the Śaiva point of view accepts for the sake of argument the Śaiva tenet that everything is possessed of Śiva-nature. Having done so, the opponent then proceeds to challenge the position by pointing to the unwanted consequences it would necessitate.

¹¹⁵The Sanskrit here reads *śaśvad eva*.

¹¹⁶The implication here is that the *śivatattva* would be similar to other material causes, such as the clay that is transformed into a pot, and so on. Insofar as it inheres in all entities, it must undergo a transformation if it is to appear in a variety of forms. Clay serves an example of an inherens (the *samavāyi-kāraṇa*) in the *satkāryavāda*.

Thus, i.e., in like manner, it is composed of parts. Although it has a unitary form as consciousness, and even though it is the Lord, it is dependent on others insofar as it is reliant on other entities when it produces and destroys (them) and insofar as it is that which may be enjoyed.¹¹⁷

In accepting the doctrine of real, material transformation,¹¹⁸ it¹¹⁹ acquires mutually exclusive forms, pure, impure, etc., in a manner similar to that of milk and curds: just as milk, which is pure, is impure when transformed into urine, so too is (Śiva's) supremacy and greatness when in the condition of material manifestation, and a lack of supremacy and an inadequacy exist in the condition of the mass of created entities. Thus, insofar as it¹²⁰ is itself not different from that,¹²¹ it is itself destroyed when the earlier condition is destroyed, that or one must resort to the doctrine of effects not existing in their cause.¹²²

In addition, there arises the unwanted consequence that one would have to perform an act of penance for traversing the earth on foot, for spitting on it, etc., it being possessed of Śiva's form. The action of placing the foot, etc., because vile, is absolutely prohibited¹²³ on that place on which neither the hand nor another, i.e., as a place for running, etc., should be directed by another than the Lord, this being the sort of activity in which he is close at hand.

This being so, moreover, i.e., walking and so on being restricted, all of everyday existence is ruined; and insofar as Śivabhaṭṭāraka himself is the nature of the

¹¹⁷In other words, the *śivatattva* depends on other entities to create and destroy the universe, this because one cannot conceive of the supreme and unitary divine principle as an entity that is sometimes created and sometimes destroyed. The present also criticizes the Pratyabhijñā view of the *śivatattva* by suggesting that a distinction of agent from object of cognition must be maintained in order to account for the enjoyment of worldly delights and, more importantly, the pursuit of liberation, this because the one who seeks such ends must, by definition, not have already achieved them. A similar argument was put forward against the grammarians' conception of *paśyantī*, for which see ŚD 2.69cd–71.

¹¹⁸Utpaladeva, following Somānanda, here refers to the doctrine of the real transformation of a cause in the production of its effect, the *pariṇāmavāda*, which is accepted by the Sāṅkhya school. See Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 65–73.

¹¹⁹This of course refers to Śiva-nature.

¹²⁰This refers to the *śivatattva*.

¹²¹That is, the *śivatattva*, in the present view, is not different from the mass of created entities.

¹²²The reference here is to the *asatkāryavāda*, the doctrine of the absence of the effect in the cause, which is the theory of causality to which the materialist Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas subscribe. (In that view, the effect, water for example, is not inherent in the cause, hydrogen and oxygen in the present example. Thus, the effect is a new entity produced by the materials that are combined to create it. This of course is precisely not the view presented by Somānanda and Utpaladeva. On the *asatkāryavāda* in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools see, e.g., Halbfass 1992: 55–58; cf. Potter [1977] 2005: 58–59.) Thus, the objection here expressed is that insofar as there is a transformation of, e.g., milk into urine, a previous condition is destroyed in establishing the subsequent one, the subsequent one involving the destruction of the preceding one. Insofar as it is, in the Pratyabhijñā, always the *śivatattva* that is present in these transformations, the opponent suggests that the *śivatattva* itself is destroyed in the course of the manifestation of the subsequent state. The example of milk and thick curds is a classical example of the *satkāryavāda*, the doctrine that the effect is inherent in the cause, as the curds inhere in potential form in the milk.

¹²³Note that *dūrotsāritā* literally means “banished” or “removed.”

universe, the motive for the manifestation of this condition must be examined, given that he is not a proper locus for action, etc.¹²⁴

3.26–29

What is more:¹²⁵

- 3.26. *nānāvādaiḥ svasiddhāntaiḥ sākam atra virodhitā
sarvabhāvaśivatvena nāstitā bandhamokṣayoḥ*
3.27. *tadabhāvād devaguruśāstrocchedo bhavet tarām
nirarthakatvaṃ śāstrasya karaṇe tannirūpaṇe*
3.28. *sarveṣām eva muktatve sthite kasyopadeśatā
dharmādharmau na sambaddhau śivasya na tayoh kṛtiḥ*
3.29. *tataś ca śivadharmaḍer vedāder akṛtārthatā
nimittasamavāyādikāraṇeṣu samānatā*

A contradiction exists herein¹²⁶ with the various doctrines (of other schools), as well as with your own settled opinion. Insofar as all entities have Śiva-nature, bondage and liberation do not exist. As a result of their nonexistence, God, the teacher, and the teachings are thoroughly undermined. There is no use in producing a teaching, nor in studying it: what is taught, if absolutely everyone is liberated? *Dharma* and *adharma* have no meaning, (and) Śiva does not create them, and hence Śiva, *dharma*, and so on,¹²⁷ as well as the Vedas, etc.,¹²⁸ are unsuccessful. (Finally:) The causes—efficient, inherent, and so on¹²⁹—are identical.

A contradiction exists with all (other) philosophical schools and with your own settled opinion in the doctrine that everything has Śiva-nature.¹³⁰ With

¹²⁴In other words, one must explain why Śiva would create a universe in which one's very existence in it—the very mundane activity of the everyday world—is sinful. A similar argument concerning the cause of manifestation was presented in opposition to the grammarians' *paśyanti*, for which see ŚD 2.25cd–26ab and 2.26cd–28ab.

¹²⁵As in ŚD 3.21–25, the following articulates objections that are put forward by the opponent who accepts for the sake of argument the Śaiva doctrine that all things have Śiva-nature.

¹²⁶The present refers to the view here criticized, namely, the one that posits that everything has Śiva-nature.

¹²⁷The term “and so on” (°*ādī*) here is likely to refer to the teacher, the teaching, etc., to which Somānanda has already referred herein.

¹²⁸It is unclear to what the term “etcetera” (°*ādī*) here refers. Utpaladeva refers only to the Vedas, to the exclusion of any other textual sources.

¹²⁹The term etcetera (°*ādī*) here refers to the noninherent (*asamavāyī*) cause. See Utpaladeva's commentary, below, and my notes on the same, for an explanation of the various types of causes in question.

¹³⁰Somānanda similarly suggested that the grammarians' view of *paśyanti* contradicts the settled opinion of every other philosophical school (see ŚD 2.82–3). Note that in ŚD 3.63 Somānanda will suggest that, despite the differing positions of his own philosophy and those of other schools, the present doctrine is not defeated by the various opinions of other schools.

respect to the first,¹³¹ this is so because you do not accept any of them, but all of them are Śaiva by nature, since nothing else exists,¹³² and as for your own settled opinion, this is (also the case) because you speak of mutually distinct entities, *māyā*, *pradhāna*, action, etc., as the causes of the universe.¹³³

Moreover, when one accepts that all entities have Śiva-nature, all living beings, by virtue of being omnipotent,¹³⁴ are forever liberated. Therefore, bondage and liberation do not exist.¹³⁵

And hence, given that no distinction exists of what should be avoided from what should be allowed, etc., the means for reaching the (four) human ends¹³⁶—namely God, the teacher, and the teachings—would be destroyed more thoroughly than was done by the Materialists;¹³⁷ for, one can accept those¹³⁸ when some aim or object is apparent at some time for one, but if everything is Śiva, then what means is there, and for whom?¹³⁹

Accordingly, there is no use in producing and studying, i.e., in narrating and hearing, the teaching. Given that absolutely everyone is liberated insofar as they are possessed of Śiva-nature, what teaching is being taught? Even a teaching that aims at *dharma* is not logical: because Śiva does not possess the bondage of *kārmamala*,¹⁴⁰ he does not meet with *dharma* or *adharma*, nor are the two of

¹³¹The present phrase is an idiomatic translation of *tatra*, which here should be understood to be used in a partitive manner. This therefore exemplifies the contradiction that exists of the view of Śiva-nature here under consideration with those of all the other philosophical schools.

¹³²In other words, insofar as the Śaivas oppose the philosophical positions of other schools, these positions may be distinguished from, may be said to conflict with, their own. This is the case despite the fact that, insofar as all things have Śiva-nature, the philosophical positions of other, opposing schools of thought also have Śiva-nature and thus also are ultimately real, meaning that to contradict them is to deny the validity of Śiva-nature itself.

¹³³Utpaladeva here explains the reason that the opponent suggests that Somānanda's understanding of Śiva-nature contradicts his own philosophy. Simply, he suggests, the opponent wishes to point to a contradiction between the notion that everything is Śiva, on the one hand, and the notion that particular, distinct entities, such as *māyā*, create the universe, which itself appears to be distinct from Śiva. It is not possible for everything to have the nature of Śiva, on the one hand, and for there to exist other, mutually distinct entities that create the universe and perform other such acts, on the other.

¹³⁴The Sanskrit more literally refers to the fact that all living beings exist as or are possessed of all the powers (*sarvaśaktitva*).

¹³⁵Note that Somānanda assesses the problems with the pursuit of liberation when criticizing the grammarians' view of *paśyanti* in ŚD 2.69cd–71.

¹³⁶The “human ends,” the *puruṣārthas*, are of course usually conceived of as four in number: the law, or appropriate conduct in the world (*dharma*); wealth and power (*artha*); pleasure (*kāma*); and liberation (*mokṣa*).

¹³⁷The Materialists, the Cārvāka-Lokāyata school, understood there to be no aim in life other than to enjoy life, for nothing after life on earth as it is known exists. For a useful collection of sources on the Materialist school, see Chattopadhyaya 1990. For a summary treatment of the school's philosophy, see Frauwallner 1973–1974, vol. 2: 215–226.

¹³⁸The pronoun *tat* in *tadabhyupagama* refers to the four acceptable goals of human action, the aforementioned *puruṣārthas*.

¹³⁹It is also possible that this passage means “then what means is there and for what [end]?”

¹⁴⁰That is, given that Śiva is not afflicted by the *kārmamala*, the following obtains.

them produced in Śiva, since erroneous cognitions, passion, etc.,¹⁴¹ are caused by (human) behavior.¹⁴² In this way, moreover, Śiva, *dharmā*, and so on, as well as the Veda, have no use,¹⁴³ because *dharmā* has no use.¹⁴⁴

And, insofar as Śiva-nature exists in (all of) the causes—inherent, noninherent, and efficient¹⁴⁵—their mutual difference, which is declared in the other teachings and known (in Śaivism), cannot exist.

3.30–32

Further:¹⁴⁶

3.30. *prthivyādikalpanayā kalpanāvān śivo bhavet
śivatattve sānubhave paśyantitulyatā tadā*

3.31. *icchāvatkāryasampattyā punar icchāntarodgame
śivasya hetur vaktavyo yadarthaṃ sā navodgatā*

¹⁴¹The term “etcetera” (*ādi*) probably refers here to hatred (*dveṣa*), the term commonly paired with *rāga*. Note that the present rendering leaves unclear whether the initial member of the compound here translated (*mīthyājñānarāgādīkāraṇatva*) is itself a coordinative (*dvandva*) compound or a descriptive (*kar-madhārāya*) compound. In other words, it is unclear whether “erroneous cognitions” (*mīthyājñāna*^o) serves to describe “passion, etc.” (*rāgādi*), passion and the like being exemplars of erroneous cognitions, or whether it is the first member of a list of entities caused by (human) behavior (*pravṛtti*), a list including erroneous cognitions, passion, and the like. One senses, however, that the appropriate interpretation demands that one understand the same to be a coordinative compound—passion, etc., are not erroneous cognitions, but rather erroneous cognitions, passion, etc., are all equally the result of human activity.

¹⁴²Here, Utpaladeva anticipates that their opponents will argue that, insofar as everything is possessed of Śiva-nature, neither *dharmā* nor *adharma* can exist. This is so, they could argue, because no being is afflicted by *kārmamāla*, the impurity associated with a limited sense of one’s own capacity to act, insofar as all beings are identical with Śiva himself. As such, there is no possibility that any living being can experience those emotions and have those cognitions that require one to possess a limited sense of self, a limited capacity to act, a prerequisite for emotional states such as passion or hatred, as well as for erroneous cognitions.

¹⁴³Utpaladeva here echoes the construction of ŚD 3.29b (*akṛtārthatā*) by slightly modifying the compound to read *akṛtaprayojanatā*.

¹⁴⁴As in the *mūla*, the distinction Utpaladeva makes in the commentary is between peculiarly Śaiva religious institutions and Vedic ones. The point is that neither the orthodox Vedic practices nor the esoteric and more powerful tantric ones have any use in a world in which everything has Śiva-nature.

¹⁴⁵Utpaladeva here indicates that Somānanda has in mind the Nyāya system of causality in the present passage, this by referring to the three causes accepted by the realist Naiyāyikas. One is the efficient cause, the *nimittakāraṇa*, such as the potter’s stick with which he spins the wheel on which the pot is formed, the stick being the efficient cause of the production of the pot. The other cause, the material cause, is conceived of as being of two types. There is the inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*), which is the material cause that leads to the production of the effect in question, e.g., the clay that is the material cause of the pot that is produced. In addition to this, the Naiyāyikas conceive of a separate cause for the attributes of the pot in question, this because they conceive of a substance (*dravya*) as different from its attributes (*guṇas*). The *samavāyikāraṇa* is a substance, the material cause of the *dravya* of the effect; the noninherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) is the cause of the attributes of the product in question. In the present example, the reddish color of the clay is the noninherent cause that leads to the reddish color of the clay pot. See, e.g., Potter [1977] 2004: 54–58.

¹⁴⁶Somānanda continues to recount an opponent’s possible objection in the following, and in doing so he continues to enumerate what his opponent considers to be the unwanted consequences resulting from the Śaiva doctrine that Śiva-nature is omnipresent.

3.32. *viśvasyāsatyarūpatvaṃ yair vākyaair varṇitam kvacit śivoktais tair virodhaḥ syāt sarvasatyatvavādinah*

Śiva would be a fiction¹⁴⁷ by dint of imagining the earth (-*tattva*), etc.¹⁴⁸ If the *śivatattva* is experienced, then it is the same as *paśyanti*. Now, because he becomes the product of action, which is possessed of will, you must state what causes Śiva to arise as a second (power of) will. Why does that [second will] arise as something new? The view that everything is real is contradicted by (certain) statements expressed (in the scriptures) by Śiva (himself), which occasionally describe the universe as having an unreal form.

When you maintain that, having endowed himself with the form of the earth (-*tattva*), etc., he exists as such, Śivabhaṭṭāraka becomes a fiction; and (yet) you maintain that he is free from change, because the variations (that make up the universe) have nescience as their form, since the distinct things are absent.¹⁴⁹

Now, (the opponent says:) if you argue that the *śivatattva* does not admit of distinctions, but rather is experienced, because experience does not fail to conform with reality,¹⁵⁰ (then he replies:) even if it were to have such a form,¹⁵¹ (we must ask:) what does it experience? Itself or the self of another? Is it¹⁵² (experienced as) one that has not been experienced previously, or one that has been

¹⁴⁷The present expression, “a fiction,” is a tentative translation of *kalpanāvat* (ŚD 3,30b). *Kalpanā* can refer to a feigning, something created in the mind, a manufacturing of something, the assuming of something to be real, a fiction, etc. Thus, it also implies a constructed or false nature. The present translation means to point to the contingent, changing, and indeed unreal nature of Śiva, the one that the opponent posits would exist given that Śiva is said to exist as the very form of the manifold universe. One could translate the present passage with “form” for *kalpanā*, given the repeated claim that Śiva is formless (*amūrta*, *amūrtaiva*), viz.: “Śiva would be possessed of a form by dint of the form of the earth (-*tattva*), etc. (being of his own self.)”

¹⁴⁸Kupetz (1972: 55) suggests that the present objection serves to compare the Pratyabhijñā “theory that the world is a real form (*klrpta*) of Śiva . . . with the Vedānta theory that the world is imaginary.” That the intended opponent is a Vedāntin is not entirely clear, however. It is true that Utpaladeva’s commentary suggests that Śiva does not become an illusory entity by being manifested in the form of the *tattvas*. In saying as much, moreover, Utpaladeva suggests that *vikalpas* have *avidyā* as their form and are not the distinct, real entities that apparently exist in the everyday world. It is thus possible that Utpaladeva is here referring to the Vedānta notion of nescience (*avidyā*) in explaining the objection at hand, but it is not certain: *avidyā* is a term that is commonly used in the VPVr, as well, for example. Cf. Utpaladeva’s commentary in ŚD 3,82cd–83.

¹⁴⁹In other words, Utpaladeva explains, the opponent here argues that Śiva must be a multiple entity that changes, one associated with the entities that falsely appear to be distinct, that is, the entities that make up the manifested universe. He suggests that these must be of the nature of nescience (*avidyā*), given that they appear to be distinct entities despite the fact that no distinct entity (*bhinnnavastu*) is present. Thus, he becomes a “fiction,” the appearance of that which is not truly present. The response to the present objection is given in ŚD 3,82cd–83.

¹⁵⁰My translation of *ayathārtha* is somewhat idiomatic. Literally, the term in question means “incongruous” or “incorrect.”

¹⁵¹The pronoun *tat* refers to the *śivatattva*; *evamrūpa* is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound referring to the same. Finally, *evamrūpe tasmīn* is a locative absolute construction.

¹⁵²The present “it” refers to the “self” (the *ātman*) that is experienced.

experienced previously.¹⁵³ There is, moreover, a clear distinction of that which is experienced from the one who experiences it.¹⁵⁴ Hence, there is thus now occasion to fault what you have said with regard to the primordial *paśyanti*.¹⁵⁵

Now, since you maintain that, by dint of the (second,) specific will, the (initial moment of) will that is the cause (of the creation of the latter will) desists, this because, i.e., the cause being that, he becomes a product of action the nature of which is the universe, (you must explain:) when another will arises with the maintenance, dissolution, and so on (of the universe), as in the (mundane) cognition of a cloth, etc., what is the cause, who is the one who utilizes that; because an always new (power of) will, belonging to Śiva, who is turned toward something, proceeds when his initial nature ceases and when another, new nature arises for him.¹⁵⁶

And, all entities must be real when they exist in the form of the same Śiva; and when this is so, the similarity of the world with Indra's web of illusion, described by the Śaiva learned works themselves,¹⁵⁷ is contradicted.

3.33ab

About this [Somānanda] says:

3.33. *ityākṣeparakṣaṇārtham atra pratividhiyate*

¹⁵³A similar line of argumentation was leveled against the grammarians in ŚD 2.55 and 2.56.

¹⁵⁴In other words, the non-duality of the system is compromised by the distinction of the experimenter from the object experienced. This is of course precisely the problem articulated by Somānanda in the second chapter, where the nature of *paśyanti* as seeing, he argued, presupposes the existence of an inherent distinction of subject from object of sight.

¹⁵⁵In other words, Utpaladeva here explains that their opponent would like to suggest that an occasion here exists in which to rebuke the authors of the Pratyabhijñā for their searing critique of *paśyanti*: their own system may be faulted in the same manner as Somānanda and Utpaladeva have suggested of *paśyanti*, because both schools conceive of a subject-object distinction in describing the experience of the everyday world.

¹⁵⁶As indicated in the Introduction (section 14, subsection entitled “Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna as *pūrvapakṣin*, and Somānanda's Arguments against the Śāktas”), the present constitutes a particularly important counterargument to the philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā. In particular, the opponent asks about the process of the development of the power of will. If it is the case, as Somānanda argues, that all entities are possessed of the power of will (*icchā/icchāśakti*), as much as is Śiva himself, and if it is also true that all entities are ultimately identical to Śiva himself, then how does the manifestation of the new, particular form of will supersede the initial moment of will that leads to the effect in question? Put differently, the opponent asks how Śiva, impelled by his power of will, can manifest entities that, in turn, are impelled by their own powers of will, which are distinguishable from the initial moment of will that created them. What occurs, in effect, they argue, is the production of a new nature (*svabhāva*) for Śiva himself, whose will, and the objects he desires, change with the advent of the product of the previous action or cognition, inspired by the preceding moment of will. The answer to this objection appears in ŚD 3.92cd–93ab.

¹⁵⁷Literally, the present passage refers to “the very teachings related to the Supreme Lord” (*pārameśvarair eva śāstrair*). It is indeed the case that a number of Śaiva scriptural sources refer to the illusory nature of the universe. See, e.g., VBh 102, quoted in note 140 of the Introduction. See also section 8 of the Introduction.

The following is here dispatched in order to ward off the aforementioned objection.¹⁵⁸

For the purpose of protecting his own philosophy from such an extensive objection, which was leveled by his opponent,¹⁵⁹ or, (one may alternatively construe:) for the purpose of protecting against,¹⁶⁰ i.e., for the purpose of refuting, this objection, [Somānanda] responds here, i.e., in the face of this objection,¹⁶¹ or, (one may alternatively construe:) here in his own philosophy.¹⁶²

3.33cd–34

cidātmano hi sthūlasya sūkṣmasyātha vikāritā

3.34. *kṣīramāyāpraktivad yāvatecchaiva yādṛśī*

parasya tādr̥gātmatvam utpadyetātra yogivat

Now, it is indeed the case that, being coarse or subtle, the one having consciousness as his nature¹⁶³ would change, as does milk, *māyā*, or *prakṛti*. Here, (however,) like a yogin, the nature of the Supreme One arises as it does only in as much as he wills it to be so.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁸My translation does not follow precisely the glosses provided by Utpaladeva, who offers a pair of varying interpretations for two elements of the present expression: he analyzes the compound (*ityākṣeparakṣaṇārtha*) found in ŚD 3.33a in two different ways, this based on two possible interpretations of the meaning of *rakṣaṇārtha*; and he offers two interpretations for the referent of the particle *atra*, meaning “here.” Note that the objection, or objections, in question are the ones articulated in ŚD 3.21–32.

¹⁵⁹The present is a gloss of *ityākṣeparakṣaṇārtha*, one suggesting an ablative relationship between *ākṣepa* and *rakṣaṇārtha*: the following arguments are dispatched to protect Somānanda’s view from the aforementioned objections.

¹⁶⁰The present is also a gloss of *ityākṣeparakṣaṇārtha*, one that suggests a genitive relationship between *ākṣepa* and *rakṣaṇārtha*: it is for the purpose of the defeat of the objections in question that the following is dispatched.

¹⁶¹The present phrase is a gloss of “here” (*atra*) that appears in ŚD 3.33b, one that suggests the term refers to the moment when the opponent’s objections have been raised.

¹⁶²The present phrase is a second gloss of “here,” *atra* (ŚD 3.33b), and it is here suggested that the term refers to the locus of Somānanda’s response, in other words the present chapter of the ŚD itself.

¹⁶³The term here translated, *cidātman* (ŚD 3.33c), appears in none of the manuscripts consulted for the present edition, as these manuscripts provide overwhelming evidence for the variant reading *tadātman*, a reading that was even accepted in the published edition of the text, prior to being corrected to *cidātman* in the errata of the KSTS edition. Given the state of the manuscript evidence, it strikes one as likely that the present reading is the product of an emendation of the text made by Kaul, an emendation probably made on the basis of the fact that the commentary strongly implies that Utpaladeva knew the text to read *cidātman* and not *tadātman* (this because the commentary opens with *cidātmanāḥ sthūlate*). I accept this reading, even if it is an emendation, on the basis of the evidence in the commentary. (Note that it is also possible that one of Kaul’s two manuscripts, either the Srinagar manuscript or his Madras manuscript, attested to the reading in question.)

¹⁶⁴Somānanda here begins to answer the string of objections enumerated in ŚD 3.21–32. The present passage refutes the argument that there is change in the *śivatattva*, which is leveled against Somānanda’s position in ŚD 3.21cd.

If the one whose nature is consciousness were coarse, he would change with the creation of the universe, just as milk does when curds are formed.¹⁶⁵ If instead he were subtle, it¹⁶⁶ would be similar to *māyā* and *prakṛti*.¹⁶⁷

Thus, in as much as, unlike the two,¹⁶⁸ the Supreme Lord, whose nature is consciousness, is neither coarse nor subtle, he is instead superior to both; for, a connection to real transformation, be it coarse or otherwise, exists only for that which is always entirely inert, not for one made up of consciousness. Instead, the nature of the Supreme One exists simply as a condition that accords with his wishes, as is the case with that which yogins create.

3.35–36ab

[Somānanda] says precisely this:

3.35. *icchayā sarvabhāvatvam anekātmavam eva ca
nātra svātmavikāreṇa janayed bhāvamaṇḍalam*
3.36. *tadicchāsāmanantarye tathābhūtātmātā yataḥ*

Omnipresence and multiplicity of nature exist by means of will.¹⁶⁹ It is not the case here¹⁷⁰ that he produces the universe¹⁷¹ by transforming himself, since his nature is as it is in immediate conformity with his will.¹⁷²

Here, [Somānanda] describes both.¹⁷³ Just as he maintains that, for yogins, omnipresence, as well as multiplicity of nature, comes into existence by means

¹⁶⁵That is, it would be a simple form of the *satkāryavāda*, a real transformation of the cause into a real effect or product of the action in question, the effect being inherent in the cause. This is close to the theory of causality to which Somānanda and Utpaladeva subscribe, the only difference being that the “transformation” of cause into effect does nothing to change the innate nature of the former, this because it is simply consciousness that is the cause, and its very nature is to be conscious of *something*, which is precisely the means by which it manifests its effect. There is, in short, a distinction in the contents of consciousness without the manifestation of a concomitant difference in the nature of the same consciousness.

¹⁶⁶The present term refers to the state of transformation (*vikāritā*) in question.

¹⁶⁷The latter refers to the nature of *mūlaprakṛti* the primary evolute from which, according to the Sāṅkhya, the entire material universe evolves.

¹⁶⁸The referent of the numerically dual pronoun here is probably the fact of being coarse (*sthūlatva*) and the fact of being subtle (*sūkṣmatva*), two conditions that require the existence of a subtle process of change in order to produce their effects. Kaul, however, suggests that it refers to the object created and the transformation that effected it. (See Kaul’s fn. 3, p. 111 of the KSTS edition: *tayoḥ tatkāryavikārayoḥ*.)

¹⁶⁹Note that I have not rendered the emphatic particle (*eva*) in the present translation. It appears to me to be present only as a verse-filler (*pādapūrana*). To render it would lead to a translation perhaps similar to the following: “Omnipresence and multiplicity of nature itself exist.” One senses that the force of the term is weak, here, and, as mentioned, appears *metri causa*.

¹⁷⁰“Here” (*atra*) refers to the Śaiva view articulated by Somānanda.

¹⁷¹Literally, *bhāvamaṇḍala* means “the circle of entities.”

¹⁷²This is a continuation of the reply to the criticism leveled in ŚD 3.21cd–23c. Compare the present passage with ŚD 1.44–45ab.

¹⁷³That is, he describes the process of creation practiced by both Śiva and the yogin. Kaul says the same (in fn. 1, p. 112 of the KSTS edition), as he glosses “both” with “the one whose nature is consciousness [=Śiva] and the yogin” (*ubhayoḥ cidātmayoginoh*).

of (their) will, so he understands the same for the Supreme Lord, as well. For, the yogin does not produce the universe¹⁷⁴ out of his own self in the manner that the one who appears to be a potter produces¹⁷⁵ what appears to be a pot out of what appears to be a ball of clay—in stages, by the real transformation, the modification of form, of the (clay that is made into a) small¹⁷⁶ *stūpa* of the King of Śibi, for example.¹⁷⁷ It is rather that there exists a certain desire for something, which, immediately following it,¹⁷⁸ exists as the nature of the (yogin’s) desire: the wished-for object. It is the same for the one whose nature is consciousness, as well.

3.36cd–39

He further says:

yathā na yogino ’stiha nānāsainyaśarirakaiḥ
 3.37. *vibhāgas tadvad iśasya madhyotkr̥ṣṭanikr̥ṣṭakaiḥ*
bhāvair nāsti vibheditvam athavāmbudhivicivat
 3.38. *tatra vīcitvam āpannam na jalam jalam ucyate*
na ca tatrāmburūpasya vicikāle vināśitā
 3.39. *nīscalatve ’pi hi jalam vīcitve jalam eva tat*
vicibhis tad viśiṣṭam cet tan nāiscalyaviśiṣṭakam

¹⁷⁴As in ŚD 3.35d, “universe” here serves to render *bhāvamaṇḍala*, literally “the circle of entities.”

¹⁷⁵I here translate the verb *janayati* a second time. It was translated first where the yogin is the subject of the verb and here when understanding “the one who appears to be a potter” to be the subject of the same verb.

¹⁷⁶I understand the *-ka* suffix of *stūpaka* here to mark the diminutive.

¹⁷⁷Reference is here made to the *stūpa*, or burial mound, of the King of Śibi. The name is associated with the Buddha in an incarnation as a compassionate being prior to his birth at Siddhārtha Gautama. The King of Śibi was a great philanthropist who ransomed his own flesh and blood to save a pigeon, which had landed in his lap, from the clutches of the hawk who was chasing it. (The two were in fact Indra and Agni in disguise, having come to the king to test his virtue.) He in the end was required to offer up his entire body to the hawk in order to match the magically heavy weight of the extraordinary pigeon that landed on his lap. For his great act of generosity, the sacrifice of his own self in lieu of the death of the bird, a beautifully adorned *stūpa* was said to have been built on the site where the very act of sacrifice occurred. The present example thus serves to suggest that what is made from the clay is a thoroughly intricate and ornate object, one requiring much detailed work on the part of the sculptor. See Meiland 2009, vol. 1: 27–57. For an earlier edition of the Sanskrit text, see Kern 1943: 6–14. Note that a similar example is given in Jayaratha’s commentary in TĀ 10.224cd–225ab.

¹⁷⁸The present expression refers to the aforementioned desire. Note that the text is ambiguous here. It is possible that *tat-samanantaram* is a compound, the translation of which is here offered. It is also possible, however, that it is not a compound, in which case one instead reads *tat samanantaram* with the neuter pronoun corresponding with the preceding relative pronoun (*yat*). On this reading, *tat* would refer to the entity wished for and would be read in apposition with *sthiti*, suggesting the state of affairs that would result from the yogin’s desire. In the end, one must understand both interpretations in order fully to render the meaning of the sentence. This occurrence of the possibility of construing the present passage in two ways, moreover, is by no means a unique event in the corpus of Pratyabhijñā writings or, for that matter, in philosophical prose more generally, and it can indeed be said to be something of a hallmark of the Pratyabhijñā authors’ style.

Just as the yogin is not divided here¹⁷⁹ by the bodies of a manifold army, so also the Lord is not divided by the superior and vile entities, and those in between.¹⁸⁰ Put differently,¹⁸¹ it is like the ocean and the waves. There,¹⁸² the water that has become wavy is not called water, but the watery form is not destroyed there in the moment it becomes wavy;¹⁸³ for, water is only water when it is wavy, or even when it is not wavy. If you argue that the waves modify it, then we reply: stillness (also) is a modifier.¹⁸⁴

Just as the nature of the yogin is not divided by the bodies of a manifold army that condition him¹⁸⁵—the elephants, chariots, cavalry, and foot soldiers—so also the Supreme Lord is not divided by the superior and vile [beings], and those in between¹⁸⁶—the Gods, humans, those in between, etc.¹⁸⁷—this in accordance with the restriction that the form of all the powers, pure consciousness, is unitary.

Put differently, the following is a very famous example: just as there is a difference in the way one talks about the ocean and the waves, even though they are identical, so also for Śiva and the universe; for, when one speaks of those,¹⁸⁸ water that has become wavy is not called “water,” but the fact of being water is not destroyed there, i.e., in the wavy form. For thus, whether unmoving or in motion with waves, it is simply water, because the waves are a property¹⁸⁹ of the water.

Now, if you argue that water that is modified by such waviness is not merely water, then we reply: this may be so. However, the water is not destroyed when it is modified by the fact of being wavy, because it remains in the same condition. If the water were not to exist when modified by waves, the fact of being water could not exist when modified by the fact of being still, either. Thus, Śiva-nature is fully established even when it exists in the form of (manifested) entities.

¹⁷⁹The term *iha*, “here,” should be interpreted to mean “here [in the world].”

¹⁸⁰Somānanda lists the three levels of beings in the following order: those in the middle, the superior, the vile. I have altered the order to reflect English idiom.

¹⁸¹The Sanskrit here reads *athavā*, literally “alternatively.”

¹⁸²*Tatra* here refers to the example of water and waves.

¹⁸³Literally, the text says “in the moment of the waves.”

¹⁸⁴This passage continues Somānanda’s response to the criticism leveled in ŚD 3.21cd–23c. It is also similar to ŚD 1.13cd–14ab and ŚD 1.18. Finally, a parallel passage may be found in VBh 110.

¹⁸⁵That is, just as the yogin experiences no change in his nature by conjuring a manifold army in his consciousness, so also the following obtains, as well.

¹⁸⁶The coordinative (*dvandva*) compound found here, following the one found in ŚD 3.37b, lists the levels of beings in a different order from the one rendered in the present translation. The text reads: “those in between, the superior, and the inferior” (*madhyotkrṣṭānikrṣṭaka*). I have changed the order, however, so as to conform to the idiom of the target language.

¹⁸⁷The term “etcetera” (° *ādi*) refers to the many types of beings that exist in the universe.

¹⁸⁸*Tatra*, literally “there,” refers to the water and the waves.

¹⁸⁹The term here used is *viśeṣa*.

3.40–42ab

3.40. *ata eva pareccḥāto na jaḍatvam avasthitam
prṥhivyāditattvagane jaḍatvaṃ cet pratiyate*

3.41. *na yathā jaḍatā kvāpi tathāgre suvicāritaiḥ
varṇayiṣyāma evātra na ca sāvayaḥ kvacit*

3.42. *kaścid astiti vakṣyāma etad apy agrataḥ sphuṭam*

For this very reason,¹⁹⁰ no inertness exists by way of the will of the supreme one. If you argue that inertness is recognized in the mass of *tattvas* beginning with the earth (-*tattva*),¹⁹¹ (then we reply:) we will explain definitively, later on, with well considered arguments, how there is no inertness anywhere at all here,¹⁹² and we will also state this clearly, later on, viz.: that no one anywhere is composed of parts.¹⁹³

For this very reason, i.e., by dint of the will of the Supreme Lord, similar as it is to that of the yogin,¹⁹⁴ no inertness exists in the mass of *tattvas* beginning with the earth (-*tattva*), because it¹⁹⁵ exists as a particular form of his will, and no inert material cause exists for it, such as primordial materiality.¹⁹⁶

Now, if you argue that inertness is recognized there¹⁹⁷ in the form of the “that-ness”¹⁹⁸ that is described (in Somānanda’s work), then we reply: not so. We will state, later on, with well-considered arguments, how in reality no inertness exists anywhere, even though [Somānanda] describes a “that-ness.”¹⁹⁹ We will

¹⁹⁰That is, because Śiva, like the yogin, does not change when imagining the various beings of the everyday world, the following obtains.

¹⁹¹The *tattvas* are often enumerated beginning with the lowest one, i.e., the earth-*tattva*, though they are also sometimes enumerated in the reversed order, with the earth-*tattva* counted as the thirty-sixth and last of the series, as in, e.g., ŚD 1.29cd–33.

¹⁹²“Here” (*atra*) may be understood to mean both “here [in the world]” and “here [in our philosophy],” though the former is the better interpretation of the two.

¹⁹³The present likely refers to the arguments put forward in chapter 5 of the ŚD.

¹⁹⁴That is, just as the yogin imagines the various parts of an army without dividing himself, so too does Śiva imagine the world of diversity without dividing himself. Both are the result merely of the power of will.

¹⁹⁵This refers to the mass of *tattvas* beginning with the earth-*tattva* (*prṥhivyāditattvagana*).

¹⁹⁶In other words, the present passage again repudiates any literal read of the schema of *tattvas* articulated in the various (often Trika) scriptural sources of tantric Śaivism; indeed, that schema adopts the system of twenty-five *tattvas* enumerated in the Sāṅkhya, including the *tattva* referred to in the Sāṅkhya as (*mūla*)-*prakṛti* or *pradhāna*, the primordial level of material existence, counted as the second of twenty-five levels in the Sāṅkhya and as the thirteenth of thirty-six in the system of the Pratyabhijñā. Simply, material existence is merely the product of Śiva’s consciousness. It should not be understood to exist separately from his consciousness, which is to say from his very nature and being, in any way.

¹⁹⁷“There” (*tatra*) should be understood to refer to the mass of *tattvas* beginning with the earth-*tattva* (*prṥhivyāditattvagana*).

¹⁹⁸Utpaladeva here uses the technical term *idantā*. See the Introduction (sections 6 and 7) for a discussion of the uses of this term in the authored works of the Pratyabhijñā.

¹⁹⁹As shown in the Introduction (sections 6 and 7), Somānanda nowhere uses the technical terms so commonly found in the ĪPK and ĪPVṛ, as well as in Abhinavagupta’s oeuvre, those contrasting “that-ness” (*idantā*) from “I-ness” (*ahantā*). The idea here expressed, then, is merely the suggestion that Somānanda understands Śiva to manifest an apparently diverse and distinct universe, apparently separate from Śiva

also refute, later on, the faulty counterargument that the *śivatattva* is composed of parts, even if it is the nature of everything, as there can be no one who is composed of parts in any condition whatsoever. When he spontaneously abides in the fact of being Śiva,²⁰⁰ and when he spontaneously abides in the condition of being the universe,²⁰¹ what is the use of considering the state of being enjoyed, because of which the state of being composed of parts would exist?²⁰²

3.42cd–47

- svecchāto bhāvarūpatve parādhinā kutah sthitiḥ*
 3.43. *kṣīravat yadi vocyeta parādhinam jaḍam bhavet*
etayaiva diśā śodhyaṃ śuddhanyūnādīdūṣaṇam
 3.44. *abhagne 'sya svarūpatve śuddhanyūnādīkaṃ kutah*
patadgrahādike hemni hematvaṃ mukuṭādike
 3.45. *sthitam eva na hemno 'sya kācid asti vibheditā*
caṇḍālasadmago vahnir na vahnir yadi kathyate
 3.46. *tad evaṃ syād athocyeta vahneḥ saṃskāracodanā*
sāstresu varṇitā kasmāt kāryārtham kāryam eva tat
 3.47. *na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra tathā tatra vyavasthiteḥ*
saṃjñākarāṇamātraṃ tad vyavahārāya kalpitam

Given that he exists, by dint of his will, in the form of the entities, how is existence dependent on another?²⁰³ If, for example, you say it is similar to milk, it would be inert, dependent on another.²⁰⁴ The fault (attributed to our system) that must be corrected—being pure, being diminished, or the like—is precisely the result of this (wrong) point of view.²⁰⁵ How can there be something pure, something diminished, etc., when his nature is undivided? The fact of being gold simply exists in gold, (be it) in (the

himself, even if he does not do so by way of reference to these technical terms, which were coined by Utpaladeva.

²⁰⁰The present passage refers to the fact that all entities exist in such a condition as to be nothing but Śiva.

²⁰¹A complement to the preceding suggestion that all entities exist in such a condition as to be nothing but Śiva, the present passage further suggests that Śiva spontaneously exists in the form of the universe and all that populates it.

²⁰²The present passage refers to the notion that a distinction between agent and object must exist for one to enjoy the objects of one's desires. Cf. ŚD 3.21–25, and the commentary on the same.

²⁰³Somānanda here responds to the assertion that the Śaiva non-dual doctrine would require a dependence on another entity in order to explain the existence of a multiple universe. See ŚD 3.22d.

²⁰⁴See ŚD 3.23ab.

²⁰⁵This serves as a response to the criticism leveled in ŚD 3.24. What is meant, as the commentary explains, is that any analogy with the sort of real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of a cause in the course of producing its effect, as is the case in the traditional formulation of the *satkāryavāda*, leads one to misapprehend the nature of causality in the Pratyabhijñā, which while being a form of the *satkāryavāda* nevertheless does not acknowledge any change whatsoever in Śiva, he being the cause of the manifested universe.

form of) a golden spittoon,²⁰⁶ etc., or in (the form of) a tiara, etc. The (fact of being) gold is in no way divided whatsoever. If you argue that a fire installed in an outcaste's house is not called fire, we reply: it should be thus. Now, if you say that injunctions involving the rites of passage for fire are explained in the (Śaiva) teachings, (we reply:) what is the goal of the action? It is the action itself. There is no division of his nature, here. It is the same for his abiding there: that is conceived of merely as the assignation of a name for the purpose of everyday speech.²⁰⁷

By dint of his will, the existence of the one whose form is that of the entities of the universe²⁰⁸ is not dependent on another, but rather is simply his own state of desiring (to be thus).

If you say that the fact of existing in the form of the universe depends on the real transformation of its cause, like the fact of existing in the form of curds is the state of being a (transformed) form of milk, i.e., (if you say) the nature of the universe depends on another, then (we reply:) it²⁰⁹ would be insentient, because there is no evidence that Śiva²¹⁰ is dependent, in as much as he is simply the nature of consciousness when he exists in the form of the universe.²¹¹ The fault (attributed to our view) that must be refuted—be it the fact of being pure or impure, the fact of growing or diminishing, or the like—is precisely the result of this (wrong) point of view, one that destroys the nature of (Śiva as) consciousness.²¹² This is because the fault related to being pure, becoming diminished, etc., does not exist for one whose own nature is thus,²¹³ i.e., when he is one

²⁰⁶As Kupetz notes, *paṭadgraha*, “that which catches what falls,” could also refer to a begging bowl. See Kupetz 1972: 178, fn. 5.

²⁰⁷The present passage can be read as a response to the criticism Somānanda anticipates in ŚD 3.25.

²⁰⁸Note that I understand *viśvabhāvarūpa* to be an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound referring to Śiva.

²⁰⁹The adjective “insentient” (*jaḍa*) here appears in the masculine, singular form, as it refers to the nature (*ātman*) of the universe.

²¹⁰Literally, the text refers here to “the one whose nature is consciousness” (*cidrūpa*).

²¹¹With the present, somewhat unclear, passage Utpaladeva wishes merely to suggest that it is not possible for the universe to be the product of a real transformation of Śiva's nature. This is so, he argues, because any real transformation would involve the production of a new entity, one distinguishable from its source (the distinction being one of the difference between the cause [*kāraṇa*] and the effect [*kārya*]). Such a new, distinct entity would of necessity be insentient, unlinked to the power of consciousness, because Śiva is totally independent, in this view. Such an outcome is of course unacceptable to Utpaladeva and to all Pratyabhijñā thinkers, however, because they espouse an unyielding monism, one that suggests that the entire universe exists merely as the contents of Śiva's consciousness.

²¹²Here, Utpaladeva makes reference to the notion that the Pratyabhijñā theory of causality, although it is a form of the *satkāryavāda*, cannot be compared to traditional, materialist conceptions of the same. Nothing changes, no real transformation of consciousness occurs, in the present view, because all of manifestation is simply a function of consciousness witnessing the object of consciousness. It is simply the nature of consciousness to appear as such, and nothing in that nature changes by doing so. Thus, analogy with the *satkāryavāda* as it is normally conceived cannot fully explain causality as conceived in the philosophy of Somānanda and Utpaladeva.

²¹³The first clause of the sentence—*svam rūpaṃ yasya sa svarūpas tasya bhāve*—indicates that *svarūpatva* (in ŚD 3.44a) is an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound describing Śiva, the one who has such a form.

whose form is consciousness, i.e., for one who is in such a condition.²¹⁴ The nature of the gold in a tiara or a spittoon is equally gold.

For instance, if you argue that a fire that is installed in the home of an outcaste is not (a pure) fire, we reply: this could be so, as well.²¹⁵ Now, if you argue that, if fire cannot be impure, then it is inexplicable why the rites of passage, replete with the mantras, are enjoined to it in the (Śaiva) teaching(s), this for the purpose of accomplishing their (purifying) effect; thus, it must be possible that [fire] can be impure, (we reply:) this is not so. The rite itself is simply established for the purpose of everyday life, but there is no change in the nature of the fire. Rather, it being established that fire is fixed in its nature, i.e., in its own form, the fact of having that nature, i.e., the very fact of being fire, exists in every instance (of fire).

Similarly, the universe has Śiva as its nature. Thus, division into the fact of being supreme, coarse, and subtle, etc.,²¹⁶ exists as a result of (Śiva) being established in the form of the Lord, the subtle elements,²¹⁷ the earth, etc.²¹⁸ And thus, there being oneness everywhere, that²¹⁹ is conceived of as merely the assignation of a name for the purpose of everyday speech in the world of transmigration.²²⁰

3.48–49ab

3.48. *vyavahāro 'py avidyā no tathātveneśvarasthiteḥ
tenaiva vā tathā kṛptas tathā tadanuvartanam*

3.49. *na tatsvarūpabhedāya śāstram yaḍ vyavahāragam*

²¹⁴That is, *tadavastha*, an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound, refers to Śiva, who “has that condition,” i.e., who is one whose form is consciousness.

²¹⁵Here, the author is merely suggesting that it is legitimate, in everyday life, to affirm the existence of distinct types of fire, their status depending on their context in the world. This is not to say, however, that the fire in question has a different nature from, say, the pure fire of the sacrifice. The statement, then, is philosophically relatively uncontroversial, but it raises questions as to the degree to which Somānanda and, following him, Utpaladeva were willing to contradict (or even contravene) contemporaneous social norms. The present passage suggests a ready willingness to acknowledge caste norms on the mundane level, even if such distinctions on their view are, philosophically speaking, without basis.

²¹⁶The term “etcetera” (° *ādi*) refers to the other hierarchical schemas found in Śaiva scriptural sources. This is not to suggest there are levels other than the aforementioned three in the present schema.

²¹⁷The term here translated is *tanmātra*, which refers to the five subtle elements or objects of cognition, viz.: sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparsā*), color (*rūpa*), flavor or taste (*rasa*), and smell (*gandha*). These five are counted as *tattvas* twenty-two to twenty-six in the thirty-sixfold Śaiva schema.

²¹⁸“The earth, etc., should be taken to refer to the five gross elements, viz.: ether (*ākāśa*), air (*vāyu*), fire (*agni*), water (*jala*), and earth (*pṛthivi*), the last five of the thirty-six *tattvas*. That they are listed here beginning with the last of the five reflects the common practice of enumerating the *tattvas* beginning with the thirty-sixth.

²¹⁹The referent of the pronoun, *ta*, it being a lemma of the root text (ŚD 3.47c), is probably the effect of action (*kārya*), mentioned in ŚD 3.46d. This is to say the present should be understood to refer to the world of transmigration and all in it that is wrongly conceived of as pure, impure, etc.

²²⁰In other words, whether one describes a fire, and by analogy the universe itself, as either pure or impure, or whether one describes Śiva as transcendent or immanent, as supreme, or coarse, or subtle, these are all merely names for the same Śiva, names used in everyday speech merely by convention.

As for the everyday world, it simply is not²²¹ nescience, because the Lord exists as such a condition. Also, he himself created it, as well as the conformity to it, in this way.²²² The teaching that is found in the everyday world does not serve to divide his nature.²²³

Although used as an expression in the everyday world of transmigration, “nescience” is (merely) a name; it is not a distinct object, because the Lord himself exists in such a condition, i.e., in such a condition as to be the nature of worldly activity.

Also, the teaching, for its part, which teaches the rites of passage that are observed in the everyday world, does not serve to divide Śiva’s nature.²²⁴ He himself, i.e., Īśvara,²²⁵ created it in this way, i.e., he himself created the rites of passage for the fire, etc., in this way; and he likewise created the conformity to, i.e., the performance of, them.²²⁶ Hence, this very form has his (power of) will as its nature; neither impurity nor division is imputed to the nature of Śiva.²²⁷

²²¹Note that *no* (ŚD 3.48a) consists of the negative particle (*na*) combined with the emphatic particle (*u*), this in accordance with the standard Sanskrit rules of euphony (*sandhi*).

²²²Presumably, Somānanda wished *klṛpta* (ŚD 3.48c) to refer to *vyavahāra*, “the everyday world” (ŚD 3.48a), with *tat* in the determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound, *tadanuvartana* (ŚD 3.48d), also referring to the same.

²²³The present passage constitutes a continuation of Somānanda’s refutation of the counterarguments presented in ŚD 3.21–32. In particular, the present passage advances the argument begun in ŚD 3.42c–47, where Somānanda discussed the conventional nature of the rites of passage in the consecration of the sacred fire, because this passage suggests that what is taught in Śaiva texts does not serve to divide his nature, just as the rites of passage (*saṃskāras*) for the fire do not divide the true nature of fire, wherever it might appear.

²²⁴In other words, as Utpaladeva will explain in what follows, it is not the case that the Śaiva scriptural sources describe any division in Śiva by articulating the processes for performing the rites of passage (*saṃskāras*) for the sacred fire, etc. These are meant only for conventional use. They do not speak to any qualitative distinctions in the nature of Śiva. Note that it is also possible that one should understand *śivatattva* to be a proper noun, though this amounts semantically to saying the same thing: to say that the *śivatattva* is not divided by what is taught in the teachings is to say the same of the very nature of Śiva himself.

²²⁵The term Īśvara as elsewhere in the commentary, should be understood to refer to Śiva himself and not to the *iśvaratattva*, the fourth of the thirty-six *tattvas*.

²²⁶Utpaladeva’s commentary here indicates that *tadanuvartana* (ŚD 3.48d) is a genitive determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound. The referent of the pronoun *tat* here is *tathāgnisaṃskārādīḥ kalpitāḥ*. It is worth noting, here, that *kalpita* glosses *klṛpta* in ŚD 3.48c, which itself describes *vyavahāra* (ŚD 3.48a). The point of the present expression, then, is simply to state that Śiva himself has created the world in such a manner that human beings conform to the conventions associated with rites of purification, caste restrictions, and the like. Note that I here translate the singular *tat* with the plural “them,” which refers to the rites of passage for the fire and the other conventions of the everyday world. The singular number of the pronoun reflects the grammatically singular *agnisaṃskārādi*, an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound describing the everyday world (*vyavahāra*) and meaning literally “the one that has the rites of passage for the fire as its first.” The plural is here used to render the passage in idiomatic English.

²²⁷Here, Utpaladeva simply wishes to suggest that the appearance of the world as it is, along with the concomitant restrictions associated with caste, rites of purification, the distinction of purity from impurity, and the like, is precisely the form of Śiva’s very power of will. It appears as it does because Śiva wills it so. Note also that it is again possible, as above (see note 224), that one should understand *śivatattva* to be a proper noun.

3.49cd–51ab

hemapiṇḍe hemataiva syāc cen na mukuṭādike

3.50. *yujyate vaktum eva tad anityatvaṃ ca yat smṛtam*

satkṛtau tad vinirṇeyam yā collaṅghanacodanā

3.51. *niyamānupraveśāya śive collaṅghanena kim*

If the nature of gold were to exist only in the gold ball,²²⁸ not in the tiara, etc., it would be appropriate to say just that.²²⁹ Also, what you think of as its impermanence is completely removed when it is accepted that the effect is inherent in the cause.²³⁰ Moreover, the injunctions²³¹ regarding (acts of) sin exist only in order to adapt oneself to convention,²³² for what sin is there in Śiva?²³³

It would be appropriate, moreover, to say that division exists when he exists in the form of the universe if the nature of gold were to exist only in the ball of gold and not in the tiara, etc. The word “only” should be understood to modify “the gold ball.”²³⁴

Also, the perishability of the *śivatattva* that you think of as requiring a rite of injunction, this as a result of the fact that the entities (in question), of which it²³⁵

²²⁸Following Utpaladeva’s commentary, I take *eva* in 3.49c to be placed out of the regular word order (*bhinnakrama*), this for metrical reasons. Accordingly, it should be understood to modify *hemapiṇḍa* and not *hematā*.

²²⁹In other words, it would be appropriate to suggest that some entities appearing in the everyday world are filled with impurities, or the like, only if they were rightly understood to be qualitatively different from, to have a different nature than, their source, Śiva himself. (The gold ball is analogous with Śiva, as the former is the source, as it were, of the goldsmith’s creations. The “tiara, etc.,” produced of the gold ball, are analogous to the manifested universe, in the present example.) Since all are said to be equally possessed of Śiva’s nature, this is simply not the case. Cf. ŚD 3.18cd–20 and 3.44cd–45ab for use of the same analogy.

²³⁰This, of course, is a reference to the *satkārya(-vāda)*, the doctrine that the effect is inherent in the cause. Somānanda here wishes to argue that, insofar as he accepts that causality takes this form, it follows that one cannot claim that the effect—the manifested universe—is different from its cause, Śiva. As such, one cannot argue that certain entities in the world decay, lose their purity, over time. (Compare the present with the preceding passages devoted to the same question, found in ŚD 3.42cd–47 and the commentary thereon.)

²³¹I here translate the singular “injunction” (*codanā*) with the plural, this to offer an idiomatic translation of the text.

²³²The term *niyamānupraveśa* is difficult to render precisely in English. The idea here expressed is the mere approximation of a true restriction, the reality being that no rites are required to purify entities appearing in the world, or rectify one’s own transgressions therein, given the fact that everything is by nature already pure.

²³³The present passage continues Somānanda’s response to the counterarguments put forward in ŚD 3.21–32. In particular, the present passage responds to objections raised in ŚD 3.23d–24, wherein it is suggested that one would sin by stepping on the earth, or by other similar acts, insofar as the earth is understood to be Śiva himself.

²³⁴In other words, one should understand the emphatic particle (*eva*) appearing in ŚD 3.49c to modify “the gold ball” (*hemapiṇḍa*) and not “the nature of gold” (*hematā*), as one would expect given the syntax of the verse. Simply, the emphatic particle (*eva*) is placed out of the regular word order (*bhinnakrama*) in the verse, this for metrical reasons.

²³⁵That is, the *śivatattva*.

is the nature, (allegedly) perish, is completely removed by accepting the doctrine that the effect is inherent in the cause.²³⁶

Moreover, that which enjoins a rite of propitiation, the sin of walking, spitting, etc., on Śiva, who is possessed of an omnipresent nature,²³⁷ serves to bring about the everyday world of transmigration, the result of adapting oneself to *dharma* and *adharma* in the form of restrictions that are formed by the power of limitation,²³⁸ which is possessed of his nature.²³⁹ In reality, however, what in the *śivatattva* is defiled by sin? That is to say nothing whatsoever (is defiled).

3.51cd–53ab

evampravartane tasya na nimittasamudgamah
 3.52. *yadi svarūpavibhramśāc chāktarūpādikalpanā*
tad vaktavyaṃ nimittatvaṃ kimarthaṃ rūpam ujjhati
 3.53. *yāvatā sarvarūpāṇāṃ tatsvarūpasvarūpitā*

Given that his activity is as it is,²⁴⁰ no motive arises for him (to act).²⁴¹ If the form of the empowered one, etc., were formed through a disturbance in his nature,²⁴² then one would have to address the nature of the motive: why does he emit form, in as much as his nature assumes the nature of all forms?²⁴³

²³⁶The logic here is as follows: insofar as the *śivatattva* is perfect, cannot be defiled, and insofar as it is a cause that is inherent in that which it produces—the universe, in this case—it exists inherently in the effect. Because the effect is similar to the cause, which means in this instance that the universe is as pure as the *śivatattva*, it is therefore not possible that entities within the universe decay, lose their purity. As such, there is no need to perform rites of expiation in order to purify the object in question: it can never be impure in any way.

²³⁷Note that I understand *sarvatrātman* to be an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound describing Śiva, the one whose nature (*ātman*) may be found everywhere.

²³⁸The term here used is *niyatisakti*, which refers to the power by which Śiva limits one's awareness of one's omnipotent and omnipresent agency. See Pandit 1997: 76.

²³⁹In other words, the power of limitation is inherent in Śiva's nature. It is not a capacity that limits him or divides him in any way.

²⁴⁰The present, locative absolute construction (*evampravartane*) refers to the activity of Śiva's consciousness, which at his will immediately manifests the universe and all within it as it appears to the mundane agents who inhabit it. It is simply Śiva's nature to perform this activity; it is the nature of the functioning of consciousness. In acting in this way, moreover, nothing changes within the nature of Śiva, for which reason, Somānanda argues, the following obtains.

²⁴¹This is offered in response to ŚD 3.25, where Somānanda considers the possible objection that Śiva, who manifests an impure universe, has undiscernible motives for doing so.

²⁴²The term *vibhramśa* could more strongly suggest the “decline” or even the “cessation” or “end” of Śiva's nature.

²⁴³The present passage responds to the criticism leveled against Somānanda in ŚD 3.25cd, where the opponent suggested that Śiva puts agents within the universe in an impossible situation: they constantly face the dangers of performing impure acts, because there is no room in a universe composed entirely of Śiva himself in which to enact the mundane (and often impure) activities that are indispensable to everyday life. Why, the opponent asks, does Śiva create such a situation, such a universe? The reply comes in the form of a counterfactual expression. Somānanda here argues that he would have to account for Śiva's motive for creation only if a real transformation occurred in Śiva. Since none exists, no motivation may be discerned. Śiva simply acts in accordance with his nature. There is therefore no need to explain why

Given that his activity, the maintenance of the universe, which is simply the condition of being as it is,²⁴⁴ occurs in the complete absence of his form undergoing a birth, a real transformation, etc.,²⁴⁵ his motive cannot be criticized, because no object exists that had not existed before. Were he, being of a peaceful form, to assume another form²⁴⁶—that of an empowered one, for example—by abandoning his Śiva-nature,²⁴⁷ then one would have to address, i.e., one would have to question, the motive for (the creation of) some object, here:²⁴⁸ “why does he emit form?” In as much as Śiva exists in a state of having a peaceful form, and as the form of the universe, as well, nothing can be possessed of any nature except Śiva’s.²⁴⁹

3.53cd–56

śaktitrayarūpatvaṃ sarve yasyāsty avasthitam

3.54. *nimittam kalpyate tatra nimittam tatra kalpyatām*

atathātve tathābhāvo yatra syād atha codyate

3.55. *purā śāntasvarūpatvaṃ paścāt tādr̥gavasthitiḥ*

śānte śivatvaṃ sthūle 'pi śivatvaṃ yatra varṇitam

3.56. *tatra kā śāntatā brūhi śānte kiṃ vastutā na te*

vastutā cet tathābhūtaśaktitritayasamgamah

(Objection:) You must consider the motive to exist as the condition of the one whose nature—the triad of powers—exists in everything. You must

Śiva, who is pure, chose to create a purportedly defiled universe. Śiva did not create such a problematic universe at all, but only one that appears in full accordance with his unchanging and pure nature.

²⁴⁴The long compound *evamavasthānamātralakṣaṇajagatsthitipravartana* may be translated more literally with “[his] activity, the maintenance of the universe, which is characterized by being nothing but such a condition.” In other words, the present should be understood merely to suggest that Śiva’s activity involves the perpetuation of the universe in the form in which it appears.

²⁴⁵The idea here expressed is that Śiva does not act in such a manner as to transform himself, let alone some other entity, in the process of creation. His activity is purely the product of the power of will. As such, it involves no creation, real transformation, or the like. The term “etcetera” (°*ādī*°) here likely refers to the destruction or demise (*marāṇa*) of the entity in question. It is worth noting, however, that two of the more recent manuscript copies of the commentary (P and R) omit the term in question (°*ādī*°) from the text.

²⁴⁶I here translate *grahaṇa* with “assume,” despite the fact that the term often refers to the act of cognition in the ŚD and the ŚDVṛ. A similar construction, one using a form of the same verb (*grah/grabh*) and *rūpa* as the object of the verb, may be found in ŚD 1.34.

²⁴⁷It is possible that *śivatattva*, the term here rendered with “Śiva-nature,” should be understood to be a technical term referring to the *śivatattva*, the first of the thirty-six *tattvas*.

²⁴⁸“Here,” *atra*, can be understood to mean “here [according to this philosophy]” or “here [in the world].”

²⁴⁹Literally, *śivasvarūpeṇaiva svarūpavattvam* means “the fact of being possessed of a nature may only result from Śiva’s nature.” What is expressed here is conceptually rather straightforward: insofar as Śiva is the only one who exists, to exist is by definition to be Śiva himself. There is no difference in the nature of Śiva when he appears to be quiescent or when he appears to exist in the form of the active universe. This is, in short, a simple expression of Somānanda’s pantheism. Cf. ŚD 1.41cd–43 for reference to Śiva as existing “as if” he were peaceful, bound by ignorance, etc. See also ŚD 1.34–43 for a description of Śiva’s omnipresence.

consider the motive in instances where some entity can come to exist where it previously did not.²⁵⁰ So, you must explain this:²⁵¹ he has a peaceful nature at an earlier time, and he subsequently abides in such a one (as the universe). (Reply:) Do tell, what is the peaceful nature, given that the Śiva-nature we describe (of him) when he is peaceful is the (same) Śiva-nature that exists when he is coarse, as well? What state of being a thing does not exist when he is peaceful, according to you? If you argue that it is the state of being a thing (itself), (we reply:) that is a unification of the triad of powers as they are.

(Objection:) You must consider the motive to exist in the one for whom the condition—being possessed of the nature of consciousness, which consists of the triad of powers, will, etc.—exists in the condition of everything. This means: What is it? Where is it set to work? How is it conceived of? This simply cannot be assumed. Indeed, the motive must be considered on the occasion of the arising of his nature in a place where his nature did not exist previously. So, i.e., in this way, you must explain this: he has a peaceful nature—he exists in a form that is not the universe—at an earlier time, and he subsequently exists in the form of the universe. Thus, it must be said that a cause exists for that which had not existed before.

Reply: not so. Where the Śiva-nature we describe when he is what we accept as peaceful is the very Śiva-nature that exists when he is coarse, as well, i.e., when he exists as the form of the universe, what peaceful nature could exist there, i.e., what is the nature of Śiva that could exist there? Do tell. For, even the peaceful [Śiva-nature] is what you consider to be a thing, and a thing, consisting of the state of being real, is a reality, is existent, which (in turn) is the nature of the agent who creates. Moreover, agency is the state of having an independent nature, which belongs to the one whose form is consciousness, the possessor of the powers of will, etc. Thus, Śiva is all things.

3.57–59

3.57. *aṅgārarūpe kiṃ vahnau vahnitā na kriyātmake*

javālādike 'tha sāvasthā niṣkriyājñānarūpiṇī

3.58. *niricchā ca na śakyeta vaktum evaṃ kadācana*

asti sthito 'sāv etasyām avasthāyām śivo yadi

3.59. *naiṣā kriyā bhavati kiṃ niricche kiṃ kriyā bhavet*

nirjñāne vā tato jñeyaṃ nāśaktiḥ kācana sthitiḥ

²⁵⁰The idea here expressed is simply that one must identify the cause of the production of some entity in instances where the entity in question did not exist in a previous moment. As this is not, according to Somānanda, the nature of Śiva's creative consciousness, the matter is of central concern to understanding the theory of causality in the Pratyabhijñā, as Somānanda conceives of it. Note that I follow Utpaladeva's commentary in understanding *tathābhāva* to be a compound of two members, viz.: *tathā-bhāva*.

²⁵¹The subject, here understood to be the cause (*nimitta*), is inherent in the verb (*codyate*).

Does the nature of fire exist in fire in the form of charcoal and not in the nature of the action, burning, etc.²⁵² Now, you might argue that the condition²⁵³ is not one that exists in the form of action and cognition, and is one that is absent of will. (Reply:) He may never be spoken of in this way.²⁵⁴ If you argue that Śiva is established in this condition,²⁵⁵ (we reply:) no. Does the action come into being in one who is absent of will, and how could action arise in one who is absent of cognition? Hence, the object of cognition never exists as a condition that is absent of power.²⁵⁶

Does the nature of fire exist only in fire in the form of charcoal, but not in the one that is penetrated by the action of burning, warming, etc.²⁵⁷ Now,²⁵⁸ there is only fire there,²⁵⁹ which is also Śiva: although he enters into²⁶⁰ the division that

²⁵²The present is clearly a rhetorical question used to counter the notion that Śiva-nature exists in the “peaceful” condition of Śiva in his supreme state, but not in the “coarse” level where Śiva exists as the universe. To believe as much, Somānanda suggests, would be essentially to believe that fire that exists *in posse* does not exist *in esse*, which he argues is absurd.

²⁵³The present phrase refers to the condition of Śiva as the supreme Śiva, analogous with the unlit charcoal in the present example.

²⁵⁴That is, it is never possible to speak of Śiva as devoid of his powers, as totally inactive, even at the highest level. See ŚD 1.3–4 for a description of Śiva in the supreme condition, one that is replete with all of his powers. Cf. ŚD 1.41cd–43, where Somānanda and Utpaladeva indicate that Śiva is “as if” peaceful, the distinction between this condition and the condition in which he is manifested as the universe being a matter only of convention.

²⁵⁵This is to say that Somānanda here anticipates that the opponent will argue that it is possible for an entity to exist absent of the power of will, etc., in a sort of potential state, an existence *in posse* that is devoid of these powers, even if the entity in question manifests itself in a fully empowered form in a subsequent moment of time. As discussed in the Introduction (section 5, and *passim*), this is of course an utterly untenable position to maintain, in Somānanda’s view.

²⁵⁶In the preceding (ŚD 3.57a–c), Somānanda argued that it is impossible to imagine the nature of power—the power to burn, for example—that exists in potential form but not in the active form. Subsequently (ŚD 3.57c–59), Somānanda rejects the possibility that the nature of a particular power may exist in its active form but may be absent in the potential condition. Thus, he has here considered both of the two possibilities, of a power *in posse* that does not exist *in esse* and of a power *in esse* that does not exist *in posse*.

²⁵⁷As mentioned in the notes to the verses in question, the present argument asks simply whether the nature of fire is present only *in posse* and not *in esse*. The answer is a resounding no, and by analogy, the nature of Śiva is said to be present not only in the “peaceful,” supreme form of the deity, but also in the form that appears as the universe.

²⁵⁸It appears at first glance that the present term here translated, *atha*, should be understood to be a lemma (ŚD 3.57c), given its appearance immediately following Utpaladeva’s interpretation of ŚD 3.57a–c, but this is not the case. Utpaladeva again uses the same term to introduce an objection in the following line of the commentary, this in the manner in which the term was used in the verse.

²⁵⁹Kaul suggests that “there” (*tatra*) refers to the ignited fuel, i.e., to the act of burning etc.: *tatra jvalanakriyāviśiṣṭe*. In other words, Śiva is equally present in his premanifested state, at the level of the *śivatattva*—here analogous to the unlit charcoal—and also in his manifested state, here analogous to the ignited fuel in the process of burning.

²⁶⁰It is also possible that *āviṣṭa* should be understood passively to refer to the fact that Śiva’s unitary nature is “penetrated” by apparent multiplicity. Cf., e.g., ŚD 1.1 and the commentary on the same.

is that entity, he is only Śiva.²⁶¹ This is communicated by means of the condition of the action.²⁶²

Now, you might argue: Śiva-nature may exist in the one who acts,²⁶³ because the powers make action possible; the state of being peaceful, on the other hand, is devoid of action, absent of cognitions of the objects of cognition, and, because no cause exists to produce an effect, devoid of will, the desire to act; therefore it is not Śiva.²⁶⁴ (Reply:) He may never be spoken of in this way, because he is always united²⁶⁵ with the act of coming into existence.²⁶⁶

If you argue that, in the absence of coarse action, we accept that Śiva exists in a peaceful condition, as well, then (we reply:) he does. Does the action, in the form of the existence of entities, etc., fail to come into being? It must come into being! And action by nature involves an actor, and an actor is independent, is fully sentient. Since independence is activity that accords with one's own will, and because he exists as such, it follows that will must exist here [in Śiva], the mark of which is his desire to exist and to remain in existence.²⁶⁷

How, moreover, could action come into existence as long as he does not understand such action, such coming into being, or such persistence?²⁶⁸ [Pāṇini] teaches that verbs like *bhavati* “to be, to become” end with a verbal ending.²⁶⁹ Therefore, that which is to be known by someone simply never exists devoid of the powers of will, etc.

²⁶¹That is, he enters into the state of being the active fire, but in doing so his nature is unchanged.

²⁶²This is to say that any entity that appears in the world is Śiva, because Śiva is the only agent, the only one who acts, and entities appearing in the world are active. With this, Utpaladeva's gloss of ŚD 3.57a–c is completed.

²⁶³Note that the term here translated, *sakriya*, is an exocentric (*bahuvrihi*) compound referring to Śiva.

²⁶⁴If one argues, in other words, that the peaceful Śiva is devoid of all powers—if one argues, by analogy, that the power to burn that exists *in esse* does not exist *in posse* in the charcoal—, then the following reply is given.

²⁶⁵Note that I interpret *bhavanakriyāviraha*, an ablative of cause, to include a negative particle (*a-*): *bhavana-kriyā-aviraha*. (To suggest that Śiva is absent the act of creation would contradict Śaiva theology.)

²⁶⁶In other words, it is not appropriate to speak of Śiva as utterly peaceful. He is active, even in his quiescent condition, for it is his nature to be thus.

²⁶⁷The present passage, then, is a detailed explanation of why the so-called “peaceful” state involves the full presence of the powers of will, cognition, and action.

²⁶⁸See A 3.4.65 for the use of the verbal root *jñā* with the infinitive, as exemplified herein. Note, also, that I understand *tathā* to apply in a distributive manner to all three infinitives in the present passage.

²⁶⁹See A 1.3.1, where Pāṇini defines verbs as those “beginning with *bhū*”: *bhūdayo dhātavaḥ*. See also A 1.4.14 (*suptināntam padam*), where Pāṇini defines terms ending with verbal endings as inflected words. Finally, see A 3.4.78, where the verbal endings are enumerated. The point of this argument is that Pāṇini suggests that the verb to be is an action. He does so because he teaches that the verb is conjugated, and the conjugation of the verb signals the identity of the agent who performs the action in question. Simply, existence is itself an action. Cf. ĪPK 1.5.17, where Utpaladeva discusses the role of verbal suffixes in defining the nature of action.

In addition, Śiva-nature is the fact of possessing the powers of will, etc. It is taught in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*,²⁷⁰ moreover, how [Śiva] creates nothing different from Śiva-nature when a pot exists, the Himālayas exist, the world exists.²⁷¹

3.60–61

3.60. *atha citratvam atrāsti bhāvapuñje na tac chive śivasya tat svarūpatvam vaicitryam yat parasparam*
 3.61. *apekṣya bhāvavaicitryam tasya tebhyo vicitratā sarvaṃ śivātmakam yadvat kathaniyam ihāgrataḥ*

Now, if you argue that the multiplicity that exists here²⁷² in the multitude of entities does not exist in Śiva,²⁷³ (we reply:) the mutual difference is the nature of Śiva's nature. With regard to the variegation of entities, his multiplicity exists through them. Everything is of the nature of Śiva in a manner that we will explain here,²⁷⁴ later on.²⁷⁵

Now, you might argue: one sees a mutual difference of entities (here in the world); so, how is this possible in Śiva, i.e., in the one who is the unitary form of consciousness?²⁷⁶

(Reply:) Even there,²⁷⁷ the mutual difference of entities is the variegated nature of Śiva himself; and, with regard to the variegation of those, i.e., of the pots, cloth, etc.,²⁷⁸ his multiplicity appears through them, i.e., by dint of their existence, even though he exists as the one who is the unitary form of consciousness.

Everything, moreover, being of the nature of consciousness, is of the nature of Śiva in a manner that we will explain, later on, i.e., in a manner conforming to logic.

²⁷⁰See, e.g., ĪPK 2.4, esp. 2.4.20 and the ĪPVṠ thereon. Torella also refers the reader to ŚD 4.32–33ab, where Somānanda makes essentially the same argument, but with regard to the functioning of the grammatical elements (*kāraṅkas*) that are deployed when speaking of an entity that does not exist, such as the horn of a hare.

²⁷¹In other words, Śiva creates only himself when he produces the effects of a limited agent, something large within the world, or even the world itself. It is always only Śiva who acts. As Somānanda says in the verse, “the object of cognition never exists as that which is absent of power.”

²⁷²“Here,” *atra*, should be understood to mean “here in the world.”

²⁷³That is, if the opponent argues that the multiplicity appearing in manifestation does not exist in Śiva when he is in the supreme condition, then the following answer is given.

²⁷⁴“Here,” *iha*, should be understood to mean “here [in the *Śivādṛṣṭi*].”

²⁷⁵See ŚD 4.1ff. for Somānanda's explanation of how everything is possessed of Śiva-nature.

²⁷⁶Note that *cidekarūpa* is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound that literally means “he whose unitary form is consciousness.”

²⁷⁷This is to say that the following obtains even in the manifested universe, in the world of apparently multiple entities.

²⁷⁸The present construction, *teṣāṃ ghaṭapaṭādinām vaicitryam*, indicates that *bhāvavaicitrya* (ŚD 3.61a) is a genitive determinative (*taṭpuruṣa*) compound, one in which the term *bhāva* should be understood to refer to the “entities” that exist in the everyday world, namely, pots, etc.

3.62

3.62. *jalāharaṇasaktaś ca ghaṭo yaḍi na bhāṇyate
ghaṭaḥ kevala evātra tad evaṃvidham ucyatām*

Moreover, if a pot is not said to be capable of holding water here,²⁷⁹ the pot being in no way connected to anything else, then it should be stated in this way.²⁸⁰

If, moreover, a pot is not said to be capable of holding water here, i.e., in the world, but rather is not connected to anything else, that is, is a pot that is fully absent of being penetrated by the action in question, then this, for its part, should be stated in a way that reflects this exclusively: “Śiva, being in no way connected to anything else, does not exist as the form of the universe.”

Insofar as it is not thus,²⁸¹ it follows that Śiva alone exists absolutely everywhere.

3.63–68ab

3.63. *nānāvādair no virodhaḥ kathaniyam ihāgrataḥ
uktaṃ vā kālapādādāv āgopālāṅganādinā*

3.64. *tad aikyaṃ kheṭapālo 'pi prāha yā kācana sthitā
śaktiḥ padārthajātasya devadevasya sākḥilā*

3.65. *śaktiśaktimatām uktā sarvatraiva hy abheditā
eko rudra itītyādi śrutāv uktaṃ tathā paraḥ*

3.66. *puruṣaḥ sarvam evedam itihāsādiśūditam
maheśasyāṣṭamūrtiṭvaṃ yāvat pārthivamūḍhataḥ*

3.67. *so 'rodid iti vede 'sti nārthavādo nirarthakaḥ
vidhyaṅgatvena cet sattā nāsatyasyāṅgatā sthitā*

3.68. *arthavādād api phalaṃ rātrikratuṣu darśitam*

There is absolutely²⁸² no contradiction as a result of the (existence of) various (opposing) doctrines, as we will explain here,²⁸³ later

²⁷⁹As Utpaladeva indicates in his commentary, “here,” *atra*, should be understood to mean “here [in the world].” What Utpaladeva does not mention is that he construes *atra* with the clause appearing in ŚD 3.62ab, even though the term appears in ŚD 3.62c, out of the normal word order. This is simply the result of the author’s need to conform to the metre in the verse of the ŚD.

²⁸⁰The present argument is made by analogy. The idea is this: to understand Śiva to be merely existent, inactive and utterly disengaged with the world—to understand him, in a word, to be utterly “peaceful”—is the equivalent of understanding a pot to be totally unengaged with the world that surrounds it, incapable of action therein. If this is the vision of Śiva expressed in Śaiva scriptures, they should have come out and said so explicitly, but they do not. Note that the passage of text following the present one (ŚD 3.63–68ab) goes on to show that various Śaiva scriptural sources describe Śiva as an active, and not merely peaceful, deity.

²⁸¹In other words, insofar as the Śaiva scriptures do not describe Śiva in this way, the following obtains.

²⁸²Note that I understand *no* to be the combination of the negative particle (*na*) and the emphatic particle (*u*), not the enclitic form of the first-person plural pronoun.

²⁸³“Here,” *iha*, should be understood to mean “here [in the Śivaḍṛṣṭi].”

on.²⁸⁴ Instead, the oneness that is expressed in, e.g., the *Kālapāda* with “down to cowherds, women,” etc.,²⁸⁵ is what Khetapāla declares, as well: “All powers of all things are entirely the power of the God of Gods.”²⁸⁶ For, the powers and the possessor of power are said to be undivided all the time, without exception. It is stated in scripture²⁸⁷ that “the one Rudra (is this universe),” etc.,²⁸⁸ and “the supreme person is all of this without exception.”²⁸⁹ It is (similarly) stated in the *Itihāsas*, etc.,²⁹⁰ that “the eightfold nature of Maheśvara exists down to the degeneracy of the earth-*tattva*.”²⁹¹ The Veda says “he howled”,²⁹² this is not meaningless supplemental text.²⁹³ If you argue that its²⁹⁴ truthfulness is the product of the fact that it is an auxiliary to the injunctions, (we reply:) that which is untrue is not established as an auxiliary: a result is shown in the sacrificial rites to the night, even if by (reference to) the supplemental text.²⁹⁵

Moreover, [Somānanda] will explain later on that there is absolutely no contradiction of the non-duality of Śiva as a result of the (existence of) various (opposing) philosophical systems.²⁹⁶

²⁸⁴Somānanda continues to answer the string of objections enumerated in ŚD 3.21–32. The suggestion that a unitary Śiva is contradicted by the multiplicity of philosophical views is suggested in ŚD 3.26ab. See 3.74cd–76ab for an explanation of the existence of a multiplicity of mutually contradictory philosophical views in a unitary Śiva.

²⁸⁵The present passage refers to the *Kālottaratantra*. The verse in question may be identified as *Sārdhatriśaktikālottaratantra* 1.6cd–7ab.

²⁸⁶The source of the quotation is unknown. Sanderson (2006²: 57, fn. 29) suggests that it could be part of the lost *Rauravavṛtti*. My translation is here based on Sanderson’s, found in the article here cited.

²⁸⁷The term here used, *śruti*, refers to the orthodox and commonly accepted scriptural sources, such as the Vedas.

²⁸⁸The source of this quotation is *Yajurveda* 8.6.10.

²⁸⁹The source of this quotation is *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 3.15. The same is quoted by Sadyojyotis in his introduction to the first verse of the third chapter of the *Nareśvaraparikṣā: tathā ca śrutiḥ. puruṣa evedam sarvaṃ yadbhūtaṃ yac ca bhāvyaṃ*.

²⁹⁰According to Utpaladeva, “etcetera” (*ādi*) here refers to the Purāṇas.

²⁹¹The term in question is a name of Śiva, understood to have an eightfold form, one including five elements, the moon, the sun, and the patron of the sacrifice, the *yajamāna*. (See: TAK, vol. 1, 155–156.) The same is referred to by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa in his *Stavacintāmaṇi*, verse 78, and in Kṣemarāja’s commentary on the same; ĪPVV, vol 3, p. 166. Here, however, Somānanda refers to the presence of the name in the epics.

²⁹²This is a reference to the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 6.1.3.8.

²⁹³The term translated with “supplemental text”, *arthavāda*, is one commonly found in the Mīmāṃsā and is based in that school’s exegetical vision. One common formulation of the idea referred to here suggests that three types of text appear in the Veda: *vidhis*, or injunctions for the performance of particular rites on particular occasions; mantras, which are used in the performance of said rites; and *arthavāda*, “explanatory” or “supplemental text” that serves to reinforce the conviction of the sacrificer to perform the rites, but that should not be taken literally. It is against this idea that Somānanda here argues: when the Veda refers to Rudra’s activity, it does so because Rudra actively engages the world. Such expressions are not merely explanatory, but are to be taken literally.

²⁹⁴That is, the present passage concerns the truthfulness of the *arthavāda*.

²⁹⁵This last statement refers to the use by Jaiminīya Mīmāṃsakas of *arthavāda* passages to justify the performance of the rite in question.

²⁹⁶See ŚD 3.74cd–76ab.

Instead, this much is expressed in our very own settled opinion, with expressions in the *Śrī Kālottara* and elsewhere, such as the following, that Śiva-nature, in the form of mantras, exists of (all) beings:

“Cowherds, women, children (all) speak it always.”²⁹⁷

The gurus teach the unity of Śiva, as well. Accordingly, the guru Khetāpāla declared, “All powers,” etc.²⁹⁸

Moreover, since the very power of the God of Gods is said to be the power of real things, and power and the possessor of power are not divided, this amounts to saying that the real thing is the God of Gods himself.²⁹⁹

The same is expressed, moreover, as the unity of Rudra: “The one Rudra is this [universe]”;³⁰⁰ and it is similarly stated in the Veda that “the supreme person himself is all of this.”³⁰¹

In addition, Maheśvara’s eightfold nature is stated in the Purāṇas, Itihāsas, and elsewhere, where even degeneracy, in the form of the extremely base earth-*tattva*, is (said to be comprised of) his very nature.

And the Veda expresses his unity with “he howled,” even though they (here) express Rudra’s power.³⁰² It is not logical to say that this [expression], for its part, is a supplemental text whose meaning is untrue insofar as its purpose is to promote accordance with the (Vedic) injunctions. How could the supplemental text that is truly auxiliary to (Vedic) injunctions have an unreal meaning? For, supplemental text is that which only expresses its own meaning, and there is no erroneousness of meaning in the Veda.³⁰³ The Jaiminīyas, moreover, teach that there exists a result of the sacrificial rites to the night, which exists as a result of one’s accordance to it, simply on the authority of the supplemental text.³⁰⁴

²⁹⁷The present is an abbreviated quotation of *Sārdhatriśatikālottara* 1.6cd–7ab. The verse there reads: *āgopālāṅganā bālā mleccnāḥ prākṛtabhāṣiṅaḥ / antarjalagatāḥ satvās te ’pi nīyaṃ bruvanti tam*. The verse in question refers to the unity of speech, down to mundane speech.

²⁹⁸See, supra, note 286.

²⁹⁹There can be perhaps no clearer expression of the identification of the process of manifestation, of activity, with the object that is implicated in the action in question: the active divinity and the world of objects that accomplish the range of activities of the universe are one and the same.

³⁰⁰See, supra, note 288.

³⁰¹This is a reference to the *Rgveda* and the famous Puruṣa Sūkta hymn. *Rgveda* 10.90.2 reads: *puruṣa evedam sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam / utāmṛtatvasyeshāno yad annenātirohati*.

³⁰²See, supra, note 292.

³⁰³What Utpaladeva here wishes to suggest, I think, is that *arthavāda*, according to Mīmāṃsaka exegetical principles, must express only what it expresses; it cannot shed light on anything in the world other than what is contained in the semantics of the expression in question. This being so, it would be impossible for text that is untrue to express anything that could motivate the practitioner to action. The Veda, simply, is not filled with lies.

³⁰⁴In other words, the Jaiminīya Mīmāṃsakas invoke passages that are classified as supplemental text, *arthavāda*, to establish both the need to perform and the potential fruits of performing the sacrificial rites to the night (*rātrikratu*), which would be impossible to do if the *arthavādas* were truly meaningless. They therefore must correspond in some direct and significant manner with reality, and, as such, reference to Rudra as an active deity should be understood accurately to describe the divine. The entire discussion found here seems to relate to what is said of the matter in the *Śabarabhāṣya* on

3.68cd–69

bandhamokṣau na bhidyete sarvatraiva śivatvataḥ
 3.69. *vijñānam idṛk sarvasya kasmān na syād vimohitā*
saivaiṣā sā ca saṃsāro bandhamokṣāv ataḥ sthitau

(Objection:) Bondage and liberation are not distinguished, because Śiva-nature is absolutely all-pervasive.³⁰⁵ Why isn't everyone possessed of such understanding?³⁰⁶ (Reply:) This is simply the nature of delusion, and that³⁰⁷ is the world of transmigration. Hence, bondage and liberation exist.³⁰⁸

Given that bondage and liberation do not exist when everyone is possessed of Śiva-nature, does absolutely everyone understand himself or herself to be Śiva? Such a cognition does not exist. This is what [the opponent] says.

(Reply:) With regard to this, too, as it is said that that is itself the nature of delusion—“that, moreover, which is characterized by ignorance is the world of transmigration, which is said to be bondage,”³⁰⁹ for instance—bondage and liberation exist in the form of ignorance.

3.70

3.70. *vibhinnaśivapakṣe tu satye dārḍhyaṃ paratra naḥ*
pratitimātram evātra tāvatā bandhamokṣatā

If, on the other hand, the view that Śiva is divided were true, stability would exist elsewhere.³¹⁰ For us, the degree to which bondage and liberation exist is simply a measure of one's perception, here.³¹¹

If, on the other hand, one were to accept the view that absolutely all entities exist separately in the form of Śiva, this because they are (distinct) agents insofar as they are connected with the powers, will, etc., then in that case, i.e. when the

the *Mimāṃsāsūtras* of Jaimini, ad 1.2.1–30. The *Bhāṣya* quotes the phrase “he howled” (so ‘rodit) as an example given by a *pūrvapakṣin* of meaningless text. See Jha 1973, vol. 1: 51–73.

³⁰⁵The present is a rearticulation of the objection raised in ŚD 3.26cd, followed by Somānanda's reply.

³⁰⁶In other words, the interlocutor asks how one could remain unaware of one's own liberated state, given that everything and everyone has Śiva-nature.

³⁰⁷The present term refers to the nature of delusion (*vimohitā*).

³⁰⁸A parallel passage to the present may be found in VBh 135. Cf. also ŚD 7.87cd.

³⁰⁹The present quotation remains untraced.

³¹⁰In other words, if one accepts the thesis that Śiva-nature exists individually in the various beings appearing in the world, rather than being one and the same Śiva-nature, then one would have to accept that the divided entities found in the world are individually stable and autonomous. This would lead, philosophically, to a divided world. It would, however, permit one to understand bondage and liberation to involve a real transformation of an autonomous individual from one state of being to another, rather than a mere change in perspective. This, however, is not how Somānanda conceives of bondage and liberation, or of the nature of reality for that matter.

³¹¹“Here” (*atra*) presumably should be understood to mean “here [in the world].”

view that Śiva is divided is true, stability would exist in the distinction of objects, this in accordance with the manner in which it appears.³¹²

But when the nature of the unitary Śiva alone is reality, then, this being our view, no stability exists for distinction, but rather liberation is the measure of one's cognition of Śiva's non-duality, while bondage is the non-cognition of the same. Thus, the degree to which they exist is a measure of one's perception, but it is not the case that the nature of bondage and liberation exists as a result of bondage and liberation being mutually distinct things.³¹³

3.71

3.71. *nāsatye satyabuddhitvakhaṇḍanātrāsti kācana
kathanaṃ sarvasāmyāya vivādihananāya ca*

It is not at all the case, here,³¹⁴ that a real perception dismisses that which is unreal. The expression (of Śiva's unity) serves to establish the equality of everything and to defeat our opponents.

Neither is it the case, here, that a real cognition dismisses, in the form of error,³¹⁵ the unreal entities, as is stated in the Veda,³¹⁶ since the multiplicity or unity of absolutely all entities exists once it is established that they possess Śiva-nature.

As for the expression of unity as the nature of Śiva, that serves to establish the equality of everything with the *śivatattva*, i.e., it serves to prevent the elevation or diminution (of some entities over others); or, if there are those who do not admit the Śiva-nature of entities, then it serves to defeat our opponents who subscribe to that view.

3.72

3.72. *tathā tathā śivāvasthā svecchātaḥ sa tadātmakeḥ
tadātmatve nāsti bandhas tadabhāvān na mokṣaṇam*

³¹²In other words, apparently distinct entities would truly be distinct, in a manner corresponding precisely to the manner in which this very distinction of objects appears in the world.

³¹³One should note that the present consideration of two alternatives (*vikalpa*), one suggesting that Śiva-nature is undivided, the other that it exists separately in each and every entity found in the world, is precisely the one considered in relation to the grammarians' *paśyanti* in ŚD 2.43–44ab. The argument here made is straightforward: bondage and liberation are not truly distinct conditions or states of being, but rather exist only because they are perceived to exist. Ultimately, there is no stability to this, or any other, distinction, however.

³¹⁴“Here” should be understood to mean “here [in our settled opinion].”

³¹⁵In other words, the present passage anticipates the idea that the dismissal is based on the fact that the cognition of the unreal entities comes to be understood to be erroneous.

³¹⁶Here, *vedoktavat* likely refers to that which is stated in the Vedānta, though precisely which form of the Vedānta remains unclear. Note that Somānanda shows no cognizance of Śaṅkara's philosophy in his summary critique of the Vedānta, found in ŚD 6.6–15.

The condition of Śiva exists in these various ways, of his own will. That has his nature.³¹⁷ Its nature being thus, there is no bondage; since that does not exist, there is no liberation (either).³¹⁸

Even when duality exists, the condition of Śiva exists in this way, i.e., in a dualistic form, by dint of his will. Moreover, that, i.e., the duality, has Śiva as its nature, and in this way, the duality being of the nature of Śiva, there is no bondage; since that does not exist, there is no liberation, either, the latter being dependent on the former.

3.73–74ab

3.73. *kimarthaṃ guruśāstrādi cet tathā tadavasthiteḥ
devasya śāstrād bodhena kiṃ prayojanam eva ca*

3.74. *kimarthaṃ bhavatārabdhaṃ śāstraṃ bodhāya kasya vā*

Objection: Of what use is the teacher, the teaching, etc., given that he abides in them as he does, and what is the very purpose of the awareness of God that is derived from the teaching? Of what use is the teaching that you have begun, and for whose awareness is it?³¹⁹

(Objection:) Of what use is the teacher, the teaching, the religious practices, etc., given that liberation does not exist, this because Śiva himself abides (in them) as he does,³²⁰ i.e., as the form of duality? For, awakening through scripture has no purpose for a god who is eternally awoken. Other teachings are for those who are seated (around the teacher);³²¹ by contrast,³²² of what use is it that you

³¹⁷This is to say that duality has the nature of Śiva. The present translation of ŚD 3.72ab follows Utpaladeva's interpretation. In the absence of the commentary, one might wish to interpret the half-verse differently from Utpaladeva, however. In my reading, the most natural way to understand the verse would differ from that of Utpaladeva in two ways. First, I would take *śvecchātaḥ* with what follows rather than what precedes it: in this interpretation, the syntax would accord with the meter, for such an interpretation asks one to punctuate at the caesura. Second, Utpaladeva understands the third-person pronoun (*sa*) here to refer to duality (*bhedā*), while one might prefer to understand it to refer to Śiva. This interpretation would render the following translation: "The condition of Śiva exists in these various ways. [Śiva] is possessed of such natures of his own will."

³¹⁸The present passage constitutes Somānanda's definitive answer to the criticism, leveled in ŚD 2.26cd, that Śaiva non-duality would compromise their understanding of bondage and liberation. His answer, in a word, is that neither truly exists, because Śiva truly is the nature of everything.

³¹⁹Somānanda here responds to the criticism anticipated in ŚD 3.27–28ab, where the author anticipates that one could object that, insofar as his philosophy posits that all things have Śiva-nature, it would follow that all would be liberated, and therefore there would be no need for teachings, for a guru, or for a God.

³²⁰Utpaladeva's commentary here indicates that *tadavasthiti* (ŚD 3. 73b) is an ablative of cause: *śivasyaivāvasthiter hetor*.

³²¹In other words, a *śāstra* is normally composed for the edification and indeed spiritual emancipation of the unenlightened disciples of the teacher, who composes the learned work for their sake. (This, indeed, is the reason Utpaladeva gives for the composition of the present commentary on the ŚD, for which see his *maṅgala*, verses 2–3, at the beginning of the ŚDVṛ.) Given that all are enlightened, then, there is no reason to undertake the composition of a śāstric work.

³²²The present expression renders the particle *vā*, which here appears, *prima facie*, to be a lemma (ŚD 3.74b). Given the syntax of the commentary, however, where Utpaladeva uses *vā* to contrast the teachings

yourself, a proponent of the unity of Śiva, have begun a teaching; for whose awareness is it?

3.74cd–76ab

sa evetthaṃ svecchayāste tatkartrtvena bodhyataḥ

3.75. *sa eva buddharūpatve tathā bhavati tatkṣaṇam*

sa eva samprajāyeta tadanuṣṭhānatatparaḥ

3.76. *phalaṃ vā tadanuṣṭhāne sa eva hi tadā bhavet*

(Reply:) He alone, by his will, exists in this way,³²³ as that agent,³²⁴ for the one who is to be enlightened, and he alone exists at that moment in the form of the enlightened one. He alone can exist as the one who is totally devoted to being in accordance with it. Also, he alone can arise as the result of according with that [teaching].³²⁵

(Reply:) God alone, by his will, i.e., for no particular reason,³²⁶ exists in this way.³²⁷ This is precisely what [Somānanda] demonstrates: he exist as that agent, i.e., as those such as ourselves, who author learned works for the one who is to be enlightened, i.e., having first taken the form of one who is to be enlightened, in the form of the student.

And he also exists at the very same moment in the form of the enlightened one.

And he exists as the one who is intent upon the religious practices of the teaching.

And he alone exists, in due time, as the form of the result (of such religious practices), be it a material reward, one of pleasure, or another.

3.76cd–78ab

vāditvaprativāditve kasmāc cet tasya tatsthiteḥ

3.77. *vyavahārāya vā sarvaṃ vyavahāro na vastugaḥ*

and teachers of other schools with Somānanda and his own, it is unclear precisely how Utpaladeva wishes to explain the use of this term in the ŚD itself. The contrast made in the commentary is not made in Somānanda's text. Thus, given the syntax of Somānanda's text, I there render the particle in a manner suggesting it contrasts two questions, the one regarding the purpose of the scripture, the other the question of for whom it is composed, even though this is not recommended by the syntax of the commentary.

³²³In other words, Śiva alone exists as the diverse entities in the universe.

³²⁴In other words, Śiva himself is the teacher, the one the very telos of whom the opponent questioned in ŚD 3.73a.

³²⁵I understand the emphatic particle (*hi*) in ŚD 3.76b to be a verse-filler, and thus have not rendered it in the translation.

³²⁶Because Śiva is completely free, there is no particular purpose to his manifestation. His desire to be manifested is the only reason for it. The question of the reason for the existence of manifestation was addressed in ŚD 3.25cd and in ŚD 2.25cd–26ab and 2.26cd–28ab, the latter pair of passages of course appearing in the midst of Somānanda's critique of the grammarians' *paśyanti*.

³²⁷Utpaladeva here glosses *itthaṃ* with *anena prakāreṇa*, though the two expressions carry essentially the same meaning.

svarūpaṃ vastugaṃ viddhi vyavahāro na jātucit

3.78. *tatheśvaravyavasthānād avastvābhāsarūpataḥ*

If you ask why truthfulness and erroneousness exist, (we reply:) this is so because he exists as both. However, everything serves the everyday world; (and) the everyday world is not a real thing. Know that his nature is a real thing; the everyday world is nothing at all, because the condition of the Lord is only thus, the form of the appearance of unreal things.

(Objection:) Given that no division of the (various) philosophies can exist if he were unitary, wherefrom truthfulness and erroneousness? After all, you refer to “the defeat of our opponents?”³²⁸

Reply: This, too, is so because he himself exists in this way. However, everything, i.e., the teaching, the proponent of it, the one propounding an opposing view, etc., serves the everyday world of society, and the everyday world of society, consisting of the noncognition of his non-duality, is not a real thing. On the other hand, what appears by way of his nature is only that which is by nature a real thing in the form of Śiva.³²⁹ The everyday world, however, is never a real thing, but rather is only confusion.³³⁰ As for the unreal thing, it has nothing but the Lord as its nature, this resulting from his abiding in the form of the appearance of that unreal thing. For this very reason, in the manner expressed in the *Īsvaraṇṇāyāṅgī*, that which appears, although it is not a real thing, is the very form of consciousness: it is merely said to be an unreal thing, because no appearing exists externally.³³¹

3.78cd

Regarding this, [Somānanda] says:

sarvam ekena rūpeṇa yad vicāryaṃ tathāgrataḥ

³²⁸Cf. ŚD 3.71d, where Somānanda uses the term *vivādihanana*.

³²⁹There is, of course, no real contradiction, according to the *Pratyabhijñā*, in the present pair of declarations. The “everyday world of society” (*lokavyavahāra*) is not real (*avastu*), according to Somānanda and Utpaladeva; and they simultaneously maintain that everything that appears is, indeed, real (*vastu*). This is so because all that appears is only Śiva himself. At the same time, the appearance of diversity is merely the product of the absence of the cognition of unity, an absence being of itself nothing whatsoever. Whatever one sees in the world is absolutely real insofar as everything that appears is Śiva himself. The only unreality is the failure to recognize this, and this failure to recognize the unity of all things is the very “everyday world” the reality of which Somānanda and Utpaladeva deny. See the Introduction, section 13, subsection entitled “Bhartṛhari’s *avidyā* and Utpaladeva’s *abhedākhyāti*.”

³³⁰The confusion (*bhrama*) involved is of course the failure to recognize the non-duality of all phenomena. It is simply the noncognition of Śiva’s non-duality (*abhedākhyāti*).

³³¹This very well could be a reference to ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.5.6, where Utpaladeva denies the reality of the external object, affirming only the appearance (*ābhāsa*) within consciousness to be real. Furthermore, he underscores the unreality of multiplicity in that passage, refuting, according to Torella, the *Vaiśiṣṭika* notion of aggregation being the basis of the appearance of entities. See ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.5.6. Cf. Torella 1994: 115–116, fn. 15. Torella 1994: 149, fn. 10 also refers the reader to the same passage in a note to ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.8.5.

The way in which everything exists in a unitary form will be considered later on.

The way in which everything, i.e., the real entity and the unreal entity, exists in the form of Śiva will definitely be considered later on.³³²

3.79

3.79. *dharmādharmaiś ca sambandhas tathā tacchivasamsthiteḥ
tatphalāphalayogena yuktatā tasya tatsthiteḥ*

The connection, moreover, with *dharma* and *adharma* exists in the manner that it does because Śiva abides in them.³³³ That he exists as both explains the fact that he is connected (to them) on account of the reward or lack of reward that results from them.³³⁴

The connection is with the result of the two or, due to incompleteness, the opposite, i.e., the connection is with the result that is the absence of the result.³³⁵ Alternatively, there is no connection with the result,³³⁶ or again an alternative: the connection is with the result of an *adharma* one did not wish for, the negative result of *adharma*.³³⁷ For this reason, the customary state of being connected or not being connected is the result of Śiva's condition being thus.³³⁸

At all times, whatever appears is possessed of nothing but Śiva's nature in the form of consciousness.

3.80–82ab

3.80. *nimittasamavāyādivaicitryāt tadvicitratā
kāraṇasyaikarūpatve na doṣas tritayātmatā*

³³²The discussion in question is found in ŚD 4. See, esp., ŚD 4.7cd–9, where Somānanda suggests that even erroneous cognitions may be understood to be real, this insofar as they appear in consciousness. As such, he suggests, the distinction of erroneous cognitions from correct cognitions only serves the everyday world, though ultimately the distinction is a false one, as both types of cognition appear in the form of Śiva's consciousness.

³³³Note that the reading found in ŚD 3.79b, *tacchivasamsthiteḥ*, finds a close parallel in ŚD 3.76d, wherein is found *tasya tatsthiteḥ*. (A similar construction—*tathā tadavasthiteḥ*—also exists in ŚD 3.73b, but there the commentary tells us to understand it as a part of the opponent's critique and not as the protagonist's reply to the objection, as it is in ŚD 3.79b.)

³³⁴The present passage is a response to the objection anticipated in ŚD 3.28cd and following.

³³⁵The present passage interprets *tatphalāphala-yoga* as an instrumental determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound, wherein *tat-phalāphala* is itself a genitive determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound and *phalāphala*, itself the second member of that compound, is a coordinative (*dvandva*) compound.

³³⁶The present passage apparently reads *aphalayoga* as one member of the compound, referring to the "fruitless connection" with the result (*taiphala*).

³³⁷The present passage suggests that *tatphalāphalayoga* refers to the existence of a connection (*yoga*) with the absence of a result (*aphala*), the absence being the result (*phala*) of the action in question (*tat*).

³³⁸Utpaladeva indicates in the commentary that *tatsthiti* (ŚD 3.79d) is an ablative of cause: *tatsthiter hetoh*.

- 3.81. *na rājājñā samādiṣṭā svayaṃ vā sa nimittakam
samavāyi tadicchaiḥ tadyogaḥ sahakāraṇam*
3.82. *tasyaiva vā trirūpatvaṃ vyapadeśāt tathāvidham*

There is no fault in the fact that he is possessed of a tripartite, variegated nature as a result of the multiplicity of (causes,) the efficient cause, the inherent cause, etc., if the cause (of these causes) has a unitary form. Royal dictates are not enjoined equitably. Put differently,³³⁹ he is the efficient cause; it is his will that is the inherent cause; (and) the connection to him is the auxiliary cause.³⁴⁰ Put differently, what is designated a tripartite nature and exists in this manner belongs to him and no other.³⁴¹

If the unitary Śiva alone is the cause, his variegated nature,³⁴² referred to as his tripartite nature, being the result of the multiplicity of the natures of the efficient cause, the inherent cause, and the extrinsic cause, is not a fault, this in the manner already explained.

It is not the case that all royal dictates are enjoined equitably, i.e., in the same way, but it is rather that, while they equally take the form of a royal decree, they are otherwise different. Similarly, he exists as all the causes, be it in the form of a thread or in the form of a connection.³⁴³

Put differently, he himself is, first, the efficient cause; his will is the inherent cause; and he himself is what connects the parts,³⁴⁴ because his will is connected

³³⁹“Put differently” serves idiomatically to translate *vā*.

³⁴⁰Based on Utpaladeva’s gloss of the passage in question, I understand *tadyoga* to be an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound referring to Śiva, literally the one “whose connection is with those [auxiliary causes].”

³⁴¹The present passage constitutes a response to the objection Somānanda anticipated in ŚD 3.29cd, namely that all the various types of causes must be identical if Śiva is understood to be one. Cf. ĪPK 1.5.10, which suggests that apparent multiplicity is the result of an underlying unity that is found in Śiva.

³⁴²The present phrase, *tasya vicitratā*, indicates that *tadvicitratā* (ŚD 3.8ob) is a genitive determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) compound.

³⁴³The present passage refers to Śiva existing in the form of the various causes. The argument, again, is analogical: a king issues many decrees in addressing an array of concerns, but they share the same nature, viz.: the authority of being the order of the king. Similarly, Śiva, although one, exists in the form of all the various types of causes. Reference to Śiva as a cause in the form of a thread makes reference to the material cause that is the same substance as the effect (*avibhāganimitta*), just as the threads are identical with the swatch of cloth they produce. This is therefore a reference to the *samavāyi* or inherent cause. Reference to Śiva as the form of the *saṃyoga* refers to the notion that some (material) entity must exist, according to the Nyāya, that connects distinct entities and qualities. See, *infra*, note 344 for a brief explanation of *saṃyoga*; see also, *supra*, note 145 for an explanation of the various types of causes here in question.

³⁴⁴In the classical Naiyāyika formulation, *saṃyoga* is one of the qualities (*guṇas*), the second of the six categories (*padārthas*) of real entities. In this view, there must exist some quality that connects two substances, at least one of which must be a material entity. This is the *saṃyoga*, the contact or connection, of the substances in question. As Potter explains it: “Contact is, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a quality which inheres in two substances under conditions such that the product of the two individuals is greater than zero but smaller than either of the two (where ‘product’ is here being used in its mathematical or set-theoretical sense). That is, the product of two individuals is the individual (if any) which exhausts their common content.” See Potter [1977] 2004: 52; cf. *ibid.*: 70–72; and Halbfass 1992: 70–82. That it

to the reality of the thing, the pot, etc. This means that he is the auxiliary cause and the inherent cause.

Put differently, even though he is unitary, that which in the manner already mentioned is designated, that is, is spoken of as, his tripartite nature is the nature of the noncognition of the non-duality of all of the distinct entities that are the everyday world.³⁴⁵

3.82cd–83

na pṛthivyādike tasmin kalpanā sampravartate
 3.83. *tathātvēnaiva kṛptatvāt tadā tat kalpanā bhavet*
tad eva tatkalpitaṃ kiṃ satye nāmāstu kalpanā

A fiction does not come forth in the (form of the) earth(-*tattva*), etc., because he is produced in that very manner. That would be a fiction only under other circumstances.³⁴⁶ How is it something that is merely imagined? When it is real, it can only be said to be imagined.³⁴⁷

Moreover, it is not a fiction that Śiva-nature exists in the whole aggregate of entities, which are cognized as the form of the earth(-*tattva*), etc. It is rather that the *śivatattva* itself is truly produced as the form of the earth(-*tattva*), etc. That³⁴⁸ would be a fiction, i.e., would be imagined, only when that which has some form is ascertained as that which does not have the form in question, as in, for example, the realm of fantasy. Insofar as Śiva himself is, in reality, the earth (-*tattva*), etc., since everything is Śiva himself in bodily form, what is (merely)

is here stated that *saṃyoga* may be identified with Śiva himself suggests that Śiva is that which connects distinct entities in the universe. This is a point Utpaladeva argues at length in the ĪPK, where he suggests that Śiva is the only one who can connect distinct *svalakṣaṇas*. See esp. ĪPK 2.2.

³⁴⁵In other words, it is mere talk to distinguish parts of Śiva. The everyday world might appear as such, because one understands it to be thus, but in reality everything is only one.

³⁴⁶The present phrase is an idiomatic rendering of *tadā tatkalpanā bhavet*, literally “the thought of that arises at that time.” I here translate in accordance with Utpaladeva’s commentary. Utpaladeva interprets the present passage by referring to instances where something fictitious is imagined. See the commentary, below.

³⁴⁷The present passage constitutes a response to the objection Somānanda anticipated in ŚD 3.30ab, namely that Śiva would exist as that which is not real, as a “fiction” (*kalpanā*), by appearing in the form of the multiple universe. Reference to Utpaladeva’s distinction between *kalpanā* or *vikalpa*, on the one hand, and *vimarśa*, on the other, is perhaps of use in explaining the present passage. Utpaladeva suggests that *vikalpa*, conceptualization, involves the perception of an entity via the exclusion of its opposite (ĪPK 1.6.3), this in a manner that evokes the *apoha* theory of the Buddhist epistemologists. Conversely, *vimarśa*, although consisting of speech (*vāgvapu*), is not dualistic (ĪPK 1.6.1). Although *vikalpa* relies on knowing something and its opposite, there can be no opposite of *vimarśa* (ĪPK 1.6.2). In fact, *vimarśa* produces *vikalpa*, with the help of *māyā* (ĪPK 1.6.4–5). Similarly, Somānanda here suggests that the world is not a “fiction” (*kalpanā*), but is real, the very form of Śiva; and the apparent duality appearing in it is the result of Śiva’s nature: this is how he appears. It should be noted, however, that Somānanda contrasts *kalpanā* with the fact of being real (*satyatva*), not with reflective awareness (*vimarśa*).

³⁴⁸The present expression should be understood to refer to the earth-*tattva*. It is also at least possible that it may be taken to refer to the *śivatattva*. The theological point is of course that no distinction of the two is possible.

imagined to be Śiva? This means that there is nothing whatsoever that exists as such.

Now, [Somānanda] says that what is imagined truly exists there. In that case, to say that it is imagined is, in reality, only to give it a name.

3.84–85ab

[Somānanda] illustrates the very same:

- 3.84. *kaṭake 'sti suvarṇatvaṃ kuṇḍale kalpanāsti kim
citravahnāv aśokādau kalpanā rājate kvacit*
3.85. *klṛptakalpanayor bhedaṃ ye na jānānti naumi tām*

Is the nature of gold that exists on the (goldsmith's) mat imagined in the earring?³⁴⁹ One sometimes imagines fire to appear in a picture of fire, in an Aśoka tree, etc. I bow to those who do not perceive the difference between that which is produced and that which is imagined.³⁵⁰

Is the nature of gold that exists on the (goldsmith's) mat real, but imagined in the earring? This means that this is simply not so.³⁵¹

One sometimes, i.e., on occasion, imagines fire to appear in a picture of fire, in the red of the flowers of an Aśoka tree, etc. This means that Śiva, who is produced as the form of, i.e., is endowed with the form of, the earth(-*tattva*), etc., himself exists there.³⁵² That which is imagined, moreover, is he himself simply wishing to be thus, i.e., to exist in that form. Therefore, [Somānanda] playfully says that they are to be praised who are not conversant with the semantic distinction between that which is produced, i.e., that which one accomplishes oneself and thus is a success, and that which is imagined, i.e., that which is not of the nature of the entity in question and thus is in the form of pure imagination.³⁵³

³⁴⁹As in ŚD 3.18cd–20, the present analogy is to a ball of unformed gold that sits in the goldsmith's studio, on a straw mat, prior to being crafted into jewelry or the like. It subsequently is crafted into some recognizable object but of course retains its very nature as gold.

³⁵⁰The present passage continues the reply of ŚD 3.82cd–83 to the objection raised in ŚD 2.30ab, that Śiva is merely a fiction if he manifests the universe in his consciousness.

³⁵¹Contrast the present example with Śaṅkara's understanding of gold, for example. As Kupetz (1972: 55–56) explains, Śaṅkara understands the gold in two distinct entities—a *rucaka* and a *svastika*, each types of golden utensils—to be mutually distinct entities, excepting their identity *qua* being gold. It is only by destroying the notions regarding the entities, their names, etc., that one can see them as equally made of gold. The same, by analogy, is true of all appearances and Brahman. Kupetz explains the distinction as follows: “Śaṅkara's theory of superimposition is clearly opposed to Utpala's position. Utpala seems to believe that various gold ornaments are identical *as such*; at least he never denies the reality of their respectively distinct forms. The manifestations of the everyday-world are identical with supreme consciousness, he claims, even in their distinctive forms as mutually isolated subjects and objects.” Cf. BrSūBhā 4.1.14.

³⁵²This is to say that it is Śiva who appears as real entities in the world; he exists not only in his unmanifested form, but he also exists equally in his manifested form as the entire universe.

³⁵³Responding to the criticism anticipated in ŚD 3.30ab—namely, that Śiva must be a fiction, an imagined entity, if he appears in the form of the earth-*tattva*, etc.—Somānanda and Utpaladeva distinguish something that is truly produced from something that is merely imagined. The gold in a golden

3.85cd–86ab

śivatattve sānubhave na paśyantyā samānatā

3.86. *yaṭo gāndhikasaugandhyavat paśyann avikalpakah*

The *śivatattva*, if it is experienced, is not the same as *paśyanti*, because, seeing analogously to the perfume vendor and perfume, [Śiva] is devoid of conceptualization.³⁵⁴

The *śivatattva*, the nature of which is consciousness, which brings forth the universe, (and is one) whose form is the experience of the universe, is not the same as *paśyanti*, which is flawed in the ways already mentioned.³⁵⁵ Since, i.e., just as, a perfume vendor, not knowing the perfumes, with their countless good-smelling substances, individually,³⁵⁶ abides in a state in which he knows

ball appears in all of the entities forged out of it. In all instances the gold is real, regardless of its particular form. The same is true, they suggest, of Śiva, who appears as all entities in the form of consciousness. In contrast to this are imagined or conceptualized entities, such as the fire that appears to burn when one glances at the mass of red flowers covering an Aśoka tree. In such instances there is a marked difference between what is imagined, on the one hand, and what is real, on the other hand, but both appearances—of real fire and of fire imagined to appear in one's perception of the red flowers of the Aśoka tree—are real insofar as they are manifested in Śiva's consciousness. It is therefore possible that Somānanda's homage to those who fail to perceive the distinction between what is produced and what is imagined was not intended sarcastically, but rather was meant to signal the unity of all appearances *qua* their very Śiva-nature. Utpaladeva, however, emphasizes the reality of the distinction.

³⁵⁴The present passage constitutes a reply to the objection anticipated in ŚD 3.30cd. The argument here put forward suggests that Śiva does not experience the world as a series of distinct phenomena, but rather experiences the mass of entities in the world as a single, albeit variegated, whole. As such, the present argument is similar to the one put forward in ŚD 2.48cd–49, wherein Somānanda considers the possibility that the grammarians might argue that *paśyanti* sees a generic cognition. The present argument may be distinguished from that one, however, by the fact that Somānanda there understood the grammarians to suggest that the “generic” cognition they saw corresponded with the class of the entity (the *jāti*) cognized. Here, the idea is rather that Śiva sees all entities as a whole, regardless of their respective class. One might object that the present argument nevertheless could be put forward by the grammarians themselves, and as such their conception of *paśyanti* is as plausible as Somānanda's theory of a unitary Śiva. To this Somānanda has already replied (cf. ŚD 2.79cd–80), as follows. Śiva is not similar to *paśyanti* because the universe that he experiences is real, is Śiva himself, and accords with his very nature. If the grammarians accept that *paśyanti* sees a subtle entity that is not different from the agent who sees it, Somānanda argues (ŚD 2.57), then they simply put forward an identical argument to that of the Śaivas. However, to do so is to deny the meaning of the word “seeing,” which implies a division of agent, object, etc.

Note that it is possible that Somānanda (and Utpaladeva) had Bhartṛhari in mind when composing (and commenting upon) the present verse. See VP 2.89: *yaṭhaivaikasya gandhasya bhedenā parikalpanā / puṣpādiṣu tathā vākye 'py arthabhedo vidhiyate*. The *Ṭikā* of Puṇyārāja on the present verse reads as follows: *sṛakandanādāv eka upasanniviṣṭa gandhaḥ. tasya tv apoddhārasamāśrayeṇa bhedaḥ kalpyata ayaṃ puṣpa-gandho 'yaṃ candanagandha ityādi, tathā vākyā evārthāpoddhārasamāśrayeṇa padārthabheda upapadyata ayaṃ devadattapadārthaḥ, ayaṃ gopadārtha ityādi*.

³⁵⁵The aforementioned flaws with *paśyanti* are detailed in chapter 2 of the ŚD and in the Introduction, section 13.

³⁵⁶The term here used, *iyattā*, may more literally be translated with “as only so much.” What is meant is that the perfume vendor, sitting next to the gamut of good scents, does not smell each of them individually, but rather experiences the smell of all of them as a whole.

all of them simultaneously, so too does Śiva exist (in a condition) devoid of conceptualization, as he sees all entities in the absence of (any distinction of) place, time, or sequence, as (both) what is expressed and what expresses it. The experience of the complete self,³⁵⁷ which is nothing but “I am,” exists because these [entities] shine forth. The way in which he is devoid of conceptualization, even though he is possessed of the reflective awareness, “I am,” can be known from the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.³⁵⁸

Even though the perfume vendor and another (unexperienced) person have the same experience of the individual perfumes, the perfume vendor does so with a delight for the scents, while it is the other who simply lacks the same.³⁵⁹ In this way, the fact that the universe is brought forth is made possible; the present exemplifies only that much.

3.86cd–88ab

satyāni svātmarūpāṇi paśyato na samānatā

3.87. *paśyantyātho śivāvasthā kriyāphalāsamāptitah*

kriyāyā vātha prārambhe kalpaniyā praśāntatā

3.88. *astu sāpi na bhedāya yathā tat praviniścitam*

Seeing those [things] that are real as the form of his own self, he is therefore not the same as *paśyanti*. Now, if you argue that we conceive of Śiva’s condition as peaceful prior to either the consummation of the fruit of the action or the action (itself), (we reply:) although that may be so, this does not result in dualism, as has been made clear.³⁶⁰

Neither the condition called *Sāda*³⁶¹ nor the *Īśvara* condition³⁶² is the same as *paśyanti*: (in both cases) the cognitive agent sees those things that are absolutely real, which lie within him because they do not alter him insofar as he thinks “I am everything.”³⁶³ In *paśyanti*, by contrast, which is similar to the condition

³⁵⁷The term here translated is *pūrṇāhambhāva*.

³⁵⁸Perhaps Utpaladeva here has in mind ĪPK 1.6.1, where he suggests that the reflective awareness “I” cannot be conceptual.

³⁵⁹This is to suggest, by analogy, that Śiva is more readily capable of enjoying the experience of the mass of entities that make up the universe, while the average person is often incapable of the same degree of relish in the experience. What is experienced, however, is precisely the same universe, precisely the same Śiva-nature.

³⁶⁰The present passage constitutes a response to the objection, anticipated in ŚD 3.30cd, that Somānanda’s understanding of Śiva is equivalent to the grammarians’ of *paśyanti* when both are thought to be the object of experience.

³⁶¹This is a reference to the third *tattva*, the *sadāśivatattva*. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, where the same term is used to refer to the *sadāśivatattva*. See also ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 3.1.2 and Torella 1994: 190, fn. 4 for the various interpretations of the term here translated.

³⁶²This is a reference to the fourth *tattva*, the *īśvaratattva*.

³⁶³In the *sadāśivatattva* and the *īśvaratattva*, Śiva identifies with the universe by saying “I am everything.” Sometimes the relationship between subject and object is said to be reversed in the move from the third to the fourth *tattva*, the expression being as it is represented here at the level of the *sadāśivatattva* and being “everything is me” (*aḥam sarvam*) at the level of the *īśvaratattva*.

of deep sleep, the absolutely distinct [entities],³⁶⁴ being suitable for the world of transmigration, are present in a seminal form. One must supply: “even (in the condition) beyond deep sleep, they are fully made of *paśyanti*’s nescience, in their view.”³⁶⁵

Now, if you argue that we conceive of Śiva’s condition as what may be called peaceful at the initial and final moments of the act of cognition,³⁶⁶ and that we say that that³⁶⁷ exists in a form that is devoid of the powers of will, etc., that is not experienced, (and) that has an insentient form, then we reply: not so. For, that condition may exist, but it is not also true that he is devoid of all of his powers at that time, in consequence whereof that [peaceful condition] would be distinct from the nature of Śiva.³⁶⁸ Rather, a connection to the powers of will, etc., exists, in an extremely subtle manner, in all of the conditions (of Śiva). This was proven in the first chapter itself.³⁶⁹

3.88cd–90ab

na ca vāsty antarāle ’tra sā daśā yā hi kevalā

3.89. *prāk kriyāphalanīṣpatteḥ samanantaram eva yat
prasarpaty aparecchaiva punar anyā tathāvidhā*

3.90. *na kadācana tasyāsti kaivalyaṃ śaktiśūnyakam*

Nor is it the case here that there is an isolated condition in the interval prior to the consummation of the fruit of the action,³⁷⁰ since a subsequent will moves forward immediately following the consummation of the fruit of the action,³⁷¹ as does another of the same qualities (following that). He never exists in a state of isolation that is devoid of his powers.³⁷²

³⁶⁴What is meant is that the entities in question are mutually distinct and, in all likelihood, what is also meant is that the entities in question are at some level different from *paśyanti*.

³⁶⁵Put differently, *paśyanti* sees distinct objects of sight, as explained in detail in ŚD 2, while Śiva sees entities that are unified with his very self. Note that the fact that it is here suggested that something must be supplied leads one to the conclusion that the present passage is marginalia that made its way into Utpaladeva’s *Vṛtti*: there is nothing in the *mūla* that could accommodate the material here identified as supplemental material. Rather, it seems that the present passage could have been added to the previous lines of the commentary itself.

³⁶⁶On the initial and final moments of cognition, cf. ŚD 1.5–6ab and Utpaladeva’s commentary on the same.

³⁶⁷The feminine, singular pronoun (*sā*) refers to Śiva’s condition (*śivāvasthā*).

³⁶⁸The term here translated with “from Śiva’s nature,” *śivatattva*, could also be taken to be a proper noun referring to the first of the thirty-six *tattvas*.

³⁶⁹Note that Utpaladeva’s commentary here suggests that *praviniścita* (ŚD 3.88b) may be understood to be short for *prathamāhnikā eva niścita*. The presence of the powers in all the conditions was articulated in particular in ŚD 1.3–4, 1.5–6ab, and 1.6cd–7ab.

³⁷⁰The emphatic particle, *hi* (ŚD 3.88d), is here used as a verse-filler.

³⁷¹Note that I read *kriyāphalanīṣpatti* with both what precedes and what follows it (*dehalidipavati*).

³⁷²The present is a reply to the objection, anticipated in ŚD 3.31, that one must explain why Śiva’s power of will arises repeatedly in the act of manifestation.

Nor is it the case here that a condition could exist that is peaceful—which appears as the absence of the powers—in the interval prior to the beginning of a second action, since, i.e., because, a subsequent will moves forward immediately following the consummation of the fruit of the action, one that is the cause of the actions of the utterly clear, supreme consciousness; and there is no absence (of the powers) at that time. Also, it is immediately following the consummation of the fruit of that (second) action that (yet) another [condition] of the same qualities, i.e., will itself, is set in motion. Why prattle on?³⁷³ In both instances, the one whose form is consciousness never exists in a state of isolation, one that appears as an interval, in a form that may be said to be devoid of his powers.

3.90cd–91ab

For instance:

yatrātmānubhavāniṣṭhā tatrecchā ca na kiṃ bhavet
 3.91. *athānubhavanam nāsti jaḍā sā na prasajyate*

Moreover, how could will not exist when there is no conclusion to one's experience of the self? Now, if you argue that there is no experience (there), (we reply:) that does not involve that being insentient.³⁷⁴

How could the action of will not exist for the sake of the action that is (Śiva's very) experience, when there is no conclusion to one's experience of the self, i.e., where there is no cessation of delight (in experience)? For, there can be no experience in the absence of the desire to experience.

Now, if you argue that no experience of the self exists (in the “peaceful” moments immediately preceding and following a cognition), which means that it does not appear (there), (we reply:) that does not involve that being an insentient condition, i.e., it cannot be so.³⁷⁵ This must be thought of in reference to what this is and where it occurs; for, the reflective awareness “I” is an experience of the self, and that is itself the very state of not being insentient, which, in the manner expressed in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, communicates the impossibility of characterizing that which is insentient.³⁷⁶

³⁷³In other words, a consideration of the second and third appearances of the power of will suffices to exemplify the entire, limitless process.

³⁷⁴The present continues Somānanda's response to the objection he anticipated in ŚD 3.31, namely, that he must explain why Śiva's power of will manifests itself repeatedly.

³⁷⁵In other words, the present passage suggests that it is simply not the case that a condition exists in which Śiva is absent his powers.

³⁷⁶The entire *Jñānādhikāra* of the ĪPK is devoted to the question of the nature of the self and its functioning in cognition. See in particular ĪPK 1.4, where the matter is dealt with in relation to the functioning of memory.

3.91cd–92ab

upalāder jaḍatve 'pi śivatvaṃ te katham̐ sthitam̐
 3.92. *yathā na tatra jaḍatā tathāgre pravīcāryate*

(Objection:) How, according to you, is Śiva-nature fixed in stones³⁷⁷ and the like, despite the fact that they are insentient? **(Reply:)** How there is no insentience in them will be explained thoroughly later on.³⁷⁸

Now, if you argue that, despite the fact that they are insentient, we do not associate insentience with stones and the like, because we accept that they have Śiva-nature, (we reply:) what fault is there in this? It is rather that there is no fault in this at all!

How there is no insentience in stones and the like will be explained thoroughly later on,³⁷⁹ that is, very soon. Thus, this unity that unfolds in the manner that was explained earlier has been described at length.³⁸⁰

3.92cd–94ab

saphalāyāṃ samāptāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ samanantaram
 3.93. *kriyāntarecchāsambhūtau tan nimittam anantatā*
yato 'sti śivaśaktināṃ tās ca nityam avasthitāḥ
 3.94. *saranty eva svabhāvena tat saratprakṛtiḥ śivaḥ*

When another will arises in an action immediately following a completed action that has had its effect, the cause is ceaseless, since it belongs to Śiva and his powers. Moreover, those [powers] exist eternally. They simply emerge in accordance with their nature. Hence, Śiva is one whose nature emerges.³⁸¹

The cause is ceaseless where, immediately following a completed, coarse action that has had its effect, will arises in another action that has its effect, and so on ad infinitum, since [the cause] belongs to Śiva and his powers.

Moreover, Śiva's powers, being eternally engaged in their activity, simply emerge in accordance with their nature; and since the powers proceed (in this

³⁷⁷The term here translated with “stones,” *upala*, could also refer to precious stones or jewels, but this seems unlikely. The idea here conveyed is that it is difficult to imagine that what appears to be truly inert is in fact imbued with consciousness.

³⁷⁸See ŚD 4, where Somānanda details his arguments for the presence of Śiva-nature in everything.

³⁷⁹Note that Utpaladeva's commentary here suggests that *pravīcāryate* should be understood to mean *prakarṣeṇa vicāryate*, meaning “will be explained thoroughly.” I have translated accordingly in my rendering of the passage of the ŚD in question.

³⁸⁰The present passage probably refers the reader to ŚD 1, where Somānanda explained how Śiva's powers manifest the form of the universe.

³⁸¹The present passage continues Somānanda's reply to the objection, anticipated in ŚD 3.31, that he must explain the reason for the recurrence of the manifestation of Śiva's will in/as the universe. Note that ŚD 3.94b is quoted in PTV ad PT 1 (p. 14 of Singh's edition).

way), Śiva, being thus, is one whose nature emerges,³⁸² because he is one who appears as such. This is expressed in the following manner:

Otherwise, however, the generation (of images) would be independent, in accordance with their character.³⁸³

Thus, a second method is expressed for the expansion.³⁸⁴

3.94cd–95ab

On the other hand,³⁸⁵ [Somānanda] says:

īśvarasya svatantrasya kenecchā vā 'pi kalpyate
3.95. *vibhavāmodabāhulyam athavoktā nimittatā*

On the other hand, by what could the will of the independent Lord be doubted? Alternatively, the manifoldness of the one possessed of the delight of power may be said to be the cause.³⁸⁶

On the other hand, by what could his will be doubted, or not? Independence, first of all, is a certainty simply as a result of the nature of the Lord. The universe, consisting of that,³⁸⁷ is simply of such a condition. This much being so, it is established as that much.³⁸⁸

Alternatively, even though he is independent, he is one for whom there exists a particular nature, one for whom there exists an endless appetite for his own power in the form of the emission of his nature as the universe. It is he, as has

³⁸²The commentary here indicates that *saratprakṛti* (ŚD 3.94b) is an exocentric (*bahuvrīhi*) compound.

³⁸³The present is a quotation of SpKā 35. My translation is based on that of Dyczkowski 1992²: xvii.

³⁸⁴In other words, Utpaladeva here wishes to suggest that Somānanda offers two distinct explanations for the unending appearance of the universe in all its forms. The first involves the immediacy of the arising of a subsequent cause following the one that precedes it (ŚD 3.92cd–93c). The second explanation appeals to the notion that the powers emerge as they do simply by nature (ŚD 3.93d–94ab). Somānanda quotes the SpKā in support of the second explanation, as the passage in question speaks to the nature of the yogin's perception. The yogin is aware in the waking and dreaming states of the fact that his own consciousness creates the objects he experiences. Were he not aware, the yogin would be similar to a man in the world, one who experiences reality without being cognizant of his true identity as the supreme creator. In either case, the powers continue to manifest the images one experiences in the waking and dreaming states. In other words, the present passage exemplifies the fact that the powers simply emerge by nature, as argued in ŚD 3.93d–94ab.

³⁸⁵Here, Utpaladeva contrasts the idea expressed in the following with what precedes it. He has already described the flowing nature of Śiva's powers, which cause Śiva to appear in the myriad universe. In what follows he reiterates the unchanging quality of Śiva's nature.

³⁸⁶The present passage concludes Somānanda's reply to the counterargument, anticipated in ŚD 3.31, that Somānanda must explain why Śiva's will repeatedly asserts itself.

³⁸⁷*Tat* in the compound *tanmaya* refers to the aforementioned nature of the Lord (*īśvaratva*).

³⁸⁸The argument here is presented in a sort of telegraphic style but is clear enough. Utpaladeva wishes to suggest that Somānanda has here argued that it is impossible to doubt the existence of Śiva's will.

been fully expressed, earlier,³⁸⁹ who is always the cause of the emission of the nature of the universe. Thus, in this way, there is no fault as regards the cause of the arising of a new will.³⁹⁰

3.95cd–96ab

viśvatucchatvavākyaṅānām vairāgyādyarthavādinām

3.96. *tātparyeṇa na doṣo 'sti nānācittvaṃ na kalpate*

No fault exists with the intention of the (scriptural) expressions regarding the insubstantiality of the universe, (and) which speak of dispassion, etc., as the goal. We do not conceive of the existence of a variegated consciousness.³⁹¹

We do not contradict the (scriptural) utterances that speak of the universe as unreal, as similar to a bubble,³⁹² even if they are uttered by Śiva, in consequence whereof no fault exists (in our view) as a result of any distance between our deliberations on the nature of the unitary Śiva and these [utterances], which explain the uses of dispassion, nonidentity with the self, etc.³⁹³

Moreover, the unwanted consequence—that the nature of consciousness is variegated—does not apply when everything has Śiva-nature.³⁹⁴

³⁸⁹ See, e.g., ŚD 1.1 and ŚD 1.2 and Utpaladeva's commentary thereon.

³⁹⁰ The present interpretation relies on an emendation of the text here of *nāsti* for the *nāstiti* found in the four manuscripts of the commentary (G, J, P, and R) and in K^{ed}. The point here made is that there is no fault in Somānanda's argument for the persistent reemergence of the power of will in all phenomena in the universe. To accept the reading as found in the published edition and the manuscripts would require one to understand the text to suggest precisely the opposite notion.

³⁹¹ The present passage constitutes a reply to the objection, anticipated in ŚD 3.32, that Somānanda's conception of Śiva as one who creates the universe out of himself contradicts the descriptions of Śiva found in scripture.

³⁹² This is meant to be an example of something fleeting, a bubble that appears at one moment and disappears in the next. Perhaps Utpaladeva has in mind the following verse (Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.1.11), which is also quoted in Rāmakaṅṭha's commentary on NP 1.3: *ekam brahma param satyaṃ neha nānāsti kiñcana / idaṃ pheno na kiñcid vā budbudo vā na kiñcana*. (The same analogy was used in the RT 5.279, as well, as quoted in the Introduction, section 4.) Yet, it is rather more likely he had a (heretofore unidentified) Śaiva tantric source in mind, given reference to Śiva as the one offering the utterance in question.

³⁹³ As noted in the Introduction (section 8), Somānanda might well have the VBh in mind when making the present argument. See, e.g., VBh 102 (quoted in note 140 of the Introduction).

³⁹⁴ Here, Utpaladeva, following Somānanda, wishes to argue that consciousness is not multiple in nature, because it can cognize apparently multiple entities without becoming divided when, and only when, everything cognized is equally the same Śiva. Thus, to reiterate the unity of consciousness here is to suggest that the vision of Śiva furnished in Somānanda's ŚD does not contradict the unity conceived in the scriptural passages that promote dispassion and a disengagement with the manifested universe.

3.96cd–97ab

For instance:³⁹⁵

ekasminn eva dehe tu vibhedāt paramāṇugāt
3.97. *ekatvāc chivarūpasya doṣo 'yaṃ bhedavādīnām*

According to those who maintain a dualistic view, a fault arises from the fact that the form of Śiva is unitary, because it is divided by the extremely small atoms found in just a single body.³⁹⁶

(Objection:) There are as many Śivas in just a single body as there are supremely small atoms. In this way, multiplicity must exist as a result of the multiplicity (of the atoms), even though it is found in the supremely small atoms.

(Reply:) This, too, the opposing view that there is an infinite number (of Śivas), is not a fault. Those many objects, extremely small atoms, etc., exist (only) in the form of the unitary Śiva. Therefore, how does multiplicity exist? For, Śiva does not exist in the form of the pots, etc., but rather the pots, etc., have Śiva as their form. Hence, there is no division of the one whose form is consciousness, because there is no division of place, time, and nature. This is taught in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*.³⁹⁷

There are those who perceive the atoms to be (mutually) distinct, however, and for them Śiva-nature exists by the nature of those atoms; and it³⁹⁸ is covered by impurity.³⁹⁹ Hence, if, due to the force of the cognition as expressed here, they manifest Śiva-nature, then there are many Śivas.⁴⁰⁰ Moreover, they are located in the body, and, since the atoms consist of him, are there not supremely small

³⁹⁵With the present, Somānanda apparently offers an example from a dualist Śaiva scriptural source. In other words, the present means to serve as an example of an instance where a Śaiva scripture that appears to contradict his theology does not. (Somānanda dealt with the concern—conformity to all scriptural sources—in ŚD 3.95cd–96ab. The issue was first raised as a potential objection in ŚD 3.32.)

³⁹⁶The present argument apparently anticipates a possible argument made by an opponent who argues that a scriptural source suggests that multiple atoms exist, thereby requiring Śiva to be divided thereby. Somānanda denies that this requires Śiva to be multiple in nature: the atoms have Śiva-nature; it is not the case that Śiva has an atomic nature. Note that I do not translate the connective particle (*tu*) found in ŚD 3.96c, as it appears merely as a verse filler (*pādapūraṇa*).

³⁹⁷See ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.1.7, where Utpaladeva suggests that nothing appears distinct from Śiva, not even an atom. See also ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 2.4.2, where Utpaladeva suggests that no insentient reality may be a cause, not even an atom. Causality is therefore nothing but being the agent and the object of the action in question.

³⁹⁸The present reference is to the aforementioned Śiva-nature (*śivatā*) of the atoms in question.

³⁹⁹The idea here expressed is that an opposing school imagines Śiva-nature to be present in/as distinct atoms. That Śiva-nature is difficult to discern is the result of the presence of impurities somehow connected with it, presumably via the impurity of duality, which must be removed before the Śiva-nature in question is purified and made cognizable.

⁴⁰⁰There are apparently many Śivas, in this view, because he is manifested by a diversity of mutually distinct atoms.

atoms in the bodies of the atoms (as well)? Therefore, there are no Śiva-atoms.⁴⁰¹ Thus, the view that the nature of consciousness is such that it possesses diverse, extremely small atoms is wrong. Hence, this fault exists only for them.⁴⁰²

3.97cd–99

ekādhiṣṭhānato vāpi teṣām api na dūṣaṇam

3.98. *āntare kṛmicaitanye citratā svāmibhr̥tyavat
tāvad ekacitsvarūpaśivaprasaraṇena vā*

3.99. *pātañjalādiśvareṇa na sāmyam avibhedataḥ
iha tadvan na vijñeyaṃ tasmāt sarvaṃ sthitaḥ śivaḥ*

Another interpretation is that there is no fault for them, either, since (in their view) there exists a single locus (for the multiple atoms). The variegation that exists internally in (e.g.) the awareness of a spider is similar to a master and his servant. Alternatively, it is so much because Śiva, whose nature is unitary consciousness, emerges. There is no similarity here⁴⁰³ with the Īśvara of the system of Patañjali, etc., since there is no duality (in our system). The same is not known (in other schools of thought). Therefore, Śiva is established as everything.

Another interpretation is that the variegated nature of consciousness is not a fault for them, i.e., for those holding the view that there is a diversity of atoms, because, as is the case in the non-dual Śaiva view, they⁴⁰⁴ have as their locus Śiva in the form of unitary consciousness, this because an absolutely unitary figure who has a variegated nature unfolds by means of his own *māyā*. We have also considered this in great detail in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, itself.⁴⁰⁵ Moreover, the noncognition of non-duality is divided in different degrees, depending on the preponderance of enjoyment in the subtle body.⁴⁰⁶ The variegation in the awareness of, e.g., a spider is the result of the fact that the consciousness has a double nature, empowered and unempowered, the forms of which are of a master and his servant.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰¹The argument here is unclear. It appears that Utpaladeva wishes to suggest that the atoms themselves are made up of infinitesimally small atoms. As such, there is no end to the layers of atoms, and as such one cannot say that Śiva-nature is encapsulated in such atoms. Why this leads one to conclude that there are no Śiva-atoms that exist/come into existence, however, is unclear.

⁴⁰²Here, Utpaladeva simply dismisses the argument that the atoms divide Śiva.

⁴⁰³That is to say, in the Śaiva view in question.

⁴⁰⁴This is the implied subject of the nominal sentence, “they” referring to the atoms in question.

⁴⁰⁵Utpaladeva may well have ĪPK 3.2 in mind, here. That “daily lesson” (*āhnikā*) deals with the nature of reality and the effect of *māyā* on the unenlightened cognizer. It does not deal explicitly with the atoms, however.

⁴⁰⁶On the nature of the subtle body (*puruṣaṣṭaka*), see note 83 of chapter 1 of the present translation. See, also, ĪPK 3.2.14.

⁴⁰⁷In other words, the spider, like a master, is conscious, has agency, and has an independent nature. Its web, like the servant is not conscious and has no independent agency. A similar theme is taken up in ŚD 4.2cd–3 and 4.4–5.

Alternatively, so much, i.e., real change, down to the multiplicity of spiders and the like, is the result of the emergence of Śiva, whose nature is unitary consciousness. In this view, the division is the result of Śiva, i.e., due to the preponderance of consciousness as the support of the subtle body,⁴⁰⁸ because he alone has such a form. For this very reason, multiplicity exists, by dint of the power of *māyā*, from the nonextension of this unity, though in reality he is undivided.

There is no similarity with the Pātañjala Īśvara, who is a type of individual, and there is no similarity with what is established by the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., because duality is accepted there.⁴⁰⁹ Here,⁴¹⁰ however, (we accept) non-duality.⁴¹¹ The same is not known in their view of Īśvara.⁴¹² Hence, absolutely everything, i.e., the mass of entities, is established as having Śiva as its nature, because every fault is avoided when this is the case. This is definitive.

⁴⁰⁸I am unsure of the meaning of this passage.

⁴⁰⁹That is, in the schools in question, the systems of the followers of Yoga, the Vaiśeṣikas, etc.

⁴¹⁰That is to say, here on the Śaiva view.

⁴¹¹Literally, *abheda* is an adjective, not an abstract noun.

⁴¹²This should be taken to refer to the Īśvara of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools.

{ PART III }

The Edition

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Chapter One of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti*

5

cidākāśamaye svāṅge viśvālekhyavidhāyine
sarvādbhutodbhavabhuvē namo viṣamacakṣuṣe (1)
vibhramākarasaṃjñēna svaputrenāsmi coditaḥ
padmānandābhīdhānena tathā sabrahmacāriṇā (2)
īśvarapratyabhijñōktavistare gurunirmite
śivadr̥ṣṭiprakaraṇe karomi padasaṅgatim (3)

1 The *maṅgala* of P reads: *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ. oṃ. The maṅgala* of G reads: (*Auspicious Symbol*) *svasti. śrīdevyai siddhidātr̥yai namaḥ. śrīgaṇapataye namaḥ. oṃ. The maṅgala* of J, centered at the top of the first folio, reads: *śrīgurave śivāya oṃ (corr: śivāyom) namaḥ. The first line* of the manuscript further includes the following *maṅgala*: *oṃ svasty astu. śrīgaṇanāthāyai namaḥ. śrīr astu. The maṅgala* of R reads: *oṃ śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ. oṃ. 3 T* omits the second and third invocatory verses from the commentary, recording only the first of the three. 3 The last part of the third *akṣara* of *vibramākara*^o is half-missing and mostly illegible in J. 6 J attests to *padasaṅgatim* but rewrites *sa* above the line to clarify the correct but obscurely-written *akṣara* in question.

3 coditaḥ] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; coditeḥ P^{a.c.} 4 padmānandābhīdhānena] GPRK^{ed.}; padmānadābhīdhāne--- J

prakṛtaśāstrānusāreṇeṣṭadevatānamaskāraṃ karoti śāstrakāraḥ

asmadrūpasamāviṣṭaḥ svātmanātmanivāraṇe

śivaḥ karotu nijayā namaḥ śaktyā tatātmane 1

10 yo'haṃ namaskaromi sa śivo 'smadrūpeṇaikyaṃ prāptaḥ vastusthityā hi sarvatat-
tvavigraho vakṣyamāṇanītyā śivaḥ. sa saṃsārārthaṃ māyāśaktikṛtaikyākhyātyā
bhāvān anātmasthān ābhāsayaṭīśvarapratyabhijñāprapañcitanyāyena. tatas tāt
prāṇādīn punaḥ kāṃścil lokayātrāsv asmadrūpapramāṭṭbhedena sthāpayiṣyan
bhinnikṛtān prameyān api ghaṭapaṭādivailakṣaṇyenātmābhedena paśyan samā-
15 viśatīty ucyate. yāvatyā ca mātrayā samāveśas tāvanmātrasiddhisambhavaḥ.
prathamas tāvat kartṛtānusārī jñānakriyāyogaḥ. yathoktaṃ spandaśāstre

na hīcchānodanasyāyaṃ prerakatvena vartate

api tv ātmabalasparśāt puruṣas tatsamo bhavet (SpKā 1.8)

1a The *maṅgala* of C reads: *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ*. The *maṅgala* (for the *mūla*) of G reads: *śrīr astu. sadguruprasādāt. om.* 1a Cf. ĪPK 4.1: *svātmaiva sarvajantūnām eka eva maheśvaraḥ / viśvarūpo 'ham idam ity akhaṇḍāmarśabrṛṃhitah.*

1a asmadrūpasamāviṣṭaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; asmadrūpanamāviṣṭaḥ C 1b āt-
manivāraṇe] TCGPRK^{ed.}; ātmanivāra---e] 1c karotu] TGJPRK^{ed.}; karoti
C 1d namaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; manaḥ C 1d śaktyā tatātmane] GPRK^{ed.}; śak-
ty---ātmane T, śara---tātmane C, śa---tātmane J

10 Cf. ĪPK 4.14: *sarvathā tv antarālinānantatattvaughanirbharah / śivaś cidā-
nandaghanah paramākṣaravigrahaḥ.* 17 R appears to read *ayaṃ prerakatvena*,
but an imperfection in the manuscript leaves the final *anusvāra* of *ayaṃ* and the
e-kāra of this first syllable of *prerakatva* indiscernible.

7 iṣṭadevatānamaskāraṃ] GPRK^{ed.}; iṣṭadeva---namaskāraṃ J 7 karoti
] GPRK^{ed.}; ka---o---i] 7 śāstrakāraḥ] GJK^{ed.}; śāstrāvātāraḥ PR 10 yo'haṃ
namaskaromi sa śivo 'smadrūpeṇaikyaṃ] GPRK^{ed.}; ---ka---o ---i---o ---peṇaikyaṃ
J 11 sarvatattvavigraho] GPRK^{ed.}; ---vigraho J 11 sa] K^{ed.}; saḥ GJ; *om.*
PR 11 saṃsārārthaṃ] GPRK^{ed.}; saṃsārā--- J 11 māyāśaktikṛtaikyākhyātyā
] GPRK^{ed.}; ---yāśaktikṛtai---yākhyātyā J 12 anātmasthān] GJK^{ed.}; anātmasthānāt-
mātmasthān R 12 ābhāsayaṭī] GPRK^{ed.}; ---yati J 12 °prapañcitanyāyena
] GJK^{ed.}; °prapañcitanyāyena P 14 ghaṭapaṭādi°] GJK^{ed.}; ghaṭapaṭādi°
P 15 °sambhavaḥ] GPRK^{ed.}; °sambhava J 16 prathamas] GPRK^{ed.};
prothamas J

12 J folio iv. 14 G folio iv. 17 R folio iv.

iti. tathānyatroktam aiśvarī pravṛttir iti. anayaiva dṛṣṭyā tattadṛddhyartham
 20 adhikatarah samāveśo 'bhyasanīyaḥ svaprayatnenāpīty etad api sūcitam. sam-
 āviṣṭas ca śivo 'pīty ucyate devadattādir api cobhayor aikyagamanāviśeṣāt. sa
 tathāvidhaḥ śivas tatātmāne parāpararūpabhagavatsadāśivādīprasaraṇamu-
 khenānantavistārāya nijasvarūpāya paramaśivasamjñāya namaskarotv iti. loṇ
 25 karavāmety arthaḥ. paratvena prathamapuruṣaprayogo 'kiñcidrūpatvena kṛtri-
 māmhambhāvasya kartṛtāmātraṃ tattvam iti darśanārthaḥ. sarvaṃ ca śivamayam
 iti namaskāre vāṇmanasādi karaṇam api śiva eva. tad āha svātmaneti. vighnā
 api tadātmāna eva nivāryāḥ. tad āhātmanivāraṇa iti. namaskāre cāsmadiyecchā-
 diśaktiḥ śaivy evety āha nijayā śaktyeti. etena sarvā eva kriyāḥ sakārakāḥ saphalās
 30 ca gamanabhojanādikā evam evānugantavyā iti darśitam.

idānīm samastaśāstrārthaṃ saṃkṣepeṇa sayuktikaṃ pratijānīte

**ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu sphuran nirvṛtacid vibhuḥ
 aniruddhecchāprasaraḥ prasaraddṛkkriyaḥ śivaḥ 2**

2b J is missing all of ŚD 1.2b-d, the passage being obscured by a strip of birch-
 bark covering the folio in the place in question.

2a ātmaiva]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ātmaika C 2b nirvṛtacid]TGPRK^{ed.}; nirvṛtacid C,
 om. J 2b vibhuḥ]TCGK^{ed.}; om. J, vapuḥ PR 2d prasaraddṛkkriyaḥ śivaḥ
]TGPRK^{ed.}; prasaraddṛṣṭi--- C, om. J

21 The birchbark manuscript of J is torn at °ṣāt. sa tathāvidhaḥ śi°, but the
 (correct) reading is legible. 24 Cf. VP 3.7.126: *dravyamātrasya tu praiṣe*
ṛcchāder loḍ vidhīyate / sakriyasya prayogas tu yadā sa viṣayo ṇicah.

20 svaprayatnena]GPRK^{ed.}; svapraya---nena J 22 °ādīprasaraṇa°]GJK^{ed.};
 °ādīkriyāprasaraṇa° PR 23 iti]GJPR; om. K^{ed.} 24 yathā]GJPR; om.
 K^{ed.} 24 iti]GJPR; itivat K^{ed.} 24 śivātmānaḥ parameśvarāya]PRK^{ed.};
 śivātmāna porameśvarāya GJ 27 vāṇmanasādi]GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; vāṇmānasādi
 P^{a.c.} 27 api]GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; ---i P^{a.c.} 28 cāsmadiyecchādiśaktiḥ]K^{ed.};
 cāsmadiye icchādiśaktiḥ GJPR 29 eva]GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 29 saphalās
]G^{a.c.} JPRK^{ed.}; sakalās G^{p.c.} 30 evam]GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 30 eva]GPRK^{ed.};
 om. J 30 anugantavyā]K^{ed.}; anumantavyā GJPR

24 J folio 2r. 28 G folio 2r.

sarvabhāveṣu svātmaiva śiva iti vyavahartavyam iti pratijñā. nirvṛtacityādī-
 35 viśeṣaṅkalāpo hetuḥ. sphurann iti dharmiṇo hetoś ca svasaṃvedanapratyakṣaṃ
 pramānam. ata eva sphurann iti pṛthakpadam. nirvṛtacityādī eva ca śivatvam ity
 arthāc chivalakṣaṇam api darśitam. tasmimś ca siddhe viśaye, śivatvavyavahār-
 amātraṃ tadviśayaṃ sādhyata īśvarapratyabhijñoktakrameṇa. yathā ca cinnir-
 40 vṛticchājñānakriyā ghaṭapaṭaparyantasarvabhāveṣu bhāsamāneṣu sphuranti,
 tathāgrato vakṣyate. śaktiśaktimator abhedāc chaktimataś caikatvāc chaktipañca-
 kaṃ parāparādyavasthāvavyavahartṛpramātrapekṣayetīśvarapratyabhijñoktanīyā
 purastād vakṣyate. nirvṛtā vedyanirākāṅkṣā pūrṇā cid yasya saḥ, tathā vibhur
 ātmasātkṛtasamastavedyārthaḥ, aniruddha icchāprasaro yasya, prasarantyaḥ dṛg
 jñānaṃ kriyā ca yasya sa tathālakṣaṇaḥ śivaḥ sarveṣv ātmaiva.
 45 evaṃ sarvaṃ śivarūpam iti svasaṃvedanasiddhe vyavahāramātraṃ sādhyam
 iti sthite vādyantaravimatiṃ nirākariṣyan paraśāṭaḥ prabhṛti ghaṭapaṭādīsthi-
 paryantam evaṃrūpaśivatāvasthitisādrīśyapratipādanaṃ prastauti.

34 J omits *sarvabhāveṣu svātmai*^o, the passage being obscured by a strip of birch-
 bark covering the folio in the place in question. 37 The variant reading of
 R (*tāsmaś*) could be explained by damage to the MS occluding the tops of the
 correct reading of *tasmimś*, but no such damage is visible in the copy of the MS
 in my possession. 38 The initial *ta* of *tadviśaya* is inserted between the
 preceding and following *akṣaras* in J, suggesting it was initially omitted by the
 scribe. 43 J does not attest *icchāprasaro yasya*, *prasarantyaḥ dṛg jñānaṃ kriyā*
ca yasya sa tathālakṣaṇaḥ śivaḥ sarveṣv ātmaiva. *evaṃ*, as a piece of tape covers
 the manuscript in the area in question.

34 *sarvabhāveṣu*] G^{ed.}; *om.* JPR 35 ^o*viśeṣaṅkalāpo*] GJK^{ed.}; ^o*viśeṣeṇa*
kalāpo PR 36 *pṛthakpadam*] GJK^{ed.}; *pṛthakyapadam* PR 37 *tasmimś*
] GJPK^{ed.}; *tāsmaś* R 38 *cinnirvṛtī*^o] GJK^{ed.}; *cinnnavṛtī*^o P, *cinnirvṛtī*^o R
 39 *ghaṭapaṭa*^o] GJK^{ed.}; *ghaṭapaṭa*^o PR 39 *sphuranti*] GJPK^{ed.}; *sphu-*
rati R 40 *caikatvāc*] J; *caikyavāc* GP^{p.c.}R, *cairyavāc* P^{a.c.}, *caikyāc* K^{ed.}
 41 *pramātrapekṣayā*] GJPK^{ed.}; *pramātrapekṣayā* R 42 *vedyanirākāṅkṣā*
] GJRK^{ed.}; *bodhyanirākāṅkṣā* P 43 *ātmasātkṛtasamastavedyārthaḥ*] K^{ed.};
ātmasātkṛtasamastavedyārthaḥ GJ; *ātmamātkṛtasamastavedyārthaḥ* PR 46
paraśāṭaḥ] GPRK^{ed.}; *paraśāṭa* J 46 *prabhṛti*] GPRK^{ed.}; *probhṛti* J

36 P folio 2. 36 J folio 2v. 37 R folio 2r. 41 G folio 2v. 47 J folio 3r.

50

sa yadāste cidāhlādamātrānubhavatallayaḥ
 tadicchā tāvatī tāvaj jñānaṃ tāvat kriyā hi sā 3
 susūkṣmaśaktitritayasāmarasyena vartate
 cidrūpāhlādaparamo nirvibhāgaḥ paras tadā 4

śivaikyākhyātīrūpabhrāntimayasamsārāvasthā yāvan nonmiṣati, tāvad api tāvad asty evoktarūpaśivatā. tathā ca śaktipañcakam api tadānīm ekarūpam api vyavahārāpekṣayā kāryasaṃbhavād asty eva. tathā hi parāparāvasthāyāṃ
 55 yo 'ham iti sahajapratyavamarśātmā prakāśaḥ, sa eva parānapekṣaḥ pūrṇatvād ānandarūpo nirvṛtacinmayaḥ sthita eva. saiva svatantratā mukhyā śivatā. tad

4a T inserts *ta* of °*tritaya*° slightly below the line. 4d T is worm-eaten at °*s tadā*, but is nevertheless legible.

3a yadāste] TGJPRK^{ed.}; yadāstau C 3a cidāhlāda°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; cidāhlāsa° C; 3b °anubhavatallayaḥ] TCGJ P^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; °anubhavataḥsayāḥ P^{a.c.} 3c tadicchā] GJ^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; tadicchā T, tādicchā C, tadicchāi J^{a.c.}, tadicchā P 3c tāvatī] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tāvatī C 3c tāvaj] CGJ^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; jñānaṃ T, tāva P^{a.c.} 3d jñānaṃ tāvat] CGJPRK^{ed.}; naṃ tāvar tāvat (hypermetric) T 3d kriyā hi sā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tāvat kri--- C 4a susūkṣmaśaktitritaya°] GJK^{ed.}; su---kṣmaśaktitritaya° T, susūkṣmaśaktitrita° C, svasūkṣmaśaktitritaya° PR 4b vartate] TGJPRK^{ed.}; pravartate C 4d nirvibhāgaḥ paras] TCGPRK^{ed.}; nirvibhāgayo ras J 4d tadā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tale C

54 Cf. ĪPK 3.1.5 and the *Vṛtti* thereon for a definition of the *parāparā* condition: *atrāparatvaṃ bhāvānām anātmatvena bhāsanāt / paratāhantaḥchādāt parāparadaśā hi sā*. *Vṛtti*: *atredantāmater aparatvam ahantaḥ sarvasya vedyācchādanāt parateti parāparāvasthaisā*. 54 J adds the first, initially-omitted *parā*° above the line. 56 The manuscript of J is torn across the page beginning with *nirvṛtacinmayaḥ* and up to *saiva svatantratā*. The readings of the manuscript are nevertheless legible. 56 Damage to the folio of J obscures the tops of the *aḥṣaras* of *mukhyā śivatā*, though the reading is mostly legible and appears to be correct.

52 °samsārāvasthā] GJRK^{ed.}; °saṃsarāvasthā P 53 tāvad asty] GJ; tāvaty PRK^{ed.} 53 eva] GJRK^{ed.}; e P 53 ukta°] GJRK^{ed.}; *om.* P 54 parāparāvasthāyāṃ] GJ^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; parāparāvasthāyā PR, parāvasthāyāṃ J^{a.c.} 55 'ham] GJ^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; m P^{a.c.} R 55 parānapekṣaḥ] GJK^{ed.}; parānapekṣā PR 56 nirvṛtacinmayaḥ] GJRK^{ed.}; nirvṛtacinmaya P 56 svatantratā] GJPR; svatantrā K^{ed.}

56 G folio 3r.

uktaṃ cidāhlādeti. pūrṇacidānandamātre 'nubhavaḥ prakāśanaṃ na tu bāhye,
 tata eva tatraiva layo yasya sa tathā. anena nirvṛtacitkathitā. icchājñānakriyās
 tu bhinnaviśayādyapekṣayā sphuṭībhavanti. parāvasthāyāṃ punaḥ pūrṇo 'ham
 60 ity eva svasvabhāvaḥ prakāśate, tāvatprakāśatvāt tad eva jñānam, saṃrambha-
 rūpatvāt saiva kriyā, tatsvabhāvena tadabhyupagamād icchāpi sthitaivety āha
 tadicchā tāvatīti. tāvac ca svarūpaṃ kriyeti yojyam. athavā tāvaj jñānam iti
 tāvacchabdaḥ kriyāyāṃ strīlingaḥ pariṇamanīyaḥ. dvitīyas tv ante tāvacchabdaḥ
 kramārthaḥ parāparādyavasthāpekṣaḥ. ata eva bhinnaviśayābhāve 'py abhyupa-
 65 gamaprakāśasaṃrambhānām sarvadā prakāśamayatvenāvicalanād icchādivy-
 avahārayogyataivety uktaṃ susūkṣmeti. susūkṣmatvam eṣitavyādyabhāvena
 vibhāgāparikalpanāt. ata eva śaktiśamarasyaṃ pūrṇacinmātraprakāśatātmatvāc
 cidrūpāhlādaparatvaṃ coktam. saiva ca nirvibhāgatā parāvasthā yadaivam āste
 paras tadety uktā.
 70 anyadaśāyām api sā tathābhūtajñeyādiśūnyaśuddhapaśivāvasthāstīty āha

57 A syllable is deleted following °mātre in G. The final akṣara of ānanda is obscured by an imperfection in the MS of R. 59 See ĪPV ad ĪPK 4.14 for a description of the parā condition: *na khalu bhagavati śrīparamaśive prameyakathā kācid asti, tattvaughasya sarvathā tatra cidrūpatāmātravīśrāntatvena linatvāt, tataś ca sāvasthā saṃvitsvabhāvena svātmavīśrāntyānandena akṛtrimanaisargikaparāmarśātmakasvātmacamatkāralakṣaṇenaikaghanā avicchinnatadrūpā paramākṣareṇa vīgrahavati bhagavato viśvamayaśyānavacchinnānuttaradhāmno nityaśuddhasya galitaprameyakathā sarvottirṇā vyapadiśyate.*

57 'nubhavaḥ] GPRK^{ed.}; 'nubhava J 57 prakāśanaṃ] GPRK^{ed.}; prokāśanaṃ J 58 tatraiva] JPRK^{ed.}; tatraivava G 58 nirvṛtacitkathitā] GJRK^{ed.}; nirvṛticitkathitā P 60 svasvabhāvaḥ] GPRK^{ed.}; svasvabhāva J 60 prakāśate] GPRK^{ed.}; prokāśate J 61 tatsvabhāvena] GJ; tatsvabhāvatvena PRK^{ed.} 63 strīlingaḥ] GPRK^{ed.}; om. J 64 kramārthaḥ] GPRK^{ed.}; kramārtha J 64 parā°] GPRK^{ed.}; porā° J 65 °vyavahārayogyatā] JPRK^{ed.}; °vyavahāratā G 66 susūkṣmatvam] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; susūkṣmitvam P^{a.c.}R 66 eṣitavya°] PRK^{ed.}; iṣitavya° GJ 67 °prakāśatātmatvāc] GJ; °prakāśanātmatvāc K^{ed.}; °prakāśātmatvāc P, prakāśātmatvāc R 68 °rūpa°] GJRK^{ed.}; om. P

57 R folio 2v. 59 J folio 3v. 68 P folio 3. 69 G folio 3v.

**na param tadavasthāyāṃ vyavasthaisā vyavasthitā
yāvat samagrajñānāgrajñātr̥sparśadaśāsv api 5
sthitaiva lakṣyate sā ca tadviśrāntīyā tathā phale**

na kevalaṃ parāparādyanāvīrbhāva evaivaṃ niyamaḥ, yāvad aparāvasthāyāṃ
75 api. sarvavikalpādijñānānām agrata utpitsāvasthāyāṃ jñānājñeyānābilajñātr̥sva-
rūpasam̐sparśo 'vaśyambhāvīti tadavasthāsv api paravyavasthā. yady api tadā
puryaṣṭakalakṣaṇajñātr̥avasthānāt sauṣuptavan na parāvasthā, tathāpi yadā jñān-
āgrabhāgeṣu viśrāmyati kvacit, tadā paratā. na ca pramāṇabhūmau viśrāntis
tatrāpi prāṇaspaṇḍātmakajñeyavyākulitavāt. tataḥ prāṇādijñeyajñānasyāpy
80 agrato viśrāntiḥ. vastutaḥ sauṣuptāgrabhāvinī paratā sthitaiva, lakṣyate ca

6b P records and then deletes one *akṣara* (*pha*) following the first *akṣara* of *tathā*.

5b vyavasthaisā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vyavascheṣo C 5b vyavasthitā] TGJPRK^{ed.};
vyayāsthītā C 5c yāvat] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tāvat C 5c samagrajñānāgra°] TGJPRK^{ed.};
samagrajñātr̥--- C 5d °jñātr̥sparśadaśāsv] TGJRK^{ed.}; ---spaśākhati C; sparśad-
jñāsv P 5d api] TGJPRK^{ed.}; om. C 6a sthitaiva] TGJPRK^{ed.}; pū---taiva C
6a lakṣyate] GJRK^{ed.}; ---kṣyate T, lakṣate C, lakṣyatai P 6a ca] TCK^{ed.}; tu
GJPR; 6b tathā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadā C

75 P adds *grata* of *agratas* in the left margin. 75 Cf. ĪPK 1.8.10: *tad
aikyena vinā na syāt sam̐vidāṃ lokapaddhatiḥ / prakāśaikyāt tadekatvaṃ mātaikāḥ
sa iti sthitam. Vṛtti: tattadvibhinnasam̐vidanusam̐dhānena hi vyavahārah. ekaś ca
prakāśātmā tadanusam̐dhānarūpaḥ sa eva caikāḥ pramātā paramātmasam̐jñāḥ.*
75 An imperfection in the manuscript of J conceals the presence or absence of
the semi-vowel (*e*) in *jñeya*. 77 The final *akṣara* of *puryaṣṭaka* is occluded by an
imperfection in the MS of R. 80 Cf. ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.1.7: *...prakāśaikarūpatvena
tv iśvarasya na kvāpy aprakāśasambhavāt paramāṇāv api.*

77 °avasthānāt] GJ^{p.c.}P^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °avasthāt P^{a.c.}R, °avasthānān J^{a.c.} 77 sauṣupta-
van] GJPK^{ed.}; sauṣu---n R 77 jñānāgrabhāgeṣu] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; jñānāprab-
hāgeṣu P^{a.c.}R 78 viśrāmyati] GJPK^{ed.}; viśrā---ti R 78 kvacit] GJRK^{ed.};
kvaci P 79 prāṇa°] JK^{ed.}; pramāṇa° GPR, 79 °vyākulitavāt] J^{p.c.}K^{ed.};
°vyākulitvāt G; °vyākulitvāt PR; °vyākulitattvāt J^{a.c.} 80 sauṣuptāgrabhāvinī
] GJPR; sauṣuptāgrabhāginī K^{ed.}

prakāśasyālakṣyamāṇatvābhāvāt, tathā phale 'pi mayaitaj jñātam iti pramāṇa-
 phalabhūtajñānāntarodaye tadā jñānamātre nirvṛtimati viśrāntyā. athavā yathā
 samagrajñānānām ārambhe, tathā phale parisamāptau tatraiva viśrāntyā. tad-
 viśrāntiṃ vinārtho jñāta eva na bhavati. samagravam anekaprakāratvena jñānā-
 85 nām madhyadaśāyām eva pratyagātmatvena. pūrvāparakotyos tv ekaviśuddhaśi-
 varūpataiva sarveśām. etac ceśvarapratyabhijñāyām parīkṣyam.
 sarvatra śaktipañcakasadbhāvam upasaṃharann āha

evam na jātucit tasya viyogas tritayātmanā 6
śaktyā nirvṛtacittvasya tadabhāgavibhāgayoḥ

90 evam uktaprakāreṇa tritayātmanecchājñānakriyārūpayā śaktyā na viyogaḥ
 kadācid api nirvṛtaṃ cittvaṃ cidrūpatvaṃ nirvivādaṃ yasya sa. tathā cidā-
 nandaśaktyoḥ parāparādyavasthāsv api samarthanāt kevalaṃ parāvasthāyām
 eṣṭavyadyabhāvād icchādyabhāvaśaṅkāyām tatsambhavo nigamitāś cidānandā-
 nuvādena. tāsām śaktinām avibhāgavibhāgayoḥ paratvāparatvāvasthābhedeṣu
 95 jñeyādisadbhāve śaktinām vibhāgavyavahārāt tasya pramātur icchādiśaktibhir
 na virahaḥ.

6d T records *ga* of *vīyogas* slightly below the line and in a smaller hand than the
 other *akṣaras*. 6d C initially records *tadabhāgavibhāge yāḥ* (a line exceedingly
 similar to ŚD 1.7b) in place of *vīyogas tritayātmanā*.

7a nirvṛtacittvasya] TGK^{ed.}; nirmṛtacittvasya J, nirvṛticit tasya C; nirvṛtacit tasya
 PR

81 Cf. ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.1.7: ...*prakāśaīkarūpatvena tv iśvarasya na kvāpy aprakāśasa-*
ṃbhavāt paramāṇāv api. 81 G records *tathā phale* twice. 82 Both G
 and J record *me* below the *ma* of *nirvṛtimati*. 92 P crosses out *śa* following
parāparādyā. 95 G crosses out an illegible *akṣara* following °*vṃyavahāra*. 95
 The MS copy of J in my possession is damaged and the initial vowel of *icchādi*^o
 is missing.

81 *alakṣyamāṇatvābhāvāt*] GJK^{ed.}; *alakṣyapramāṇatvābhāvāt* PR 83 *samagra-*
jñānānām] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; *samagrajñānānām* P^{a.c.} 83 *tathā*] JPRK^{ed.}; *om.* G
 84 *anekaprakāratvena*] GJ; *anekaprakāratvena* PRK^{ed.} 86 *ekaviśuddhaśivar-*
ūpatā] G^{p.c.} JPR; *ekaviśuddhaśivatā* K^{ed.}, *viekāśuddhaśivarūpatā* G^{a.c.} 86 *etac ca*
] GJPK^{ed.}; *etaś ca* R 87 °*sadbhāvam*] GJPR; °*svabhāvam* K^{ed.} 91 *cittvaṃ*
] GJPK^{ed.}; *cittaṃ* R 91 *sa*] GJPR; *om.* K^{ed.} 95 *pramātur*] GJPK^{ed.}; *pramātsya*
 R 95 *icchādiśaktibhir na virahaḥ*] PRK^{ed.}; *icchādiśaktibhinnavirahaḥ* GJ

82 G folio 4r. 82 J folio 4v. 95 J folio 5r. 95 R folio 3v.

vibhāge yathā śaktipañcakasthitis tathā vaktavyam, tat krameṇāha

yadā tu tasya ciddharmavibhavāmodajṛmbhayā 7
vicitraracanānānākāryasṛṣṭipravartane

100 bhavaty unmukhitā cittā secchāyāḥ prathamā tuṭiḥ 8

cidrūpasya śivabhāṭṭāarakasyāyam dharmah svabhāvo yo vibhavaḥ pañcavidh-
akṛtyanirvṛttiyogyatā, tasyāmodaś camatkāras tathāsvarūpaparāmarśarūpas ta-
sya jṛmbhā viśvātmatayā vikāsanam. yad uktaṃ mayā stotre

105 sphārayasy akhilam ātmanā sphuran
viśvam āmrśasi rūpam āmrśan
yat svayaṃ nijarasena ghūrṇase
tat samullasati bhāvamaṇḍalam (ŚSt 13.15)

iti. ghūrṇanam jṛmbhoktā, tayā jṛmbhayā hetubhūtayā sthitisvarūpasyaiva
māyīyābhedākhyātivaicitryaracanopalakṣitā tatsvabhāvā yā nānākāryasṛṣṭiḥ, tatp-
110 ravartane yadonmukhitonmukhavād ācaritā vastuto dvitīyābhāvān nairapekṣaye-
ṇāntarmukhitvāc cittā caitanyameva, tadā sā tuṭiḥ sūkṣmakālaparicchinna icchā-
prathamabhāgaḥ. atra caitāvac chaktikalāpo vyavahartṛṇām paramārthapadam
āruruḥṣatām saṃbhāvayata ity evaṃ nirdīśyate, na tu māyātattvād ūrdhvaṃ kālav-
ibhāgasamsparśaḥ. athavā māyordhve 'pi parāpararūpatvād avasthāviśeṣasya
115 kālavibhāgo 'pi syād ity ata eva tuṭiḥ ity uktam. sarvaṃ caitat pratyabhijñāyām
uktam.

7d vibhavāmoda°] TCGJPK^{ed.}; vabhavāmoda° (tops missing) R 7d °jṛmbhayā
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °jṛmmayā C 8a °racanānānā°] GJPRK^{ed.}; °racanān---nā° T,
°racanānām C 8b °kāryasṛṣṭi°] CGJPRK^{ed.}; °kāryasṛṣṭiḥ T 8b °pravartane
] GJPRK^{ed.}; pravartate TC 8c unmukhitā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; unmakhitām C 8d
secchāyāḥ] TCGJPK^{ed.}; svecchāyāḥ R 8d prathamā] TCGPRK^{ed.}; prathamāt
J 8d tuṭiḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ṭṛṭi C

97 vibhāge] GJPK^{ed.}; ---bhāge R 101 ayaṃ] GJPR; om. K^{ed.} 102
°svarūpaparāmarśa°] GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; °svarūparāmarśa° K^{ed.a.c.} 103 vikāsanam
] GJPR; vikāsanam K^{ed.} 104 akhilam] JPRK^{ed.}; ākhilam G 107 samullasati
] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; samullati J^{a.c.} 108 tayā] G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}PRK^{ed.}; tathā G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}
110 unmukhavād] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; unmukhavād P^{a.c.} 111 °mukhitvāc
] G^{p.c.}J^{a.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °mukhatvāc G^{a.c.}, °mukhitatvāc J^{p.c.} 111 cittā] JPRK^{ed.};
cintā G

97 G folio 4v. 101 P folio 4. 111 J folio 5v. 112 G folio 5r.

sā ca dṛṣyā hṛduḍdeṣe kāryasmarāṅakālataḥ
 praharṣāvedasamaye darasaṃdarśanaḥṣaṇe 9
 anālocanato dṛṣṭe visargaprasarāṣpade
 visargoktiprasaṅge ca vācane dhāvane tathā 10
 eteṣv eva prasāṅgeṣu sarvaśaktivilatā

120

sā ca sūkṣmaunmukhyaśaktirūpā lakṣyā hṛtpradeṣe pūrvacikīrṣitavismṛta-
 kāryasmarāṅe, tathā praharṣahetuputranmādyāvedanakāle, darasya bhayasya
 sandarśanaprārambhakṣaṇe, anālocanataḥ sahasaiveṣṭe dṛṣṭe, caramadhātuvisa-
 125 rgasthāne, tathā visarjanīyabhāṣaṅnaprasaṅge, tvaritagranthavācane, dhāvana-
 vidhau ceti. eteṣv evāvasareṣu sā pūrvoktakrameṇa sarvaśaktīnām vilatā
 miśrībhāvaḥ.

sukhaduḥkhātmatvenāśuddhatvād dheyē 'smin kārye katham aunmukhyam
 ity āśāṅkāṃ nivārayann āha

9a Cf. VBh 69: śaktisaṃgamasamṅksubdhaśaktyāveśāvāsāṅikam / yat sukham
 brahmatattvasya tat sukham svākyam ucyate; VBh 70: lehanāmanthanākoṭaiḥ stri-
 sukhasya bharāt smṛteḥ / śaktyabhāve 'pi deveśi bhaved ānandasamplavaḥ; VBh 71:
 ānande mahati prāpte dṛṣṭe vā bāndhave cirāt / ānandam udgataṃ dhyātvā tal-
 layas tanmanā bhavet; VBh 118: kṣutādyante bhaye śoke gahvare vā raṅād drute /
 kutūhale kṣudhādyante brahmasattāmāyī daśā; and SpKā 22: atikruddhaḥ prahr̥ṣṭo
 vā kiṃ karotīti vā mṛṣān / dhāvan vā yat padaṃ gacchet tatra spandaḥ pratiṣṭhitāḥ.
 Cf. ŚSūVā ad ŚS 3,6: kāmakrodhalobhaharṣabhayatrāsamadogame / praharṣe
 'pi ca sarvatra moha eva vijṛmbhate. tad evāvaraṇaṃ jñeyaṃ svarūpācchādakat-
 vataḥ / hetubhūtāt tatas tasmāt prākkoṭipravimarsataḥ. siddhiḥ syād ātmanaḥ sar-
 vajñatvakartrīvalakṣaṇā. 9d P deletes akṣaras following both sam and da of
 darasaṃdarśanaḥṣaṇa and replaces the second with the correct reading rśa; G
 and J also record the alternative reading of bhaya above dara. 10a J records an
 alternative (though hypometric) reading of sahasā above the first three akṣaras
 of anālocanatas. 10a T records the final e of dṛṣṭe in a small hand in what
 appears to be a correction. 11b J records a variant reading of °miśratā, written
 above °vilatā.

9b °kālataḥ] TGJPP^c.RK^{ed.}; °kālataḥ C; °kātaḥ P^{a.c.} 9d dara°] CGJPRK^{ed.};
 dāra° T 10b °prasarāṣpade] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °prasargaprasarospade (hypermetric)
 C 10c °prasaṅge] TCGJPK^{ed.}; °---ge R 11b sarva°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sarvaḥ C

122 pūrvacikīrṣita°] GJPK^{ed.}; pūvācakāṣata° (tops missing) R 123 °āvedana°
] GJPK^{ed.}; °āvadana° R 128 °ātmatvena] GJ; °ātmakatvena PRK^{ed.} 129
 āśāṅkāṃ] GJK^{ed.}; śāṅkāṃ PR

119 R folio 4r. 124 J folio 6r. 126 G folio 5v.

130 kutsite 'kutsitasya syāt katham unmukhateti cet II
 rūpapasārarasato garhitatvam ayuktimat
 pañcaprakāraḥkṛtyoktiśivatvān nijakarmaṇe I2
 pravṛttasya nimittānām apareṣām kva mārḡaṇam

135 māyāśaktikṛtapaṇḍasvarūpākhyātimayacitrakāryatāpannasvarūpapasaraṇa-
 rasāt prabhor asya tadrūpasya kāryabhedasya kutsitatvam ayuktam. tathā hi
 parāparāvasthāyām sadāśiveśvararūpatve viśvam aham iti viśvarūpatvam eva
 samvidi sphurati. aparāvasthāyām apy ahaṃ ghaṭam imaṃ vedmi ghaṭo 'yam iti
 vā dvaitadṛṣṭau cidātmakatām vinā prakāśamānataiva nopapadyata iti tadrūpatai-
 va, kintu māyāśaktivaśād abhedāparāmarśa iti sarvadā svarūpapasaraṇam eveti
 140 katham garhitatvam. abhedāparāmarśanam eva bhrāntirūpaṃ kutsitam, tac ca
 na kiñcid akhyātirūpamātratvāt. na tv apūrvasya kasyacit prathā. viśvātma-
 tvam ca cinmayasya pratibimbānām iva darpaṇaparamārthatvena bhāvānām

11C Cf. VBh 123: *kiṃcijñāir yā smṛtā śuddhiḥ sāsuddhiḥ śambhudarśane / na śucir hy aśucis tasmān nirvikalpaḥ sukḥi bhavet.*

11C 'kutsitasya] TCJPRK^{ed.}; 'kutsitasa G 11d katham] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---tham
 T, athāmun C 11d unmukhatā] GJPRK^{ed.}; mukhitā (hypometric) TC 12b
 garhitatvam] TC^{p.c.}GJPRK^{ed.}; gavarhitatvam C^{a.c.} 12c °kṛtyokti] CGJPRK^{ed.};
 °kṛtyoktiś T 12d śivatvān] CGJPRK^{ed.}; śivatvan T 13a nimittānām] GJPRK^{ed.};
 nivṛttānām T, nimittānom C

137 A syllable following *ve* in *vedmi* is crossed out and *dmi* is added in the right margin of P. 139 A syllable following *vaśā* of °*vaśāt* is crossed out and *d* is added in P.

136 viśvarūpatvam] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; viśvamaharūpatvam P^{a.c.} 138 cidātmakatām
] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; cidātmakavarttā P^{a.c.} 140 eva] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; evā P^{a.c.} 140
 tac ca] GJK^{ed.}; tataś ca PR 142 cinmayasya] GJPK^{ed.}; ci--yasya R 142
 pratibimbānām] GJPK^{ed.}; pratibi---ānām R

138 P folio 5. 138 J folio 6v. 140 G folio 6r. 141 R folio 4v.

svacchacinmātrasatattvatayāvasthānāt. etac ca sarvam īsvarapratyabhijñāṭikā-
 yāṃ nipuṇaṃ ālocitam. sargasthitipralayānugrahatiṛodhānalakṣaṇapañcapra-
 145 kāraṃ kṛtyaṃ yasya tasyoktiḥ pañcavidhakṛtyo yad ucyate tac chivatvaṃ tato
 nijakarmane tattvādīrūpaprasaraṇarūpāya pravṛttasya nimittānāṃ ca dayādīnāṃ
 kva mārgaṇaṃ nimittānveṣaṇaprasaṅgasyaivābhāvāt katham evaṃ prasaratīti
 na codyam iti tāvad akutsitaviṣayam evaunmukhyam iti samarthitam.
 tad idānīm nidarśanena sphuṭikartum āha

150 **gacchato nistarāṅgasya jalasyātitarāṅgitām I3**
ārambhe dr̥ṣṭim āpātya tad aunmukhyaṃ hi gamyate
vrajato muṣṭitām pāṇeh pūrvah kampas tatheksyate I4

13c nistarāṅgasya] GJPRK^{ed.}; ni---raṅgasya T, nisargeśya C 14a ārambhe
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---ṛme C 14a dr̥ṣṭim] TGJPRK^{ed.}; dr̥ṣīm C 14a āpātya] TK^{ed.};
 āpātya CPR, āpādyā GJ 14b tad aunmukhyaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; datadonmukhyaṃ
 C 14c muṣṭitām] TGJPRK^{ed.}; muṣṭināṃ C 14c pāṇeh] GJPRK^{ed.}; prāṇeh
 TC 14d kampas] TGJ^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; kaṃpa C; kampaḥ P^{a.c.} 14d tatheksyate
] TGJR; tatheṣyate CP, tadekṣyate K^{ed.}

143 An imperfection in the manuscript renders the first *akṣara* of °*satattva*°
 nearly illegible in J. 144 The ĪPT̥ is, of course, lost. See instead, e.g., ĪPK 1.5.10
 and Utpaladeva's *Vṛtti* on the same: *svāmināś cātmasaṃsthasya bhāvajātasya*
bhāsanam / asty eva na vinā tasmād icchāmarśah pravartate. Vṛtti: cidātmanaś
ceśvarasyātmanivābhedenārtheṣv api prakāśo 'sty anyathā pratibhāsamānārthaik-
aviṣayo nirmātrtāmayo vimarśa icchārūpo na syāt. Cf. ĪPK 2.4.18–19: ekātmano
vibhedaś ca kriyā kālakramānugā / tathā syāt kartṛtaivaivaṃ tathāpariṇamattayā.
na ca yuktaṃ jaḍasyaivaṃ bhedaḥbhedavirodhataḥ / ābhāsabhedād ekatra cidātmani
tu yujyate. Vṛtti: jaḍasyābhinnātmano bhedenāvasthiter virodhād ayuktam, svacche
cidātmany ekasminn evam anekapratibimbadhāraṇenāvirodhād yujyate. 145 J
 records the (correct) reading *tataḥ* above its variant reading of *tena*. 146 An
 “x” appears by *-ti* of the erroneous reading *datiyādīnāṃ* of P. 148 J records
viṣaya beneath *akutsita*.

143 sarvam] GJPK^{ed.}; savam (tops missing) R 144 °anugrahatiṛodhāna°
] JPRK^{ed.}; °tirodhānānugrahana° G 145 tato] GJ^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; tena PRJ^{a.c.} 146
 ca] GJPR; *om.* K^{ed.} 146 dayādīnāṃ] GJ^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; datiyādīnāṃ P^{a.c.} R 148
 akutsitaviṣayam] GJ^{p.c.} PRK^{ed.}; akutsitam J^{a.c.}

155 bodhasya svātmaniṣṭhasya racanām prati nirvṛtiḥ
 tadāsthāpravikāso yas tad aunmukhyaṃ pracakṣate 15
 kiñciducchūnatā saiva mahadbhiḥ kaiścid ucyate
 tasyecchā kāryatām yātā yayā secchaḥ sa jāyate 16
 aunmukhyasya ya ābhogaḥ sthūlaḥ secchā vyavasthitā
 na caunmukhyaprasaṅgena śivaḥ sthūlatvabhāk kvacit 17

160 yathā jalasya pūrvam nistarāṅgasyātitarāṅgitām gacchataḥ sūkṣmaḥ pūrvāḥ
 kampa aunmukhyarūpaḥ, pāṇeś ca muṣṭitām gacchataḥ pūrvāḥ susūkṣmaḥ
 kampo dṛśyate, tathā bodhasya svarūpaniṣṭhasya pūrṇasya viśvaracanām prati
 abhilāṣamātram racanāyogyatāyā yaḥ prathamō vikāsaḥ pravṛtṭyārambhas tad
 aunmukhyaṃ pracakṣate. pravṛtṭyārambhaś ca nirvṛtāv apy abhedākhyātidhar-
 matvena tasyāḥ prathanāt. yad etad aunmukhyam, saiva kiñciducchūnatā kath-
 165 yate bhāṭṭapradyumna tattvagarbhe. anyair api tarāṅgormyādīśabdair api.

15c T records a gap, at least one *akṣara*'s width, between s and the marker (stand-
 ing prior to it, as is the practice in Grantha Malayalam script) that signals the
 presence of the final o in *pravikāso*.

15b racanām] CGJPRK^{ed.}; racanaṃ T 15b prati] CGJPRK^{ed.}; pr-- T 15b
 nirvṛtiḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; nirvṛtām C 15c °pravikāso] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °pravikāso C
 16a kiñciducchūnatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kiñcituchānatā C 16c tasya] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 yasya C 16c icchā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; icchām T 16c yātā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; yā kā
 T 16d yayā] T^{p.c.}CGJPRK^{ed.}; yayāḥ T^{a.c.} 16d secchaḥ sa] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 sechasya C 17a aunmukhyasya] GJPRK^{ed.}; aunmukh---ya--- T jānmukhyasye
 C 17a ya ābhogaḥ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---gaḥ T 17b sthūlaḥ secchā] TGJK^{ed.};
 sthālasyesthā C; sthūlasveccha° P, sthūlasvecchā R 17c na caunmukhyaprasaṅ-
 gena] TCG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.p.c.}; na caunmukhyasya prasaṅgena (hypermetric) G^{a.c.};
 nai cānmukhyaprasaṅgena K^{ed.a.c.} 17d śivaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; śivāḥ C 17d
 sthūlatvabhāk] TCGJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; sthūletvabhāk P^{a.c.}R 17d kvacit] TCGJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.};
 vacit P^{a.c.}

159 atitarāṅgitām] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; atitatarāṅgitām J^{a.c.} 161 bodhasya svarū-
 paniṣṭhasya] J; bodhasya svarūpasthasya GK^{ed.}, bodhasvarūpasthasya PR 162
 abhilāṣamātram racanāyogyatāyā] GJPR; abhilāṣamātraracanāyogyatāyā K^{ed.}
 163 nirvṛtāv] JPRK^{ed.}; nirvṛtām G 163 abhedākhyātidharmatvena] K^{ed.};
 abhedākhyātiḥ dharmatvena GJPR 164 kathiyate] GJK^{ed.}; kathitā P^{p.c.}, kathito
 P^{a.c.}, kathite R 165 bhāṭṭapradyumna] JPRK^{ed.}; bhāṭṭapradyumna G

155 C folio. 2r 163 R folio 5r. 164 J folio 7v.

tasyaunmukhyasyecchā kāryā. tasya hi yo 'sāv ābhogo jñānādikāryotpādanasam-
 artho vistṛto dārḍhyamaya uttaro bhāgo 'ta eva racanāsthāvikāsādārḍhyāt sthūlah,
 secchā vyavasthitā. na cocchūnatādivyapadeśyaunmukhyaprasaṅgena śivo bijam
 170 iva sthaulyabhāk. icchādyasadbhāve vānyatra kvacid vastuto na sthaulyaṃ cidāt-
 manaḥ pratibimbakalpair bhāvair anādhikyāt. nāpi tadātmatāprathā bhrāntir iti
 sarvam uktaṃ ṭikāyām.

vyāvahāriko 'pi nāsty evamādau bhedas tathāparāmarśānivr̥tter ity āha

**goḥ stanāt pātataḥ kṣīre vikāras tata eva hi
 na ca na kṣīram ity eṣa vyapadeśo 'sti tatkṣaṇam 18**

175 goḥ stanāt pātāt kṣīre vikāras tata eva tadanantaram eva. na ca tatkṣaṇam
 tatra na kṣīraparāmarśaḥ, yāvat parāmarśaikyaṃ tāvat sarvadaikyam eva.
 evam aunmukhyam icchāyā uktam idānīm apy upapādayann āha

**yata icchati taj jñātuṃ kartuṃ vā secchayā kriyā
 tasyāḥ pūrvāparau bhāgau kalpanīyau purā hi yā 19
 180 tatkarmanirvṛtiprāptir aunmukhyaṃ tad vikāsītā**

18d T does not record 'sti *tatkṣaṇam* due to a piece of the manuscript having
 broken from the bottom of the folio. 19a T does not record *yata icchati taj* due
 to a piece of the manuscript having broken from the bottom of the folio. 20a
 T deletes *ṣa* following *tatkarmani*^o.

18a goḥ] CGJKE^d; go TPR 18a pātataḥ] GJPRK^{ed}; pātitaṃ T, vatataḥ
 C 18b tata] TGJPRK^{ed}; tava C 18c na] CGJPRK^{ed}; na na T 18d
 vyapadeśo] GJPRK^{ed}; vyapa---e--- T, vyavadeśo C 19a icchati] GJPRK^{ed};
 --- T, icchanti C 19b vā secchayā] TCGJPRK^{ed.a.c.}; vāhecchayā K^{ed.p.c.} 19b
 kriyā] TCGJPRK^{ed.a.c.}; kriyām K^{ed.p.c.} 19d kalpanīyau] TGJRK^{ed}; ka---yau C;
 kalpanīyā P 20b °prāptir aunmukhyaṃ] GJPRK^{ed}; °prāptir aunmukhyaṃs
 T, °prāpikānmukhyaṃ C 20b vikāsītā] GJPRK^{ed}; vikāsīt--- T, vikasmitā C

171 The ĪPṬ is of course lost. See, instead, e.g., ĪPK 2.4.19 and the *Vṛtti* on the
 same.

166 tasya] JPRK^{ed}; om. G 168 vyavasthitā] GJK^{ed}; vyavatā PR 169
 vānyatra] GJRK^{ed}; nānyatra P 172 evamādau] GJJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed}; evamādaur P^{a.c.}
 172 °para°] JPRK^{ed}; om. G 175 goḥ] GJK^{ed}; go PR 175 na] GJK^{ed};
 om. PR 177 icchāyā] GJPR; icchāyām K^{ed}. 177 apy] GJ; om. PRK^{ed}.

166 G folio 7r. 172 P folio 6. 176 J folio 8r. 180 G folio 7v.

yasmād icchatīśvaro jñātum vā kartum veti yad ucyate, tadākhyātapadam icchayecchālakṣaṇām kriyām āha. tasyā icchāyāḥ pūrvāparau bhāgau kalpanīyau pūrvāparībhūtāvayavatvāt kriyāyā icchāyāḥ kriyātvābhīdhānena. icchādīnāmanyonyātmatā śaktyavasthāyām sutarām syāt. tataś ca paramārthata ekaiva śaktiḥ
 185 śakta evāstīti pratipāditam. utpattikathāyām tv icchāyāḥ purobhāge yā tasmin karmaṇi tatkarmaniṣṭhā nirvṛtiḥ prāptiḥ, tad aunmukhyam, karmāvachinnā nirvṛtir aunmukhyam, anavachinnā nirvṛtimātram ānandaśaktir iti yāvat. tad aunmukhyam vikāsītā cidāsthāpravikāsa ity uktam.

190 **anantaram hi tatkāryajñānadarśanaśaktitā 20**
jñānaśaktis tadartham hi yo 'sau sthūlah samudyamaḥ
sā kriyāśaktir uditā tataḥ sarvaṃ jagat sthitam 21

paratas tasmin viśvalakṣaṇe kārye yaj jñānam, tat prakāśanaśaktirūpatā cidātmanaḥ sarvapratipattīṅām avedyam antaḥkaraṇa iva prakāśamānam tat kāryam yataḥ sā jñānaśaktiḥ. anantaram sarvapramātrvedyasthūlakāryākārasamutpattiphalaḥ samudyama icchāviśaya eva kriyāśaktiḥ. tata eva parisamāptir vyavahāryakāryalābhād ity uktam tataḥ sarvaṃ jagat sthitam iti.

20d The reading of ŚD 1.20cd is unavailable in T, excepting the last *akṣara*, due to the relevant piece of manuscript having broken off. 21b T crosses out an *akṣara* prior to *ma* of *samudyama*.

20d tatkāryajñānadarśanaśaktitā] GJPRK^{ed.}; , --- tā T, tatkārya---darśanaśaktitā C 21a jñānaśaktis] TGJPRK^{ed.}; jānaśaktis C 21a hi] TGJPRK^{ed.}; hī C 21b yo] TGJPRK^{ed.}; yau C 21c kriyāśaktir] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kriyāśakti--- C 21c uditā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; --- C 21d sthitam] TGJJP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; sitam C; sthitām P^{a.c.}

187 A syllable is crossed out after *anavacchi* and *nnā* is added in P. 194 The second, erroneously recorded *kārya* is underlined in P. 195 G records °*ppa*° written above °*utpatti*°; J records *mpa* of *sampatti* above the line.

181 vā] JPRK^{ed.}; om. G 181 yad] JPRK^{ed.}; tad G 182 tasyā] GJPK^{ed.}; tasyāḥ R 185 purobhāge] PRK^{ed.}; pare bhāge GJ 186 nirvṛtiḥ prāptiḥ] GJ; nirvṛtiprāptiḥ PRK^{ed.} 186 aunmukhyam, karmāvachinnā] GPRK^{ed.}; aunmukhyakarmāvachinnā J 187 nirvṛtir] JPRK^{ed.}; nirvṛtir prāptis tad G 187 nirvṛtimātram] GJPK^{ed.}; nirvṛtimātram R 188 °pravikāsa] GJRK^{ed.}; °pravikāsa P 192 paratas] GJPK^{ed.}; paras R 193 °pratipattīṅām] GJPK^{ed.}; °pramātrīṅām R 193 antaḥkaraṇa] GJPK^{ed.}; antaḥkaraṇe R 194 °ākāra°] JK^{ed.}; °kāryakārya° PR, °kāra° G 195 samutpatti°] GJ^{a.c.} R; °sampatti° J^{p.c.} PK^{ed.}

184 R folio 5v. 188 J folio 8v. 189 T folio iv. 193 G folio 8r.

na kevaḷaṃ jagannirmāṇa evaivam, yāvad ekaikaghaṭakaraṇakāle 'py evaṃ śaktirūpatety āha

evaṃ sarvasamutpattikāle śaktitrayātmā

200

na nirvṛtā na caunmukhyaṃ nirvṛtaṃ nāpi nirvṛtiḥ 22

icchājñānakriyātmā tāvat siddhā ghaṭādikaraṇakāle. aunmukhyam apīc-
chāpūrvabhāgo 'sti karmāvacchinnaviśiṣṭanirvṛtirūpaḥ. anyāpy anavacchinnān-
andarūpā nirvṛtir anivṛtā, tadabhāve viśeṣanirvṛter abhāvād yathā bodhābhāve
viśiṣṭaghaṭādibodhasya. ata eva nirvṛter viśiṣṭarūpatāprāptir iti prāptigrahaṇam
205 pūrvam kṛtam. yadi vā nirvṛtiśabdena pūrṇacicchaktir upātā śaktipañcakāya.
ekaśaktyabhāve 'pi kāryotpattir na syād ity āha

yad ekataraniryāṇe kāryam jātu na jāyate

tasmāt sarvpadārthānām sāmāsyam avasthitam 23

yasmād ekatarasya śaktibhedasya niryāṇe 'pāye kāryam na kadācit syād ity
210 uktam, tasmāt sarvpadārthānām utpattikāle sarvatattvamayaśivatattvopayoga
iti na kadācanāpi śivarūpasamsparsāviraḥitā, mahāśargaprārambha iva bhāvā-
nām ekaikasya nirmāṇe 'pi parameśvarasparśaraso 'khaṇḍita eveti sāmāsyam.
kumbhakāryāpi ghaṭakaraṇe sarvaśaktiśivātmā, tadaparijñānāt tu kumbhak-
āratety arthaḥ. ekatāretī tarappāṭha aunmukhyanirvṛtidvīpēkṣayā.

22c The reading of *nirvṛtā na caunmukhyaṃ* is missing in T due to a piece of the manuscript having broken off from the top of the folio. 23a J records an apparent variant reading of °*virahe* above °*niryāṇe*.

22a °samutpatti°] GJPRK^{ed.}; °samutpattiḥ T, °samutpattiṃ C 22b °trayāt-
matā] GJPRK^{ed.}; °trayātmanā T, °priyātmatā C 22d na caunmukhyaṃ nirvṛt-
taṃ] GJPRK^{ed.}; na --- T, na navṛtā na vaunmu---ttaṃ C 23a ekataraniryāṇe
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ekatataranirvāṇa C 23d sāmāsyam] GJPRK^{ed.}; sāmāsyā° T,
---marasyam C 23d avasthitam] CGJPRK^{ed.}; °vyavasthitam T

201 An *anusvāra* is deleted following *aunmukhya* in J.

197 evaivam] GJPK^{ed.}; evevaṃ R 197 °kāle] GJPK^{ed.}; °kāla R 202
°viśiṣṭa°] GJK^{ed.}; °viśiṣṭa° PR 202 anavacchinnā°] JPRK^{ed.}; anacchinnā° G 206
ekaśaktyabhāve] JPRK^{ed.}; ekaśaktyābhāve G 211 °prārambha] JPK^{ed.};
°prādambha G, °prāraṃ R 212 nirmāṇe] GJPR; nirvāṇe K^{ed.} 212
°sparśaraso] JPRK^{ed.}; °spaśe raso G 214 tarappāṭhaḥ] P^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; tarappāṭhaḥ
GJ^{a.c.}R

203 J folio 9r. 205 R folio 6r. 205 G folio 8v. 206 P folio 7.

215 na kevalam ghaṭādikaraṇakāle sarvaśaktisambhavaḥ, yāvad grahaṇakāle
'pīty āha

**ghaṭādigrahakāle 'pi ghaṭam jānāti sā kriyā
jānāti jñānam atraiva niricchor vedanakṣatiḥ 24
aunmukhyābhāvatas tasya nivṛttir nirvṛtiṃ vinā
220 dveṣye pravartate naiva na ca vetti vinā citam 25**

ghaṭādi jñānakāle yad ghaṭam jānāti cidabhedākhyātivaicitryabhinnaghaṭa-
devadattātmakavedyavedakābhāsanam nāma yat kramikam apūrvaṃ rūpaṃ
sā jñānalakṣaṇā kriyā pūrvāparībhūtāvayavā, na tu jānāmīti vacanapravṛttikāla
eva. jānātirūpatvāj jñānam atraiva kriyātmani sthitam. niricchor avadhā-
225 narahitasya vedanam na bhaven manasānadhiṣṭhānāt. avadhānavad darśanam
evecchā. tatra cecchākriyāpūrvabhāga aunmukhyaṃ tatkarmanirvṛtiḥ. tad aun-
mukhyābhāvatas tasya pramātur vedanasya vā nivṛttir na hy aunmukhyarūpam
tatkarmanirvṛtiṃ vinā dveṣye pravartate. na ca citam abhedapratyavamarśasak-
tīrūpam vinā pūrṇasuddhabodhātmā kartā vetti ghaṭādīn saṃvinnīṣṭhatvād
230 viṣayavyavasthitīnām. saiva cicchaktiḥ sāmānyā nirvṛtiśaktir ānandarūpā.

24a °grahakāle]TGJPRK^{ed.}; °jñānakāle C 24c jānāti jñānam]GJPRK^{ed.};
jānāti jñā --- T, jānitājñām C 24c atraiva]CGJK^{ed.}; ---traiva T, anyatra PR 24d
niricchor]TGJPRK^{ed.}; nirimchor C 24d vedanakṣatiḥ]CGJK^{ed.}; vedanakṣitiḥ
T, darśanakṣatiḥ PR 25b nivṛttir]GJPRK^{ed.}; nirvṛtta T, nivṛtti C 25b nirvṛtiṃ
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; nirghṛtiṃ C 25c dveṣye]CGJPRK^{ed.}; dveṣye T 25c pravartate
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; pravatte C 25d citam]TGJPRK^{ed.}; citiṃ C

223 J records *mī* of the (corrected) reading *jānāmīti* above the line. 229
J rewrites *dī* above the first, correct but slightly unclear recording of the same
akṣara in *ghaṭādīn*.

222 °ābhāsanam]GJK^{ed.}; °bhāsanam PR 222 kramikam]G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
krimikam G^{a.c.}P^{a.c.} 223 jānāmi]J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; jānāti GJ^{a.c.} 225 manasānadhiṣ-
ṭhānāt]JRK^{ed.}; manasādhiṣṭhānāt G; manaso 'nadhiṣṭhānāt P 225 avadhāna-
vad]GJ^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; avadhānavad P^{a.c.}R 226 aunmukhyaṃ]JPRK^{ed.}; unmukhyaṃ
G 227 nivṛttir]JPRK^{ed.}; nivṛtti G 229 vetti]GPRK^{ed.}; ve--- J

215 G folio 9r. 215 J folio 9v. 227 R folio 6v. 229 J folio 10r. 229
G folio 9v.

jñānakāle śivatvābhāvam āśaṅkamāna āha

buddhiṃ vinā katham bodhaḥ sā buddhiḥ prakṛteḥ prajā
na ca tasya tayā yoga iti ced aparasthitau 26
sā buddhir yat punaḥ sūkṣmam sarvadikkaṃ vyavasthitam
 235 **jñānam bodhamayaṃ tasya śivasya sahaḥ sadā 27**
nyāyādibhir na tulyatvaṃ tair hi yā prakṛti matih
tasyā evātmadharmatvam iṣṭam na parabodhake 28
eṣa eva hi vijñeyo nyāya icchām prati sphuṭam

240 syāt. buddhiś ca prakṛteḥ prajātā jaḍā. na ca tayā tasya sarvaśakteḥ śivatattvasya
 nirmalasya saṃbandha ity evaṃ cet, tan na. aparāvasthāyām abhedākhyātāv
 ekarasāyām puryaṣṭakapramātṛṇām sā buddhiḥ. yat punaḥ pūrnatāyām parāv-
 asthasyāta eva sūkṣmam abhinnaṃ vedyatām anupayātam ata eva sarvadikkaṃ
 245 dikkālakhaṇḍitaṃ jñānam bodhamātram abodhyarūpam, tat tasya śivasya saha-
 ḥam sadā prakṛtabuddhyullāse 'pi tatsadbhāvāt tad vinā tadabhāvāt. nanv evam

26a An imperfection in the manuscript obscures the presence or absence of the final *anusvāra* of *katham* in J. 29b C records ---*ichātaḥ kadācidjñānaśaktitaḥ* (=ŚD I.30ab) prior to ŚD I.29d.

26a buddhiṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; buddhi C 26a bodhaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bādha C
 26b prakṛteḥ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; prakṛte T 26c tayā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; tadā T 26c
 yoga] CGJPRK^{ed.}; y---ga T 26d ced] TCG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; cid G^{a.c.} 26d aparasthi-
 tau] TGJPRK^{ed.}; aparasthitā C 27b sarvadikkaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sarvadikkā C
 27c jñānam bodhamayaṃ] GJPRK^{ed.}; jñānabodhamayaṃ T, jñānodhamayaṃ
 (hypometric) C 27d sadā] TG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; surā C; tadā G^{a.c.} 28a nyāyādibhir
 na tulyatvaṃ] CJPRK^{ed.}; nyāyādibhir na tulyatva T, nyāyādibhinnatulyatvaṃ G
 28c ātmadharmatvam] TCG^{p.c.}JRK^{ed.}; ātmadharmatvaṃm G^{a.c.}; ātmadharmit-
 vam P 28d parabodhake] TCGJK^{ed.}; bodhake (hypometric) PR 29a eṣa
 eva] TGJPRK^{ed.}; eṣayeva C 29a vijñeyo] TGJPRK^{ed.}; jñāyo C

241 P records *khyā* of *abhedākhyāti* twice, with the first being underlined.

240 sarvaśakteḥ] JK^{ed.}; sarvatattveś G; śarvaśakteḥ PR 241 abhedākhyātāv
] GJRK^{ed.}; abhedākhykhyātāv P 242 parāvasthasya] GJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; parāvasthāsyā
 P^{a.c.} 245 tadabhāvāt] GJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; tadbhāvāt P^{a.c.}

241 P folio 8. 243 J folio 10v. 243 G folio 10r.

250 api nyāyavaiśeṣikādisāmyam āyāti jñānasya śivāśritatvopagame, jñānaṃ hi teṣāṃ ātmasamavetam iṣṭaṃ śivaś cātmarūpa ity uktam nyāyādibhir iti, tair na tulyatvaṃ prakṛtyāṃ bhedadaśāyāṃ buddhibhedātmano jñānasya tathābhidhānāt, na tv īsvare pararūpe jñātari, tad uktam eṣa eva nyāya icchāṃ prati sphuṭaṃ jñeyah. icchā citeḥ pratyagātmāśritā bhedamayy evoktā yānyair man-aḥṣaṃkalparūpā, na tu parameśvarasvabhāvabhūtā parāparāvasthā sthitā vā.
sarvatattvamayatayā śivatattvāvasthānam āha

255 tad evaṃ prasṛto devaḥ kadācic chaktimātrake 29
bibharti rūpam icchātaḥ kadācij jñānaśaktiḥ
sadāśivatvam udrekāt kadācid aiśvarīm sthitim 30
kriyāśaktisamābhogāt kadācit sthūlavedanāt
vidyātvavidyeśānatvamantramantreśvarātmatām 31
ātmapracchādanakriḍāṃ kurvato vā kathañcana
māyārūpam itityādiṣaṭṭrimśattattvarūpatām 32

30d J records *sthitih* below its erroneous reading *stitim*. 31a *bibharti rūpam* precedes 1.31 in C 31a J rewrites *mā* of °*samābhogāt* above the first (correct but obscured) recording of the same *akṣara*.

29d kadācic]TGJPRK^{ed.}; kadāci C 29d chaktimātrake]CGJPRK^{ed.}; cha---mātrake T 30d kadācid]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ka---ācid T 30d aiśvarīm]CGJPRK^{ed.}; aiśvarī T 30d sthitim]CGJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; sthitih T, stitim J^{a.c.} 31b kadācit]CGJPRK^{ed.}; kadāci T 31d °mantreśvarātmatām]GJPRK^{ed.}; °mantreśvarātmanāḥ T, °mantreśvaretatām C 32a ātmapracchādanakriḍāṃ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ātmaprachādanan kri C 32b kurvato]TGJPRK^{ed.}; kurvaṃto C 32c °rūpam]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---pam T 32d itityādi°]TGJPRK^{ed.}; itityādi° C

248 G and J record *bhe* above *bu* of *buddhi*°. 250 An imperfection in J obscures its (nevertheless legible) reading of *jñeyah*. 250 J apparently reads *evoktā*, though an imperfection in the manuscript obscures the presence or absence of the initial semivowel.

246 nyāyavaiśeṣikādisāmyam]G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; nyāyavaiśeṣikādisāmyam G^{a.c.}; nyāyaṃ vaiśeṣikādisāmyam P^{a.c.}R 246 hi]JPRK^{ed.}; ni G 247 ātmasamavetam]GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; ātmasamavetim P^{a.c.} 248 bhedadaśāyāṃ]PRK^{ed.}; buddhidāśāyāṃ GJ 248 buddhibhedātmano]GJPR; buddhiyogātmano K^{ed.} 250 sphuṭaṃ]GJPK^{ed.}; sphu--- R 251 parameśvarasvabhāvabhūtā]JPRK^{ed.}; parameśvarasya bhāvabhūtā G

249 R folio 7r. 256 J folio 11r. 256 G folio 10v. 257 C folio 2v.

260 **bibhrad bibharti rūpāni tāvato vyavahārataḥ**
vyāvāt sthūlaṃ jaḍābhāsaṃ saṃhatam pārthivam ghanam 33

tasmād evam uktena krameṇa svarūpānupraviṣṭacinnirvṛtirūpaśaktidvayaḥ
 prakāśānandamayaḥ pūrṇaḥ parameśvaraḥ śivaḥ prasṛtaḥ kadācit prathamataḥ.
 śaktimātraka aunmukhye viṣayān anuṣakte nirvṛtimaya icchāpūrvabhāge parā-
 265 parāvasthārambhadaśāyām tadanurūpaṃ rūpaṃ bibharti dhyāyinām dhyeyam.
 kadācid icchāta icchāśaktirūpatvān nimittāt. athavechhārūpaṃ āpādyā tadanurū-
 paṃ pūrvavad rūpaṃ bibharti. kadācit punar jñānaśaktirūpatvāt sadāśivarū-
 paṃ bibharti. kriyāto jñānaṃ tu prāguktanayenādhiyāt. aiśvarīm tu sthitiṃ
 kadācit kriyāśakteḥ samābhogāt paryantaprāptavistārād bibharti. kadācit parā-
 270 parāvasthāntarabhinnāśeṣavedyavedakarūpabodhātmapramātravasthayaḥ mantr-
 ādirūpatām bibharti. ekāntabhinnataiva vedyasya viśvasya sthūlatvam. pramā-
 tṛṇām ca bodhātmatve 'pi śivecchāto bhedāpatteḥ sthūlatvam. ato vedanasyāpi
 sthūlatvam, idaṃ ca vidyātvam. anye cainām vidyām bhedollāsān mahāmāyām
 icchanti. kadācidātmapracchādanātmakābhedākhyātimayīm saṃsārarūpām bhr-
 275 āntiṃ kriḍām eva kathañcana tathāsvabhāvatvāt kurvato māyāśaktir aparāvasth-
 ābijabhūtā rūpaṃ iti caktāni tattvāny ādibhūtāni yeṣāṃ ṣaṭtrimśatas tattvānām,

33a bibhrad] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bibhra C 33a bibharti] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bidharti C
 33a rūpāni] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---ñi C 33b tāvato] CGJPR; tāvate T, tāvatā K^{ed.} 33b
 vyavahārataḥ] TCGJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; vyavahāratiḥ P^{a.c.} 33c sthūlaṃ jaḍābhāsaṃ
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sthūjaḍābhāmsaṃ C 33d ghanam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; dhanam C

266] records *pā* above *sā* of *āsādyā*. 267 P and R omit *kadācit punar*
jñānaśaktirūpatvāt sadāśivarūpaṃ bibharti. 275 P records *ḍā* of *kriḍām* in
śāradā script. 276 A syllable is crossed out after *caktā*^o in G.

262 evam] GJPK^{ed.}; eva pūrvam R 262 krameṇa] GPRK^{ed.}; kra---eṇa
 J 264 anuṣakte] GJPK^{ed.}; anuṣakta R 266 āpādyā] GJ^{p.c.} PR; āsādyā
 J^{a.c.} K^{ed.} 268 jñānaṃ] GJPR; jñāne K^{ed.} 268 sthitiṃ] GJPK^{ed.}; sthiti R
 269 °vistārād] JPK^{ed.}; °vistarād GR 270 °rūpabodhātmapramātravasthayaḥ
] GJK^{ed.}; °rūpabodhātmapramātravasthāyām P^{p.c.} R, °bodhātmapramātravasthā-
 yām P^{a.c.} 272 °āpatteḥ sthūlatvam] GJK^{ed.}; °āpatte 'sthūlatvam PR 272
 ato vedanasyāpi sthūlatvam] GK^{ed.}; ato vedanāpi sthūlatvam J, om. PR 273
 idaṃ] GJK^{ed.}; iṃdaṃ P, i--- R 273 ca] GJ; tu PRK^{ed.} 273 anye] JPRK^{ed.};
 anyai G 273 vidyām] GJJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; vidyo P^{a.c.} 275 kurvato] GJK^{ed.}; sarvato
 PR 276 ṣaṭtrimśatas] GJ^{p.c.} PRK^{ed.}; ṣaṭtrimśatis J^{a.c.}

269 J folio IIV. 269 G folio IIR. 272 R folio 7v. 275 P folio 9.

tadrūpatām sāmānyena bibhrat tadviśeṣarūpāny api bibharti tāvataḥ prasid-
dhavyavahāranīṣpatteḥ. aprasiddhavyavahārāntaram astv īsvarasya kāryāṇām
280 jānīmahe. ṣaṭtriṃśatsaṃkhyā pūryate yāvat pārthivaṃ tattvam, tadanantaram
nopalabhyate 'tra. tathā pārthivaṃ tattvam sthūlatvāt paryantavarti. anekasahak-
ārisaṃpādyaviśeṣaṃ kāraṇāt kāryaṃ sthūlaṃ bhavati vyaktataratvān na tu sūkṣ-
mam. mahattve 'pi pradhānādeḥ kāraṇasya sauṣṭmyam eva. tathā cinmayatvāt
285 tāvat kāraṇatā saṃbhāvā. pārthive 'pi tu yāvat tad asti citprakāśaikhyātim-
ātratvāt pṛthak prakāśātmatve 'pi. tad uktaṃ jaḍābhāsaṃ kārṣṇyāḥ jaḍo 'prakāśa
ābhāso rūpam asyeti tat. ākāśādīmahābhūtamayatanmātrapañcakavyūhanāt-
matayā saṃhatam, anantaram saṃparkāntarāsaṃbhavād antyakāryam, ata eva
290 miśraṇāsahaṃ paripuṣṭadvaitadrṣṭi paryantaniviṣṭam.

ata ūrdhvaṃ yāni bhuvanādīni kāryāṇi, tāny eṣām eva bhūtānām vibhava-
bhūtāny aparisaṃkhyeyāni sa eva nirmimīta ity āha

tathā nānāśarīrāṇi bhuvanāni tathā tathā

visṛjya rūpaṃ gr̥hṇāti protkr̥ṣṭādhamamadhyamam 34

34a nānāśarīrāṇi] TGJPRK^{ed.}; nānāśarīrāṇi C 34b bhuvanāni] TGJPRK^{ed.};
bhu---ni C 34b tathā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---thā T 34c gr̥hṇāti] TCGJRK^{ed.}; gr̥hṇāni
P 34d protkr̥ṣṭādhamamadhyamam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; hrotkr̥ṣṭādhamamad-
hyamā C

277 J initially omits *sāmānyena* but adds the term in the right margin. 285
A syllable is deleted following *citprakāśai*^o in G.

277 °viśeṣa°] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °viśeṣaṇa° J^{a.c.} 277 tāvataḥ] GJPR; tāvatā K^{ed.}
278 vyavahārāntaram] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; vyavahāntaram J^{a.c.} 279 śakyā ity etāvat
] GJK^{ed.}; śakyate tāvat P, śakyete tāvat R 281 pārthivaṃ] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; vaṃ G^{a.c.}
284 °varṇe] GJK^{ed.}; °varṇa PR 286 °mātratvāt] em.; °mātrāt GJPRK^{ed.} 286
pṛthak] GJK^{ed.}; prathak PR 286 prakāśātmatve] JPRK^{ed.}; prakāśatve G 286
kārṣṇyāḥ] GJK^{ed.}; kārlyāḥ PR 286 'prakāśa ābhāso] GJPK^{ed.}; 'prakāśābhāso R
287 °pañcakavyūhanātmatayā] K^{ed.}; °pañcakavyūhānātmatayā GJ; °pañcakam
avyūhanātmatayā PR 288 saṃhatam] GJRK^{ed.}; saṃhanam P 290
°miśraṇāsahaṃ] GJK^{ed.}; °miśriṇāsahaṃ PR 291 bhuvanādīni] JPRK^{ed.};
bhuvanādīni G 292 aparisaṃkhyeyāni] GJPK^{ed.}; apa---i--- khyeyā--- R

281 G folio 11v. 281 J folio 12r. 291 R folio 8r. 294 G folio 12r. 294
J folio 12v.

295 evaṃ yathā viśvaprapañcatananakṣamaṃ tattvarūpaṃ ṣaṭtrimśatsaṃkhyam
 kāryaṃ rūpeṇa bibharti, tathā tair eva tattvair janakasamsāripuruṣarūpeṇa nir-
 vartanīyāni na tu sākṣād vidhātur devādiśārīrāṇi kāryāṇi, kevalaṃ pratyabhi-
 jñoktanīyā parasyākīñcitkaratvāt sa eva svakamātāpitṛbhūtādirūpeṇa devādīn
 300 bhuvanāni ca tannivāsarūpāni visrjya, protkrṣṭādiddevamanuṣyatiryagyonirūpaṃ
 gr̥hṇāti.

śārīrabhuvanavāsanā anyonyānurūpā gr̥hṇātīty āha

**sthānānurūpato dehān dehākāreṇa bhāvanāḥ
 ādadat tena tenaiva rūpeṇa pravibhāvyaṭe 35**

anyonyānurūpyeṇaivaiṣāṃ devādīnāṃ vilakṣaṇavyavahāranirvṛttiḥ. sa ca
 305 śārīrādy ādadat tenaiva māyīyenaiva rūpeṇopalakṣyate prasiddhaḥ.
 svasvarūpākhyāter narakādāv api sa evāstīty āha

**krīḍayā duḥkhavedyāni karmakārīni tatphalaiḥ
 sambhatsyamānāni tathā narakārṇavagahvare 36
 nivāsīni śārīrāni gr̥hṇāti parameśvaraḥ**

35a J records *rū* of *sthānānurūpato* in the left margin. 35b T records *deha* twice. 36c The initial *sa* of *sambhatsyamānāni* is underlined in P. The scribe of C inserts *nā* of °*mānāni* on the right side of the manuscript and marks it with “nā 4.” (The insertion occurs on the fourth line of the text.) 36c P’s hypermetric reading of *phalai* is underlined in P.

35a *sthānānurūpato*] TC^{p.c.}GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; *sthānārūpato* C^{a.c.}, *sthānānupato* J^{a.c.}
 35b *dehākāreṇa*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *dehā---*riṇa C 35c *tena*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *tana* C
 35d *pravibhāvyaṭe*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *pravibhāvyaṭi* C 36a *krīḍayā*] CGJPRK^{ed.};
*krīḍ---*ā T 36a *duḥkhavedyāni*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *duḥkhabhāvyaṭi* C 36b *karmakārīni*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *karmakā---* C 36b *tatphalaiḥ*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *tatphalai* C
 36c *sambhatsyamānāni*] TK^{ed.}; *sambhartsyamānāni* C^{p.c.}, *sambhartsyamāni* C^{a.c.}, *sambhavyamānāni* G, *samvatsyamānāni* J^{p.c.}PR, *samvapyamānāni* J^{a.c.} 36c
tathā] CGJRK^{ed.}; *nibadā* T, *phalai tathā* (hypermetric) P 36d *narakārṇavagah-
 vare*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *narakārṇihagamhare* C 37a *nivāsīni*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *nivāsīni* C
 37b *parameśvaraḥ*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *parameśvara* C

297 *vidhātur*] GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; *kdhiātur* K^{ed.a.c.} 298 °*rūpeṇa devādīn*] GJPK^{ed.};
 °*rūpeṇād evādīn* R 299 *tannivāsarūpāni*] GJR^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; *tamavāsarūpāni* P^{p.c.},
tamivāsarūpāni P^{a.c.}R^{a.c.} 299 °*manuṣya°*] GJPK^{ed.}; °*mānuṣya°* R 304
anyonyānurūpyeṇa] GJPK^{ed.}; *anyonyārūpeṇa* R 304 *devādīnāṃ*] GJPK^{ed.};
devatādīnāṃ R

307 P folio 10. 308 G folio 12v. 308 J folio 13r.

310 viśvaracanāmayakrīdāsavbhāvena duḥkharūpatayā vedayiṣyamāṇāni narake,
athavā duḥkhaṃ vedayiṣyamāṇaṃ narake yeṣu tāni māyātmakaniyatīśaktivaṣāt
pāpakarmakārīṇīha śarīrāṇi grhṇāti, tathā naraka evārṇavas tatkukṣāvagādha-
bhīṣaṇe nivāsīni santi tatkarmaphalaiḥ saṃbandham āgamiṣyanti. parameśvaro
narake 'pi sa evāste, na tu tadatiriktaḥ kaścid astīty aikyam eva sthirīkṛtam.

315 etad eva laukikadr̥ṣṭāntenāha

yathā nrpaḥ sārvabhaumaḥ prabhāvāmodabhāvitaḥ 37
krīḍan karoti pādātadharmāms taddharmadharmataḥ
tathā prabhuḥ pramodātmā krīḍaty evaṃ tathā tathā 38

yathaiśvoryacamatkāravāsitaḥ sārvabhaumo rājā nirargalatayā krīḍayā talla-
320 kṣaṇasavbhāvāpatteḥ padātisaṃbandhiceṣṭitāny ācarati, tathā parameśvaraḥ
pūrṇatvāt svata ānandaghūrṇitas tais tair bhūtabhedātmabhiḥ prakārair evaṃ
etatsadr̥ṣaṃ krīḍati. harṣānusārī spandaḥ krīḍā.

37d °bhāvitaḥ] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---bha---taḥ T, °vr̥ṃhitāḥ C 38a krīḍan] CGJPRK^{ed.};
krī---n T 38a pādāta°] GJK^{ed.}; pādāti° T, pādādi° C, pādāmta° PR 38b
°dharmāms] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °dharmāṇ C 38c pramodātmā] TCGJPK^{ed.}; pravod-
hātmā R 38d evaṃ] GJPRK^{ed.}; eva TC

312 R might read *etārṇavas* for *evārṇavas*. The reading of the MS is unclear.
321 A syllable is crossed out after *pūrṇatvā* and *tava* (of the erroneous reading
pūrṇatvāt avata) is added in P.

310 vedayiṣyamāṇāni] GJK^{ed.}; vevayiṣyamāṇāni P^{p.c.}, vevayiṣyamāṇīni P^{a.c.},
vevayiṣyamāni R 312 naraka evārṇavas] JPRK^{ed.}; narakārṇava ārṇavas G 313
°bhīṣaṇe] GJK^{ed.}; °bhīṣaṇī PR 314 sa] GJPK^{ed.}; --- R 314 āste] GJPK^{ed.};
ās--- R 314 na] GJPK^{ed.}; --- R 314 sthirīkṛtam] GJPK^{ed.}; asthirīkṛtam R 319
nirargalatayā] GJK^{ed.}; nirargalataḥ PR 320 °saṃbandhiceṣṭitāny] GJRK^{ed.};
°saṃbandhe ceṣṭitāny P 321 svata] GJRK^{ed.}; avata P 321 °ghūrṇitas
] GJPR; °ghūrṇitais K^{ed.} 321 prakārair evaṃ] JP^{p.c.}-RK^{ed.}; preokārair evaṃ G,
prakāraim P^{a.c.}

313 R folio 8v. 321 G folio 13r. 321 J folio 13v.

pūrvoktaśaktyāditattvam upasaṃhartum āha

325 **itthaṃ śivo bodhamayaḥ sa eva paranirvṛtiḥ**
saiva conmukhtāṃ yāti secchājñānakriyātmatām 39
saiva śāktaśarīrādinārakāntaṃ hi bhūtata
prasūyate svacidrūpapramukhaṃ pārthivāntakam 40
padārthatvena bhagavān sarvatraiva tadātmatā

330 anenoktaprakāreṇa śivo bhagavān bodhamātrarūpaḥ pūrṇo nirapekṣa ānan-
dātmā sadaiva. tathā māyāśaktivaśād ātmākhyātita ānandātirikta iva tattvatām
eti jagannirmāṇecchārūpeṇa sthātum. tasyāḥ kriyātvāt tatpūrvabhāgātmakon-
mukhatām yāti. sā ca krameṇecchājñānakriyātmatām yāti. etāvataḥ nirmāṇtvena
śāktaśarīraprabhṛtināraśarīrāntarūpaṃ prasūyate sa eva jāyate. sā ca bhūtata
335 vena tais tair ucyamānaṃ bhagavān prasūyate. tataḥ sarvatraiva tadātmatā. yuk-
tiś ca vakṣyate.

39b sa]TGJPRK^{ed.}; na C 39c saiva]TGJPRK^{ed.}; sauva C 39d secchājñāna-
kriyātmatām]TJPK^{ed.}; svechānakriyātmatām (hypometric) C, svechājñānakri-
yātmatām GR 40a saiva]TGJPRK^{ed.}; sau C 40a śāktaśarīrādinārakāntaṃ
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; śāktaśarīrādinān narakāmtar C 40c prasūyate svacidrūpapra-
mukhaṃ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; prasūpa ---cidrūpapramukhaṃ C 40d pārthivāntakam
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; pārthivāntake C 41a padārthatvena]TCGJK^{ed.}; parārthatvena
PR 41b tadātmatā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadātmatām C

330 P and R omit *sadaiva*. *tathā māyāśaktivaśād* in an eye-skip from *ānandātmā*
to *ātmākhyātita*. 334 A tear in the manuscript eliminates the presence of the
last two *aḥṣaras* of °*tattvānta* in J. 335 A tear in the manuscript eliminates
the presence of *bhagavān prasūyate* in J, excepting the first *aḥṣara*.

330 sadaiva]GK^{ed.}; tadaiva J, om. PR. 330 ānandātirikta]K^{ed.}; ānando 'tirikta
GJPR 331 kriyātvāt]GJPK^{ed.}; kriyātvāt R 332 °pūrvabhāgātmakonmuk-
hatām]PRK^{ed.}; °pūrvabhāgātmayonmukhatām G, ---rvabhāyonmukhatām
J^{a.c.}, ---rvabhāgātmakonmukhatām J^{p.c.} 334 °tattvāntaṃ]GPRK^{ed.}; °tat --- J
335 bhagavān]GPRK^{ed.}; bha--- J 335 prasūyate]GPRK^{ed.}; --- J

bhūtasarge pramātrpañcakaṃ nidarśayann āha

340
 svaśivatvam ivājānan paśvātmavyapadeśataḥ 41
 tad rūpatvena vā paśyan sthitaḥ śānta iva kvacit
 kevaleśadṛḍhatvena kvacit kevalaśambhutā 42
 aprabuddho niṣkalaś ca kvacit pralayakevalī
 ātmabodhī vikalavat kvacid vijñānakevalī 43

345
 svaśivatvam ajānann iva paśvātmavyapadeśam āpādyā sthitaḥ. svarūpābhe-
 dākhyātir eva hi māyāśaktikṛtā grāhyagrāhakarūpasamsārātmatayāvatiṣṭhate.
 tatra grāhakaḥ paśuḥ puryaṣṭakāvaccinnaṃ caitanyam. sa eva parimitatvād
 aṇuś caitanyātmatayā nityo 'mūrtaś ca, viśvātmatātyāgenājñāḥ, asvātantryāt
 kriyāguṇarahito 'nīśvaraś ca, vedyapuryaṣṭakātmani bhinna iva rāgitayā
 bhogopāyavicintakaḥ, māyākṛtatvān māyodarāntasthaḥ. svaśivatvājñānaṃ śiva-
 bhattāarakasyāyuktaṃ nityanirmalāsabhāvatvāt, tad vinā malānām evānutpattes

42d C shows a piece of paper attached to the manuscript that includes the reading *t kelaśambhutām //42/*, followed by a second *danḍa* written on the manuscript itself.

41c svaśivatvam] GJPRK^{ed}; svaśivatva--- T, sa śivatvam C 41c ivājānan] GJPRK^{ed}; ---jānan T, ivājā--- C 41d paśvātmavyapadeśataḥ] TGJPRK^{ed}; ---śvātmavyapadeśataḥ C 42a vā paśyan] GJPRK^{ed}; cāpaśyan T, pā vaśyan C 42b sthitaḥ śānta] TGJPRK^{ed}; sthitas tv ānta C 42b iva] TCJPK^{ed}; ivā GR 42c kevaleśadṛḍhatvena] TCG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed}; kevaleśadṛtvedhana G^{a.c.} 42d kvacit kevalaśambhutā] GJPRK^{ed}; kvacit kevalaśambhunā T, kva---t kelaśambhutām C 43a aprabuddho] TGJPRK^{ed}; dhau (hypometric) C 43b pralayakevalī] TGJPRK^{ed}; pralayakevalam C 43c °vikalavat] GJPRK^{ed}; °---lavat T, °vikṛlavat C 43d vijñānakevalī] TGJPRK^{ed}; ---kavali C

345 Cf. KT I.15: *paśur nityo hy amūrto 'jñō niṣkriyo nirguṇaḥ*; KVṛ on the same: *sa eva parimitatvād aṇuś caitanyātmatayā nityo 'mūrtaś ca, viśvātmatātyāgenājñāḥ, asvātantryāt kriyāguṇarahito 'nīśvaraś ca, vedyapuryaṣṭakātmani bhinna iva rāgitayā bhogopāyavicintakaḥ, māyākṛtatvān māyodarāntasthaḥ*. 349 An *aḥsara* is crossed out after *vi* of *vinā* in G.

343 svaśivatvam ajānann] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed}; svaśivatvam api jānann G^{a.c.} 343 āpādyā] GJPR; āśādyā K^{ed}. 346 °tyāgenājñāḥ] GJPK^{ed}; °tyāgo nājñāḥ R 347 iva] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed}; uva G^{a.c.} 348 māyodarāntasthaḥ] GJK^{ed}; māyodarāntaḥ sthaḥ PR 349 eva] GJPR^{p.c.}K^{ed}; evo R^{a.c.}

337 J folio 14r. 338 T folio 2r. 338 R folio 9r. 344 P folio 11.

350 tadadhiṣṭhānāt teṣām. tatas tadajñānabhāgo 'ṅus tadaiva māyāśaktivaśād utti-
 ṣṭhatīty āṇavamāyāmaladvayodbhavaḥ. kārmamalaś ca tatprabhavaḥ. svaśivat-
 vam iveti cevagrahaṇaṃ vyapadeśagrahaṇaṃ cājñānātmakam etan na vastutaḥ
 kaścid grāhyagrāhakabheda itī vaktum. etac ceśvarapratyabhijñāyāṃ nipuṇaṃ
 355 vīvecitam. kvacin mahāmāyāparaparyāyavidyāśaktivaśāt tadrūpatvena śivatven-
 jñānaviśeṣeṇa śāntatā, na tu vastutaḥ sāvātmyaviraḥa itī vaktum. uttaratrāpī-
 vaśabdas tadarthaṃ yojaniyāḥ. vidyāśaktitāratamyataś ca bhedaṭ kvacid vaiśe-
 śikādimatekevalēśvaramātradr̥ḍhābhīmānena sthitaḥ, kvacit kevalaśambhusaṃ-
 jñā śivabhedena. kvāpy avasthābhedaṽasthitavijñānamaya evāmlānapaśubhāvo
 360 māyākhyamalopasthāpitabhinnagrāhyaśūnyaḥ pralayaḥkevalī bhavati. anyatrāt-
 mabodhī na tu puryaṣṭakasthaḥ, pralayākalavac ca grāhyarahitaḥ, kārmamal-
 āsparśī vijñānakevalirūpaḥ.

350 R records the presence of a final *-e* in the variant reading *tadajñāne bhāgo* in a faint hand. 351 See ĪPK 3.2.4-5.: *svātantryahānir bodhasya svātantryasyāpy abodhatā / dvidhāṇavaṃ malam idaṃ svasvarūpāpahānitaḥ. bhinnavedyaprathātraiva māyākhyam janmabhogadam / kartāy abodhe kārmaṃ tu māyāśaktyaiva tattrayam.* 354 See, e.g., ĪPK 1.4.8. 360 J records *ya* above (the correct) *ya* of *pralaya*^o, apparently to make clear the awkwardly-recorded *akṣara* first written. 360 Cf. ĪPK 3.2.8. *śūnyādyabodharūpās tu kartārah pralayākalāḥ / teṣām kārmamalo 'py asti māyiyas tu vikalpitaḥ.* 360 G records *bha* of *bhavati* twice. 362 See ĪPK 3.2.6-7: *śuddhabodhātmakatve 'pi yeṣāṃ nottmakartrtā / nirmitāḥ svātmano bhinnā bhartrā te kartrtātyayāt. bodhādīlakṣaṇaikye 'pi teṣām anyonyabhinnatā / tathēśvareccābhedena te ca vijñānakevalāḥ.*

350 *tadajñānabhāgo*] GJP^{p.c.}; *tadajñāne bhāgo* P^{a.c.}R, *tadajñānabhāg* K^{ed.} 352 *iveti cevagrahaṇaṃ*] GJ; *iveti vagrahaṇaṃ* PK^{ed.}, *iveti ivagrahaṇaṃ* R 353 *etac*] GJPK^{ed.}; *etaś* R 354 *śivatvena*] GJPR; *om.* K^{ed.} 357 *tadarthaṃ*] GJK^{ed.}; *tadarthae* P, *tadartha* R 357 ^o*tāratamyataś*] GJPK^{ed.}; ^o*tāratamyatac* R 357 *ca*] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; *caṃ* P^{a.c.} 357 *kvacid vaiśeṣikādi*^o] GJPK^{ed.}; *kvacird veśeṣikādi*^o R 358 *sthitaḥ*] GJPK^{ed.}; *asthitaḥ* R 360 ^o*bhinna*^o] GPRK^{ed.}; ^o*bhina*^o] 361 *pralayākalavac*] GJPK^{ed.}; *pralayākalavaś* R

351 J folio 14v. 351 G folio 14r. 358 R folio 9v.

icchāvaśenaivam avasthānam iti bahutaravādyupetadṛṣṭāntam āha

365 **yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpopapattitā**
na cāsti sādhanam kiñcin mṛdādicchām vinā prabhoḥ 44
tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate

370 yoginām icchāmātrena nānāgrhādirūpāṇām upapattikriyātmatvam āsādyata
 iti śeṣaḥ. na ca mṛtkāṣṭhādī teṣāṃ takṣādīnām iva kiñcit sādhanam asti param-
 eśvarecchātiriktam. tadrūpatāpattiyā hi te nirmimīte. tathā bhagavadicchāmā-
 tram eva viśvarūpatvaṃ saṃpadyate.
 dṛṣṭam udāharaṇam āha

dṛśyante 'tra tadicchāto bhāvā bhītyādiyogataḥ 45
tatra mithyāsvarūpaṃ cet sthāpyāgre satyatedṛśām

375 kāmāśokabhayādiyogāc ca te te bhāvāḥ puraḥ sphuranto dṛśyante. tatra
 bhagavadicchaiva kāraṇam tāvatyaṃśe bhāvanāvaśād īśvaratāveśāt. na ca tatra
 caurādayo mithyārūpā bhānti yato 'gre satyatvam idṛṣānām avaśyaṃ
 sthāpanīyam.

44a G crosses out *yāta* before recoding the reading of *yadvan*. 45b Cf. PV 3.282: *kāmāśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ / abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva*.

44b nānārūpopapattitā] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; nānārūpopattitā TP^{a.c.}R; nānārūpopapattitā C 44c sādhanam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sādhanā C 44c kiñcin] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kiṃ ci C 44d mṛdādicchām vinā prabhoḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; narādīchāti ---bhoḥ C 45c dṛśyante 'tra] TGJPRK^{ed.}; dṛśyanta tra C 45c tadicchāto] GJPRK^{ed.}; t---chāto T; tadicāto C 45d bhāvā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; bhāvā T 45d bhītyādiyogataḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.a.c.}; kāmādiyogataḥ K^{ed.p.c.}; bhāvāriyādiyogataḥ C 46b sthāpyāgre satyatedṛśām] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sthāvyāgreṇa tyatedṛśām C

369 J records *śva* of *parameśvara*^o in the left margin.

367 upapatti^o] GJPR; upapattitā K^{ed.} 368 parameśvarecchātiriktam] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; paramerecchātiriktam]^{a.c.} 369 nirmimīte] GJP^{a.c.}R; nirmimate P^{p.c.}K^{ed.} 369 tathā] GJK^{ed.}; tathā hi PR

364 J folio 15r. 364 G folio 14v. 375 P folio 12.

evam etad apy agre vakṣyata ity āha

380 **evam sarveṣu bhāveṣu yathā sā śivarūpatā 46**
nīrūpatā nirvṛtir vā śaktitritayayogitā
sacittvaṃ saṃsthitam nityaṃ kathanīyaṃ tathāgrataḥ 47
 uktaṃ tāvat
 padārthatvena bhagavān ... (ŚD 1.41)

385 ityādinā tattvabhūtamukhena sarvasya śivarūpatvam. idānīm yathā ghaṭapaṭā-
 diṣv api bhāveṣu śivatā, tadrūpatvāc ca parimitarūpair nīrūpatvam, nirvṛtiḥ,
 icchādiyogitā, sacittvam ajaḍatvaṃ ca samyag eva sthitam upapannam, tathā-
 grato 'vaśyaṃ kathanīyam.

evam sthite yad bhavati, tad āha

390 **evam sarvapaḍārthānām samaiva śivatā sthitā**
parāparādibhedo 'tra śraddhadhānair udāhṛtaḥ 48

paramaśivāt prabhṛti ghaṭādyantānām api paḍārthānām samaivānyūnānatir-
 iktā ca śivatā pūrṇacidrūpānatirekān niyatā sarveṣāṃ tathā sāmarasyāsvādanāt

46c T deletes *va* prior to *sarveṣu*. 48d C records *śivadṛṣtau* in the margin in Bengali script, above “*adhyaḥya //2//*,” the latter written, as is standard for this MS, in *devanāgarī* script.

46d śivarūpatā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; śivarūpatām C 47a nīrūpatā]GJPRK^{ed.}; śi-
 varūpatā T, nīrūpatā C 47a nirvṛtir]TGJPRK^{ed.}; nirvṛttir C 47b śakti°
]TCGJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; śikti° J^{a.c.} 47b °tritayayogitā]CGJPRK^{ed.}; °triyayogitā T 47c
 sacittvaṃ]GJPRK^{ed.}; sacittaṃ T, saccittvaṃ C 47c saṃsthitam]CGJPRK^{ed.};
 saṃ--- T 47d kathanīyaṃ tathāgrataḥ]GJPRK^{ed.}; kathanī--- tadagrataḥ T,
 kathamīhanihāgrataḥ C 48a sarvapaḍārthānām]TGJPRK^{ed.}; sarvaṃ ni-
 paḍārthānām C 48b śivatā sthitā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; śitāsītā C 48d śraddha°]
 J^{p.c.}G^{p.c.}; śradda°]TCG^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}PRK^{ed.}

384 J records *ta* of °bhūta° above an illegible *akṣara* that appears to read *tu*.
 390 The *ddha* of the reading *śraddhadhāna* is written above *dda* in G, and *ddha*
 is written in the right margin of J.

385 parimitarūpair]GJRK^{ed.}; parimitirūpair P 386 ajaḍatvaṃ]JPRK^{ed.};
 ajaḍam G 391 °anyūna°]GPRK^{ed.}; °anūna° J 392 sāmarasyāsvādanāt
]GJPR; sāmarasyāsādanāt K^{ed.}

379 G folio 15r. 380 J folio 15v. 380 C folio 3r. 385 R folio 10r.

kāpi sthitiḥ syād ity arthaḥ. evaṃ ca sarvasya śivarūpasāmarasyāt tadakhyātima-
 yaśuddhyaśuddhirūpaparāparādibhedo bhāvānām uktaḥ. tatra śraddhāmātreṇo-
 395 papattirahitena jantūnām, na tu vastūnām śuddhir aśuddhir vā kācit.
 evaṃ sarveṣāṃ satyatvam āha

**evaṃ bhedātmakam nityam śivatattvam anantakam
 tathā tasya vyavasthānān nānārūpe 'pi satyatā 49**

uktakrameṇa bhedātmakam, na tu bhāvabhedapṛthagbhūtam. bhedā api
 400 tadātmakāḥ, ata eva tad anantakam bhinnārthasadbhāve saty antaḥ syāt tadrūpā-
 nākramaṇāt. evaṃ vyavasthānasvabhāvatvāt tasya parameśvarasya nānārūpe 'pi
 viśvasmin satyataiveti.

49a bhedātmakam]CGJPRK^{ed.}; bhedātmaka T 49b anantakam]TGJPRK^{ed.};
 anaṃkrtaṃ C 49c vyavasthānān]GJPRK^{ed.}; vyava---nān T, vyavasthānām C
 49d nānārūpe]TGJPRK^{ed.}; nnārūpe C

402 The colophon of T reads: *iti prathamam āhnikam*. The colophon of C reads:
iti (corr.: i) śrīmahāmaheśvaradūrvāsamuniracite śivadr̥ṣṭīśāstre [prathama]m āhni-
kam. śrī. The colophons of G, J, P, R, and K^{ed.} read: *iti śrīśivadr̥ṣṭau śrīmadut-*
paladevaprabhupādanirmitāyāṃ vṛttau prathamam āhnikam (R reads °śrīmat for
 °śrīmad; J places *āhnikam* in parentheses).

400 tadrūpānākramaṇāt]GJK^{ed.}; tadrūpānākramaṇāt PR

395 G folio 15v. 397 J folio 16r.

Chapter Two of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti*

īśvarādvayavāda eva yuktīyukto na tu śabdaparabrahmādvayavāda iti vaktum
vaiyākaraṇopetaśabdādvaitam tāvan nirākartum upakramamāṇa āha

**athāsmākaṃ jñānaśaktir yā sadāśivarūpatā
vaiyākaraṇasādhūnām paśyantī sā parā sthitiḥ** 1

5 paśyantī yady api nādarūpatayā viśvam āmṛśantī kriyāśaktirūpatayā saman-
vitā, tathāpi paśyantītidarśanaprādhānyād upacaritajñānaśaktirūpatve 'py āśrīya-
māṇe paramaśivarūpatāyā atyantadūravartinī na tu paryantadaśāsaujñānaśakteḥ

1d *śivadr̥ṣṭau* is written in the margin of C in Bengali script, above *adhyāya*
//2//, which is written in *devanāgarī* script.

1b sadāśivarūpatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sadāśivarūpatām C 1c vaiyākaraṇa°] TGJP-
RK^{ed.}; yaiyākaraṇa° C

1 J records *iti* inserted above the line. 4 J adds a pair of double-*daṇḍa* marks
above the line following ŚD 2.1 and prior to the commentary on the same.

1 iti] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; om. J^{a.c.} 7 āśrīyamāṇe] P^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; āśrayamāṇe GJ,
āśrayaṇamāṇe P^{a.c.}R

5 R folio 10v. 6 G folio 16r.

sadāśivarūpatvāt parāparavyavasthātra. teṣāṃ punaḥ sā parāvasthā matā. sadāśi-
varūpatve ca kriyāśaktir api na parityaktā. yad uktaṃ

10 jñānakriye sādākhyam

iti. śaktiśaktimātor abhedāj jñānaśaktimān sadāśivaḥ, udriktakriyāśaktir īśvara
iti. ata evēcchāśaktimayaḥ śivo yāvac citsvātantryaśaktimān paryante paramaśi-
vaḥ. atrāntare caunmukhyanirvṛtyapekṣayādhiakatattvasambhavaḥ. tad astu, mā
vā bhūt, naitad iha mukhyayā vṛtṭyā pratipādyam, ata evādhikaśaktipradarśane
15 kṛte 'py uktaṃ ṣaṭtrimśattattvarūpatāṃ bibhrad iti. śivādvayatātparyam tu na
khaṇḍyata iti niyamaḥ. māyōttirṇe 'py adhvani vidyonmeṣe 'pi kārmamalānu-
llāsāt saṃsārāsamparke 'pi parameśvarābhedākhyāteḥ sarvathaivāvicchedād
āgamāvagatēśvarecchāvāśoṭthaparāparadaśāvyapadeśyoktatattvopagamaḥ. vai-
yākaraṇasādhūnām iti sādhuḡrahaṇam eṣāṃ jādyakhyāpanāya. param api hi
20 rūpaṃ yadi paśyantiyā yad uktaṃ

pratilabdhasamādhānā ca (VPVṛ ad VP 1.159)

8 J adds *parāvasthā matā*, omitted in the original transcription, below the line.

9 An imperfection in the MS obscures whether or not J reads *na*, though it appears likely that it does. 10 The present quotation remains untraced.

A parallel, however, may be found in ĪPK 3.1.1-2: *evam antarbahirvṛtṭiḥ kriyā kālakramānugā / mātur eva tadanyonyāvīyukte jñānakarmaṇi. kintv āntaradaśo- drekāt sādākhyam tattvam āditaḥ / bahir bhāvaparatve tu parataḥ pārameśvaram.*

16 A syllable is crossed out prior to *khaṇ* in P. 18 G and J record °*gamaḥ* above °*deśaḥ*. 19 See VPVṛ ad VP 1.159: *paraṃ tu paśyantirūpaṃ anapabhraṃśam asaṃkīrṇaṃ lokavyavahārātītam.*

11 abhedāj] GJP^{p.c.}R; abhedāt K^{ed.}, abhej P^{a.c.} 11 udriktakriyāśaktir] PRK^{ed.}; udriktakriyāśaktir GJ 12 paryante] JPRK^{ed.}; paryaryante G 14 mukhyayā vṛtṭyā] GJP; mukhyayā vṛtṭyāṃ R, mukhyavṛtṭyā K^{ed.} 15 ṣaṭtrimśattattva°] GJRK^{ed.}; ṣaṭtrimśattattva° P 15 śivādvayatātparyam] *em.*; śivābhedatātparyam GK^{ed.}, śivādvayatātparyan J, śivābhedatātparyantaṃ PR 15 na] GPRK^{ed.}; nā J 16 niyamaḥ] GJPK^{ed.}; nigamaḥ R 16 adhvani] JPRK^{ed.}; adhuni G 17 °saṃparke] GPRK^{ed.}; °saṃparke J 17 parameśvarābhedākhyāteḥ] G; parameśvarābhedākhyāteḥ JPRK^{ed.} 17 avicchedād] GJK^{ed.}; avicchedā° PR 18 °vaśoṭthaparāparadaśā°] GJ^{p.c.}P^{a.c.}RK^{ed.}; *om.* P^{p.c.}, °vaśoktaparāparadaśā° J^{a.c.} 18 °vyapadeśyokta°] P^{a.c.}RK^{ed.}; °vyapadaśokta° GJ, *om.* P^{p.c.} 18 °upagamaḥ] G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °upadeśaḥ G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.} 20 rūpaṃ] JPRK^{ed.}; tadrūpaṃ G 20 paśyantiyā] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; paśyantiyāṃ P^{a.c.}

9 J folio 16v. 11 P folio 13. 18 G folio 16v. G records *śrīgurave namaḥ* in the middle of the top of folio 16v.

iti,

viśuddhā ca (VPVṛ ad VP 1.159)

iti,

25 praśāntapratyavabhāsā ca (VPVṛ ad VP 1.159)

iti, anyad vāpy ato 'dhikataram prakṛṣṭam rūpam asyāḥ syāt. tathāpi saro rasa iti madhyamāyām unmiṣataḥ kramasya kāraṇabhūtāyām tatkramaśaktir asty eva. yad uktaṃ

30 (VPVṛ ad VP 1.159) pratisamhṛtakramāpy antaḥ saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī

iti. tato na sā pūrṇā paryantadaśeti kathaṃ tasyāḥ parasthitirūpatā, parabrahmarūpatā, śabdabrahmarūpatā.

tathā ca ta evam āhur ity āha

ity āhus te param brahma yad anādi tathākṣayam

35 **tad akṣaram śabdārūpaṃ sā paśyantī parā hi vāk 2**

yad anādy anantaṃ ca param brahma cidrūpaṃ tad akṣaram nirvikāram śabdārūpaṃ. saiva ca paśyantīsamjñā parā vāk. vāgrūpatāṃ vinā parabrahmākhyāś citprakāśo 'pi na prakāśeta. sā hi pratyavamarśinī. pratyavamarśanam eva ca prakāśanam ucyata ity āhus te.

2a Cf. VP 1.1: *anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdātattvaṃ yad akṣaram / vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ.* 2b The long ā of *tathākṣayam* is inserted between preceding and following *akṣaras* in J, suggesting it was initially left out.

2a param] CGJPRK^{ed.}; pa--- T 2b tathākṣayam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadakṣayam C

37 Cf. VP 1.132: *vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāsvatī / na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī.*

26 prakṛṣṭam rūpam] GJPR; prakṛṣṭarūpam K^{ed.} 26 saro] GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; samro P^{a.c.} 27 tatkramaśaktir] GJK^{ed.}; utkramaśaktir PR 31 pūrṇā paryantadaśā] GJRK^{ed.}; pūrṇaparyantadaśā P 32 śabdabrahmarūpatā] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 37 parabrahmākhyāś] GJK^{ed.}; parabrahmākhyā P, param brahmākhyā R

29 J folio 17r. 29 R folio 11r. 38 G folio 17r.

40 sa eva cātmety āha

sa evātmā sarvadehavyāpakatvena vartate
antaḥpaśyadavasthaiva cidrūpatvam arūpakam 3

yāntaḥpaśyadavasthā bhokṛtārūpā jñeyarūpaśūnyaṃ cidrūpatvaṃ caitanya-
mātraṃ sa evātmā kathyate, sarvadehavyāpakas tadbhogāyatanānvasthito bho-
45 gyaṃ bhunkte.

sa eva paramātmā sarvajña ity āha

tāvad yāvat parā kāṣṭhā yāvat paśyaty anantakam

abhyāsaprakarṣāt tathā kāṣṭhā prāptā sā paśyanty eva bhavati, yathānantam
sarvam eva viśvaṃ paśyati yena darśanakriyārtho 'syāḥ pūryate.
50 tadaivāvidyopāśamāt paramārtho 'sāv ity āha

akṣādivṛttibhir hīnaṃ deśakālādīśūnyakam 4

4b An illegible mark appears above *ta* of the reading *antaka* of C.

3a sa evātmā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; na ha vātmā C 3b °vyāpakatvena] TGJPRK^{ed.};
°vyāpakatvina C 3c antaḥpaśyadavasthaiva] TGJPRK^{ed.}; saṃtaḥ paśyantyada-
istheva C^{p.c.}, saṃtaḥ paśiantyadaistheva C^{a.c.} 4a tāvad yāvat] CGJPRK^{ed.}; tā--- T
4a parā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; pakā C 4b kāṣṭhā yāvat paśyaty anantakam] TGJPRK^{ed.};
kāṣṭhāṃte 'tha paśyamty antakam C 4c akṣādivṛttibhir] TGJPRK^{ed.}; akṣāvṛt-
tibhir C 4d deśakālādīśūnyakam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; deśakālādīśu śenyakam (hy-
permetric) C

45 Cf. VP 1.4: *ekasya sarvabijasya yasya ceyam anekadhā / bhokṛtṛbhoktavyarūpeṇa
bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ.* (VPVṛ: *ekasya hi brahmaṇas tattvānyātvābhyaṃ sattvāsāt-
vābhyaṃ cāniruktāvirodhiśaktyupagrāhyasyāsatyarūpapravibhāgasya svapnavijñā-
napuruṣavad bahis tattvāḥ parasparavilakṣaṇā bhokṛtṛbhokṛtṛvyabhoggranthayo
vivartante. tasya ca granthyanantarūpasamatikrameṇa vivṛttagranthiparicchedasye-
yam anekadhā lokavyavasthā prakalpate.*)

43 bhokṛtārūpā] GJK^{ed.}; bhokṛtārūpāj PR 49 eva] GPRK^{ed.}; e--- J 49
'syāḥ] GJK^{ed.}; 'sya PR 50 avidyopāśamāt] JPRK^{ed.}; avidyopāśamāt G

49] folio 17v.

**sarvataḥ kramasaṃhāramātram ākāravarjitam
brahmatattvaṃ parā kāṣṭhā paramārthas tad eva saḥ 5**

tadārthaprakāśanavyāpāra indriyādyālocanādyupāyopayogo nāsti deśakāla-
55 jātyavacchedaś ca, ata eva sarvato deśāt kālāc ca yaḥ kramas tadupaśamamātram
brahmatattvaṃ kramasyaiva saṃsārarūpatvāt, ataś ca sarvagrāhyagrāhakākāra-
varjitam, tataḥ paratarasyābhāvāt parā kāṣṭhā, prāptaṃ tat sa eva ca paramārthaḥ
paśyantīrūpaḥ.

sa eva ca punar evaṃ bhavatīty āha

60 **āste vijñānarūpatve sa śabdo 'rthavivakṣayā
madhyamā kathyate saiva bindunādamarutkramāt 6**

sa eva paśyantīrūpaḥ śabdo 'rthapratipādanecchārūpayā vivakṣayopalakṣite
manovijñānarūpatva āste. saiva ca madhyamā vāk kathyate krameṇa bindunāda-
saṃjñaprāṇāpānavāyūllāsāt prāṇāpānāntare nityam ekā sarvasya tiṣṭhatīti.

5b J twice records *tram ā* of °*saṃhāramātram ākāra*°. 6b T inserts an illegible *akṣara* prior to *sa śabdo*. 6d In J, *tkra* of °*marutkramāt* is only partially visible, cut off on the left side due to an imperfection in the MS. The reading is nevertheless legible.

5a *kramasaṃhāramātram*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *kramanaṃhāsā*---*tram* C 5b °*varjitam*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; °*varṇitaṃ* C 5c *kāṣṭhā*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *kāṣṭhāṃ* C 5d *paramārthas*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *paramārḍas* C 5d *tad eva saḥ*]GJPRK^{ed.}; e--- *saḥ* T, *tathaiva* ca C 6a *vijñānarūpatve*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *vijñānarūpatve* C 6b *'rthavivakṣayā*]GPK^{ed.}; *'tra vivakṣayā* TJR, *'tra vikṣa* - - - C 6c *madhyamā*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---*yamā* C 6c *kathyate*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *kathayatai* C 6c *saiva*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *saivā* C 6d *bindunāda*°]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *bindunāḍa*° C

56 Cf. VP 1.56: *grāhyatvaṃ grāhakatvaṃ ca dve śakti tejaso yathā / tathaiva sarvaśabdānām ete pṛthagavasthite*. 56 R records *ataś ca...abhāvāt* at the top of the page. 64 The MS of J is torn on the line that includes °*jñāprāṇāpānavāyūllāsāt prāṇāpānāntare nitya*. The reading is nevertheless legible, with one exception, noted in the variant readings. 64 The present is a quotation of VP 1.161cd: *prāṇāpānāntare nityam ekā sarvasya tiṣṭhati*.

54 °*ādy*°]GPK^{ed.}; *om.* JR 55 °*avacchedaś*]K^{ed.}; °*avacchedaś* GJPR 55 *tadupaśamamātram*]GJ; *tadupadeśamātraṃ* PRK^{ed.} 56 *eva*]GJPK^{ed.}; e--- R 57 *para*°]GJPK^{ed.}; *mura*° R 64 °*ullāsāt*]GPRK^{ed.}; *ullās*---t J

54 G folio 17v. 55 P folio 14. 56 R folio 11v.

65 punar apy evam āsta ity āha

**saṃprāptā vaktrakuhaṃ kaṅṭhādīsthānabhāgaśaḥ
vaikharī kathyate saiva bahirvāsanayā kramāt 7
ghaṭādirūpair vyāvṛttā gr̥hyate cakṣurādīnā**

atrāpi bindunādamarutkramāt sā paśyantī saṃprāptā vaktrakuharam iti
70 yojyam. tad uktaṃ

prāṇo varṇān abhivyajya varṇeṣv eva pralīyate (VP 1.118cd)

iti. tato vaktrodaram prāptā kaṅṭhādīsthānabhāgeṣu vibhaktakārādivarṇarūpā
vaikharī varṇyate

sthāneṣu vivṛte vāyau kṛtavarṇaparigrahā

75 vaikharī vāk prayoktṛṇāṃ prāṇavṛttinibandhanā (VP 1.165)

iti. parato 'pi bāhyārthavāsanayāvidyārūpayā krameṇa ghaṭapaṭādyākārair vivṛttā
saiva vāk cakṣurādīnāṃ grāhyabhāvam āpadyate.

tathā te prāhur ity āha

**yasmāt tair ucyate sadbhir evaṃ vastupravṛttaye 8
anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram**

80

7a C records ŚD 2.8 prior to ŚD 2.7, and T omits ŚD 2.7. 8d G records *svāb-
hidheyapratitaye* above *vastupravṛttaye*, while J records *sābhidheyapratitaye* above
the same. 9a ŚD 2.9 is a quotation of VP 1.1, which is also cited at ŚD 2.2a.

7b kaṅṭhādīsthānabhāgaśaḥ] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; om. T, kaṅṭhādīsthānabhāgakāḥ
C, °bhāgasāḥ P^{a.c.} 7d bahirvāsanayā] GJPRK^{ed.}; om. T, ---hir vāsayān C
8a °rūpair] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °rūpai C 8c yasmāt] GPRK^{ed.}; tasmāt T, yasmā C,
ya---māt J 8c tair ucyate sadbhir] GJPRK^{ed.}; tai---cyate T, ---tadbhir C 8d vas-
tupravṛttaye] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vasktapravṛttaye C 9b śabdatattvaṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.};
śabdatattv--- T

68 G records a line of circles, a symbol normally indicating that some of the
text is missing, across the bottom line of folio 17v. 77 J records *pā* of its
corrected reading (*āpādyate*) in the left margin.

65 evam āsta] G^{a.c.} JPRK^{ed.}; eva sāsta G^{p.c.} 69 saṃprāptā] GPRK^{ed.};
---ṃprāptā J 70 yojyam] G^{p.c.} JPRK^{ed.}; yojya G^{a.c.} 71 varṇān] GPRK^{ed.};
varṇ---n J 74 vivṛte] JPRK^{ed.}; varṇyate G 74 vāyau] GPRK^{ed.}; ---āyau J
77 āpadyate] GJ^{a.c.} PRK^{ed.}; āpādyate J^{p.c.}

67 J folio 18r. 68 G folio 18r.

vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ 9
 na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte
 śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ paraṃ brahmādhigacchati 10
 avibhāgā tu paśyanti sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā
 ityādivākyaracanais tair evaṃ pratipāditam 11

85 yasmāt tair vaiyākaraṇaiḥ sadbhiḥ sādhubhir mugdhair evaṃ ukta-rūpaṃ
 pratipāditam paśyantīrūpaṃ śabdatattvam akṣaram anādyantaṃ brahma
 viśvārthabhāvena vivartate tad asatyarūpaṃ ātmany upagrḥṇāti, asatyavibhak-
 tānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartas tasyās tad vivartate, yato vivartanāt prakriyā
 90 bhāvabhūtabhuvanādivinyāsavaicitryam iti. tathā na sa ghaṭapāṭīdipratyayo

10a ŚD 2.10ab is a quotation of VP 1.131ab. 10c ŚD 2.10cd is a quotation of MBh (Śāntiparvan) 12.224.60cd; the same is quoted in VBh 38cd. Cf. VP 1.22cd, which echoes the same: *tad vyākaraṇam āgamyā paraṃ brahmādhigamyate*. 10d C records 2.10cd as 2.11ab. C then records the following as 2.10cd: *aviddham avijñānaṃ sarve śabde na gamyate*. 11a ŚD 2.11ab is a quotation of VP 1.167ab. 11a The MS of J is torn across the page at *tu paśyanti sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā*. The reading of J is nevertheless legible.

9c 'rthabhāvena]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ardhabhāvena C 9d prakriyā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; prakṛtyauyām ya (hypermetric) C 9d jagato yataḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; jagatāmvitah C 10a so]TGJPRK^{ed.}; se C 10b śabdānugamād]GJPRK^{ed.}; śabdānuga--- T, śabdānugad C 10b ṛte]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---te T 10c śabdabrahmaṇi]TGJPRK^{ed.}; śabde brahmaṇi C 10c niṣṇātaḥ]TCGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; nisptātaḥ P^{a.c.}, nismātaḥ R 10d adhigacchati]GJPRK^{ed.}; adhigacchcchati T, adhigachanti C 11a tu]CGJPRK^{ed.}; t--- T 11a paśyanti]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---yanti T 11d evaṃ]CGJPRK^{ed.}; eva T

86 J is damaged at *uktarūpaṃ*, but the reading is legible. 87 The top is missing of the first *i* in *pratipāditam* in J. 87 R records *paśyantīrūpaṃ śabdatattvam...viśvārthabhāvena vivartate* twice. 89 Cf. VPVṛ ad VP 1.1: *ekasya tattvād apracyutasya bhedānukāreṇāsatyavibhaktānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartaḥ*. See also the VPP on the same: *ekasyābhinnasyānyarūpopagrāhitā anyarūpasvikāro 'nyagatasya rūpasya svātmani saṃdarśanaṃ vivartaḥ*. 90 J adds *sa* above the line.

86 mugdhair]GPRK^{ed.}; mu---dhai--- J 86 evaṃ]GPRK^{ed.}; e--- J 88 upagrḥṇāti]GJ; upagacchati PRK^{ed.} 90 °bhuvanādi°]G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}, °bhuvan-yādi° G^{a.c.} 90 sa]G^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; om. J^{a.c.} 90 ghaṭa°]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; ghaṭā° P^{a.c.}R

85 R folio 12r. 85 G folio 18v. 88 J folio 18v.

lokavyavahāre 'sti, yo vācakaśabdānugamavarjitaḥ. vāgrūpatām vinā na brahmatattvaprakāśo 'pi prakāśeta, sā hi pratyavamarśinīti. tathaivaṃbhūte paśyantīrūpe śabdākhye brahmaṇi yo niṣṇātas tena paraṃ brahmādhigataṃ bhavātīti. tathā tac ca paśyantīrūpaṃ grāhyagrāhakavibhāgākramarahitam, avibhāgā tu 95 paśyantī deśakālakramasaṃhāravatī cety ādigrahaṇāt prākpradarśitamadhyamā-vaikharyādivākyair uktam iti.

tad idānīm vicāryata ity āha

tadvicārāya rāddhāntaḥ sampraty eṣa vidhīyate

vaiyākaraṇoktavīcārārthaṃ siddhānto vaksyamāṇo yuktiyuktatvād yaḥ, sa 100 pariniṣṭhāṃ prāpyate.

tathā cety āha

**ādau tāvad indriyatve sthitā vāk karmasaṃjñite 12
tasyātmā brahmatā vā vaktuṃ śakyā na sādhubhiḥ**

12a Due to a piece of the manuscript having broken off of the bottom of the page, the reading in T for *rāddhāntaḥ sampraty eṣa vidhīyate* is lost. 12b The final *akṣara* of *vidhīyate* is obscured by an imperfection in the MS but is nevertheless legible in J. 12b 2.12ab is added at the bottom of the page C. Following this, the numbering of the verses in C excludes this one and therefore shifts forward by one half-verse for the remainder of the chapter. 12d An imperfection in J obscures the presence or absence of a final long *ā* in *sthitā*.

12a rāddhāntaḥ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; rāddh--- T 12b eṣa] GJPRK^{ed.}; --- T, eṣa C 12c tāvad] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vad C 12d vāk] GJPRK^{ed.}; vā TC 12d karmasaṃjñite] TGJPRK^{ed.}; karmasaṃtite C 13a tasyātmā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---yātmatmā C 13a brahmatā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ba---hmatā T 13b vaktuṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; tum (hypometric) T

101 *tathā ca* is added in the right margin in P. 102 *rāmacandra* is written in the margin of C.

92 prakāśeta] GJK^{ed.}; prakāśate PR 93 niṣṇātas] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; nistātas P^{a.c.} 94 tac] GJPK^{ed.}; taś R 94 avibhāgā] GJPK^{ed.}; avibhāgāt R 95 °madhyamā°] GPRK^{ed.}; °---dhyamā° J 99 yuktiyuktatvād yaḥ] GJP^{p.c.}R^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; yuktiyuktatvāyuh P^{a.c.}; yuktiyuktatvā yaḥ R^{a.c.} 101 tathā] GPRK^{ed.}; ta---ā J

prathamam tāvad vācuyuktir evaiṣā viruddhā. tathā hi vāk sthītātisthūlakar-
105 mendriyatve, buddhīndriyasya bodhopayogo 'pi bhavet, tasya paryantavarttina
ātmano brahmatattvasya vā saṃbandhī svabhāvo bhavet, tasmāt taiḥ pūrvavat
sādhubhis tadrūpatvaṃ vaktum eva na śakyam.

tasyā avidyāyām sthītātāt pāṇipādādīvyāvṛtyā paramārthatvaṃ na yujyata
ity āha

110 **indriyatve 'pi sāmānye pāṇyāder brahmatā na kim 13**
tatra cet sūkṣmakalanā sarvatra kalanāgrataḥ

vācaḥ sūkṣmapaśyantīrūpatayā brahmatāsti, tenaiṣokteti cet, sā satyarūpatā
sarvatra pāṇyādau ghaṭādāv api cāgre kalayīsyate.

atha vāgyapadeśe 'pi dhyānāvasthāyām ḥṛtkaṇṭhatālubhrūmadhyādisthā-
115 nāntarākramaṇāt tasyā utkarṣaḥ, na tu pāṇyāder evam astīty āha

antaḥ kramo ḥṛdādeś cet prāṇādeḥ kiṃ na satyatā 14
sarvasyāntaḥparamarśapūrṇatāsti pravartane

13d ŚD 2.13cd, along with the beginning of ŚD 2.14a, is lost in T due to a piece
of the manuscript having broken off at the top edge of the folio. 14d The
reading in T of *kiṃ na satyatā* is partially obscured at the top due to a missing
piece of the manuscript, but it is nevertheless legible.

13c 'pi]TGJPRK^{ed.}; om. C 13c sāmānye]CGJPRK^{ed.}; sā--- T 13d pāṇyāder
]GPRK^{ed.}; --- T, pā--- C, pāṇyā---er J 13d brahmatā]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; --- T, brahyatā
P^{a.c.}, bratyatā R, ---hmatā C 14a tatra cet]CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 14a sūkṣmakalanā
]GJPRK^{ed.}; --- T, sūkṣmakalanam C 14b sarvatra]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---rvatra T
14c antaḥ]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---ḥ T 14c ḥṛdādeś cet]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ḥṛdādiś ca T
14d prāṇādeḥ kiṃ na satyatā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; cāṇodaḥ ---tyataḥ C 15a sarvasya
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---sya T 15b °pūrṇatā]GJPRK^{ed.}; °pūrvatā TC 15b pravartane
]CGJK^{ed.}; pravartate TPR

107 In J, the initial *e* of *eva* is obscured by an imperfection in the manuscript.

104 vācuyuktir evaiṣā]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; vācuyukti vaiṣā P^{a.c.} 104 viruddhā
]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; viruddhamtā P^{a.c.}, viruddhatā R 104 atisthūlakarmendriyatve
]GJK^{ed.}; atisthūlakarmendriyasya PR 105 buddhīndriyasya]GJK^{ed.}; om.
PR 108 paramārthatvaṃ]GPRK^{ed.}; ---ārthatvaṃ J 112 tenaiṣokteti
]JPRK^{ed.}; tenaiṣakteti G 112 sā satyarūpatā]GJK^{ed.}; sāmānyarūpatā PR
115 °ākramaṇāt]GJK^{ed.}; °apakramaṇāt PR

105 J folio 19r. 107 R folio 12v. 110 T folio 2v. 110 C folio 3v. 113 G
folio 19v.

prāṇāpānasamānodānāder api hṛdādyākramaṇāt satyatā syāt. sarvasya cār-
 thasya pravṛttikāle 'ntaḥ parāmarśo 'sti. na hi paśyantyabhimatāvasthāyām śab-
 120 dasyeva śabdārthasyāpi na parāmarśaḥ kevalam abhedeneti sarvaṃ tathā syāt.
 atha vācaḥ siddhipradatvādinotkarṣa ity āha

atropāsanayā siddhir devatāyogiteti cet 15
yogaśāstreṣu sarveṣāṃ devatāsiddhiyogitā

ye vai vācam upāsate, teṣāṃ tadvidāṃ siddhir uktā, vāgīśvarī cādhiṣṭhāṭṛ-
 125 devatā tatrāstīti sā satyā, ity etad api na, yogaśāstrādiṣv adhiṣṭhāṭṛdevatāḥ, kara-
 ṇānāṃ mahābhūtānāṃ ca dhāraṇāvaśāt siddhayo 'pi. tatas tatrāpi prasaṅgaḥ.
 tenaitan mantavyam ity āha

tasmād dhiranyagarbhādiyogasāṅkhyetiḥāsātām 16
vihāya śāstraracanā jātucin na virājate

130 **pāṇyādīndriyavan naitad brahma vāgīndriyaṃ bhavet 17**

16a C has a paper pasted over 2.16ab, which reads: ---śāstreṣu sarveṣāṃ devatā
 yā siddhayogitā

15c atropāsanayā] GPRK^{ed.}; atropāsa--- T, atraupāsanayā C, atr---āsanayā] 15c
 siddhir] GJPRK^{ed.}; --- T, siddhi C 15d devatāyogiteti] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---vatā---e---
 T, devavatāyogiteti (hypermetric) C 16a yogaśāstreṣu] TJPRK^{ed.}; ---śāstreṣu
 C, yoyogaśāstreṣu G 16b devatāsiddhiyogitā] GJPRK^{ed.}; devatāsiddhiyo---tā T,
 devatā yā siddhayogitā (hypermetric) C 16d °yogasāṅkhyetiḥāsātām] TGJPRK^{p.c.}
 RK^{ed.}; °yogitāṅkhyetiḥāsātām C; °yogasāṅkhyetiḥāsātām P^{a.c.} 17a vihāya
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---ya C 17b jātucin na] TJPRK^{ed.}; jātu kiṃ cin na (hypermetric)
 C; jātun na (hypometric) G 17b virājate] TGJPRK^{ed.}; jāyate C 17c pāṇyādīn-
 driyavan naitad] GJPRK^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; pāṇyādīndriya---n n---tan T, pāṇyāvīndriyan ned
 C; pāṇyādīndriyavat taitad P^{a.c.} 17d vāg°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; pāg° C

121 Cf. VP 1.144: *tasmād yaḥ śabdasaṃskāraḥ sā siddhiḥ paramātmanah / tasya
 pravṛttitattvajñas tad brahmāmṛtam aśnute.* 125 See, e.g., YS 3.1: *deśaban-
 dhaś ca cittasya dhāraṇā* (cf. Vyāsa's commentary: *nābhicakre hṛdayapūṇḍarīke
 mūrdhni jyotiṣi nāsikāgre jihvāgra ity evamādiṣu deṣeṣu bāhye vā viṣaye cittasya vṛt-
 timātreṇa bandha iti dhāraṇā*); see, also, VBh 74: *yatra yatra manas tuṣṭir manas
 tatraiva dhārayet / tatra tatra parānandasvarūpaṃ sampravartate.*

118 hṛdādyā°] GJPRK^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; hṛdāyā° P^{a.c.} R 121 °pradatvādinā] GJK^{ed.};
 °yogitāpradatvādinā PR 124 ye] GJPRK^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; yo P^{a.c.} R 124 vāgīśvarī
] GPRK^{ed.}; vāgeśvarī J 125 ity] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR

123 J folio 19v. 126 G folio 20r.

tasmād brahmādiraṇītayogaśāstrasāṅkhyānām itihāsarūpam, taduktam arthaṃ prapañcayac chāstraṃ kāryam, taditihāsātmatām vihāya svamanīṣikayā śāstraracanā na śobhate. evaṃ ca yathā pāṇyādīndriyam anādisāstrāsiddhatvān na brahmarūpeṇa yuktaṃ viracyate, api tu tadanusāreṇaiva tathā vāg api.

135 sāṅkhyāder api katham anāditvam ity āha

athocyate prakriyāsau sāṅkhyādiracitā na sā
tattvonmeṣaprasaraṇe bhavet saṃbandhabhāginī 18
vīmarśānubhavenaiśā yathā vāk prathamam śrītā
lakṣyate bodharūpeṇa na tathā caraṇādīkam 19
140 iti cec carcyatām tāvat paśyantī yujyate yathā

sāṅkhyādisiddhānteṣu racanā vāk karmendriyam iti praṇetr̥saṃbandhikalpanāmātram etat, na tu paramārthasaṃvitpariyālocanasparśo 'sti. na ca prakriyā

18c J is missing °*ṣaprasaraṇe* due to damage to the MS. 18d J is missing *bhavet saṃbandhabhāginī* due to damage to the MS. 19a J is missing *vīmarśānu*° due to damage to the MS. 19b J is missing 2.19b-20a due to damage to the MS.

18a ucyate] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ucyata C 18b sāṅkhyādiracitā] CG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; sāṅkhyādirac--- T, sāṅkhyāderacitā G^{a.c.} 18b na sā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °ādi sā C 18c tattvonmeṣa°] TGPRK^{ed.}; °tatvoddeśa C, tattvonme---° J 19a °bhavenaiśā] TGPRK^{ed.}; °bhavaineśā C, °bhavenai--- J 19b prathamam śrītā] TGPRK^{ed.}; kathamamsthītā C, --- J 19c lakṣyate] TGPRK^{ed.}; lakṣate C, --- J 19c bodharūpeṇa] GPRK^{ed.}; ---dharūpeṇa T, bādhate rūpeṇa (hypermetric) C, --- J 19d tathā] TGPRK^{ed.}; taḍā C, --- J 19d caraṇādīkam] TGPRK^{ed.}; caraṇādike C, --- J 20a iti] TGPRK^{ed.}; itir C, --- J 20a cec] TGPRK^{ed.}; cerc C, --- J 20a tāvat] GPRK^{ed.}; yāvat TC, --- J 20b paśyantī yujyate yathā] TCGPRK^{ed.}; ---jyate yathā J

132 R crosses out °*rūpam*, *taduktam arthaṃ prapañcava*° following *taditihāsa*°. 133 A syllable is crossed out before *bhate* of *śobhate* in G.

132 prapañcayac] GJPK^{ed.}; prapañcavaśāc R 132 svamanīṣikayā] GPRK^{ed.}; ---vamanīṣikayā J 133 na] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; *om.* P^{a.c.}R 133 °śāstrāsiddhatvān] GJPR; °śāstrāsiddhatvān K^{ed.} 134 °rūpeṇa] GPRK^{ed.}; °rūp---ṇa J 134 °anusāreṇa] GPRK^{ed.}; °anus---ṇa J 135 sāṅkhyāder] GJK^{ed.}; saṅkhyāder PR 141 praṇetr̥°] P^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; praṇetya° GJP^{a.c.}R 142 na] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; ta P^{a.c.}

131 R folio 13r. 134 P folio 16. 140 J folio 20r. 141 G folio 20v.

paramārthavicāreṣu saṃbaddhatām yāti. tathā hi sarve 'rthāḥ saṃvidi pratiṣ-
 ṭhām upayānti, asaṃviditā asanta eva. saṃvic ca vimarśāsūnyā saṃvid eva
 145 na bhavati. tataś ca samastatattvasārasvarūpo 'yaṃ vimarśo 'nubhūyamāno
 'bhilāpamaya eveti vācā saha kā spardhā pāṇyādīnām. bodhamayo hy arthasat-
 tāprārambhaḥ, bodhaś ca vimarśātmā prathamam vācaivānuviddhaḥ, na tu pāṇi-
 pādādineti cet, tad evam api bodho vimarśātmā vānmaya evety āstām anyad etat,
 paśyantī tāvat svarūpābhidhānābhyāṃ vicāryatām yathā paśyantī bhavati paś-
 150 yantītvēna yuktaivety arthaḥ.

svarūpam abhidhānam ca tasyāś carcaiyitum āha

vartamānasamārūdhā kriyā paśyantyudāhṛtā 20
ḍṛśiḥ sakarmako dhātuḥ kiṃ paśyantīti kathyatām

vartamānakālārūdhā darśanakriyā hi vāgātmaakakarṭṛniṣṭhā paśyantīśabdasy-
 155 ārthaḥ. ḍṛśiś ca dhātuḥ sakarmakaḥ sakarmakakriya iti ḍṛśyam atra karma
 nirūpaṇīyam.

20c C twice records *samā* of *vartamānasamārūdhā*. 20d The MS of J is torn and illegible at *paśyantyudāhṛtā*. 21a J is torn and illegible at *ḍṛśiḥ sakarmako dhātuḥ*. 21a T deletes an *akṣara* following *dhā* of *dhātuḥ*. 21b J's reading of ŚD 2.21b is missing due to damage to the MS.

20c °samārūdhā] TCGJRK^{ed.}; °kārūdhā P 20d °udāhṛtā] TGPRK^{ed.}; °udāhṛdā C, <?> J 21a sakarmako] TGPRK^{ed.}; karmako C, <?> J 21b paśyantīti] TGPRK^{ed.}; paśyamtoti C, --- J

148 R records *tad evam api...anyad etat* in the right margin. 154 Due to damage to the MS, J's reading of the following is missing: *vartamānakālārūdhā darśanakriyā hi vāgātmaakakarṭṛniṣṭhā paśyantīśabda°*.

143 saṃbaddhatām] G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}PRK^{ed.}; saṃbandhatām G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.} 143 pratiṣṭhām] GPRK^{ed.}; prati<?>ām J 144 asaṃviditā] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; asaṃvidite P^{a.c.} 144 vimarśāsūnyā] GJPK^{ed.}; vimarśāsūnyā R 145 °sārasvarūpo] GJK^{ed.}; °sārarūpo PR 146 'bhilāpamaya] G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}K^{ed.}; 'bhilāṣamaya G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}PR 146 pāṇyādīnām] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; pāṇyākīnām P^{a.c.} 146 bodhamayo] GJRK^{ed.}; bodhamāṇe P 148 vānmaya] JPK^{ed.}; vānmāya G, vāṃnmaya R 148 evety] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; evetyādi P^{a.c.} 151 tasyāś] GJPK^{ed.}; tasyā R 155 sakarmakaḥ sakarmakakriya] GJ; sakarmakriya PK^{ed.}, sakarmakakriya R

153 R folio 13v. 154 G folio 21r. 154 J folio 20v.

tad eva paryālocayann āha

yady ābhāsān bahirbhūtāms tān sato 'py asato 'pi vā 21
satyatve darśanabhraṃśo hy asatyē satyatā katham

160 yady ābhāsān ghaṭapaṭādirūpān idantayā paśyati, tat teṣāṃ satyāsatyatāvicāre satyatā tāvad asatyavibhaktānyarūpopagrāhitātmakam vivartam icchadbhir darśanabhraṃśabhayān na vācyā, asatyē punar dr̥ṣye nāsatyārthadarśitve paśyan-tyāḥ satyatāyogaḥ.

avidyāvādo 'pi na yukta ity āha

165 **gr̥hṇāty athāvidyayā vā sāpy asyāḥ katham āsthitā 22**
satyā vāsāv asatyā vā satyatve darśanakṣatiḥ
asatyayāpi satyasya sambandho 'tīva durghaṭaḥ 23

anādyavidyāvāśād apy asatyadarśane mithyātvaṃ tāvad asyāḥ sthitam, avidyāyāpi ca sambandho na tasyā ghaṭate, avidyā hy avidyātvābhyupagamād evā-
170 satyā, na cāsatyayā sambandho rūpaśleṣamayo yuktaḥ.

21c yady] TJPRK^{ed.}; yayā C; yadvā G 21c ābhāsān] GJPRK^{ed.}; ābhāsā--- T, ābhāsād C 21c bahirbhūtāms] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bahirbhūtām C 21d tān sato 'py asato 'pi vā] TJPR; satotdyasato 'thavā (hypometric) C, tat sato 'py asato 'pi vā GK^{ed.} 22b katham] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kathām C 22c gr̥hṇāty] TGJPRK^{ed.}; gr̥hāty C 22c atha] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ata T 22c avidyayā vā] TG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; avidyaṃ yā vā C; avidyavā yā G^{a.c.} 22d sāpy asyāḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sāḥ thasyāḥ C 23a vā] TC; hy GJPRK^{ed.} 23a asāv] GJPRK^{ed.}; asāv TC 23b darśanakṣatiḥ] JPRK^{ed.}; darśana---tiḥ T, darśanakṣatī C; darśanakṣitiḥ G 23c asatyayāpi] TGJPRK^{ed.}; asatyā vāpi C 23d 'tīva] TCGPRK^{ed.}; 'tī--- J 23d durghaṭaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; dur---ṭāḥ C

161 Cf. VPVṛ ad VP 1.1, quoted at ŚD 2, line 89. 168 An imperfection in the manuscript makes it difficult to read the (nevertheless legible) reading of *asatyadarśane* in J.

157 eva] GJPR^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; e R^{a.c.} 169 avidyā] GJRK^{ed.}; avidyā yā P 169 avidyātvābhyupagamād] GJK^{ed.}; avidyābhyupagamād PR 170 asatyā] GJK^{ed.}; asatyatā PR 170 asatyayā] GJK^{ed.}; satyayā PR

na ca paśyanty apy asatyā yuktety āha

asatyā yadī paśyantī paśyantī brahma citratā

paśyantī yady asatyā, tat paśyantī brahmatattvam ity āścaryarūpatāsyārthasya.

anyac cāha

175 **bahirbhāvān visrjyādaḥ paścāt paśyati sātha kim 24**
satyā srjaty asatyāni vicitram abhidhīyate

kiṃ tattvāntarābhāvād viśve bhāvāḥ paśyantyaiva sraṣṭavyāḥ, tāmś ca sṛṣṭvā labdhasvarūpān sā paścāt paśyati, etad eva hi yuktaṃ. tatra sā satyā saty asatyāni rūpāni srjātīty etat tv asaṃbhavād āścaryaṃ satkāryavādoapatteḥ kāraṇasya 180 kāryavyatirekenāsatyatāprāpteḥ, asatyasarge 'py asamañjasakāritvena mālinya-prasaṅgāt.

na ca krīḍārthā vānyathā vā sṛṣṭir ity āha

jñātān srjaty asau tān vā neti jñāteṣv adarśanam 25
ajñāteṣu na sṛṣṭiḥ syād iṣṭaṃ krīḍādikam na ca

24b C adds *paśyantī* in the left margin. 24b C inserts ŚD 2.26ab between 2.24ab and 2.24cd.

24c *bahirbhāvān*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *bahirbhāsān* C 25b *vicitram abhidhīyate*] GJPRK^{ed.}; *vicitram a---dhīyate* T, *visrjajitrabhidhīyate* (hypermetric) C 25c *srjaty*] TCGJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; *srjati* P^{a.c.} 25d *adarśanam*] TCGJK^{ed.}; *adarśanāt* PR 26a *na*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *naḥ* C 26a *sṛṣṭiḥ syād*] TCGP^{c.}JPRK^{ed.}; *sṛṣṭi* syād G^{a.c.} 26b *iṣṭaṃ*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *iṣṭin* C

171 *paśyanty*] GPRK^{ed.}; *pa---nty* J 171 *asatyā*] GJPK^{ed.}; *asatā* R^{a.c.}, *asata* R^{p.c.} 173 *āścaryarūpatāsyārthasya*] PRK^{ed.}; *āccharyarūpatāsyā* 'rthasya GJ 174 *anyac*] GJPRP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; *anya* R^{a.c.} 177 *paśyantyaiva*] JR; *paśyanty eva* GPK^{ed.} 177 *sraṣṭavyāḥ*] JPRK^{ed.}; *sraṣṭavyāḥ* G 178 °*svarūpān*] GJPK^{ed.}; °*svarūpān* R 178 *paśyati*] GJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; *pūryati* P^{a.c.} 178 *etad*] GJK^{ed.}; *tad* PR 179 *rūpāni*] GJPK^{ed.}; *rū---ni* R 179 *srjātīty*] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; *srjaty* G^{a.c.} 180 *kāryavyatirekeṇa*] GPR; *kāryavyatirekeṇa* JK^{ed.} 180 *asatyatāprāpteḥ*] PRK^{ed.}; *ca satyatāprāpteḥ* GJ 180 *asatyasarge*] GJRK^{ed.}; *asatyasargo* P 180 'py *asamañjasa* °] GJRK^{ed.}; *aprasamañjasa* ° P 182 *krīḍārthā*] GPRK^{ed.}; *krīḍārtha* J 182 *vānyathā*] GJK^{ed.}; *om.* PR

173 J folio 21r. 175 P folio 17. 179 R folio 14r.

185 sṛṣṭīś ca jñātapūrvāṅām utājñātānām. tatra sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvam alabdhasvarūpatve kasya darśanam, ato 'paridrṣṭān eva sṛjet, taj jñāteṣu sṛṣṭir iti pakṣo nopapannah. athavājñāteṣu sṛṣṭir iti na bhavatām darśanam nābhuyupagama ity arthaḥ. ajñāteṣv api buddhimatām abuddhipūrvā katham sṛṣṭiḥ. niṣprayojanā ca katham syāt sṛṣṭiḥ. krīḍaiva sraṣṭuḥ sṛṣṭiḥ sṛṣṭisvabhāvatvaṃ veti hi bhavatām neṣṭam.

190 punar vikalpayann āha

tāni drṣṭvānusṛjati sṛṣṭvā vānuprapaśyati 26
 paśyantyāḥ satyarūpāyās tatsatyatve na darśanam
 asatyē satyadrṣṭyaiva paśyantyām malinātmatā 27
 asatyān satyarūpā vā katham sṛjati kalpyatām

195 tāni tāni vastūni drṣṭvā jñātvā vā sṛjati, sṛṣṭvā vā prapaśyatīty etad yathāstu, anuśabdo 'tra paścādartho nuśabdo vā vitarke. paśyantītvam eva na yuktam. tathā hi satyarūpā sā, tadrṣyānām ca satyatve na darśanam nābhuyupagamo dvaitaprasaṅgāt. atha teṣām asatyatvam, tato yathāiva satyasarge malinātā, tad vad asatyasṛṣṭau mukhyaiva bhrāntirūpatā. punar api cāsatyān arthān satyā sā
 200 paśyantī krīḍāyabhāve 'pi kena prayojanaprakāreṇa sṛjatīti vimrśyatām.

26c drṣṭvānusṛjati] CGJK^{ed.}; drṣyaṣṭyānusṛjati (hypermetric) T, drṣṭāni sṛjati PR^{p.c.}, drṣṭvāni sṛjati R^{a.c.} 27a °rūpāyās] CGJPRK^{ed.}; °rūpāy--s T 27b na] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ca C 27c satyadrṣṭyaiva] TGJRK^{ed.}; sa--drṣṭavya C; satyasṛṣṭyaiva P 27d paśyantyām] GJPRK^{ed.}; paśyantyā T, paśyanti C 27d malinātmatā] GJPRK^{ed.}; malinātmatāḥ T, matinātmanā C 28a asatyān] TGJPRK^{ed.}; asatyā C 28a satyarūpā] TC; satyarūpān GJPRK^{ed.} 28b katham] TGJPRK^{ed.}; katha C

185 P and R omit *tatra sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvam alabdhasvarūpatve kasya darśanam*. 186 P and R omit *pakṣo nopapannah. athavājñāteṣu sṛṣṭir iti*. 188 In P *niṣprayojanā ca katham sṛṣṭiḥ* is crossed out, followed by the correct reading. 196 An imperfection in the MS renders it difficult to read what is found in J, though it appears to witness the correct reading *paścādartho*. 200 The reading of J (°*abhāve*) is difficult to read due to an imperfection in the MS, but it is nevertheless legible.

186 eva] GJK^{ed.}; naiva P, neva R 189 sraṣṭuḥ] GJRK^{ed.}; sṛṣṭuḥ P 189 neṣṭam] GJK^{ed.}; neṣṭam na PR 195 ity etad] GJRK^{ed.}; itetad P 195 yathāstu] GJP^{a.c.}-RK^{ed.}; yathāsti tathāstu P^{p.c.} 197 tadrṣyānām] PRK^{ed.}; tato drṣyānām GJ 198 malinātā] GJP^{p.c.}-RK^{ed.}; malinātā P^{a.c.} 199 asatyasṛṣṭau] GK^{ed.}; asatyadrṣṭau JPR 199 satyā] P^{a.c.}; satyān GJP^{p.c.}-RK^{ed.} 199 sā] GJPR; vā K^{ed.} 200 prayojanaprakāreṇa] PRK^{ed.}; prayogena prakāreṇa GJ

185 G folio 22r. 189 J folio 21v. 199 G folio 22v.

asatyasatyasargadarśane prāgukte 'py avidyāparyāptaparyālocanāprasāṅga-
dānāya punarvikalpīte prayojanaṃ vinaivāvidyākṛtaḥ sarga iti paryālocayann āha

avidyāsyāḥ svadharmāḥ kiṃ paradharmo 'thavā bhavet 28
svadharmatve 'syā mālinyaṃ paradharme 'pi kasya sā
205 parasya śāstrāniṣṭasya svatantrā vā tathāpi sā 29
svātantryād durnivāraiva svatantraḥ kena vāryate

avidyā kiṃ paśyantyāḥ svadharmāḥ, uta paradharmāḥ. svadharmatve tasyā
avidyāsvabhāvatve mālinyaṃ syāt, paradharmatve vā kasya parasyāsau dharmāḥ.
na hy advayavāde brahmaṇaḥ kaścid arthaḥ paro 'stīti śāstre 'bhīṣṭaḥ. athā-
210 vidyā svatantraiva na tu kasyacid dharmabhūtā, tathāpi sā durucchedaiva svā-
tantryād dhetoh syāt svatantra hi kenānyena nivāryate, kena vā pravartyate, tathā
hi svatantra eva na syāt. atha pravṛttāu svatantrā nivṛtīḥ punar asyāḥ parakāryā-
pi syāt, tan na nivṛttikāraṇābhāvamukhaprekṣipravṛttikatvenāsvātantryāpatteḥ.
avācyatvam avidyāya vimṛśann āha

215 tattvānyatvair avācyā vā yady avidyābhīdhīyate 30

28c avidyāsyāḥ svadharmāḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; avidyāt svathā - - - C 29a 'syā
mālinyaṃ] GJP^{a.c.} RK^{ed.}; sy--- mālinyaṃ T, samālinyaṃ C; syān mālinyaṃ P^{p.c.}
29c śāstrān°] CGJPRK^{ed.}; śāstran° T 29d svatantrā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sva - -
C 29d vā tathāpi] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tathāṃpi C 30a svātantryād] TCGJPK^{ed.};
svātantryā--- R 30a durnivāraiva] GJPRK^{ed.}; durnivāraeva T, durnivāraipa C
30c tattvānyatvair] TGPRK^{ed.}; tatvānmatvair C, tattvānyatvai--- J 30c avācyā
] TCGPRK^{ed.}; ---vācyā J 30c vā yady avidyābhīdhīyate] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vāvāvib-
hidīyate (hypometric) C

207 P and R omit *tasyā avidyāsvabhāvatve mālinyaṃ syāt, paradharmatve.* 212
P and R omit *nivṛtīḥ punar asyāḥ parakāryāpi syāt, tan.* 213 The reading
°*mukha*° is difficult to make out in J due to an imperfection in the MS, but it is
nevertheless legible.

201 'py] GPRK^{ed.}; ---y J 202 °paryālocanā°] GJK^{ed.}; °paryālocana° PR
202 punarvikalpīte] GJRK^{ed.}; punarviklpete P 210 svatantraiva] GPRK^{ed.};
sva---ntraiva J 211 pravartyate] GJP^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; pravartate P^{a.c.} R 212 atha] *em.*;
ataḥ GJPRK^{ed.} 212 pravṛttāu] GJPR^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; *om.* R^{a.c.} 212 svatantrā] GJK^{ed.};
svatantrān PR 213 syāt] K^{ed.}; syā GJ, *om.* PR 213 tan na nivṛtī° GJ; *om.*
PR, tannivṛtī° K^{ed.}

202 R folio 14v. 204 C folio 4r. 204 J folio 22r. 211 G folio 23r. 214
P folio 18.

**paśyantyā lakṣitāsau vā na vā yadi na lakṣitā
paśyantī jāḍyam āyāti lakṣitā tarhi lakṣitā** 31

vastūni hi tattvānyattvanityatvānityatvādibhir vastudharmair vācyāni. avastu
punar avidyā niḥsvabhāvē katham svabhāvavattayā vyapadesārḥā syād iti cet, tad
220 avastubhūtā sā paśyantyā dṛṣṭā na vā. yadi na dṛṣṭā, tarhi paśyantī jāḍyam āyāti
sarvadarśanābhāvād apaśyantī syād ity arthaḥ. atha tayā dṛṣṭā, tad dṛṣṭaivopa-
lakṣitaiāvāparavivekenaiva pratibhātāt tadanusāritayā vācyāpi bhaved iti yāvat.
tattvānyatvair iti bahuvacanam śauṇḍārdharcādinīyāyena.

avācyatvenāpy avyavahāryatā tasyāḥ syād ity āha

225

**avācyatvena bhavatām tasyā rūpaṃ kuto gatam
alakṣitasvarūpāyā avidyātvaṃ katham sthitam** 32

alakṣitatve saty avācyatvenāpi tadīyam rūpaṃ kutaḥ pramāṇād bhavatām
avagatam tasyāpy alakṣitatvāt, alakṣitasvarūpatve cāvācyatvavad avidyātvam api
katham vyavasthāpyeta.

32b An imperfection in the MS renders the reading, *kuto gatam*, in J difficult to read but nevertheless legible.

31a paśyantyā] GJPRK^{ed.}; paśyantya T, paśyantvā C 31a lakṣitāsau vā] GJPRK^{ed.}; likṣitās--- vā T, lakṣitā caiva C 31b lakṣitā] TCJPRK^{ed.}; lakṣatā G 31c jāḍyam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; jāḍya C 31c āyāti] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhāyāti C 31d tarhi] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tatha C 32b rūpaṃ] TCGJJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; rūpo P^{a.c.} 32b gatam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhavet C 32c alakṣitasvarūpāyā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; alakṣisvarūpāyā (hypometric) C 32d avidyātvaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; avidyātvaṃ C 32d katham] TGJPRK^{ed.}; katha C

218 J records and then deletes *nitya* before recording °*nityatvānityatva*°. 222 J records *ity arthaḥ* above *yāvat*.

218 °anīyatvādibhir] GJJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °anīyatvābhir P^{a.c.}R 218 vastudharmair] GPRK^{ed.}; vastudhar---ai--- J 220 āyāti] GJPK^{ed.}; āyati R 221 dṛṣṭaivopalakṣitaiva] GJRK^{ed.}; dṛṣṭyaivopalakṣataiva P 223 śauṇḍārdharcādinīyāyena] GK^{ed.}; śauṇḍārcādinīyāyena JPR 224 apy avyavahāryatā] JK^{ed.}; apy avahāryatā GP^{a.c.}R, avyavahāryatā P^{p.c.} 227 alakṣitatve] GJK^{ed.}; alakṣitve PR 227 saty avācyatvena] GJK^{ed.}; satyāvācitvena PR 227 bhavatām] GJJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; bhavatāmaṃ P^{a.c.} 228 avagatam] GJPK^{ed.}; agatam R 228 avācyatvavad] JPRK^{ed.}; avācyatvavad G

220 J folio 22v. 224 G folio 23v. 225 R folio 15r.

230 anumānasiddhatām kalpayann āha

bhedabuddhyanumānāc cel lakṣitā tarhi lakṣitā

bhāvabhedaśiddhyanyathānupapattā tathātvenāvīdyā yadi lakṣitānumī-
tety arthaḥ. evaṃ tarhi lakṣitaiva, tat kim ity alakṣitatvam ucyate 'syā avācyat-
vaṃ vā.

235 evam api na siddety āha

na cānumānam iṣṭam te 'py avasthetyādiduṣaṇāt 33

na cāpi bhavato 'numānaṃ samyagjñānam iṣṭam

avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu
bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā (VP 1.32)

240 iti,

hastasparsād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā
anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ (VP 1.42)

iti cānyac ca vadataḥ. na hi vastuvyavasthāpane śaktatāyām pratyakṣān nyūnatā
tasya syāt, aśaktatāyām tv aprāmāṇyam eva.

33a °buddhyanumānāc | CG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; °buddhyanumānā--- T, °buddhyinumā-
nāc G^{a.c.} 33a cel | GJPRK^{ed.}; c---1 T, ce C 33b tarhi | TGJPRK^{ed.}; rhī
(hypometric) C 33c anumānam | TGJPRK^{ed.}; anumānīn C 33c iṣṭam
| TGJPRK^{ed.}; iṣṭaḥ C 33c te | TGJPRK^{ed.}; tve C 33d 'py | TCGJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.};
apye P^{a.c.} 33d avasthā | TCGJPK^{ed.}; eva sthā R

241 P crosses out *śa* preceding *sta* of *hastasparsādi*°. 241 G's recording
of *dhāvatā* extends into the right margin. 244 J records a large gap and a
blotched, illegible *akṣara*, possibly *tā*, between its reading of *aśaktā* and *yām*.

230 kalpayann | GPRK^{ed.}; kalayann J 239 prasiddhir | GJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; prasiddar
P^{a.c.} 239 atidurlabhā | PRK^{ed.}; itidurlabhā GJ 241 °vāndhena | GJK^{ed.};
°vānyena PR 243 pratyakṣān | PRK^{ed.}; pratyakṣā GJ 244 tasya | PRK^{ed.};
om. GJ 244 aśaktatāyām | GPK^{ed.}; aśaktāyām J, aśaktatāyā R

238 J folio 23r. 241 G folio 24r.

245 **satyā vā syād asatyā vā na madhyāyāḥ samanvayaḥ**
vidyā na bhavatīty evaṃ tattulyā kācid āpatet 34
satyaiva yadi vidyānām abhāvas tarhi śūnyatā
śūnyayā bādhyate citraṃ paśyantī darśanātmikā 35

satyā sati sattve sādhuḥ satī vā syād avidyā, asatyā tadviparītā vety arthaḥ.
 250 na madhyāyāḥ sambhavaḥ sadasatoḥ parasparābhāvarūpatvān na tṛtīyarāśi-
 sambhavo yataḥ. tathā hīyam avidyā vidyā na bhavatīty evaṃ vidyāparyudāsenā
 samastaviśvātmatayā prathamānā na pratiśedhamātrarūpā, ataś ca vidyāsadrīśī
 kācid viśvātmikā syād avidyā satyaiva, ataś ca nānirvācyatvam, nāpy advayam.
 vidyānām samyagjñānānām abhāvaḥ prasajyapraśiśedho 'pi yady avidyā, tat sā
 255 śūnyatā nirṛttimātraṃ na kiñcid iti yāvat. tataś ca śūnyayā nīrūpayā paśyantī
 nāma samyagjñānātmakāḥ pakṣo bādhyata iti citraṃ. samyagdarśanabādhena-
 iva dvaitabhrāntiḥ, akiñcidrūpasya bādhanaśaktyabhāvān na sambhavaty etad

34c It is suggested in the errata of K^{ed.} that the edition reads *tattalyā* for *tattulyā*, but this reading is recorded only in the errata and not in the text itself.

34a vā na] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vān C 34b madhyāyāḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; madhyāvāḥ C
 34b samanvayaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; samanvayaṃ C 34c ity evaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; yair
 va C 34d tattulyā] GJPRK^{ed.}; tattulyāḥ T, tatkulyā C 34d āpatet] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 ābhavet C 35a satyaiva] GJPRK^{ed.}; satya--- T, satyaita C 35a yadi] CGJPRK^{ed.};
 --- T 35a vidyānām] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---nām C 35b tarhi] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tahi C
 35b śūnyatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; śrūnyatām C 35c śūnyayā] CGJK^{ed.}; śūnyā yā TPR
 35c bādhyate] GJPRK^{ed.}; badhyate T, bāhate C

251] reads *evaṃ*, but an imperfection in the MS renders it difficult to read.

249 sati] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; sa<?>i J^{a.c.} 249 sattve] GJ; satye PRK^{ed.} 249
 vā] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; va J^{a.c.} 250 madhyāyāḥ] JPRK^{ed.}; madhyamāyāḥ G 251
 tathā] JPRK^{ed.}; yathā G 252 pratiśedhamātrarūpā] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; pratiśed-
 harūpamātra G^{a.c.} 254 samyagjñānānām] GJ^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; samyagjñānām P^{a.c.} R
 255 nirṛttimātraṃ] GJK^{ed.}; nirṛttimātraṃ PR 255 kiñcid] GJPR; kañcid K^{ed.}
 255 nīrūpayā] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; tūrūpayā P^{a.c.} 256 samyagdarśanabādhena] K^{ed.};
 samyagdarśanabodhena GJPR 257 °śaktyabhāvān] GJRK^{ed.}; °śa---bhāvān P

247 T folio 3r. 251 R folio 15v. 254 P folio 19. 255 G folio 24v. 255
 J folio 23v.

ity arthaḥ. paśyantī ca neśvarapratyabhijñoktanyāyena śabdanātmikā parameś-
varaśaktir iṣyate bhavadbhir īśvaropagamaprasaṅgāt, api tu sūkṣmo vācyābhe-
260 dena sthito vācakaḥ śabda ity evaṃ ca śabdātmāsau.

indriyatvābhāve 'pi pāṇyādi yathā pārthivatvān na paramārthaḥ, tathā vāyavī
vāg apīty āha

**pāṇyādeś ced dharādyātmā vāco vāyvātmatā na kim
sindhuśabdādivac chabdo na paśyantyādike bhavet 36**

265 na śabdāmātraṃ paśyantīmadhyamādaḥ sthātum utsahate samudraghoṣā-
dir iva tathā tatrādarśanāt.

na paśyantyāḥ satyabhūtāyā avidyayā bādhanam, api tu madhyamāyā ity āha

**atha madhyamāyā bāhyā bhāvā grāhyā hy avidyayā
tasyā eva hi saṃyogo buddhyā saṃkalpanātmanā 37**

36a C does not separate 2.35cd from 2.36ab with a *daṇḍa*, as is normal practice in the MS.

36a ced dharādyātmā] TGJRK^{ed.}; ed dharādyātmā C; ceṃdriyādyātmā P^{p.c.}, ce-
drar---dyātmā P^{a.c.} 36b vāco] TGJPRK^{ed.}; --- C 36b vāyvātmatā] TGJPRK^{ed.};
---yām̐tmā C 36c sindhuśabdādivac] TGJPRK^{ed.}; siṃhaśavdodiva C 36c
chabdo] TGJPRK^{ed.}; chivdo C 36d paśyantyādike] K^{ed.p.c.}; paśyantyādito
TCGJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 36d bhavet] CGJPRK^{ed.}; bhave--- T 37a atha madhya-
mayā] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---tha madhyamayā T, adhamamadhyamayā C 37b bhāvā
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---sā C 37b grāhyā] CGPRK^{ed.}; grā T, ---hyā] 37d saṃkalpanāt-
manā] GJPRK^{ed.}; saṃkalanātmanā T, saṃkilaṇātmanā C

258 See ĪPK 1.5.6: *cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ / yogiva
nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet. (Vṛtti:) cittvam eva īśvaratvāt svātmarūpatay-
opapannābhāsanam anantaśaktitvād icchāvaśān ṛṣṭādīkaraṇaṃ vinaiva bāhyat-
vena ghaṭapatādīkam artharāśiṃ prakāśayet. Cf. ŚD 1.44-45ab: yoginām icchayā
yadvan nānārūpopapattitā / na cāsti sādhanam kiñcin ṛṣṭādīcchām vinā prabhoh.
tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate.*

258 īśvara°] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; īśvarā° P^{a.c.} 260 sthito] GPRK^{ed.}; sthi---o]
260 evaṃ ca] GJPR; evaṃ K^{ed.} 261 pāṇyādi] GJRK^{ed.}; pāṇyādir P 267
paśyantyāḥ] GJK^{ed.}; paśyantyā PR 267 avidyayā] GK^{ed.}; avidyāyā] JPR

270 madhyamākhyayā vācā bāhyatvena bhedenābhāsyamānā bhāvā avidyāvaśād
grāhyāḥ. tasyā eva saṃkalpanātmanārthāvasāyarūpayā buddhyā saṃbandho
'ntaḥkaraṇe prāṇāpānpathe tasyā evāvasthānāt, na tu paśyantyāḥ.
etad api nety āha

275 **tatrāpi madhyamā kasya kāryaṃ paśyantyavasthayā
sā janyā hetunā kena śabalāṃ janayed asau 38**

tatrāpi madhyamāyā buddhipade vedyavedakadvaitāvabhāsini sthitāyā avid-
yāyoga ity abhyupagame madhyamā vāk kadācidbhāvāt kāryatāvat

vāca eva ca pūrvasyāḥ sā kāryā syāt...

iti nyāyenānyakāraṇābhāvāt paśyantyavasthayaiva sā janyā prāptā. evaṃ ca sati
280 kena hetunā tāṃ madhyamāṃ śabalāṃ bhinnagrāhyāc churitām asau śuddha-
svabhāvā sati janayet.

na kathañcit tajjananaṃ yuktam ity āha

**na hi tasyā nimittam vā kāraṇam samavāyi vā
nimittatve pṛthaktvaṃ syāt samavāye tadātmatā 39**

38a madhyamā] K^{ed.}; madhyā TCGJPR 38a kasya] K^{ed.}; kasyāḥ syāt (hy-
permetric) TGJPR, kasyā (hypometric) C 38b kāryaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---yaṃ
C 38b °avasthayā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °avasthitaṃ C 38c hetunā] TGJPRK^{ed.};
hetunāṃ C 38d śabalāṃ] GPK^{ed.}; śabdya T, sabalāṃ C, śabalaṃ JR 38d
janayed] GJPRK^{ed.}; jana--- T, janayod C 38d asau] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---sau T 39b
samavāyi] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sapravāyi C 39c nimittatve] TCGJ; nimittetva PR,
nimittatve K^{ed.}

271 Cf. VPVṛ ad VP 1.159: *madhyamā tv antaḥsaṃniveśini parigrhītakrameva
buddhimātropādānā. sā tu sūkṣmaprāṇavṛttyanugatā kramasaṃhārabhāve 'pi
vyaktaprāṇaparigrahaiva keśaṃ cit.* 278 The present quotation remains un-
traced to date.

271 grāhyāḥ] GJRK^{ed.}; grahyāḥ P 273 etad] GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; etād P^{a.c.} 276
sthitāyā] GJRK^{ed.}; sthitāyās ca P 276 avidyāyoga] GJRK^{ed.}; vidyāyoga P 277
abhyupagame] GJPK^{ed.}; ubhyupagame R 277 kāryatāvat] *em.*; kāryātāvad
GJ, kāryabhāvāt PRK^{ed.} 279 °avasthayaiva] GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; °avasthaiva P^{a.c.}
280 churitām] GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; charitām P^{a.c.} 282 kathañcit] GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.};
kathañci P^{a.c.} 282 tajjananaṃ] GJK^{ed.}; jananaṃ PR

270 G folio 25r. 271 J folio 24r. 274 R folio 16r.

285 asāv ity anuvartate. asau paśyanti na tasyā nimittamātraṃ kāraṇaṃ vijātiyam,
 nāpi samavāyikāraṇaṃ sajātiyatayāvibhāgena vā sthitam, nimittamātratve
 dvaitāpattiḥ, samavāyitve tu kṣīrasyeva dadhyupādānakāraṇatve saty upādā-
 nopādeyayor ekapravāharūpatvenābhinnayogakṣematā prāptā, kālabhede 'py
 anyathātathātvaṃ na syāt. paṭaṃ prati tantūnām iva vā samavāyitve paśyanti-
 290 madhyamayos tantupaṭavad abhinnātmatā bhedenāprathanāt.

tataś ca doṣaṃ abhidhāya dvaye paśyantītvam apy anupapannam ity āha

**tathāpy avidyayā yogaḥ paśyanty ātmānam eva cet
 andhamūkaṃ jagad bāhye sarvam eva bhaviṣyati 40
 indriyāder manovṛtteḥ sarvasyā eva lopitā**

295 paśyantyā madhyamayā sahaikayogakṣematvenaikyena vā madhyamāyā ivā-
 vidyāyogadoṣaḥ śuddhatāhāneḥ. atha śuddhaiva paśyanti yato na bhedenārthān
 paśyaty api tv ātmarūpāms tato nāvidyāyogadoṣas tasyā iti. evaṃ sati madhya-
 māyā api tadabhedāt, tathātve bāhye bhinne 'rthajāte 'ndham ajñam āsraṇāc
 coccārādyavyutpatter mūkam api sarvam eva jagad bhaviṣyati yadi tvanmatam
 300 āsrayiṣyati, na tv idānīm evam astīti pratyakṣaviruddhatām asyopagamayāha

40d bhaviṣyati] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---viṣyati T, bhavid syati C 41a manovṛtteḥ
] TCGJRK^{ed.}; manovṛttiḥ P 41b sarvasyā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sarvavasya (hyper-
 metric) C

285 P crosses out *asāv iti varttate tv aprthata kaṃ syāt samavāyena tadātmatā*.
 298 Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.37: *madhyamākhyayā vācā bāhyatvena bhedenābhā-
 syamānā bhāvā avidyāvaśād grāhyāḥ*. 299 P and R omit *yadi tvanmatam
 āsrayiṣyati*.

285 anuvartate] K^{ed.}; vartate GJPR 285 na] *em.*; *om.* GJPRK^{ed.} 287
 dvaitāpattiḥ] GPRK^{ed.}; dvaitāpatti J 287 kṣīrasyeva] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; kṣīrasye-
 vaṃ P^{a.c.} 287 saty upādāna°] GJPK^{ed.}; satyapādāna° R 288 prāptā] GJK^{ed.};
 prāptakāle PR 288 kālabhede] GJK^{ed.}; bhede PR 290 abhinnātmatā
] GJRK^{ed.}; bhinnātmatā yā P 291 ity] GPRK^{ed.}; *om.* J 295 madhyamayā
] JPRK^{ed.}; madhyamāyā G 296 avidyāyogadoṣaḥ] GJK^{ed.}; avidyādoṣaḥ PR
 296 śuddhaiva] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; śudhyaiva P^{a.c.} 296 bhedenārthān] GJK^{ed.};
 bhedaṃ nārthān PR 297 ātmarūpāms] GJP^{a.c.}K^{ed.}; ātmarūpa P^{p.c.}, ātmarū-
 paṃs R 297 sati madhyamāyā] GJK^{ed.}; satyamadhyamāyā PR 298 'ndham
] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; 'ndhum P^{a.c.}R 298 āsraṇāc] GJP^{a.c.}RK^{ed.}; āsraṇāṃ P^{p.c.}
 300 upagamaya] GJPR; upagamamya K^{ed.}

286 G folio 25v. 288 J folio 24v. 289 P folio 20. 297 R folio 16v.
 300 G folio 26r.

cakṣurādīndriyam ādīḥ pravartako yasyās tasyā manovṛtteḥ sarvasyāś cakṣurā-
disahitāyā bhinnārthaviṣayāyā vilopitānupayogitā ca pratyakṣaviruddhāpi
bhaviṣyati.

punar anyat paryālocayann āha

305 **paśyantī kiṃ śārīre 'ntar bahiḥ sarvatra vā sthitā 4I**
antar avyāpitā tasyā bāhye kiṃ madhyamādinā

paśyantī kiṃ śārīre 'ntar ahantābhūmau, kiṃ vā bahir apīti sarvatra sthitā.
pūrvasmin kalpe parimitatvam, dvitīyasmin madhyamāyām kaksyāyām idantā-
vedyamāyām api vyāptyavasthānāt kiṃ madhyamāvaikharirūpavākprabhedena.

310 **prasaren nādabindvādi sāpekṣā ced anīśvarī 42**

paśyanty anuvartamānā prāṇāpānarūpabindunādasāpekṣā cet sargasam-
hārayoḥ prasaret, tarhi tathāpi na vyāpikā nāpy advayā syāt. etad anīśvaratvam.

pratideham pṛthak kiṃ sā sarvatraikyena vā sthitā
nānātvam tatpṛthaktvena tadaikyāt samaśabdatā 43

43c C adds *tvam* of *nānātvam* at the bottom of the page. 43d T shows what
appears to be a correction of *samaśabdatā*, but I cannot make out the reading
either before or after correction.

41d bahiḥ] TCGJ^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; bahir P^{a.c.} 41d sarvatra] TGJPRK^{ed.}; pūrva-
tra C 42a tasyā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *om.* (hypometric) C 42b madhyamādinā
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; madhyamā vinā C 42c prasaren] TCK^{ed.}; prasaran GJPR 42c
nāda°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; nādi° C 42d sāpekṣā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; sāp---kṣā T 42d
anīśvarī] TCPRK^{ed.}; anēśvarī GJ 43a pṛthak] TGPRK^{ed.}; prathak C, pṛthat
J 43a kiṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *om.* T 43b sarvatraikyena] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sarva-
trailokyena C (hypermetric) 43c tatpṛthaktvena] TGJPRK^{ed.}; pyathak kena
C 43d tadaikyāt] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sadaikyāt C 43d samaśabdatā] GJK^{ed.};
samaśa<?>itā T, samaśabdītā C; ma---maśabdatā P, mamaśabdatā R

302 R records a space in *cakṣurādisahitāyā*, viz.: *cakṣurādisahi tāyā*. 31I P
adds °*rūpa*° in the left margin.

301 yasyās] GJJP^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; yasyas P^{a.c.} R 301 sarvasyāś] GJPK^{ed.}; sarvasyā R 302
vilopitānupayogitā] PRK^{ed.}; vilopitānupalopi GJ 304 anyat] P^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; apy GJ;
nyat P^{a.c.}, avyat R 304 paryālocayann] PRK^{ed.}; aparyālocayann GJ 307 sthitā
] GJJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; sthiti P^{a.c.} 309 °vākprabhedena] GJRK^{ed.}; °vākyabhedena P
312 anīśvaratvam] GJJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; anēśvaratvam P^{a.c.}

306 J folio 25r.

315 **śārīraiḥ pravibhāgāś cet tāny asatyāni te sthitiḥ**

sā ca paśyantī pratidehaṃ pṛthagbhūtā vā syāt sarvadeheṣv ekaiva vā. pṛthak-
 tve bahvyaḥ paśyantaḥ syuḥ, tataś ca nādvaitam, aikye sati sarvadehinām
 ekapaśyantīyogād ekatrāpi vaktari tatpūrvakaprayatnapreritaprāṇābhihatatasthā-
 notthitaḥ śabdaviśeṣo yaḥ, sa eva sarveṣv api tūṣṇīm āsīneṣv apy uccaritaḥ syāt,
 320 anyathā kvacit tādrśakāryākaraṇāt tasyaḥ svabhāvabhedāpatter aikyaṃ na syāt.
 athaikatve 'pi śāriropāśrayaḥ pravibhāgaḥ sphaṭikasyeveti. tan na, tāny asatyān-
 īti tava darśane vyavasthā. na cāsatyam akiñcidrūpaṃ kvacid upayogi bhavatīti
 yāvat.

avibhāgetyādikena lakṣaṇena sulakṣitā 44325 **paśyantī yadi varṇyeta lakṣaṇaṃ tadvilakṣaṇam**

paśyantī ca

avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ samḥrtakramā (VP 1.167ab)

44a pravibhāgāś cet] TGJPRK^{ed.}; pratibhā---taiḥ C 44b sthitiḥ] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.};
 sthitaḥ T, sthite C, sthiteḥ G^{a.c.} 44c avibhāgetyādikena] GJPRK^{ed.}; a---bhāge-
 tyādikena T, avibhāgetyārikena C 44d sulakṣitā] TCGJK^{ed.}; svalakṣite PR 45a
 varṇyeta] TGJPRK^{ed.}; varṇyeta C 45b lakṣaṇam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; lakṣaṇam C

321 P adds *dhyā* of the variant reading °*upādhyāśrayaḥ* in the left margin. 321
 Cf. VP 3.3.40-41: *sphaṭikādi yathā dravyaṃ bhinnarūpair upāśrayaiḥ / svasaktiyo-
 gāt sambandhaṃ tādrūpyeṇeva gacchati. tadvac chabdo 'pi sattāyām asyām pūrvam
 vyavasthitaḥ / dharmair upaiti sambandham avirodhivirodhibhiḥ.* 327 P crosses
 out *paśyantī ca* following *avibhāgā tu*; R retains the same.

316 vā] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; vāḥ P^{a.c.} 317 aikye] Pp^{c.}K^{ed.}; vākye GJP^{a.c.}R 319
 sa eva] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 319 āsīneṣv] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; āsaneṣv P^{a.c.}R 320
 °kāryākaraṇāt] GJPK^{ed.}; °kāyīkāraṇāt R^{p.c.}, °kāraṇāt R^{a.c.} 320 tasyaḥ] em.;
 tasya GJPRK^{ed.} 320 °bhedāpatter] G^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °bhedātter G^{a.c.}, °bhedātteḥ
 J 321 °upāśrayaḥ] GJP^{a.c.}RK^{ed.}; °upādhyāśrayaḥ P^{p.c.} 321 sphaṭikasya
] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; sphaṭikasya P^{a.c.}R 321 tan na] GJK^{ed.}; tatra PR 322
 akiñcidrūpaṃ] GJRK^{ed.}; kiñcidrūpaṃ P 326 paśyantī ca] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR
 327 avibhāgā] GJPK^{ed.}; avibhāgāt R

315 G folio 26v. 320 R folio 17r. 321 J folio 25v. 324 C folio 4v.

ityādinā lakṣaṇena suṣṭhv avyāptyativyāptiparihāreṇa lakṣitā yady ucyeta, tal
lakṣaṇam etadvilakṣaṇam atiśobhanam ity upahāsaḥ, yato vilakṣaṇam lakṣaṇas-
330 ya yal lakṣaṇam tadvigamāt.

tad āha

avibhāgā katham sā syād yataḥ paśyanty asau smṛtā 45

yata eva paśyanty asau vibhaktadrśyārthonmukhī smṛtā, tataḥ katham avi-
bhāgā syād yato lakṣyalakṣaṇapadayor anyonyavirahaḥ.

335 tathā hi

**yāni paśyati kiṃ svākyarūpadikkālabhāgaśaḥ
atathā yadi paśyantī mithyā paśyantyudāhṛtā 46
yathārūpeṇa paśyantī nirvibhāgā katham bhavet**

svakena svakena rūpadikkālabhāgena kiṃ drśyavastūni paśyati yāni draṣṭum
340 pravṛttety adhyāhāraḥ. yuktaṃ hy etat, yadi punar atathā viparyayeṇa paśyantī
bhavati, tan mithyājñānarūpā paśyantī athavā mithyā paśyantyudāhṛtā paśyantīty
arthah. avibhaktā tu tadā syād bhinnadrśyavastvabhāvāt. paśyantītvānurodhāt

46d C omits ŚD 2.46cd. The numbering of the verses in C reflect this omission
from this point forward, until the end of the chapter.

45c katham] CGJPRK^{ed.}; kathām T 45c syād] TCJPRK^{ed.}; syā G 45d
smṛtā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; smṛtām C 46a svākya] CGJPRK^{ed.}; svāniḥ T 46b
°kālabhāgaśaḥ] CGJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; °kāla---āgaśaḥ T, °kālabhāgasāḥ P^{a.c.} 46c atathā
] CGJPRK^{ed.}; athatā T 47b nirvibhāgā] GJPRK^{ed.}; nirvibhāgaḥ T, nirvi-
bhāga C

334 J appears at first glance to accord with the erroneous reading of G (*anyānya*°),
as the top which marks the short diphthong in *anyonya*° is difficult to discern
and might be a later correction.

328 suṣṭhv avyāpty°] GPRK^{ed.}; suṣṭhu vyāpty° J 328 yady] GJP^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; yādy
P^{a.c.}, yad R 328 ucyeta] GJP^{p.c.} R^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; ucyete P^{a.c.} R^{a.c.} 329 atiśobhanam
] GJP^{p.c.} PRK^{ed.}; itiśobhanam J^{a.c.} 329 vilakṣaṇam] GJRK^{ed.}; vilakṣaṇā P^{p.c.},
vilakṣaṇām P^{a.c.} 330 yal lakṣaṇam] GJK^{ed.}; yad vilakṣaṇam PR 334 any-
onyavirahaḥ] JPRK^{ed.}; anyānyavirodhas G 34I mithyā] GP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; mithā
J, mithyām P^{a.c.}

329 P folio 21. 329 G folio 27r. 340 J folio 26r.

tu yathāsthithena rūpeṇa svarūpānatikrameṇa vā paśyanti vibhaktadṛśyavastu-
yuktā nirvibhāgā katham bhaved ity uktam. svakam eva svākyam.

345 **bhaviṣyantam vartamānam katham paśyanty anāgatam 47**
anyadigdeśagenānyadigdeśe saty adarśanam

yogyadeśasthavartamānārthānubhaviṭṛtvena tāvat sarvapramātṛṇām svātm-
any anubhavaḥ. tatra bhaviṣyantam artham tadanāgatam aprāptam eva katham
vartamānam vartamānatve paśyanti syāt samyagrūpety arthaḥ. tathānyayogyadeśasthite
350 ³⁵⁰ deśasthite 'nyayogyadeśasthe na satyadarśanam samyagdarśanarūpā paśyan-
tīty arthaḥ. tathānyadigdeśakālagatena jñānenānyadikkālagate sati vidyamāne
'rthe na darśanam. tathā ca katham vartamānam yogyadeśastham eva paśyanti
bhaviṣyantam anāgatam asaṃprāptam anyadeśasthitam ca paśyanti syāt. sarva-
darśinī ceṣyate sā. deśakālāv atra parasparopalakṣaṇe.

355 **atha sādharmaṇam jñānam tādrk kiñcana paśyati 48**
tathāpi tadvibhedena bhedaṭā tadabhedataḥ
na kiñcana grhītam syāt tathānyā saṃhṛtakramā 49

48b An unidentified mark appears in the right margin of J following ŚD 2.48ab.
48c C adds *tha* of *atha* in the left margin.

47c bhaviṣyantam]TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhaviṣyatam C 47d paśyanty]TGJPRK^{ed.};
paśyant C 48a °genānya°]CGJPRK^{ed.}; °genānanya° (hypermetric) T 48b
°digdeśe]CGJPRK^{ed.}; di---śā T 48d paśyati]TGJPRK^{ed.}; paśyati C 49c kiñ-
cana]TGJPRK^{ed.}; kiñca (hypometric) C 49c grhītam]CGJPRK^{ed.}; grhatam T
49c syāt]TGJPRK^{ed.}; sya C 49d tathā]CGJPRK^{ed.}; tatathā T 49d anyā
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *om.* (hypometric) C 49d saṃhṛtakramā]GJPRK^{ed.}; saṃhṛ-
takrakramāt (hypermetric) T, saṃhṛtikramā C

350 P crosses out 'nyayogyadeśasthite following anyayogyadeśasthite.

343 tu]GJPK^{ed.}; u R 343 yathāsthithena rūpeṇa]K^{ed.}; yathā sthitarūpeṇa
GJPR 343 vibhaktadṛśyavastuyuktā]JK^{ed.}; dṛśyavastuyuktā G; vibhakta-
dṛśyayuktā PR 347 °anubhaviṭṛtvena]GJRK^{ed.}; °anubhrvatṛtvena P 350
samyagdarśanarūpā]GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; samyagdarśanam rūpā P^{a.c.} 351 anyadig-
deśakālagatena]JK^{ed.}; digdeśakālagatena G; anyadigdeśakālagate PR 351
jñānenānyadikkālagate]GJK^{ed.}; *om.* PR 352 tathā]GJ; tatas PRK^{ed.} 353
ca]RK^{ed.}; *om.* GJ; tu P 353 sarvadarśinī]GJK^{ed.}; sarvadarśine P, sarvadar-
śane R

345 G folio 27v. 346 R folio 17v. 356 J folio 26v.

deśakālabhinnārthagrahīṇi bhinnāny eva jñānāni, sā paśyantī teṣu sādharma-
 ṇam ekaṃ tādrk sarvatajjñānaprapañcanavyāpanakṣamaṃ kiñcanāniyataṃ
 360 paridṛśyamānanīlapītādīniyatajñānottaram asti, tat paśyati sarvaṃ paśyantīty
 arthaḥ. tathāpy asādharmaṇanīlādīniyatajñānānām bhedāt tasyāpi bhedatā bhi-
 dyamānatā syāt, na tu sāmānyatā tebhyas tasyābhedāt. tathā ca sati na kiñcanānā-
 gatādi grhītaṃ syāt, anāgatārthajñānāvibhinnā paśyantī tadānim eva taṃ
 365 grahīṣyatīti. athavā nīlapītādījñānavad bhedatāsyāḥ paśyantyāḥ, tasyā api nīlā-
 dikabhaviṣyadvartamānārthaśabalikṛtatvāt. atha tasyā na bhaviṣyadādīśabalatā,
 api tu bodhamātrārūpatvenāvibheda eva, tatas tadabhedato na kiñcana nīlādītayā
 grhītaṃ, tataḥ kathaṃ paśyantī syād iti. athānyā lakṣaṇāntarabheditā taiḥ
 paśyantī saṃhṛtakrameti.

370 **saṃhṛtaḥ krama ity asyāṃ saṃhartā jāyate paraḥ**
yayā kramaḥ saṃhṛto vā kim ātmany aparatra vā 50
ātmanaḥ sakramatvaṃ syād anyatrāparasamgamah
kiṃ pūrvaṃ sakramābhūt sā rūpadvitvaṃ prasajyate 51

saṃhṛtaḥ kramo 'syām iti. evam itīśabdo bhinnakramo yojyaḥ. evaṃ yadi
 saptamyarthe paśyantyātmani bahuvrīhis tadā saṃhartānyo 'rtho 'pekṣaṇīyo

50a saṃhṛtaḥ] GJPRK^{ed.}; saṃhṛta TC 50a asyāṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; asyama T
 50b saṃhartā] GJPRK^{ed.}; saṃ--- T, saṃhato C 50c yayā] TCPK^{ed.}; yathā GJR
 50c kramaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kramo C 51a ātmanaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ā--- C 51a
 sakramatvaṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; sakramatva T 51b aparasamgamah] TGJPK^{ed.};
 parasamgamah C, aparamamgamah R 51c sakrama] CGJPRK^{ed.}; akrama T
 51d sā rūpadvitvaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sāmāpadvitvaṃ C

361 P crosses out *tasyābhāpi* and records *tasyāpi*. 373 In the errata of K^{ed.} it is
 suggested that *itīśabda* should be read as a compound, though it is not recorded
 as such in the text.

359 sarvatajjñāna°] GJ^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; sarvaṃ tajjñāna° J^{a.c.}, ---rvatajjñāna° P, sarvataj-
 ñāna° R 359 °vyāpanakṣamaṃ] GJPR; °vyāpārakṣamaṃ K^{ed.} 360 °ādi°
] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °āyi° J^{a.c.} 361 bhidyamānatā] GJRK^{ed.}; vidyamānatā P 362
 tasyābhedāt] GJK^{ed.}; tasya bhedāt PR 362 na] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 362
 anāgatādi°] GJK^{ed.}; anādi° PR 363 °avibhinnā] GJK^{ed.}; °abhinnā PR 365
 bhaviṣyad°] GPRK^{ed.}; bhavi---° J 368 saṃhṛtakrameti] PRK^{ed.}; saṃhṛtaḥ
 krameti GJ 373 iti. evam] PRK^{ed.}; itīvam GJ 374 tadā saṃhartānyo
] PRK^{ed.}; tadasaṃhartānyo G^{p.c.}J, tadahartānyo G^{a.c.}

359 G folio 28r. 365 P folio 22. 366 R folio 18r. 369 J folio 27r.
 371 G folio 28v.

375 'treti vyāhatam. athavā tṛtīyārthe yayā kramah saṃhṛtaḥ paśyantyā sā tathā. evaṃ
cādhikaraṇāpekṣāyāṃ kim ātmani saṃhṛto 'thāparatreti vikalpaḥ. tathātmani
kramasya saṃharaṇe yojane sati tasya sakramatvaṃ syāt. athānyatra, dvitīyavas-
tusambandhas tathā ca dvaitāpattiḥ. athātmany eva pūrvaṃ sakramayā bhū-
tayā paścāt kramah saṃhṛto nivārīto na tv anyatra dvaitāpatteḥ, tathāpi tasyāḥ
380 sakramākramarūpadvitvaprasaṅgaḥ.

avibhāgā katham sā syād yataḥ paśyanty asau smṛtā (ŚD 2.45cd)

ity atra paśyantītvād eva darśanakriyākaraṇāpekṣayā nirvibhāgatvaṃ dūṣitaṃ
samarthyamānaṃ pareṇāśaṅkate

athātmanā sā svātmānaṃ paśyantī nirvibhāgaśaḥ

385 **bhāge karaṇarūpatvāt pāratantryaṃ jaḍātmatā 52**

ātmanaivātmānam eva ca paśyantī sā sthitā nirvibhāgaśo viśiṣṭād atyanta-
pṛthagbhūtād bhāgān niṣkrāntā karmakaraṇādīśaktimātreṇa sthitety arthaḥ.
tatrāpi bhāge dvitīyakārakaśaktyātmani karaṇādirūpatvāt tasyā eva pāratantryaṃ
jaḍatā ca prāpnoti svātantryātmatvād eva cidrūpasyeti. etad īśvarapratyabhijñā-
390 yāṃ parīkṣyam.

52a atha]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *om.* (hypometric) C 52b paśyantī]GJPRK^{ed.}; paśy---
T, ---tī C 52b nirvibhāgaśaḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; nivibhāśaḥ (hypometric) C 52c
°rūpatvāt]TCGK^{ed.}; °bhūtātāt JR, °bhūpatvāt P

383 J corrects its reading to *āśaṅkate* in the left margin. 388 It appears that
J originally read *dvitaya*^o and was corrected by a later hand to *dvitīya*^o. 390
See, e.g., ĪPK 1.5.13: *citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā / svātantryaṃ
etan mukhyaṃ tad aiśvaryaṃ paramātmanaḥ.*

375 vyāhatam]JPRK^{ed.}; vyāhṛtam G 375 yayā]K^{ed.}; yathā GJPR 377
dvitīyavastusambandhas]JPR; dvitīyas tu sambandhas GK^{ed.} 378 tathā]GJ;
tataś PRK^{ed.} 378 ca]GJPK^{ed.}; car R 380 °dvitvaprasaṅgaḥ]JPRK^{ed.};
°dvitaprasaṅgaḥ G 381 katham]JPRK^{ed.}; kathamā G 381 syād]JPRK^{ed.}; sy-
ataḥ G 381 yataḥ]GJRK^{ed.}; *om.* P 382 °kriyākaraṇa^o]K^{ed.}; °kriyākarma-
karaṇa^o GJPR 383 samarthyamānaṃ]GJPR^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; samakyamānaṃ R^{a.c.}
383 āśaṅkate]G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; āśaṅkyate G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.} 387 bhāgān]RK^{ed.};
bhāgād bhāgān GJ; bhāgā P 387 sthitety]G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; sthityete G^{a.c.} 388
dvitīya^o]JR; dvitīye GPK^{ed.} 388 °ātmani]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °āātmani P^{a.c.} 389
svātantryātmatvād]JPR; svātantryātmatād G, svātantryād K^{ed.} 390 parīkṣyam
]GJPR; parīkṣitam K^{ed.}

385 J folio 27v. 386 G folio 29r. 389 R folio 18v.

para āha

ātmanam ātmanā hanti devadatto yathā tathā
bhaviṣyaty atra tatrāsya svāṅgair eva vibhāgitā 53
hastādeḥ karaṇatvaṃ hi mastakādeś ca karmatā
395 kartā manaḥsvāvayavī nāmūrtāyā idaṃ punaḥ 54

devadattātmani yathā karmādibhedas tathātra syāt, ity etan na, devadattasya mūrtatvena vitatākārasya svāṅgair eva bahubhir upagr̥hītātmaśabdābhīdhāyakaḥ vibhāgaḥ. tathā hi hastasyānyasya vāvayavasya śastrādiyujaḥ karaṇatā, mastakasya ḥṛdayāder vā hanyamānasya karmatā, kartā manoyuktaḥ sva ātmā sa eva 400 hastādisambaddho 'vayavīty ukto yata eva tāvaty ātmabhāvaḥ. paśyantyāḥ punaś cinmātrarūpatvenāmūrtāyā vaitatyābhāvān nāvayavāpekṣo 'yaṃ vyavahāraḥ, tatas tasyā eva bhāge karaṇādītvena jaḍatāpattir eva.

53a The second long ā of *ātmanam* is inserted between the preceding and following *akṣaras* in T. 53c J is torn and is missing all but the tops of °*viṣyaty atra tatrāsya svāṅgair eva vibhā*°. 54a J is torn and is missing *karaṇatvam hi*.

53a ātmanam] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ātmānām T 53a ātmanā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; atmanā T 53b devadatto] TGJPRK^{ed.}; devattatod C 53c atra tatrāsya] GPRK^{ed.}; ātmatāsya (hypometric) T, atra tartrasyā C, --- J 53d svāṅgair] CGJPRK^{ed.}; syāṅgair T 54a hastādeḥ] CGJPK^{ed.}; hastā--- T, hastādaḥ R 54a karaṇatvaṃ] GPRK^{ed.}; --- TJ, karaṇatvaṃ (hypometric) C 54b mastakādeś] GJPRK^{ed.}; ma--- T, mastakāderaś (hypermetric) C 54b ca] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 54c manaḥsvāvayavī] GJPRK^{ed.}; mayatasvāvayavī (hypermetric) T, manaḥsvāvayavī C 54d nāmūrtāyā] GJRK^{ed.}; nā---yā T, ---rtāyām C; nāmūrtayā P 54d idaṃ punaḥ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---na--- T

401 J records the final syllable (*raḥ*) of *vyavahāraḥ* in the middle of the bottom of the page.

396 devadattātmani] GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; devadattātmani P^{a.c.} 396 ity etan na] GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; ittetad P^{a.c.} 401 vaitatyābhāvān nā°] GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; vaitatyābhāvāt ā° P^{a.c.}

401 G folio 29v. 401 J folio 28r. 401 P folio 23.

**paśyanty adrṣṭam ātmānaṃ drṣṭam vādrṣṭatā katham
paśyantyā darśanaṃ drṣṭe na ca vā hy upapadyate 55**

405 ātmānaṃ ca paśyantī kim adrṣṭapūrvam paśyaty atha drṣṭam. tad dvayam api na yuktaṃ yataḥ paśyantyāḥ prakāśarūpāyā adrṣṭatvam aprakāśatā naiva, drṣṭe cātmani na punar darśanakriyāpravṛttir yukta. na ca paśyantyā ātmā pratikṣaṇam anyo yena pratikṣaṇam eva darśanakriyāyā upayogena vartamānatā syāt, nāpi tasyā ātmano dikkālāvachedaḥ.

410 **paśyantam sā kim ātmānaṃ paśyantī jaḍam eva vā
jaḍe jaḍatvam evāsyāḥ paśyato hy anavasthatā 56**

sā cātmanaṃ prakāśarūpatvāt paśyantyātmakatvāc ca kiṃ paśyantam paśyaty utāprakāśarūpaṃ jaḍam. jaḍe tasmin sāpi jaḍā syād athātmāpy asyāḥ prakāśātmatvāt paśyati, na ca bhinnam paśyaty api tv ātmānaṃ eva, tatas tasyāpi
415 pūrvavikalpayogād anavasthatā, avasthānasya darśanaviśrānter abhāvāt.

55b The bottom of the folio of T is missing at *drṣṭam vādrṣṭatā katham*, but the passage is nevertheless partially legible. 56a It appears as if some 17 characters are lost in T with a broken-off piece of manuscript, but with only *paśyantam* (ŚD 2.56a) missing in our reading of T, it is likely something else was recorded here, as well. 56c T does not appear to record ŚD 2.56cd, though it is difficult to determine whether or not this is so, as the manuscript is damaged here.

55a paśyanty] CGJPRK^{ed.}; paś---ty T 55a ātmānaṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ātmāna T 55b drṣṭam vādrṣṭatā katham] GJPRK^{ed.}; drṣṭam ---tā katham T, drṣṭatā katham anyatā C 55c darśanaṃ] GJPRK^{ed.}; drṣṭam T^{a.c.}, drṣṭam T^{p.c.}, drṣṭani C 55c drṣṭe] GJPRK^{ed.}; ātmāna T, drṣṭer C 55d ca] GJPRK^{ed.}; nṛṣṭam T, da C 55d hy upapadyate] CGJPRK^{ed.}; drṣ<?>tā--- T 56a paśyantam] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---m T 56b paśyantī] CGJPRK^{ed.}; paśya--- T 56b jaḍam eva vā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 56c evāsyāḥ] CGJK^{ed.}; --- or *om.* T, eva syā P^{p.c.}, syāt P^{a.c.}, eva syāḥ R 56d paśyato] GJPRK^{ed.}; --- or *om.* T, paśyanto C 56d anavasthatā] GJK^{ed.}; --- or *om.* T, anavasthitā CPR

414 G records a line of circles, a symbol normally indicating that some of the text is missing, across the bottom line of folio 29v.

408 anyo] G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; anyā G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}PR 409 nāpi] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; āpi P^{a.c.} 412 sā] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; sa J^{a.c.} 412 °rūpatvāt] JPRK^{ed.}; °rūpatvān na G 412 °ātmakatvāc] GK^{ed.}; °ātmatvāc JP, °ātmatvās R 415 anavasthatā] JPRK^{ed.}; anavasthā G

410 T folio 3v. 412 R folio 19r. 414 G folio 30r.

**kiñcit paśyati vā sūkṣmaṃ tad asmaddarśanānvayaḥ
karmatve pāratantryaṃ syāt tasyā eva nījātmani 57**

yadi vā bhavadbhir nānyan nīlapītādi sthūlaṃ vibhaktasvarūpaṃ dṛśyaṃ paśyati api tu dṛśyabhuvam anāpannaṃ draṣṭāram eva kiñcid avikalpyaṃ sūkṣ-
420 mam apṛthagrūpaṃ paśyati, na ca paśyati dṛśyārthamayadraṣṭṛrūpaiva satī prakāśate paśyantīti kathyate. tato 'smadīyadarśanānugamaḥ syāt paśyantyarthaḥ kriyākartṛkarmakālavibhāgātmā tyakto bhavet. vāstave tu karmatve 'bhyupagamyamāne tadīyasūkṣmadraṣṭṛrūpātmādhikaraṇe sati tasminn evaikātmani draṣṭṛtvāt svatantre dṛśyatayā pāratantryaṃ syād viruddham.

425 **sphoṭa eva hi paśyantī tadanyā vā dvayaṃ bhavet
tadanyatve tadaikye vā tad aṅgulyagrārūpayā 58
vākyagatyātra satyatvaṃ labhyate na viśeṣatā
āptānāptavicāro vā sarvathaiva nivartate 59**

57c The reading of the last *akṣara* of J is blotched, but the MS appears to read *karmatve*.

57a kiñcit] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 57a paśyati] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---śyati T, paśyamīti C 57a vā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *om.* C 57b tad] CGJPRK^{ed.}; yad T 57b asmaddarśanānvayaḥ] GJPRK^{ed.}; *asmaddarśanān<?>tamyam* T, *asmaddarśanvayaḥ* (hypometric) C 57c karmatve] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *karma---* T 57c pāratantryaṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 57d tasyā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---<?> (perhaps *ṃrata*) T 58b vā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; yā T 58d °agrārūpayā] TCG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; °arūpayā (hypometric) G^{a.c.} 59a vākyagatyātra] CGJPRK^{ed.}; vākyagatyātra (hypermetric) T 59b viśeṣatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; viśeṣakā C 59c āptānāptavicāro vā] GJPRK^{ed.}; āptānāptavi--- T, ātmānātmavi--- C 59d sarvathaiva] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; ---rvathaiva T, sarvaṃ deva C, sarvatraiva G^{a.c.} 59d nivartate] TCPRK^{ed.}; vivartate GJ

419 P records an “x” mark above *annā* in its variant reading *annāpannaṃ*.
428 G records a line of circles, a symbol normally indicating that some of the text is missing, across the bottom line of folio 30r.

418 nānyan nīlapītādi] GJ; nānyanīlapītādi PRK^{ed.} 419 dṛśyabhuvam anāpannaṃ] K^{ed.}; dṛśyabhuvanāpannaṃ GJ; dṛśyabhuvam annāpannaṃ PR 419 draṣṭāram] GJPK^{ed.}; dṛṣṭāram R 419 avikalpyaṃ] GJK^{ed.}; akalpyaṃ PR 420 °draṣṭṛrūpaiva] GJPR^{p.c.}; °draṣṭā rūpaiva R^{a.c.}, °dṛṣṭṛrūpaiva K^{ed.} 421 paśyantyarthaḥ] GJP^{a.c.}RK^{ed.}; paśyantyartha° P^{p.c.} 422 tyakto] G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; tyanto G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.} 423 °draṣṭṛ°] GJK^{ed.}; °dṛṣṭṛ° P, °draṣṭā° R 424 draṣṭṛtvāt] JPR^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; dṛṣṭṛtvāt G, draṣṭātvāt R^{a.c.} 424 syād] JPRK^{ed.}; syā G

416 J folio 28v. 428 G folio 30v.

bhavadbhiḥ sphoṭaḥ paśyantī ca nityatvenābhyupagatau, tataḥ sphoṭa eva vā
 430 paśyantī syāc chabdamātrabhedāt, tato vānyā. tatra dvaitaṃ syād anyatvapakṣe.
 aikye vābhyupagate tat paśyantyāḥ saṃbandhi satyārthadarśitvaṃ labhyetāngu-
 lyagre hastiyūthaśatam āsta ity anayā vākyasphoṭapratītyātra loke. na tu paśyan-
 tiśaṃjñāsatyadarśanarūpatvena sarvasya sphoṭasya satyābhimatād vākyād
 435 viśiṣyamānatā labhyate. anyatvapakṣe tu sphoṭasya satyasyāpy asatyārthatvaṃ
 na doṣaḥ, paśyantyātmanas tu śuddhasaṃvidrūpasya mithyātvaṃ doṣa eva
 paśyantyaikyena sphoṭasatyārthatvāt. āptapraṇītātānāptapraṇītatva vicāro vā sar-
 vathā tadā nivartate sarveṣāṃ aviśeṣeṇa samyagrūpatvāt, pūrvoktapaśyantībahuv-
 tvavan nityasphoṭabahutvaṃ tataś cādvayahānir ity etad apy atra sūcitam.

**sphoṭasyāsatyarūpair hi padādyair vyaṅgyatā katham
 paśyantyāḥ satyarūpāyā asatyair vyaṅgyatā na ca 60
 tādr̥gvyañjanasāpekṣā sā na kiñcana jāyate**

440

sphoṭasya ca kūtasthanityasya satyasya padavarṇadhvanibhir upaplutair
 akiñcitsvarūpair aśaktair atyantavijāṭiyaiḥ katham vyaṅgyatā satyaprakāśanasā-
 marthyē teṣāṃ satyatāpatteḥ. paśyantyātmatve 'pi ca sphoṭasyāsatyavyañjakatā

60a °rūpair] CGJPRK^{ed.}; rūpe T 60b padādyair] TGJPRK^{ed.}; padāder
 C 60b vyaṅgyatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vyaṅgyatāṃ C 60c paśyantyāḥ] TGJK^{ed.};
 paśyantī C; paśyantyā PR 60c satyarūpāyā] GJPRK^{ed.}; satvarūpāyā T, satyadā-
 pāyā C 60d asatyair] CGJPRK^{ed.}; asatve T 60d vyaṅgyatā na ca] PRK^{ed.};
 vyaṅgatā na ca T, vyaṃjyātāṃ - - C, vyaṅgyatā katham GJ 61a tādr̥gvyañ-
 janasāpekṣā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadagvyañjanasāpekṣā C 61b na] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 kena (hypermetric) C 61b kiñcana] CGJPRK^{ed.}; kiñcana T

433 P and R omit *satyābhimatād vākyād viśiṣyamānatā labhyate. anyatvapakṣe tu sphoṭasya* by a skip of the eye. 435 G omits *na doṣaḥ, paśyantyātmanas tu śuddhasaṃvidrūpasya mithyātvaṃ* by an eye-skip.

431 °darśitvaṃ] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; °datvaṃrśī G^{a.c.} 431 labhyeta] GJPR; lab-
 hyate K^{ed.} 433 °saṃjñāsatyā°] J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °saṃjñāsatyā° GJ^{a.c.} 434
 viśiṣyamānatā] K^{ed.}; viśiṣyamānatā GJ, om. PR 435 śuddhasaṃvidrūpasya
] JRK^{ed.}; om. G, śuddhasaṃcidrūpasya P 436 °aikyena] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °aikena
 P^{a.c.} 436 sphoṭasatyārthatvāt] GJK^{ed.}; sarvasya sphoṭasatyārthatvāt PR 436
 °praṇītātānāpta°] GJ; °praṇītānāpta° PRK^{ed.} 436 °praṇītatva°] GJPR;
 °praṇīta° K^{ed.} 437 °bahutvavan] GJRK^{ed.}; °bahutvavana P

431 J folio 29r. 435 R folio 19v. 436 P folio 24. 441 G folio 31r.

445 tathaiva na yuktā, asatyenāvidyātmanāvyaajyamānālokena rūpam iva svayaṃ
prakāśanāśaktā na kiñcid evāvidyātmeva sā syāt tāvatprapañcarūpaivāvidyeti
kṛtvā.

paśyantī vā pramāṇena kenāsau pratipādyate 61

pratyakṣasyāgocaratvād anumānaṃ pradūṣitam

450

bhavadbhir eva nāptasyānanubhūtārthavakṛtā 62

pramāṇena vā kena paśyantī bhavadbhir vyavasthāpyate. pratyakṣaṃ tāvad
atra cakṣurādīmanogocarātīkramān nāsti. avasthetyādinā bhavadbhir eva tasya
dūṣaṇāc cānumānaṃ na samyag avabodhakam. āptasyāpi nānanubhūtārthavak-
ṛtā, tad api na pramāṇam.

455

atha svānubhavenaiva paśyantīm paśya yuktitaḥ

evaṃ tarhy aparasyāsau paśyantī karmatām gatā 63

yo hi paśyati paśyantīm sa devaḥ paramo mataḥ

atha bhavanto mām āhuḥ svagatenānubhavena pramāṇena paśyan-
tīm yuktito yogātmasamādher avadhānāt paśyati. evaṃ tarhy aparasya

61d P underlines *ti* of its variant reading *pratipadyate*.

61c pramāṇena] CGJPRK^{ed.}; pram---na T 61d kenāsau] TGJPRK^{ed.};
senāsau C 61d pratipādyate] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; pratipadyate TP^{a.c.}; pratīpādyate C
62a agocaratvād] TGJPRK^{ed.}; a---varasvād C 62b pradūṣitam] TCGJRK^{ed.};
prahṛṣitam P 62c eva nāptasyā] GJPRK^{ed.}; evānāptasyā T, eva sā nāptasyā
(hypermetric) C 62d °vakṛtā] TGJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °vakṛtā C; °vakṛyā P^{a.c.} 63b
paśyantīm] GJPK^{ed.}; paśyantī TCR 63b yuktitaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; yuktataḥ
C 63c aparasyāsau] TGJK^{ed.}; parasyāsau CPR 63d paśyantī] GJPRK^{ed.};
---śyantī T, kaśyantī C 63d karmatām] TCGPK^{ed.}; karmatā JR 63d gatā
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; gataḥ C 64a paśyantīm] TGJPRK^{ed.}; paśyantī C 64b devaḥ
] GJPRK^{ed.}; daivaḥ T, eva C 64b paramo mataḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; paramāvṛttaḥ C

445 avidyātmanāvyaajyamānālokena] GRK^{ed.p.c.}; avidyātma<?>jjyamānālokena
J, avidyātmanāvyaajyamānālokena P, avidyātmanāvyaajyamānālokena K^{ed.a.c.} 446
°aśaktā] G; °śaktā J, °aśaktyā P, °śaktyā RK^{ed.} 446 avidyātmeva] GJP;
avidyātme iva R, avidyaiva K^{ed.} 453 dūṣaṇāc cānumānaṃ] GJK^{ed.}; dūṣaṇān
na cānumānaṃ P^{p.c.}, dūṣaṇāś cānumānaṃ P^{a.c.}R 453 na K^{ed.}; om. GJPR 453
avabodhakam] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; vabodhakam P^{a.c.} 453 nānanu °] GJK^{ed.}; nānu °
PR 458 svagatena] J^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; om. G, svāgatena P^{a.c.}R 459 yogātma °] GJ;
yogāt PRK^{ed.}

445 J folio 29v. 455 C folio 5r. 455 G folio 31v. 458 R folio 20r.

460 svānubhavasamjñāsya pramāṇāsya paśyantī karmatvaṃ prāptā, tataś ca sā
paramārthatvenopagatā na tathā syāt. yasmāt sa eva tadānīm parākāṣṭhāprāpto
devatvena sarvotkarṣeṇa bhavatām mataḥ syād yas tām api sarvadarśinīm paśy-
ati, tataś ca darśanatyāgaḥ.

pratibhā kathitā yā vā sānumānaṃ na tac ca te 64

465 **na cāpi pratipādyasya kādācitkapratikṣaṇam**

atha paśyantyām pratibhā pramāṇam tat pratibhā prabhāsanam nirmittam
asti, kūpe jalam ityādivan na pramāṇam. athātmasthītir eva vilakṣaṇā mamai-
vaṃ śamsatūti pratibhā, tad ātmasthīter viśiṣṭāyāḥ sādhyāvvyabhicārānīscayenā-
rthāntarāvagame 'numānataiva, tac ca bhavatām aṇiṣṭam, avyabhicārānīscaye tv
470 anavagamakatvam, yuktivaśāc cānubhavaḥ kadācidbhāvi pratibhā vā bhavet, paś-
yantīm paśyety āptena pratipādyamānāsya na tu sadā, tataś ca tasyā vicchinnaṃ
darśanaṃ syāt, na sadā prakāśamānatā, nacaitat tatkālapratikṣaṇam matam.

64d The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *sānumānaṃ*, not the MS itself.

64c kathitā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; kathitām C 64c yā]T^{p.c.}CGJPRK^{ed.}; om. T^{a.c.} 64d
sānumānaṃ]TCGPRK^{ed.}; s<?>numānaṃ J 64d tac]TGJK^{ed.}; rā C; taś PR
65a na cāpi]TGJPRK^{ed.}; sa na cāpi (hypermetric) C 65a pratipādyasya
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; pratipadyasya T 65b kādācitkapratikṣaṇam]TGJK^{ed.}; kim āyā-
taṃ svavikṣaṇāmṭḥ C; kadācitkvapratikṣaṇam P^{p.c.}; kadācitkapratikṣaṇam P^{a.c.}R

466 The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *pramāṇam*, not the MS itself.
467 Damage to the manuscript leaves out two *akṣaras* of *vilakṣaṇā* in J. 467
G highlights *ma* of *mamaivam*. 470 The copy of J in my possession is illegible
at *vā bhavet*, not the MS itself. 471 The copy of J in my possession is illegible
at *sadā*, not the MS itself.

460 svānubhavasamjñāsya]GJPR; svānubhavasamjñākāsya K^{ed.} 460 pra-
māṇāsya]GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 461 sa eva]GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 461 °prāpto]GJK^{ed.};
°prāptau PR 462 bhavatām]GJRK^{ed.}; bhavatā P 462 mataḥ]GJPK^{ed.};
ataḥ R 462 °darśinīm]GJPR^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °darśanīm R^{a.c.} 466 pramāṇam
]GPRK^{ed.}; <?>āṇam J 466 nirmittam]GJK^{ed.}; nirmittam PR 467
vilakṣaṇā]GPRK^{ed.}; vi---ṇā J 468 sādhyāvvyabhicārānīscayena]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
sādhyādhyabhicārānīscayena P^{a.c.} 469 tv]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; tur P^{a.c.} 470
anavagamakatvam]GJRK^{ed.}; navagamakatvam P 470 yuktivaśāc]GJK^{ed.};
śaktivaśāc PR 470 vā bhavet]PRK^{ed.}; vād bhavet G, vā <?>et J 471 sadā
]GPRK^{ed.}; sa<?>ā J 471 tataś]GJK^{ed.}; tac PR 472 darśanaṃ]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.};
darśanaṃ P^{a.c.}R

462 J folio 30r. 470 G folio 32r.

svātmanātmānam atha cet paśyantī sā bhaviṣyati 65
 tadānīm pratipādyasya kim āyātam svavikṣaṇāt
 475 vaktavyam eva tasyāpi paśyantīm paśya yā svayam 66
 ātmānam eva jānāti tathāpy asyāsti karmatā

nānubhavādinā paśyantīdarśanam api tu sā svātmanā na vyatiriktenānubhavana svam ātmānam paśyantī bhaviṣyatīti yadi matam, tad evaṃ sati pratipādyasya bhavadbhir upadeṣṭṛbhiḥ kim apūrvaṃ kāryaṃ svayam eva tasyāḥ
 480 prathanāt. evaṃ tv avaśyavaktavyaṃ bhavadbhiḥ pratipādakaiḥ sadbhiḥ pratipādyasya paśyantīm adrṣṭapūrvam tvam paśya yā svayam evātmānam paśyati. tathāpi cāsyāḥ pratipādyasaṃbandhyanubhavaṃ prati pūrvavat karmatāsty eva, pratipādyena parimitatvāt parābhimatāyāḥ paśyantyāś cyutatvāt, parimitenaiva dvaitadaśocitenānubhavana sā dṛṣyā syāt, na tu tadā pratipādyapratipādakapa-
 485 śyantīnām aikadhyam yena karmatāpattir na bhavet. evaṃ ca karmatāpattau tasyāḥ svayaṃprakāśatākṣatir iti punar api tatprakāśakam eva pradhānam bhavet. avyatiriko 'pi prakāśas tasyā ātmānam ātmanā paśyantīm paśyati vivartabhūmy-āliṅganād aśuddhatāpannaḥ. asyāstīti paśyantīsvarūpasya.

65c ŚD 2.65cd-66ab is recorded after 2.66cd-67ab in C. 66b C reads *kadācit kaputikṣaṇam* following ŚD 2.66ab 66c The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *vaktavyam*, not the MS itself.

65c ātmānam] TCPRK^{ed.}; ātmanam GJ 65c atha cet] CGJPRK^{ed.}; a--- c---t T 65d bhaviṣyati] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhaviṣyati C 66a tadānīm] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadānīm C 66b svavikṣaṇāt] TCGJK^{ed.}; svavekṣaṇāt PR 66c vaktavyam] TCGPRK^{ed.}; <?>ktavyam J 66d paśyantīm] GJPK^{ed.}; paśyantī TCR 67b karmatā] GJPRK^{ed.}; karmat--- T, karmatām C

477 G records *vi* above the connective particle *tu*.

477 api] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; avi J^{a.c.} 477 sā] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; sār P^{a.c.} 477 svātmanā] GJRK^{ed.}; svātmanā P 478 svam ātmānam] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; svātmānam G^{a.c.} 480 tv] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; cva P^{a.c.} 480 avaśyavaktavyam] GPRK^{ed.}; avaśyaṃ vaktavyam J 480 pratipādakaiḥ sadbhiḥ] GJK^{ed.}; *om.* (eye skip) PR 482 pratipādyā°] GJK^{ed.}; pratipādyasya PR 482 pūrvavat karmatā] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; pūrvavakurmatā P^{a.c.} 483 eva dvaitadaśocitena] JPRK^{ed.}; eva dvaivadvaitadaśocitena G 484 syāt, na tu] GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; syāt tu P^{a.c.} 485 aikadhyam] J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; aikagryam GJ^{a.c.} 486 svayaṃprakāśatākṣatir] JPRK^{ed.}; svayaṃprakāśatākṣatir G 487 paśyantīm] GJPK^{ed.}; paśyantī R 488 aśuddhatāpannaḥ] GJK^{ed.}; aśuddhatāpannoḥ P, aśuddhatāpannaḥ R

473 P folio 25. 476 J folio 30v. 479 R folio 20v. 484 G folio 32v.

asatyaḥ pratipādyo 'sminn asatyaḥ pratipādakah 67
 490 asatasyopadeśatvam asatyena parikṣyate

paśyantyatiriktaḥ sarva eva pratipādyādiprapaṅco 'smin darśane 'satyaḥ, tat
 kutaḥ paśyantyāḥ siddhiḥ kasya vā kena vā pramāṇena.

yena sā vā pramāṇena sthāpyate tasya satyatā 68
 tatsatyatve dvisatyatvam asatyatve na kiñcana

495 yadi vā yena pramāṇena sā vyavasthāpyate tasya satyateṣṭā, tad dvayoḥ paś-
 yantītatpramāṇayoḥ satyatā prāptā, pramāṇasyāsatyatve na kiñcana sthitaṃ syāt.

sādhuśabdasaṃuccārāt kasya svargādiyogitā 69
 paśyantyāś ced avidyātvaṃ tadbhogaunmukhyayogataḥ
 500 madhyamāder jaḍyāḥ kiṃ bhogena śabalātmanaḥ 70
 tasmād asādhuḥ sādhuḥ syāc chabdavidyāphalapradaḥ
 evaṃ vyākaraṇasyāpi samuccheda upaiti te 71

67c asatyaḥ] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---satyaḥ T, asatya C 67d asatyaḥ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; asatya
 T 67d pratipādakah] T^{p.c.} CGJPRK^{ed.}; pratiprādakah T^{a.c.} 68a upadeśatvam
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; upadeśatvadam C 68b asatyena] TGJPRK^{ed.}; satyena C 68b
 parikṣyate] GJPRK^{ed.}; ca rakṣyate T, parikṣate C 68c yena] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kena
 C 68d satyatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; syatyatā C 69a dvisatyatvam] CGJPRK^{ed.};
 'pi satyatva--- T 69b asatyatve] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---satyatve T 69d svargādiyog-
 itā] GJPRK^{ed.}; svargādiyogikatā (hypermetric) T, svargayogitāṃ (hypometric) C
 70a paśyantyāś] TGJPRK^{ed.}; paśyantyā C 70a ced avidyātvaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 vedavidyatvaṃ C 70b °bhogaunmukhya°] GJPRK^{ed.}; °bhogonmukhya° T,
 °bhogānmukhya° C 70d śabalātmanaḥ] CGJPR; śabalātmana--- T, śabalāt-
 manā K^{ed.} 71a tasmād] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---smād T 71a asādhuḥ sādhuḥ syāc
] GJPRK^{ed.}; asādhuḥ sādhu syāc T, asādhu syāc ca sādhu syāc (hypermetric) C
 71b chabdavidyāphalapradaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; chabdo vidyāphaladaḥ (hypomet-
 ric) C 71c vyākaraṇasya] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vyāpakaraṇasya (hypermetric) C 71d
 upaiti] TGJPRK^{ed.}; apaiti C

491 °atiriktaḥ] PRK^{ed.}; °atirikaś ca GJ 495 tasya satyateṣṭā] G^{p.c.} JPRK^{ed.};
 satya tasyateṣṭā G^{a.c.} 496 °pramāṇayoḥ] PRK^{ed.}; °pramāṇayoḥs GJ

489 J folio 31r. 497 G folio 33r. 500 R folio 21r.

vaiyākaraṇaiḥ sādhuśabdaprayogaḥ svargāpavargaphala uktaḥ. ekaḥ śabdaḥ
śāstrapūrvam prayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavatīti. tathā

sādhvī vāg bhuyasī yeṣu puruṣeṣu vyavasthitā
505 adhikaṃ vartate teṣu puṇyarūpaṃ prajāpateḥ (VP 1.126)
prājāpatyaṃ mahat tejas tanmātrair eva samvṛtam
śarīrabhede viduṣāṃ svāṃ yonim upadhāvati (VP 1.127)

iti. tatphalaṃ svargākhyam tāvat kasya syād yaḥ śabdaprayogasya karteti. tat-
phalārthitayā paśyantyāḥ kartṛtve svargabhogaunmukhyād avidyāsamparkeṇā-
510 śuddhatā syāt. madhyamāvaikharīdaśāyām iṣṭāniṣṭopalambhabhāji prāptipari-
hāraunmukhyena pravṛttiḥ. tan na, pāramārthikapramātrniṣṭhā hi viśayavyava-
sthitiḥ, tan madhyamādeḥ savibhāgatvena dvaitāvasthāne saty avidyāśabalarūpa-
tayā jaḍatvān na paramārthapadapraṭiṣṭhena kiñcidbhogena, bhoga evāsau na
bhaved ity arthaḥ. tasmāt sādhuśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ śabdavidyāphalasya bhogāder
515 dātā, pratyuta paśyantyā aśuddhyāpādanenāsādhur aśubhaḥ syāt. evaṃ cāsu-
bhakāritvād yathāvarṇitaphalaṃ vyākaraṇam api tvadiyaṃ samucchinnam
heyam eva syāt.

503 Cf. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, commentary on A 6.1.84.: *ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyag
jñātaḥ śāstrānvitah suprayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavatīti.* 507 R records
upadhāvati ti prior to correcting to *upadhāvati*. 507 P records an “x” mark
above *upadhā*. 509 J records a large gap between *paśya*- and *-ntyāḥ*. 509
J records *kartṛtve*, but it does so in a manner that suggests the scribe may first
have written *kartṛtvam*.

503 svarge] PRK^{ed.}; svarga° GJ 506 tejas] GJRK^{ed.}; tejaḥ P 506
tanmātrair] PRK^{ed.}; tatpātrair GJ 507 yonim upadhāvati] GJK^{ed.}; yoripupa-
dhāvati PR 508 syād yaḥ] GJRK^{ed.}; syāpvaḥ P 509 kartṛtve] JPRK^{ed.}; kartṛt-
vam G 510 iṣṭāniṣṭopalambhabhāji] GJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; iṣṭāniṣṭopalambhāji P^{a.c.}
510 °parihāraunmukhyena] PRK^{ed.}; °parihāraunmukhyena GJ 511 tan na
] GJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; tata P^{a.c.} 511 viśaya°] PRK^{ed.}; vivaśaya° GJ 512 madhyamādeḥ
] PRK^{ed.}; madhyamā G, madhyamāḥ J 513 na] GJRK^{ed.}; om. P 515 dātā
] GJK^{ed.}; mātā PR 515 pratyuta paśyantyā] GJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; pratyutpaśyantyā P^{a.c.}
515 aśuddhyāpādanenāsādhur] K^{ed.}; aśuddhyāpādanam nāsādhur GJPR

504 J folio 31v. 510 P folio 26. 512 G folio 33v.

vaiyākaraṇatām tyaktvā vijñānānveṣaṇena kim
bhavatām aprastutena na kevalam ihoditam 72
vijñānābhāsanam yāvat samikṣāyām udāhṛtam

520

arthapratīhetusādhuśabdānuśāsanavyāpāram eva vaiyākaraṇatvaṃ tyaktvā
mokṣaprayojanaiḥ śāstrair yat samyagjñānam anusaraṇīyaṃ tadanveṣaṇena
bhavatām akaraṇīyatvenāprastutena na kiñcit, na kevalam cātraiva paśyanty-
abhidhānena samyagjñānābhāsa evokto yāvac chavdadhātusamikṣāyām api vid-
525 vadbhartṛharinā.

dikkālādilakṣaṇena vyāpakatvaṃ vihanyate 73
avaśyaṃ vyāpako yo hi sarvadikṣu sa vartate

dikkālādyanavacchinnānantacinmātramūrtaye
svānubhūtyekamānāya namaḥ śāntāya tejase (NŚ I.1)

72d J records *tam* of *uditam* in the middle of the bottom of the page. 73b
ŚD 2.73 is originally not counted as a *mūlasloka* in K^{ed.}, but this oversight is
corrected in the errata, where we are told that the verse should be understood to
be a part of the root text.

72a vaiyākaraṇatām] TGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; vaiyākaraṇatyām C; vaiyākaraṇabhām P^{a.c.}R
72a tyaktvā] TCGJK^{ed.}; jyatkā PR 72b vijñānānveṣaṇena] GJPRK^{ed.}; vi-
jñānonveṣaṇena T, vijñānānveṣana C 72d ihoditam] CGJPRK^{ed.}; iho---tam T
73a vijñānābhāsanam] GJPRK^{ed.}; vijñānābhasam (hypometric) T, vijñānām
bhāsanam C 73b samikṣāyām] TGJPRK^{ed.}; samikṣāyam C 73b udāhṛtam
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; udāhyatam C 73b dikkālādilakṣaṇena] GJPRK^{ed.}; dikkālādi-
lakṣaṇaina T, dikkālādir lakṣaṇa C 73b vyāpakatvaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vyāpaka---
C 74b sa] TGJPRK^{ed.}; na C

523 R crosses out *bhavatām karaṇīm yatvenā* following *na kevalam cātraiva*.
524 The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *samyag°*, not the MS itself.

522 samyagjñānam] GJPK^{ed.}; samyag--- R 522 anusaraṇīyaṃ] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.};
usaraṇīyaṃ P^{a.c.}, <?>raṇīyaṃ R 523 akaraṇīyatvena] *em.*; karaṇīyatvena
GJPRK^{ed.} 523 aprastutena] GJPK^{ed.}; aprastuto na R 524 samyag°
] GPRK^{ed.}; sa---g J 524 chavdadhātusamikṣāyām] K^{ed.}; cha---tusamikṣāyām
G, chavda tu samikṣāyām J, chavdasamikṣāyām PR

519 J folio 32r. 522 R folio 21v. 525 G folio 34r.

530 iti lakṣaṇena digdeśakālair avacchedo viśiṣyamāṇatā niṣiddhā. tac cāyuktam, parimitadeśakālād arthāt tasyāvacchedāt, anyathā sarvadikkālādiviśeṣaṇabhāve vyāpakatvādi na syāt. vyāpako hi bhavet sarvadikṣv avāṣyaṃ vartamānaḥ sarvakālāvachinnaś ca nityaḥ. vyāpakatvam upalakṣaṇaṃ nirdiṣṭam.

atha dikkālaviśeṣāvachedābhāvo mataḥ, tat tathaiva vaktavyaṃ na sāmān-
535 yena, na caitad api yuktam ity āha

**svānubhūtir vartamānakālenāsya vibhāvyaṭe 74
evaṃ kālānavacchedaḥ katham asyodito hi taiḥ**

yasmin hi kālabhāge sthitaḥ sāṃsārikaḥ pramātā tenaiva vartamānakālena bhaviṣyadādinā tadā tasyānavasthānāt svānubhavaviṣayatāsyopalakṣyate, tat
540 katham kālaviśeṣeṇāpy anavacchedaḥ.

anantasyānubhūtiḥ kā paricchedaṃ vinātmanaḥ 75

75b ŚD 2.75cd is omitted in T, P and R.

74c vartamānakālenāsya] GJPK^{ed.}; vartamānakale---sya T, vartamāno ko nāsya (hypometric) C, vartyamānakālenāsya R 75a evaṃ kālānavacchedaḥ] GJPRK^{ed.}; evaṃ kālānavacchedāḥ T, evatkālānavachetaḥ C 75b katham] CGJPRK^{ed.}; pratham T 75b asyodito] TGJPRK^{ed.}; anyodito C 75b taiḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tai C 75c anantasyānubhūtiḥ kā] GJK^{ed.}; anantasyānubhūrīṇaṃ C, *om.* TPR 75d paricchedaṃ] GJK^{ed.}; hachedaṃ C, *om.* TPR

531 The copy of J in my possession is illegible at °kālād, not the MS itself.
532 The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *hi bhavet*, not the MS itself.
539 R records the presence of a mark suggesting the need to insert text following *svānubhavaviṣaya*, but no additional text is provided, and the reading of R matches those of the other manuscripts.

530 viśiṣyamāṇatā] G^{a.c.}K^{ed.}; viśayamāṇatā G^{p.c.}; viśiṣṭamāṇatā J^{p.c.}PR, viśiṣṭamāṇatā J^{a.c.} 530 ayuktaṃ] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; apuktaṃ P^{a.c.} 531 °kālād] GPRK^{ed.}; °k<?>lād J 531 °viśeṣaṇabhāve] JPRK^{ed.}; °viśeṣeṇa bhāve G 532 hi bhavet] GPRK^{ed.}; <?>vet J 532 sarvadikṣv] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; sarvadiktva P^{a.c.}R 534 tathaiva] GJRK^{ed.}; athaiva P 535 caitad] *em.*; etad GJ, ca tad PRK^{ed.} 539 anavasthānāt] *em.* (Isaacson); avasthānāt GJPRK^{ed.} 540 kālaviśeṣeṇa] JPR; kālaviśeṣaṇena GK^{ed.}

534 J folio 32v. 539 G folio 34v.

**anante 'vagamaḥ kutra tejavste śāntatā katham
asarvagapramāṇam hi mūrtir no lakṣyate citaḥ 76**

dhātuṣaṭkopagamād bhedavāde deśakālayogo 'vaśyaṃbhāvīty anantatvaṃ
545 deśakālaparyavasānam ucyeṭa, ataś cāparyavasitadeśakālasya kānubhūtir na
tayoḥ saṃbandho yukta ity arthaḥ. tathā hy ātmanaḥ svarūpasya paricchedam
iyattāṃ vinānante vastuni kutrāṃśe 'vagamo 'stu bhāgānām aparyavasānāt.
anantatāpratītiḥ tu paridr̥ṣṭatāvātpadārthanīṣedhapuraḥsaratvenaāgrāhyādyanta-
koṭīdirghavastumātrāvasāyīni sphurati, na tv anantena rūpeṇāparicchinne-
550 vabhāsanasaṃbhavaḥ. parisamāptarūpanīścayo hi pratītiḥ. tejorūpatā cet,
nirābhāsatvābhāvāt katham śāntatā. tat keyam ukṭiḥ śāntāya tejasa iti. upacāre
ca kiṃ prayojanam. asarvagatadravyaparimāṇam mūrtiḥ kāṭhīnyam vā na cid
bhavati, tat katham cinmūrtaya iti.

**atraiva śabdanityatvavādino rūḍhatām gatāḥ
555 anādinātha tenaiva śabdatattvena tulyatā 77**

76b J rewrites *nta* of *śāntatā* above the already correct reading first recorded in the MS. 77a T omits all of ŚD 2.77 excepting *atraiva* and jumps to ŚD 2.78c, beginning with *śabdatattvasya*.

76a anante] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ante (hypometric) C 76b tejavste] TGJPRK^{ed.}; teja--- C 76d mūrtir] GJPK^{ed.}; ninī° T, mūrti CR 76d no lakṣyate] PK^{ed.}; °totprekṣyate T, no 'pekṣyate CGJ, lakṣite R 76d citaḥ] GJPRK^{ed.}; --- T, 'nviṭaḥ C 77a atraiva] TGJPRK^{ed.}; a---ca C 77b śabdanityatvavādino] CGJPRK^{ed.}; om. T 77b rūḍhatām] CGJPRK^{ed.}; om. T 77b gatāḥ] GJPRK^{ed.}; om. T, gato C

544 Cf. YājSmṛ 3.145ab: *brahmakhānilatejāṃsi jalaṃ bhūś ceti dhātavaḥ*. 549 There is a tear in J across the line that includes °*nāparicchinneāvabhāsanasaṃbhavaḥ*. *parisamāptarūpani*°, but the reading of the MS is legible.

544 bhedavāde] GJK^{ed.}; bhedavāda° PR 545 kānubhūtir] GJPR; sānubhūtir K^{ed.} 548 paridr̥ṣṭatāvāt°] K^{ed.}; paridr̥ṣṭāntavat° GJPR 548 °puraḥsaratvena°] GPRK^{ed.}; °puraḥsaratvana° J 549 °koṭīdirgha°] GJRK^{ed.}; °koṭīdirgham P 549 aparicchinne] GJRK^{ed.}; aparicchennena P 552 prayojanam] JPRK^{ed.}; praprayojanam G 552 mūrtiḥ] GJK^{ed.}; mūrti PR

545 R folio 22r. 547 P folio 27. 551 J folio 33r. 552 G folio 35r. G reads *śrīgurubhyo namaḥ* at the top of the folio. 554 T folio 4r. There are twelve lines of text on T f. 4r, not the usual eleven.

anye vaiyākaraṇā eva sphoṭād anyad eva śabdātmāṇaṃ nityam icchanti, tatraiva rūḍhāḥ. atha tatrāpi teṣāṃ paśyantīrūpenānādinidhanātmanā śabdatattvena tulyā pramāṇābhāvādīdūṣaṇatā sphoṭātmanā vā.

tad āha

560 **āptānāptabhāṣitatve viśeṣo nāsti śabdagaḥ**
 nityatve śabdatattvasya vyaṅgyatvaṃ dhvanibhir na ca 78
 vyomavac cen na tulyatvaṃ sadā vyomny anumeyatā

anāptabhāṣitasyaṅpi nityatvaviśeṣāt tulyapramāṇatā syāt. na ca nityasya dhvanibhiḥ kadācid vyaṅgyatvaṃ yuktaṃ nityam ekarūpatvena vyaktāvyaktatvāyogāt.
 565 atha yathā nityam ekam api cākāśaṃ dhvanibhir vyajyate ghaṭākāśādi vā ghaṭādibhis tathā śabdātmāpīti. tan na tulyatvaṃ atra, yataḥ sadā vyomni śabdaguṇādinānumeyatā na tu pratyakṣākhyā vyaktiḥ.

bhavatpakṣe na kiṃ nyāya eṣa āyāti cec chive 79
 tathā rūpānurūpatvāt prasūteḥ śivarūpataḥ
 570 **satyatvāc ca na tulyatvaṃ ato 'smāt praviramyatām 80**

80a Cf. ŚD I.12ab: *rūpaprasārarasato garhītatvam ayuktimat.* 80b J records *śivarūpataḥ* in a manner that suggests it may have first read *śivarūpatāḥ*.

78a *āptānāptabhāṣitatve*] GJPRK^{ed.}; *om.* T, *āptānāptabhāvitatve* C 78b *viśeṣo*] GJPRK^{ed.}; *om.* T, *viśeṣo* C 78c *śabdatattvasya*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *tattvasya* C 79b *sadā*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *sarā* C 79c *bhavatpakṣe*] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *bhavaty akṣe* T 79c *nyāya*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *nyāyā* C 79d *āyāti*] TCGJRK^{ed.}; *āyātiṃ* P 79d *cec*] TGJK^{ed.}; *ce* C; *cic* PR 80a *rūpānurūpatvāt*] GJPRK^{ed.}; *rūpe 'numeyatvāt* TC 80b *śivarūpataḥ*] CJPRK^{ed.}; *śivarūpa---* T, *śivarūpatāḥ* G 80c *satyatvāc* ca] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *---* T 80d *praviramyatām*] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *praviramyate* T

563 G records *dhvanibhiḥ* in the left margin. 565 *vā* is highlighted in G and J.

556 *vaiyākaraṇā*] GJP^{a.c.} RK^{ed.}; *vaiyākaraṇo* P^{a.c.} 556 *anyad*] GJP^{a.c.} K^{ed.}; *anyed* P^{a.c.} R 558 *tulyā*] K^{ed.}; *tulya°* GJPR 558 *sphoṭātmanā*] GJK^{ed.}; *sphoṭātātmanā* PR 564 *vyaktāvyaktatvāyogāt*] JPR; *vyaktāvyaktatvāyogāt* GK^{ed.} 566 *śabdātmā*] GJPR; *śabdo* K^{ed.} 566 *na*] GJRK^{ed.}; *om.* P

567 R folio 22v. 567 G folio 35v. 567 J folio 33v. 568 C folio 5v.

śivādvaitapakṣe 'pi bhavataḥ śabda iva śive 'pi satyatvādidūṣaṇanyāyaḥ kiṃ
nāpataṭī cet. tan na, jagad api tataḥ śivarūpāc chivarūpānurūpyeṇa tathā sarva-
śaktiyogād yadā prasūtaṃ tadā śivarūpam eva, ata eva ca satyarūpam, tathā ca
vakṣyate vistarataḥ. tan na tulyatvaṃ śabdādvaitapakṣeṇa śivādvayasyety etad
575 dūṣaṇāpādanād viramyaṭām.

tad etat prāsaṅgikam uktvā paśyantīm eva paryālocayann āha

**atha nāmnaiva paśyantī sphuṭam eva jaḍā tataḥ
jñānaśaktiḥ smṛtā bhaṅgyā strīliṅgavyapadeśataḥ 81**

atha darśanārthānvaye doṣān nāmamātreṇa yādṛcchikena paśyantīṣyate,
580 strīliṅgabhaṅgyā ca brahmasaṃbandhijñānaśaktirūpā sā matā, tato viruddham
etat darśanāsamanvayāḥ jaḍatāpatteḥ, jaḍātmani ca jñānaśaktitānupapattir iti.

**śabdasya viṣayākhyasya miśratvenendriyasya tu
sarvadarśanavijñānaśūnyatā padavedinām 82
yasmād anādinidhanam śabdatattvaṃ parā hi vāk
585 paśyantyā varṇyamānatve haste grāhyaikatāpatet 83**

82d J records the final *m* of its variant reading, *padaveditām* in the middle of the bottom of the page.

81a nāmnaiva]TGJPRK^{ed.}; nāmneva C 81b sphuṭam]TGJPRK^{ed.}; spyatam C 81d strīliṅgavyapadeśataḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; strīliṅgavyapadeśitaḥ C 82a śabdasya]CGJPRK^{ed.}; śabdamsya T 82a viṣayākhyasya]TGJRK^{ed.}; ---yākhyasya C; viṣasyākhyasya P 82c °vijñāna°]CGJPRK^{ed.}; °vijñātrṃ° T 82d padavedinām]GPRK^{ed.}; ---vedinām T, papadadinām C, padaveditām J 83b parā hi vāk]TGJPRK^{ed.}; parā --- vok C 83d grāhyaikatāpatet]GJPK^{ed.}; grāhyekatāpate T, stahyekatāpatet C, grāhvaikatāpatet R

573 The connective particle *ca*, following *ata eva*, is added by a later hand in G.
576 J is torn across the entire page, beginning at *paryālocayann āha* and up to *sphuṭam eva* (ŚD 2.81b). The MS is easily legible, however.

572 āpataṭī] G^{p.c.}JP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; āpatīṭī G^{a.c.}; āpatī P^{a.c.}, āpatī R 572 tan na]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; tu na P^{a.c.}, tun na R 573 ca]GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 574 tan na tulyatvaṃ]GJRK^{ed.}; tattulyatvaṃ P 579 yādṛcchikena]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; yādṛcchikena P^{a.c.} 580 strīliṅgabhaṅgyā]JPRK^{ed.}; strīliṅgā bhaṅgyā G 581 darśanāsamanvayāḥ]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; darśanāsamanvayā P^{a.c.}

581 G folio 36r. 583 J folio 34r.

viṣayarūpatvena karmatayā yasyākhyā pratītiḥ śabdasya tasyendriyasya ca
 karaṇatayā prasiddhasya vāgrūpasya miśratvenaikikāreṇa yasmāt tair uktam
 anādinidhanam ityādikam abhedābhidhāyi tayoh, tasmāt tena miśrikāreṇa
 sarvadarśanājñānatā padavedinām vaiyākaraṇānām prāptā. na hi kvacid api
 590 sāṅkhyādidarśaneṣu vyāvahārikayor indriyaviṣayayor abheda iṣṭaḥ. evaṃ ca vā
 śabdasya paratvenānādinidhanatvenādvyavādād aikyena varṇyamānatve haste
 'pi karmendriye tadgrāhyeṇa viṣayenaikatā prasajyeta.

brahmaṇo jñānaśaktiḥ paśyantīty api yāvad iṣyate tāvad anyad api sūkṣma-
 taram eṣṭavyam ity āha

595 paśyantī hi kriyā tasyā bhāgau pūrvāparau sthitau
 etad draṣṭavyam ity eṣo vimarśaḥ pūrvato bhavet 84
 yathā kartuḥ kulālāder ghaṭaḥ kārya itidṛśaḥ
 vimarśa icchārūpeṇa tadvad atrāpi samsthitam 85
 sā sthitā pūrvatas tasyā icchāyāḥ prasaraḥ katham
 600 yāvan na sūkṣma ullāsaś citaḥ kāryonmukhaḥ sthitaḥ 86
 tasyā api sāmarasye vyavasthāvān sthitaḥ śivaḥ
 evaṃ bhavatprakriyāyā api sūkṣmatarā sthitiḥ 87

84b bhāgau]TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhāgā C 84b pūrvāparau]TGJPRK^{ed.}; pūrvagā
 (hypometric) C 84c etad]TK^{ed.p.c.}; e--- C; na tad GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 84c draṣṭavyam
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---ṣṭavyam C 84c eṣo]em.; etad TCGJPRK^{ed.} 84d vimarśaḥ
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; vimīśraḥ T 84d bhavet]CGJPRK^{ed.}; bha---e--- T 85a yathā
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; yadā C 85b ghaṭaḥ kārya]TCGJK^{ed.}; ghaṭākārya PR 85b
 itidṛśaḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; itidṛśaḥ C 85d tadvad]TGJPRK^{ed.}; --- C 85d atrāpi
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; trāpi (hypometric) C 85d samsthitam]TGJPRK^{ed.}; samsthi-
 taḥ C 86b icchāyāḥ]GJPRK^{ed.}; icchayāḥ TC 86b prasaraḥ]GJPRK^{ed.};
 prasara T, prasavaṃ C 86c na]TCPRK^{ed.}; naḥ GJ 86d kāryonmukhaḥ
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; kāryo---khaḥ C 87a api]GJPRK^{ed.}; 'pi T, 'api C 87a sāmarasye
]GJPRK^{ed.}; sāmarasyasya T, sāmarasya C 87b śivaḥ]TJPRK^{ed.}; śivā C; śivam
 G 87c bhavatprakriyāyā]TK^{ed.}; bhavatprakriyāyām C; bhavaprakriyāyā GJ;
 bhavatprakriyāyā P, bhāvaprakriyāyā R 87d api]TGJPRK^{ed.}; pi C

592 J is torn across the entire page, beginning at *viṣayenaikatā* and up to *paśyan-
 tīty api*. The MS is easily legible, however.

586 pratītiḥ]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; prātītiḥ P^{a.c.} 588 miśrikāreṇa]GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.};
 miśrikāreṇe J^{a.c.} 589 prāptā]PK^{ed.}; prāptaḥ GJR 590 vyāvahārikayor
]JPRK^{ed.}; vyāvahārikayor G 592 tadgrāhyeṇa]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; tadgrāheṇa P^{a.c.}R
 593 anyad api]JPRK^{ed.}; anyadāpi G

586 P folio 28. 589 R folio 23r. 596 G folio 36v. 601 J folio 34v.

**sthitā sā na punaḥ satyā vāco vāyugamātmanah
iṣyate brahmarūpatvaṃ ghaṭāder api kathyatām 88**

605 paśyantī hi darśanakriyātmikā pūrvāparībhūtāvayavā, pūrvam caitad
draṣṭavyam iti vimarśaḥ kulālāder iva ghaṭādikaraṇe 'vaśyam icchātmakaḥ syāt,
tadvad atrāpi sarvam etat sthitam. evaṃ cecchā darśanakriyāyāḥ pūrvā sthitā,
tasyāś cecchāyā api cittattvasambandhisūkṣmatarollāsam iṣṭajñeyakāryaun-
mukhyalakṣaṇaṃ vinā prāguktanyāyāt kathaṃ prasarah, tasyā api cito nirvṛty-
610 aunmukhyecchājñānakriyākramavyavasthāyā yat sāmarasyam ekībhavaḥ
samāveśaviśayas tatra vyavasthāvān vyavasthāśrayo 'kramaḥ śivabhaṭṭārakaḥ
sthitā iti. evaṃ jñānaśaktitābhīprāyeṇāpi paśyantyā bhavalakṣaṇāṃ prakriyāṃ
prati sūkṣmatarānyāpi pararūpā sthitiḥ asti, tataḥ sāpy anumantavyā na tu vāyu-
gamātmikāyā vācaḥ satyāś brahmarūpatvaṃ eṣṭavyam evam iṣyamāṇe
615 bhūtātvaīśeṣād ghaṭāder apy evam ucyatām.

**yathā sarvapadārthānāṃ bhagavacchivarūpatā
tadvad vāgindriyasyāpi na punaḥ sā parā daśā 89**

88a sā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; sa C 88a satyā]GJPRK^{ed.}; tassatyā (hypermetric) T, savyā
C 88b vāco]TGJPRK^{ed.}; om. (hypometric) C 88d ghaṭāder]TGJPRK^{ed.};
ghaṭāchar C 89a sarvapadārthānāṃ]CGJPRK^{ed.}; sarvapadā---ānāṃ T 89b
bhagavacchivarūpatā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhagavaścivarūpatāṃ C; bhagavacchevarūpatā
P 89c vāgindriyasyāpi]TGJPRK^{ed.}; vāgīṃdriyasyāpi C

612 P records an “x” marked above the second *bhava* of its variant reading
bhavabhavalakṣaṇāṃ. 614 An imperfection in the MS obscures J’s reading
of *evam*.

606 draṣṭavyam]GJPK^{ed.}; dravyam R 606 vimarśaḥ]GJ^{p.c.}P^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
vimārśaḥ J^{a.c.}, virśaḥ P^{a.c.} 607 darśanakriyāyāḥ]G^{p.c.}J^{a.c.}PRK^{ed.}; darśanakriyā-
yāṃḥ G^{a.c.}, darśanakriyā yā J^{p.c.} 608 tasyāś]JPK^{ed.}; tasyā GR 608 cittattva°
]JPRK^{ed.}; cet tattva° G 608 °sūkṣmatarollāsam]J^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; sūkṣmatarol-
lasam G; °sūkṣmatarollāsan P^{p.c.} 609 prāguktanyāyāt]G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; prāguk-
tānyāyāt G^{a.c.} 609 nirvṛty°]GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; nirvṛty° K^{ed.a.c.} 610 sāmarasyam
]GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; sāmāthyam K^{ed.a.c.} 611 samāveśaviśayas]JPRK^{ed.}; samāveśav-
inayas G 611 tatra]GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; tatrā P^{a.c.} 612 bhavalakṣaṇāṃ]GJK^{ed.};
bhavabhavalakṣaṇāṃ P, bhavam avalakṣaṇāṃ R 612 prakriyāṃ]GJ^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
prakriyāṃ P^{a.c.} 614 eṣṭavyam]JPRK^{ed.}; om. G 614 evam]GPRK^{ed.}; e<?>m J

611 G folio 37r. 612 R folio 23v. 616 J folio 35r.

kaṅṭhādau vadane vāyor vyāpāro vāgrutasya sā
 karaṇaṃ nādarūpādīśabdasyāsti śivātmatā 90
 tasyāpi kathitā pañcatattvadīkṣāvidhau kvacit
 na vāca iṣyate tadvat tasmāt sarvaṃ śivātmakam 91

620

yady api sarvārthānāṃ jñānagocarāṇāṃ cidantaḥpraveśāc cillakṣaṇapara-
 meśvararūpatā paramārthato yathā tathā vāgindriyasyāpi jñeyasarvārthāntar-
 bhāvād ajñeyatve 'sattvādeḥ, tathāpi vāgindriyadaśā parā na bhavati, māyāśaktyā
 625 śivābhedākhyātyā tadutthānāt. tathā hi kaṅṭhatālvādau vadanaikadeśe vāyor yo

91a The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *tasya*, not the MS itself. 91c
 The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *na vāca*, not the MS itself. 91d
 The colophon of C reads: *iti śivadr̥ṣṭivaiyākaraṇa{ma}khaṇḍa{na}nāmadvitiyam
 āhnikam*. That of T reads: *iti dvitiyam āhnikam*.

90a kaṅṭhādau] TGJPRK^{ed.}; karṇādau C 90a vadane] TCK^{ed.}; vedane
 GJPR 90a vāyor] CK^{ed.p.c.}; vāyau TGJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 90b vāgrutasya] TK^{ed.};
 vāgatasya C; bhrāgrutasya GJ; vyāghratasya PR 90c nāda°] TCGJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
 nādi° P^{a.c.} 91a tasya] TCGPRK^{ed.}; <?> J 91b °tattvadīkṣāvidhau] GJPRK^{ed.};
 °tattva---kṣāvidhau T, °tatkaṭākṣāvidhai C 91c na vāca] TGK^{ed.}; avāca C, na
 <?> J, na kā ca PR 91c iṣyate] GJPRK^{ed.}; yiṣyate T, iṣyati C 91d tasmāt
] TJGRK^{ed.}; asmāt C; tasmāt (hypermetric) P

625 The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *kaṅṭha*°, not the MS itself.

622 °parameśvararūpatā] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °parameśvaratā J^{a.c.} 623 paramārtha-
 to] GJRK^{ed.}; paramārtho P 624 'sattvādeḥ] GJK^{ed.p.c.}; sattvāde PR, satvādeḥ
 K^{ed.a.c.} 624 vāgindriyadaśā] JRK^{ed.}; vāgindrayadaśā G; vāṃgindriyadaśā P
 624 parā] GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; aparā K^{ed.a.c.} 624 bhavati] GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; bhaveta
 K^{ed.a.c.} 625 °ākhyātyā] JPRK^{ed.}; °ākhyātā G 625 tadutthānāt] GJPK^{ed.};
 tadutyānāt R 625 kaṅṭha°] GPRK^{ed.}; ka<?> J

623 P folio 29. 625 G folio 37v.

'dhighātavyāpāraḥ śabdāvīrbhāvahetū rutaṃ nāma tasya sā karaṇam, eṣā ca sarvaiva bhedamayy aparāvasthā. atha nādarūpasya sthūlasya sūkṣmasya parasya ca śabdasyāsti mantrātmanaḥ paraśivātmatā tad iṣṭā kathitā pañcatattvadīkṣāvīdhau dīkṣāsāstre na punar evaṃ vāca indriyarūpāyāḥ parabhāvaḥ, tanmayatvaṃ 630 vā jagato yuktam, ataḥ sarvaṃ śivātmakam evopapannam iti.

626 A later hand rewrites *tū* of °*hetū* above the original, correct reading in J. 629 The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *dīkṣāsāstre na*, not the MS itself. 630 The copy of J in my possession is illegible at *upapannam iti*, not the MS itself. 630 The colophons of P and R read: *iti śrīmadrājānakotpaladevakṛtau śivadrṣṭivṛttau dvitīyam āhnikam*. The colophon of K^{ed} reads: *iti śrīmadutpaladevapādakṛtau śrīśivadrṣṭivṛttau dvitīyam āhnikam*. The colophon of G reads: *iti śrīmadrājānakotpaladevakṛtau śivadrṣṭivṛttau dvitīyam āhnikam. śrīguruvācarāṇakamalebhy(corr: ai)o namaḥ*. The colophon of J reads: *iti śrīmadrājānakotpaladevakṛtau śivadrṣṭivṛttau dvitīyam āhnikam. śrīgurucaraṇakamalebhyo namaḥ*.

626 'dhighātavyāpāraḥ] K^{ed}; 'dhighātavyāpāraṃ G^{P.c.}, 'dhiccātavyāpāraṃ P^{a.c.}, 'bhiccātavyāpāraṃ R, 'bhīghavyāpāraṃ J 626 śabdāvīrbhāvahetū] K^{ed}; śabdahetuḥ G^{P.c.}PR; śabdahetu G^{a.c.}J 626 rutaṃ] GJK^{ed}; kurute PR 626 tasya sā] GJK^{ed}; tasyāsau P^{P.c.}, tasyāḥ 'sau P^{a.c.}, tasyā sā R 626 ca] PRK^{ed}; om. GJ 628 paraśivātmatā] GJPR; paramaśivātmatā K^{ed}. 629 dīkṣāsāstre na] GK^{ed}; dīkṣāsā<?> J, dīkṣāsāstreṇa PR 630 sarvaṃ] PRK^{ed}; sarva GJ 630 upapannam] GPRK^{ed}; upapa<?>m J 630 iti] GPR; <?>ti J, iti śivam K^{ed}.

Chapter Three of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti*

advayavādaḥ sthitaḥ, paśyantivicārād anantaram svayūthyān advayavādinaḥ pra-
tīdanīm ārambhaḥ. tathā ca tair uktam

yasyā nirupādhiyotīrūpāyāḥ śivasamjñāyā
vyapadeśaḥ parāṃ tām tvām ambām nityam upāsmahe

5 iti. tatrāha

**atha śakteḥ parāvasthā yair bhaktyā parigīyate
yuktyā prakāśito devas tataḥ śaktidaśā yataḥ** 1

1a śakteḥ] TGJRK^{ed.}; śaktiḥ C, śabde P 1a parāvasthā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; parā
vyasthā C 1b parigīyate] TGJPRK^{ed.}; parigītaye C 1c yuktyā] TGJPRK^{ed.};
yuktā C 1c prakāśito] TCGJPK^{ed.}, prakāśato R 1c devas] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---evas
T 1d tataḥ] TGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; tac (hypometric) C, ūtaḥ P^{a.c.}R 1d śaktidaśā yataḥ
] GJPRK^{ed.}; śaktidaśā yathā T, chaktidaśāṃtaye C

3 The present quotation is an excerpt from the lost TGSt of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna.

1 svayūthyān] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; svayūthyāṃn P^{a.c.} 3 nirupādhiyotī°] GJR^{p.c.}
K^{ed.a.c.}; nirudhiyotī° P, nirupācijyotī° R^{a.c.}, nirupadhijyoti K^{ed.p.c.} 3 śivasamj-
ñāyā] GPRK^{ed.}; śivasamjñāyā J 4 tvām] GJRK^{ed.}; tvāṃm P

1 R folio 24r. 7 G folio 38r.

liṅgaviśeṣānyathānupapattī śaktitvenaivābhimatasyārthasya parāvasthārūpā-
 bhidhānaṃ bhaktir eva tataḥ parasya śaktimato 'bhāvāc chaktimadabhinnā hi
 10 tata uddhṛtyāpi prayojanavaśān nirdiśyamānā tatpāratantryeṇa tadanantaram
 nirdeśam arhati. yatas tair eva tataḥ parāvasthāto 'nantaram śaktidaśā kiñciduc-
 chūnatetyādinoktā tato yaiḥ śakteḥ paratvaṃ gīyate tais tayā dharmabhūtayā
 dharmī svāśrayaḥ svatanthro vāstavābhedayuktyā devaḥ śivaḥ prakāśitaḥ. nirmim-
 ittam eva tu viśeṣātmani strīliṅge kim ity abhiniveśaḥ, puṃstvaṃ hi
 15 strīpuṃsayoḥ sāmānyam liṅgam, napuṃsakam punaḥ śaktatāparyāyarūpaṃ
 naivaṃvidhaviśveṣvaranirdeśāvasare yuktopapādanam ity abhedābhidhānār-
 thaṃ śaktitadvatoḥ puṃstvenopapattiḥ.

tathā tadvyapadeśāś ced vyapadeśaḥ śivātmakaḥ

tathā strīliṅgena paramaśivasyaiva vyapadeśo mataś cet tat so 'pi vyapadeśa
 20 uktanyāyāc chivaśabdātmakaḥ kāryaḥ.

2a tadvyapadeśāś]TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadyupadeśāś C 2b vyapadeśaḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.};
 yūpadeśaḥ C^{p.c.}; yūpadeśeḥ C^{a.c.}

11 J suggests *parāvasthāto* should be read as two words, viz.: *parāvasthā 'to*. It
 is possible that the scribe transposed the *avagraha*, however, and that it should
 be understood with what follows, i.e., it should be read prior to *anantaram*.

8 abhimatasya]GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; abhimate sya J^{a.c.} 10 nirdiśyamānā]JPRK^{ed.};
 nirdimānā G 10 tatpāra°]GJRK^{ed.}; tatpāraṃ P 10 tadanantaram]GJK^{ed.};
 tadantaram PR 11 ucchūnatety°]PRK^{ed.}; °ucchūnety GJ^{p.c.}, ucchūtety J^{a.c.}
 12 yaiḥ]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; yai P^{a.c.}R 13 svatanthro]J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; svātantryo G, svā-
 tantro J^{a.c.} 13 vāstavābheda°]GJK^{ed.}; vāstavāthābheda° P^{p.c.}, vās tathābheda°
 P^{a.c.}R 13 prakāśitaḥ]GJK^{ed.}; prakāśato P^{p.c.}R, prakāśatoṃ P^{a.c.} 13 nirmim-
 mittam]GJPR; animittam K^{ed.} 15 śaktatā°]G^{a.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; śaktitā° G^{p.c.} 16
 yuktopapādanam]GJP^{p.c.}; yuktopamādanam P^{a.c.}R, yuktopapādānam K^{ed.} 16
 abheda°]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; abhibheda° P^{a.c.}R 17 śaktitadvatoḥ]JP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; tadvatoḥ
 G, śaktitadvato P^{a.c.}R 19 strīliṅgena]GJRK^{ed.}; strīliṅgena P 19 cet]PRK^{ed.};
 ces GJ 20 chivaśabdātmakaḥ]G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; chivātmakaḥ G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}

abhedam evāha

na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekiṇī 2
 śivaḥ śaktas tathā bhāvān icchayā kartum idr̥śān
 śaktiśaktimātor bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varṇyate 3

25 śaktiyā rahitaḥ śūnyo na yady api śivas tathāpi katham aikyam. tad āha na śaktir vyatirekinīti. tathā hi tena tenaiva vaicitryeṇedr̥śān atiduṣkarān icchāmātreṇa śaktaḥ śivaḥ kartum iti vyavahāre 'py abhedah, śaktitadvator bhedo 'nupapadyamānatvāc chaive na kadācid avāntarādibhedeṣv api varṇyate yathānyatrāprāmāṇikadarśaneṣu.

30 tad eva vicārayann āha

śakter eva svatantratvāt kartum bhāvān vicitrakān
 sāmartyaṃ yadi kalpyeta tan nāmānantyam eva vā 4
 bhede hi śaktiḥ kiṃ kāryaṃ karoty uta ca śaktimān

2c Cf. VBh 18: *śaktiśaktimātor yadvad abhedah sarvadā sthitaḥ / atas taddharmadharmitvāt parā śaktiḥ parātmanaḥ*. Cf., also, ŚS 1.17: *svapadaśaktiḥ*. 4b P deletes an erroneously recorded *ca* prior to *bhāvān*. 5a C deletes the erroneous recording of *yadi* prior to recording *bhede hi*.

2c na] TGJPRK^{ed.}; om. C 2d śaktir] TGJPRK^{ed.}; śakti C 2d vyatirekiṇī] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vyatirekiṇī C 3a śaktas] TCGJPK^{ed.}; śaktis R 3b idr̥śān] TCK^{ed.p.c.}; ihate GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 3c °śaktimātor] TJPRK^{ed.}; °śaktimanor C, °śaktimato G 3c bhedaḥ] TCGJPK^{ed.}; bheda P^{a.c.}R 3d jātu] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --ātu T 4a śakter] TGJRK^{ed.}; śaktir CP 4c sāmartyaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sāmartyaṃ C 4c kalpyeta] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kalpetam C 4d tan] CGJPK^{ed.}; tan<?>an T, n P^{a.c.} 5a śaktiḥ] TCGJPK^{ed.}; śakti R 5a kāryaṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; kārya T 5b karoty uta ca] TGJPRK^{ed.}; karoti yadi C

26 The reading of my copy of J is unclear at *vaicitryeṇa*, and it is possible that the MS reads *vecitryeṇa*. 27 J records *bheda*^o in a blotched hand, and the same is rewritten in the right margin. 31 J records *rtum* of *kartum* in a blotched hand, and the same is rewritten at the bottom of the page, directly below the *akṣara* in question.

21 abhedam] GJPR^{a.c.}K^{ed.}; abhedas R^{p.c.} 26 śaktir] JPRK^{ed.}; śakti G 26 idr̥śān] K^{ed.}; dr̥śān GJPR 27 vyavahāre] GJPK^{ed.}; vyavahāra R 27 bhedo] *em.*; bheda^o GJPR; bhedaḥ^o K^{ed.} 28 chaive] GJPK^{ed.}; chaiva R 28 avāntarādibhedeṣv] GJPK^{ed.}; vāntarādibhedeṣv P^{a.c.} 29 °darśaneṣu] JPRK^{ed.}; °adarśaneṣu G

21 G folio 38v. 25 R folio 24v. 28 P folio 30. 32 J folio 36v. 33 C folio 6r.

tatra yadi śaktis tat kim asau śaktā karoty athāśaktā, aśaktasya karaṇe 'tipra-
35 saṅgaḥ, śaktatve tasyāḥ śaktyantarayoge śaktyāśrayasya śivasyaiva śaktir iti nāma
syāt. atha śaktyaiva satyābhinnaśaktiyogas tat saiva bhinnaśaktiḥ kāryaṃ kuryāt,
kathaṃ vā kuryād aśaktā, śaktatve śaktyantarakalpanenānavasthā syād ānanta-
patteḥ.

kiṃ ca

40 śaktimān eva śaktiḥ syāc chivavat karaṇārthataḥ 5
śakteḥ svatantrakāryatvāc chivatvaṃ na kvacid bhavet

śaktir api śaktyantarayogāt kurvati śaktimān eva syāt. kāraṇalakṣaṇād arthāt
pravṛttinimitat kartṛtvād ity arthaḥ, yathā śivabhaṭṭārakaḥ. śakteś ca svatantraṃ
svanibandhanaṃ kāryaṃ nānyāśrayam iti śivatā nānyatra kvacid bhaved iti śaiva-
45 darśanānupapattiḥ svayūthyānām.

muñcato 'pi nijāṃ śaktiṃ svātantrye jñānam āpatet 6

5d J records the first *va* in *chivavat*^o in an unclear hand, and the same is written above the *akṣara* in question.

5c śaktiḥ syāc]TGJPRK^{ed.}; śa--- C 5d chivavat^o]JPRK^{ed.}; chiva---^o T, chivat^o
(hypometric) C, chinnavat^o G 5d °karaṇārthataḥ]TGJK^{ed.}; °karaṇārdataḥ C,
°kāraṇārthataḥ PR 6a śakteḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; śaktiḥ C 6a svatantrakāryatvāc
]K^{ed.p.c.}; svātantryakāryatvāc TGJPRK^{ed.a.c.}, svatantrakāryatva C 6b bhavet
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhevat C 6c muñcato]TGJPRK^{ed.}; mañcato C 6c 'pi
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; hi T 6d jñānam]TGJPRK^{ed.}; --m C

34 śaktā]G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}K^{ed.}; śakta G^{p.c.}, śaktaḥ J^{p.c.}, śaktyā PR 34 aśaktā]G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}PR-
K^{ed.}; aśaktaḥ G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.} 34 karaṇe]GJK^{ed.}; kaṇe PR 36 bhinnaśaktiḥ
]GJK^{ed.}; bhinnaśakti^o PR 37 anavasthā]JK^{ed.}; anavastā G, avasthā PR 37
ānanta^o]JK^{ed.}; anantya^o GPR 39 kiṃ ca]GJRK^{ed.}; om. P 42 kāraṇa^o
]GJPR; karaṇa^o K^{ed.} 42 °lakṣaṇād]JPK^{ed.}; °upalakṣaṇād G, °lakṣāṇād R
43 yathā]JPRK^{ed.}; yathāc ca G 43 svatantraṃ]JPRK^{ed.}; svatantryaṃ G
44 kāryaṃ]GJPK^{ed.}; kārya R 44 na]GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 45 svayūthyānām
]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; svaśūthyānām P^{a.c.}, sva---ūdhyānām R

śaktim muñcato viviktasya śivabhaṭṭāarakasyābhyupagame...tattvāt svātantrye jñeyaniṣṭhatvābhāvasa...m āpnoti jñeyāprakāśanāt tac ca...athavā nijaśaktityāge...hi tasya svātantryasya...tathaiva jñānaṃ syāt...śaktimataḥ śakteḥ pṛthagbhāvena pratītir asti kevalam ekasminn eva yasmin vastuni pratīteḥ kiñcid bhavati tatsamānaṃ śaktaṃ vyavahārasāram evam ucyate śaktimān iti.

tad āha

na himasya pṛthak śaityaṃ nāgner auṣnyaṃ pṛthag bhavet

śaktiḥ śaktatvaṃ śaktasya dharmāḥ, na ca dharmo dharmiṇo bhidyate yathā 55 himavahnyoḥ śiṭoṣṇasparśau na pṛthag upalabhyete.

7a Cf. VBh 19: *na vahner dāhikā śaktir vyatirikṭā vibhāvvyate / kevalaṃ jñānasat-tāyāṃ prārambho 'yaṃ praveśane.*

7a śaityaṃ] TGPP^{c.}K^{ed.}; chaityaṃ CJR, daityaṃ P^{a.c.} 7b nāgner] TGJRK^{ed.}; nāgne C, nāgnyer P 7b auṣnyaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kāṣṭhaye (hypermetric) C

47 R records a gap in the transcription of *muñcato*, viz.: *muñca - to*. 47 G, P, and R omit ...*tattvāt svātantrye jñeyaniṣṭhatvābhāvasa...m āpnoti jñeyāprakāśanāt tac ca...athavā nijaśaktityāge...hi tasya svātantryasya...tathaiva jñānaṃ syāt... śaktimataḥ śakteḥ*. 49 G deletes an *akṣara* prior to *pṛthagbhāva*. 51 The reading of my copy of J, and not the MS itself, is unclear at *tatsamānaṃ*. 52 The reading of my copy of J, and not the MS itself, is unclear at *tad āha*. 55 The reading of my copy of J, and not the MS itself, is unclear at *upalabhyete*.

47 śivabhaṭṭāarakasya] GPRK^{ed.}; śivabhaṭṭārasya J 47 °abhyupagame] PRK^{ed.}; °abhyupage GJ 49 svātantryasya] J; om. GPR, svasvātantryasya K^{ed.} 49 śakteḥ] K^{ed.}; om. GJPR 49 pṛthagbhāvena] GJK^{ed.}; prāgbhavana P, --bhāvena R 50 pratīteḥ] K^{ed.}; pratīte GJPR 50 kiñcid] GPRK^{ed.}; kiñci J 51 tatsamānaṃ] GPRK^{ed.}; ---mānaṃ J 52 tad āha] GPRK^{ed.}; ---d āha J 54 śaktatvaṃ] GJK^{ed.}; na PR 54 śaktasya dharmāḥ] GJK^{ed.}; śaktadharmo PR 53 yathā] *em.*; tathā GJPRK^{ed.} 55 upalabhyete] GPRK^{ed.}; u---labhyete J

47 J folio 37r. 50 R folio 25r. 51 G folio 39v.

mantrastambhanatāyāṃ hi nāsau vahnis tadocyate 7
hemādivad bhāsvaram tad dravyaṃ tair vyabhicāritam
yady auṣṇyavyatirekatve dr̥ṣṭānto dāhakāśrayāt 8

mantreṇa uṣṇyastambhanaṃ yasya tathā śaktivyatirekatā śaktimata ucyate. 60 tan nedaṃ vahnitvam, tadabhāve saty agner auṣṇyaṃ nopalabhyate yatas tadānīm asau vahnis tejomayate 'pi yathā suvarṇādi dravyaṃ bhāsvaram. atha tair eva hemādibhir agniṣaṃjñatejomahābhūtātmbhir eva dr̥ṣṭāntair yadi śaktivyatirekatā śaktimata ucyate tan na doṣo yato dāhakatvenāśrita uṣṇaḥ san vahniḥ śaktivyatireke dr̥ṣṭāntīkr̥to na vahnimātram.

7c T might read °dāvanatāṃ yā for °stambhanatāyāṃ. 7d The reading of my copy of J, and not the MS itself, is unclear at *tadocyate*. The reading of T at *tadocyate* is mostly missing due to damage to the manuscript, but is nevertheless legible. 8c ŚD 3,8cd is omitted in G and J.

7c °stambhanatāyāṃ] JPRK^{ed.}; °bhāvanatāṃ yā T, °stamdambhanatāyā (hypermetric) C, °stambhanatāṃ yāṃ G 7d nāsau] GJPRK^{ed.}; nā--- T, nānā C 7d vahnis] TCGJK^{ed.}; vahni PR 7d tadocyate] TGPRK^{ed.}; tatho - - C, tado--- J 8a bhāsvaram] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhāmsvaram C 8b vyabhicāritam] GJPRK^{ed.}; vyabhicāritā TC 8c yady] CGJPRK^{ed.}; yad T 8c auṣṇyavyatirekatve] TPR; osnyavyatirecive C, om. GJ, auṣṇyavyatirekatve K^{ed.} 8d dr̥ṣṭānto] TPRK^{ed.}; dr̥ṣṭāṃśo C, om. GJ

59 G omits *śaktivyatirekatā śaktimata ucyate. tan nedaṃ vahnitvam, tada*. J Does so, as well, but adds the following in the left margin: *ya<?>e<?> vyatirekatve <?> dākāhaṃ <?>*. 60 P and R omit °*daṃ vahnitvam, tada*°, along with G and J. 61 The reading of my copy of J, and not the MS itself, is unclear at *api*. 62 K^{ed.} includes, in parentheses, *agnisahacaritair* following *agnisaṃjñā*°, but none of the four manuscripts (G, J, P or R) attests to this reading, and I therefore leave it out of the present edition. 62 K^{ed.} records *śaktivyatirekatā...yato* in parentheses. 62 J records *śaktiśaktivyatirekatā tan ne* on the last page of the folio on a line that begins far into the left margin. Following this, J again records °*vyatirekatā* beginning at the top of the next folio. 63 A later hand has marked the text with an “x” above *san* in P. 64 R records an unidentified mark above the final *akṣara* of *dr̥ṣṭānti*°.

59 mantreṇa] JK^{ed.}; mantryeṇa GPR 61 'pi] GPRK^{ed.}; <?> J 62 °ātmabhir] GPRK^{ed.}; °ādibhir J 62 dr̥ṣṭāntair] GJPR; dr̥ṣṭānto K^{ed.} 62 śaktivyatirekatā] GPRK^{ed.}; śaktiśaktivyatirekatā J 63 āśrita] GJR; śrita PK^{ed.} 63 san] GJPR; san sa K^{ed.} 63 vahniḥ] GJK^{ed.}; vahni PR 64 śaktivyatireke] GK^{ed.}; śaktivyatireke JPR 64 °mātram] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; °mātrakaṃ P^{a.c.}

65 śaivaiḥ sadbhir vāca eva paśyantyādikrame sthitāḥ
kalpitās tair aśaivatvam ātmanah pratipāditam 9

anyac ca yaiḥ śaktivādibhiḥ

yasyā nirupādhijyotirūpāyāḥ śivasamjñayā
vyapadeśaḥ

70 ity evamabhidhānāc chaivadarśanasthitair api sadbhir vāca eva kramavyavasthi-
tāḥ paśyantīmadhyamāvaikharīsamjñābhir viśvātmatayā kalpitāḥ, yad āhuḥ

yāvan nonmeṣabhāg aṇuḥ
na tāvad arthe varteta sa conmeṣaḥ kriyā matā
kriyā ca nānārūpaiva

75 ity upakramya

svasvabhāvasthitiṃ muktvā tasmān nānyāsti sā daśā
śive yasyāṃ na vāgrūpaṃ sūkṣmam aprāptasamnidhi

9a C, despite witnessing a complete ŚD 3.9, records the presence of three miss-
ing *akṣaras* (- - -) prior to the verse in question.

9a śaivaiḥ] TPRK^{ed.}; śaivai C, śaivaḥ G] 9a vāca eva] CGJPRK^{ed.}; vājayaiva
T 9b sthitāḥ] GJK^{ed.}; sthi--- T, sthitaḥ CPR 9c kalpitās] GJPRK^{ed.};
ka---i--- T, kalpitā C 9c tair] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 9c aśaivatvam] GJPRK^{ed.};
--- T, aśeṣatvam C 9d ātmanah] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---naḥ T 9d pratipāditam
] GJPRK^{ed.}; pratiprā---itam T, pratipāditāḥ C

71 R records the addition of an *akṣara* following *paśyantīmadhyamāvaikharī*^o,
but what is intended is not entirely clear. 72 J highlights its reading *aṇuḥ*.

73 J records *da* above the last *akṣara* of *tavad*, this to make clear that *da* and not
ca was meant to be written. 76 J's recording of *svasvabhāva*^o extends into the
right margin.

67 śaktivādibhiḥ] GJRK^{ed.}; śaktivādbhiḥ P 68 yasyā] JPRK^{ed.}; asyā G
68 nirupādhi^o] G]; nirupadhi^o P^{p.c.}K^{ed.}, nirupadi^o P^{a.c.}, nirupādi^o R 68
śivasamjñayā] GPRK^{ed.}; śivasamjñāyā J 70 ^osthitair] GJP^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; ^osthitir
P^{a.c.} 72 unmeṣabhāg] PRK^{ed.}; unmeṣabhāgā G] 72 aṇuḥ] JRK^{ed.}; *om.*
G, aṇaḥ P 73 arthe] GJRK^{ed.}; artha P 73 varteta] GJK^{ed.}; vartate PR
74 nānārūpaiva] JPRK^{ed.}; nānārūpair vā G 76 muktvā] GJK^{ed.}; uktā PR
76 tasmān na] GJP^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; tasmāl P^{a.c.} 76 sā] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; sa P^{a.c.}R 77
yasyāṃ] GJPR; yasyā K^{ed.} 77 aprāptasamnidhi] GJP^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; aprāptaṃ
samnidhi J^{a.c.}

68 G folio 4or. 71 P folio 31. 77 R folio 25v.

iti tair aśaivatvam ātmana uktam.

tathā hi

- 80 śaive vāca indriyatvam atha nādādinoditā
 tadabhyāse phalāvāptiḥ sūkṣmamantrasvarūpatā IO
 kathitā kālapādādaḥ nādākhyam yat paraṃ tv iti
 parāparādibhedaś ca tatraiva pratipāditaḥ II
 ity anena varṇitātra vāca eva parātmā

- 85 śaive hi vācaḥ sāṅkhya iva karmendriyatvam evātyantādhas tanadaśāyām.
 atha nāde pralīnacita ityādinā vāca eva phalāvāptiḥ kathitā sūkṣmamantrātmatā
 kālottarādaḥ

nādākhyam yat paraṃ bijam... ([Śatika-]Kālaññāna 1.2c/
 Sārdhatrisatikālottara 1.5a)

11b J's recording of ŚD 3.11b extends into the left margin. 12a J's recording of *varṇitātra* begins in the left margin and includes a gap between the first and second *akṣaras*, as well as the presence of an additional short -i marker prior to the gap in question. 12b T's reading of *vāca* is obscured by damage to the manuscript, but is legible.

10a vāca] GJPRK^{ed.}; v---ca T, vā--- C 10a indriyatvam] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 ---drayatvam C 10b nādādinoditā] GJRK^{ed.}; n---ditā T, nādāditā (hypomet-
 ric) C, nādadinoditā P 10c tadabhyāse] TCPRK^{ed.}; tadābhyāse G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}, tadā-
 syāse G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.} 10d sūkṣmamantra°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sūkṣmamantraḥ C 11a
 kāla°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; jñāna° C 11b yat paraṃ tv iti] GJPRK^{ed.}; --- T, yat padaṃ-
 tite C 11c parāparādibhedaś] CGJK^{ed.}; ---dibheda--- T, parāparādibhedaś PR
 11d tatraiva] GJPRK^{ed.}; tatreva T, tatraiteva (hypermetric) C 11d pratipāditaḥ
] CGJPRK^{ed.}; prati---āditaḥ T 12a varṇitātra] GJPRK^{ed.}; va---ṇ---ta--- T, avarṇitā-
 tra (hypermetric) C 12b vāca] TGJPRK^{ed.}; pāca C 12b eva] CGJPRK^{ed.};
 evā T

86 J highlights *ta* in °*cita*.

- 85 sāṅkhya] JPRK^{ed.}; sāṅkhyā G 85 evātyantādhas] GJK^{ed.}; evādhas PR
 86 °*cita*] G^{a.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; °*citta* G^{p.c.} 86 ° *ātmatā*] GJPR; ° *ātmakatā* K^{ed.}

82 T folio 4v. 85 J folio 38r.

90 ityādinā parāparādibhinnaṭā cōkṭeti tasmād anena śaivagranthena vāca eva parātmatā katham ayuktā. paraṃ tv iti tuśabdaḥ pādapūraṇe.

naitan na vācaḥ kathitaṃ patiśabdasya varṇitam 12
śabdasya viśayākhyasya na kadācid udāhṛtam

tad etan na, na hi vāgindriyasya baddhāṇuvyavasthitasya tat tatra kathitam, 95 viśayākhyasya vā śabdasya tat paratvaṃ kadācit kvacit pratipāditam, api tu pati-bhāva īśvaratāsamāpattau yo mahāmantramayaḥ śabdanātmā tasyoktam.

tathā cāha khetapālaḥ śabdarāśer viśeṣatām 13
svāyambhuvasya ṭikāyāṃ bādham ityādinā guruḥ
tathā mataṅgaṭikāyāṃ vyākhyāniguruṇoditam 14
mantrānāṃ paraśabdānāṃ uktam vāco na jātucit

100

13c J records *āha* in a manner that closely resembles *āpha*. 13c P records a black mark above the *visarga* in *khetapālaḥ*. 14d An *akṣara* is deleted following °*guru*° in G. 15b T records *vāco* in a manner suggesting it first read *vāce*. 15b An *akṣara*, apparently *na*, follows the negative particle *na* in T, a hypermetric reading. 15b T is torn at *jātucit*, but is nevertheless legible.

12c *kathitaṃ*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *kathitaḥ* C 13b *udāhṛtam*] CGJPRK^{ed.}; u--- T 13c *tathā*] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 13c *āha*] CJPRK^{ed.}; cā--- T, *āpha* G 13c *khetapālaḥ*] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---laḥ T, *khetapā* - C 13d *śabdarāśer*] TGJK^{ed.}; *śabdarāśir* C, *śabdarāśi* PR 14a *svāyambhuvasya ṭikāyāṃ*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *svāyambhuvākhyāṭikāyāṃ* C 14b *ityādinā*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *ityāha dināṃ* (hypermetric) C 14d *vyākhyāniguruṇoditam*] G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; *vyākhyāniguruṇoditam* T, *vyā* - - *guruṇoditam* C, *vyākhyāniguṇoditam* (hypometric) G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.} 15a *paraśabdānāṃ*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *paraśabdānāṃm* C 15b *uktam*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *uktam ukta* (hypermetric) C

90 *ityādinā*] GJK^{ed.}; *ityanā* PR 91 *tuśabdaḥ*] GJK^{ed.}; *śabdaḥ* PR 91 *pādapūraṇe*] GJRK^{ed.}; *pādapūna* P^{p.c.}, *pādapūrṇe* P^{a.c.} 94 *na*] JRK^{ed.}; *om.* GP 94 *vāgindriyasya*] GJK^{ed.}; *vāgindriya*° PR 94 °*aṇu*°] JP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °*āra*° G, °*aṇuṃ* P^{a.c.}, °*anuṇu*° R 95 *kvacit*] JPRK^{ed.}; *om.* G

khetapālaguruḥ śrīsvāyambhuvaśāstraṭīkāyāṃ kiṃ śabdarāśer viśeṣo 'stīty ākṣipya bādham ekaḥ śivātmako 'nyac ca pāśātmaka ityādinā paratvena śabdarāśer mantrarūpasya kartr̥śaktāv avasthānād viśiṣyamāṇatām āha na tu śabda ity eva kṛtvā śabdarāśer nirviśeṣatvam. tathā vyākhyānisamjñakena guruṇā mata-
 105 ṅgaṭīkāyāṃ evam eva viśiṣṭam uktam. tac coktaṃ pramāṭṛbhūmigatānāṃ mantrānāṃ parabhūmigatānāṃ ca śabdānāṃ na tu vāgindriyasya kadācit, vāgin-
 driyaṃ hi māyāpada eva sthitam, śabdāḥ tu paratanmātrarūpaḥ paravyomama-
 hābhūtamayaḥ parameśvarasya pañcabrahmavinyāse vaktram ucyate. darśitaṃ
 ca tad īśvarapratyabhijñāyām.

110 **tatra vā tadupāyatvāt paratvenopacāritā 15**
kiraṇeṣu tathā coktaṃ nādabindvādinēdṛśam

atha paramantraśabdaprāptiupāyatvāt paratvaṃ paśyantyā evopacārayogena matam. tathā ca śrīkīraṇasaṃhitāyāṃ nādabindvādinaivaṃvidham upacāra-
 vastu kathitam.

115 **tadupāyāt paratvaṃ ced dīpāder apy upāyatā 16**

16c An illegible syllable is deleted following *dīpā* in C.

15c tatra] CGJPRK^{ed.}; t--- T 15c tadupāyatvāt] GJPRK^{ed.}; tadupāsatvāt T, tadupāyatvā C 15d upacāritā] T^{p.c.}GJK^{ed.}; ucāritī T^{a.c.}, upadāditaḥ C, upacāritaḥ PR 16a kiraṇeṣu] T^{p.c.}CGJPRK^{ed.}; kiraṇaṣu T^{a.c.} 16a tathā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; thā (hypometric) T 16b nādabindvādinā] TJPRK^{ed.}; nāda tv indvādinā C, nādarindvādanā G 16c tadupāyāt] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadupāyā C 16d upāyatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; apāyatā C

102 J is damaged at *ityādinā*. 102 J records the following marginal note at the bottom of the folio: *tathā mataṅgaṭīkāyāṃ bādham ityādinā guruḥ*.

101 khetapālaguruḥ] JPRK^{ed.}; khetapānaguruḥ G 102 pāśātmaka] PRK^{ed.}; pāśātmaka GJ 102 ityādinā] GPRK^{ed.}; ityā---i--- J 103 viśiṣyamāṇatām] GP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; viśiṣyamāṇatām JP^{a.c.} 103 na tu] GJK^{ed.}; nṛta PR 104 nir-
 viśeṣatvam] JPRK^{ed.}; nirviśetvam G 104 vyākhyānisamjñakena guruṇā] GJK^{ed.}; vyākhyānisamjñaketuguruṇā P, vyākhyānisamjñaketvaguruṇā R 104 mataṅga°] JPRK^{ed.}; mātaṅgā° G 105 tac coktaṃ] GJPR; tathoktaṃ K^{ed.} 106 śabdānāṃ] GJP^{a.c.}RK^{ed.}; śabdānā P^{p.c.} 107 paratanmātrarūpaḥ] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; para tasmān narūpaḥ P^{a.c.} 107 paravyoma°] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; paravyama° P^{a.c.}R 109 ca tad] GJPR; caitad K^{ed.} 112 °śabda°] GJPK^{ed.}; om. R 112 °prāptiupāyatvāt] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °prāpti upāyatvāt P^{a.c.}, prāvyaprāpti upāyatvāt R 112 paśyantyā] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; paśyanratyā P^{a.c.}, paśantyā R 113 ca] JPRK^{ed.}; om. G

102 J folio 38v. 103 R folio 26r. 104 G folio 41r. 112 P folio 32.

kiraṇādāv anyathā tad uktam, tatra tadupāyamātrarūpatvāt paratvaṃ dīpāder
api jñānopāyāt paratāprasaṅgād ity eṣāṃ śaivadarśanasthānānāṃ paśyantī-
paratvavādo 'nupapannaḥ. pūrvoktanīyā ca svatantraśaktivādaḥ prakṛto 'py
eṣāṃ ayuktaḥ.

120 **tasmāt samagrākāreṣu sarvāsu pratipattiṣu**
vijñeyaṃ śivarūpatvaṃ svaśaktyāveśanātmakam 17

tasmāc chaktimātravādasyānupapannatvāt sarvāsu pratītiṣv indriya-
manomātrajanyāsu ye sphuranty ākārās teṣu sarveṣv eva śaktimadbhaga-
vacchivarūpatvaṃ sthitaṃ jñeyaṃ pūrvoktasarvanijaśaktisāmarasyamayam
125 upadeśagamyam.

svaniṣṭhe śivatā deve pṛthivyādāv apīdrśam

yathā svaniṣṭhe śivatāmātrasthitaḥ parameśvare śivatā sarvaśaktivilatā,
tathā pṛthivīparyantāyām api tādrśam eva rūpam.

130 **piṇḍe vā kaṭikāyāṃ vā kiṃ suvarṇatvam iṣyate** 18
na bhūṣaṇe kuṇḍalādaḥ yathā tatra svaśaktiṭaḥ
rūpakatvaṃ gataṃ hema na śaktyaiva svatantrayā 19

17c T is torn at *vijñeyaṃ* but is nevertheless legible.

17a tasmāt] TGJPRK^{ed.}; --- C 17a samagrākāreṣu] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sama-
grākāreṣu C 17b sarvāsu] TGJPRK^{ed.}; sarvānu° C 17c śivarūpatvaṃ
] CGJPRK^{ed.}; śivarūpat--m̐ T 17d °āveśana°] CGJPRK^{ed.}; °āvedana° T 18a
svaniṣṭhe] TGJPRK^{ed.}; svaniṣṭhā C 18a deve] TGJPRK^{ed.}; deva C 18b
pṛthivyādāv] GJPRK^{ed.}; pṛthivyāvād T^{a.c.}; pṛthivyāvāvad T^{p.c.}; pāthī-- v C^{p.c.};
pṛthī-- v C^{a.c.} 18b apīdrśam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; apīdrśam C 18c vā kaṭikāyāṃ
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vādikāyāṃ (hypometric) C 18d suvarṇatvam] TPRK^{ed.}; su-
varṇam (hypometric) C, svavarṇatvam GJ 19a kuṇḍalādaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.};
kuṇḍaledaḥ C 19c gataṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; gate T 19d śaktyaiva] TCGJK^{ed.};
śaktyaiva PR 19d svatantrayā] CGJPK^{ed.}; svatantratā TR

116 kiraṇādāv] GJJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; kiraṇādoḥ P^{a.c.}; kiraṇādāv R 117 śaivadarśana-
sthānānāṃ] P; śaivadarśanasthānāṃ GJRK^{ed.} 118 pūrvoktanīyā] GJK^{ed.};
pūrvoktapūrvoktanīyā PR 118 prakṛto] K^{ed.}; prakṛte GJPR 122 pratītiṣv
] GJRK^{ed.}; om. P 123 °mātra°] GJK^{ed.}; °māva° PR 123 ākārās] P^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
ākārās GJP^{a.c.} 124 °sāmarasyamayam] GJRK^{ed.}; °sāmarasyamayam ayam
P 127 svaniṣṭhe] GJK^{ed.}; svaniṣṭe PR 128 °paryantāyām] GJJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.};
°paryantāyām P^{a.c.}R 128 eva] GJJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; e P^{a.c.}R

117 J folio 39r. 118 G folio 41v. 127 R folio 26v.

**tathēcchayā samāviṣṭas tathā śaktitrayeṇa ca
tathā tathā sthito bhāvair ataḥ sarvaṃ śivātmakam 20**

na hi tattadbhūṣaṇādivyaktāvayavavikāram aprāpta eva piṇḍe kaṭikāsthita eva
135 suvarṇatā na tu kuṇḍalādāv iti vaktuṃ śakyam, api tu sarvatraiva sāmyena sva-
yaṃ vikārāpattiśaktiyutaṃ hemaiva sthitam, piṇḍākhyam suvarṇam eva tathā
śaktimat prasaratī. kuṇḍalam api punar anyathā prasaratī śaktimad eva, na tu
śaktir eva svatantrā hemnas tathātvakāraṇam. tasyās tadvyatirikṭayā anupalak-
ṣaṇāt. dr̥ṣyamānahemarūpatve ca śakter nāmni vivādaḥ, tasyā api ca punaḥ
140 kuṇḍalādigamane śaktir eṣṭavyetyādi prāg uktam. evaṃ suvarṇavat parameś-
vara eva pūrvoktecchādiśaktimāms tathā tattvabhuvanakāryakāraṇādiprakāravai-
citryeṇa sarvaiḥ padārthair itthambhūtalakṣaṇaiḥ sthito 'taḥ śivātmakam eva
sarvaṃ na tu śaktyātmakam. vyāvahārikaśaktibhedāśrayaṇe tu śaktyātmakam
uktam

145 śaktayas tu jagat sarvaṃ

iti, vastutas tu śivātmakam eva.

20b The conjunct consonant *sta* of *samāviṣṭas tathā* is blotched but rewritten more legibly above the *saṃyuktākṣara* in question in J.

20a tathēcchayā] GJPRK^{ed.}; yathecchayā T, tathēcayā C 20a samāviṣṭas
] TGJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; samāviṣṭa CP^{a.c.} 20b śakti°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; śaktim C 20c
bhāvair] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhāṃvair C

134 J is damaged at °ādirūpasthita. 135 P records an “x” mark above its read-
ing of *va* for the negative particle *na*. 136 A later hand inserts a mark above
ma in P’s reading of *hemava* for *hemaiva*. 138 G correctly records *hemnas*,
but the first syllable is rewritten above the line, presumably to make clear the
hastily written first *akṣara*. 143 G deletes an *akṣara* following °*bhedā*°.

134 tattad°] GJK^{ed.}; tad° PR 134 °vikāram] JPRK^{ed.}; °vikārām G 134
piṇḍe kaṭikāsthita] *conj.*; piṇḍakataḥkādirūpasthita G, piṇḍakataḥkādi---pasthita J,
piṇḍakataḥkāṭikādirūpasthita PR, piṇḍe kaṭakādirūpasthita K^{ed.} 135 na] GJK^{ed.};
va P, van R 136 hemaiva] GJK^{ed.}; hemava PR 138 tathātvakāraṇam] PRK^{ed.};
tathātvakāraṇam G^{p.c.}J, tathātvakāraṇatvam G^{a.c.} 139 °hema°] GJK^{ed.}; *om.*
PR 139 ca] GJRK^{ed.}; *om.* P 140 eṣṭavya] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; eṣṭavyo P^{a.c.} 140
suvarṇavat] GJPK^{ed.}; svavarṇavat R 141 °kāraṇa°] J; °karaṇa° GK^{ed.}, *om.*
PR 141 °śaktimāms tathā tattvabhuvanakāryakāraṇādi°] GJK^{ed.}; *om.* PR
142 sarvaiḥ] GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; sarvai° K^{ed.a.c.} 143 °āśrayaṇe] JK^{ed.}; °āśrayeṇa
GPR 145 śaktayas tu] GJPK^{ed.}; śaktayaś ca R 145 jagat] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
janat P^{a.c.} 145 sarvaṃ] GJPR; kṛtsnaṃ K^{ed.}

134 G folio 42r. 134 J folio 39v. 146 G folio 42v.

ityukte 'tra samākṣepaḥ pakṣasyāsyā vidhīyate
 ādau tāvad vikāritvaṃ śivatattvasya jāyate 21
 nānāvikārarūpeṇa jaḍataivam avasthitā
 150 tathā sāvayavatvaṃ ca parādhīnatvam eva ca 22
 kṣīravat pariṇāmitve śuddhāśuddhaparāpara-
 nyūnatādi vināsitvaṃ tathollaṅghananiṣkṛtiḥ 23
 yatropari na hastādi neyam īśvarasannidhau
 tatra pādavihārādeḥ sphuṭam eva niṣiddhatā 24
 155 evaṃ sati samagrasya vyavahārasya bhaṅgitā
 tathaivam saṃpravṛttau tu nimittakalanāpatet 25

evaṃ śivātmakatve sarvasyaivokte 'smin sati parair asya pakṣasya bahumukham
 ākṣepaḥ kriyate. viśvātmakatve cinmayasya śivatattvasya śaśvad evopacayāpaca-
 yarahitasyābhimatasya vikāritā mṛdādisāmyena prāptā, ity ayam eva prathamato

24b A later hand marks P's reading of *yenam* for *neyam* with an "x" mark above
na.

21a ityukte 'tra]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ity---ktena C 21a samākṣepaḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.};
 samākṣepa C 21b pakṣasya]TGJPRK^{ed.}; kṣasya C 21d jāyate]GJPRK^{ed.};
 j---yate T, jāyata C 22b jaḍataivam]CGJPRK^{ed.}; jaḍatevam T 22c sāvaya-
 vatvaṃ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; sāvayamatvaṃ C 23a pariṇāmitve]TK^{ed.}; paramānitve
 C, pariṇāmitvam GJPR 23b śuddhāśuddha°]GJPRK^{ed.}; śuddhāśuddhā°
 T, śuddhāśuddhe C 23b °parāpara°]PK^{ed.}; °parāparā° TR, °parāpare C,
 °parāparaṃ GJ 23c °nyūnatādi]TCGJP; °nyanatvādi R, °nyūnatvādi K^{ed.}
 23c vināsitvaṃ]TCGJK^{ed.}; vināsatvaṃ PR 24a yatropari]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ----
 topari T 24a hastādi]TCGJPRK^{ed.a.c.}; hasto 'nyan K^{ed.p.c.} 24b neyam
]TGJK^{ed.}; nayam C, yenam PR 24b īśvarasannidhau]TGJPRK^{ed.}; īśvarasan-
 tidhau C 24c tatra]CGJPRK^{ed.}; vatatra (hypermetric) T 24c pādavihārādeḥ
]TCGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; pādavihādeḥ (hypometric) P^{a.c.}R 24d eva]TGJPRK^{ed.}; eha
 C 25b vyavahārasya]TCGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; vivahārasya P^{a.c.}R 25c tathaivam
]TCGJK^{ed.}; tathaiva PR 25c saṃpravṛttau]TGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; saṃpravṛttā C,
 saṃprattau (hypometric) P^{a.c.}R 25c tu]TCGJP^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; om. J^{a.c.} 25d nimit-
 takalanāpatet]GJK^{ed.}; nimittakalanāpate--- T, mitvakalane patet (hypometric)
 C, nimittakalana patet PR

157 eva]GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 158 viśvātmakatve]GJK^{ed.}; viśvātmakē tv a° PR
 158 upacayāpacaya°]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; upacayāya P^{a.c.} 159 °rahitasyābhimatasya
]GJPK^{ed.}; °rahitasya bhimatasya R

148 J folio 4or. 149 C folio 6v. 151 R folio 27r. 153 P folio 33.

160 mahān doṣaḥ. pṛthivyādivedyavastunānārūpeṇa cāvasthāne jaḍatā 'sya. tathā
 tadvat sāvayavatvam. cidekarūpasyāpīśvarasyāpi cotpattivināśeṣv anyāpekṣatayā
 bhogyabhāvena ca parāyattatvam. kṣīradadhiyat pariṇāmavādābhyupagame
 śuddhāśuddhādivirodhirūpāpattiḥ. yathā kṣīraṃ śuddham mūtratvena pariṇa-
 165 tām aśuddham, tathā prākṛtadaśāyāṃ paratā mahattvaṃ ca. kāryakalāpāvas-
 thāne tv aparatā nyūnatvaṃ ca. tathā pūrvāvasthānanāśe tadabhedāt tasyaiva
 nāśo 'satkāryavādāśrayaṇe vā. tathā pṛthivyāḥ śivarūpāyāḥ pādalaṅghanaṣṭhī-
 vanādiviṣayatve prāyaścittāpattiḥ. yasmin vyavahāre sannihita īśvare 'nyasya
 tasyaiva copari hasto 'nyat kāṣṭhādi ca na netavyaṃ tatra pādanyāsādikriyā nik-
 170 ṛṣṭatvād dūrotsāritaiva. evaṃ ca pādavihārāder virodhe sarvavyavahārotsādāḥ.
 śivabhaṭṭārakasyaiva ca viśvātmanāvasthānapravṛtttau nimittaṃ vicāryaṃ tasya
 karmādyaviṣayatvāt.

160 An imperfection in the manuscript obscures J's reading of °nānā°. 168
 An *akṣara* appearing to be *na* or *ta* is deleted following *ne* in *netavyaṃ* in P.

160 °nānā°] GPRK^{ed.}; n<?>nā] 160 tathā] GJPK^{ed.}; om. R 161 °rūpasya
] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °rūpasyo P^{a.c.} 161 api] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 161 īśvarasya
] GJPK^{ed.}; āśvarasya R 162 parāyattatvam] K^{ed.}; parāyattattvam GJP, parāy-
 atattatvam R 162 °vādābhyupagame] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °vādabhyupagame P^{a.c.}R
 163 mūtratvena] J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; mūdatvena GJ^{a.c.} 163 pariṇatam] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
 pariṇam P^{a.c.} 164 tathā] GJPK^{ed.}; tathāta R 164 °kalā°] GJPK^{ed.}; °kāla° R
 166 °āśrayaṇe] JPRK^{ed.}; °āśrayaṇa G 166 °laṅghanaṣṭhīvanādi°] GJK^{ed.};
 °laṅghanaṣṭhīvanādi° P^{p.c.}R, °laṅtvanāṣṭhīvanādi° P^{a.c.} 168 tasya] GJ; tathā
 PRK^{ed.} 168 hasto] GJK^{ed.}; nyasto PR 168 na] GJK^{ed.}; om. P, ne R 168
 netavyaṃ] GJPK^{ed.}; natavyaṃ R 168 °kriyā] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °kṛyā P^{a.c.} 168
 nikṛṣṭatvād] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; niṣṭatvād J^{a.c.} 169 pādavihārāder] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.};
 pādavihārāder J^{a.c.} 169 virodhe] GJPK^{ed.}; virodha R 170 viśvātmanā
] PK^{ed.}; viśvātmatā GJR 170 tasya] GJK^{ed.}; tasyaiva P^{p.c.}, tasyai P^{a.c.}R

161 G folio 43r. 164 J folio 40v.

anyac ca

	nānāvādaiḥ svasiddhāntaiḥ sākam atra virodhitā	
	sarvabhāvaśivatvena nāstitā bandhamokṣayoḥ 26	
175	tadabhāvād devaguruśāstrocchedo bhavet tarām	
	nirarthakatvaṃ śāstrasya karaṇe tannirūpaṇe 27	
	sarveṣām eva muktatve sthite kasyopadeśatā	
	dharmādharmau na sambaddhau śivasya na tayoh kṛtiḥ 28	
	tataś ca śivadharmāder vedāder akṛtārthatā	
180	nimittasamavāyādikāraṇeṣu samānatā 29	

26b It is possible, though the manuscript's reading is unclear, that T crosses out the first *akṣara* (*ni*) of its hypermetric and erroneous reading of *nivirodhitā*.
 28c ^{K^{ed.}} records *naśam baddhau* before correcting the text in the errata to *na sambaddhau*. 28d A later hand marks the variant reading *tanayoh* (appearing for *na tayoh*) with an "x" mark above *tana* in P. 29c P and R omit ŚD 3.29cd. 29c An unidentified mark appears following *nimittasama*^o in T.

26a *nānāvādaiḥ*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *nānāvādai* C 26a *svasiddhāntaiḥ*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *svasiddhāntai* C 26b *sākam*]GJPRK^{ed.}; *sakam* T, *sākaṃ* C 26b *virodhitā*]CGJPRK^{ed.}; *nivirodhitā citā* (hypermetric) T 26c *sarva*^o]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *sarvaṃ* C 26c ^o*bhāvaśivatvena*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ^o*māvaśitvena* C 26d *nāstitā*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *nāstitāṃ* C 26d *bandhamokṣayoḥ*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *bandhamokṣayo* C 27a *tadabhāvād*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *dabhād* (hypometric) C 27a *deva*^o]CGJPRK^{ed.}; *daiva*^o T 27c *nirarthakatvaṃ*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *nirarthakaṃtvaṃ* C 27c *śāstrasya*]CGJPRK^{ed.}; *śr---sya* T 27d *karaṇe*]CGJPRK^{ed.}; *kāraṇe* T 27d ^o*nirūpaṇe*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ^o*nirūpaṇaṃ* C 28a *sarveṣām*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *sarveṣāv* C 28b *sthite*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *sthito* C 28b *upadeśatā*]TJR; *upadeśy-ataḥ* C, *ipadeśatā* G, *upadeśyatā* PK^{ed.} 28c *dharmādharmau na sambaddhau*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *varmādharmopasambandhau* C 28d *na tayoh*]TCGJK^{ed.}; *tanayoh* PR 28d *kṛtiḥ*]CGJPRK^{ed.}; *kṣatiḥ* T 29a *tataś*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *taś* C 29b *akṛtārthatā*]CGJK^{ed.}; *akṣatāryatā* T, *akṛtākṛtā* PR 29d *samānatā*]TGJK^{ed.}; *samānataḥ* C, *om.* PR

sarvaśivatvavāde sarvadarśanaḥ svasiddhāntena ca saha virodhaḥ. tatraivam
 anīṣṭatvāt teṣāṃ api cānyārthābhāvāc chaivatvam. svasiddhānte 'pi ca
 māyāpradhānakarmādeḥ pṛthagbhūtasya jagatkāraṇatvenokteḥ. sarveṣāṃ ca
 bhāvānāṃ śivatvābhuyupagame prāṇino 'pi sarvaśaktivān nityanirmuktā iti
 185 bandhamokṣābhāvaḥ. tataś ca heyopādeyādivibhāgābhāvād devaguruśāstralak-
 ṣaṇapuruṣārthapṛāptiyupāyocchedo lokāyatādhikyena bhavet, tasya hi kadācid
 drṣṭārthe tadabhyupagamaḥ syāt, sarvaśivatve tu kaḥ kasyopāyaḥ. tathā ca śā-
 strasya karaṇe nirūpaṇe vyākhyāne śravaṇe ca nirarthakatvam. sarveṣāṃ eva
 śivatvena muktatvāt kasya śāstrasyopadiśyamānatā. dharmārtham api śāstram
 190 ayuktaṃ śivasya karmamalābhāvān na dharmādharmau samavetau, na tu tayoh
 śive karaṇaṃ mithyājñānarāgādikāraṇatvāt pravṛttinām. evaṃ ca śivadharma-
 dīnāṃ vedasya ca dharmārthatvābhāvād akṛtaprayojanatā. tathā samavāyasa-
 mavāyinimittakāraṇeṣu śivatvena viśeṣaḥ śāstrāntaroktaḥ paridrṣyamānāś ca na
 syāt.

195 kiṃ ca

**pṛthivyādikalpanayā kalpanāvān śivo bhavet
 śivatattve sānubhave paśyantītulyatā tadā 30**

30b P erroneously numbers the present half-verse as a completed verse and
 continues numbering the verses on the half-verse from this point forward.

30a pṛthivyādi°] GJPRK^{ed.}; pṛthivyādeḥ TC 30a °kalpanayā] GJPRK^{ed.};
 kalpanā yāḥ T, kalpanā yā C 30b kalpanāvān] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kalpanāva C 30b
 śivo] CK^{ed.}; chito TGJPR 30c śivatattve] TGJPRK^{ed.}; śivetvān (hypometric)
 C 30c sānubhave] TGJPRK^{ed.}; anubhavet C 30d °tulyatā] CGJPRK^{ed.};
 °tulyadā T 30d tadā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhavet C

182 P and R omit *anyārthābhāvāc chaivatvam. svasiddhānte 'pi ca.*

181 ca] PRK^{ed.}; om. GJ 181 virodhaḥ] GJK^{ed.}; virodhatā P^{a.c.}R, virodhitā
 P^{p.c.} 182 ca] GJRK^{ed.}; om. P 183 māyāpradhānakarmādeḥ] GJK^{ed.};
 mayākarmādeḥ PR 184 śivatva°] GJK^{ed.}; śivatātva° P, śivatatva° R 185
 heyopādeyādi°] JPRK^{ed.}; heyopāyādi° G 186 lokāyata°] JPRK^{ed.}; lokayata°
 G 187 drṣṭārthe tad°] GJK^{ed.}; drṣṭārthtvād P, drṣṭārthatād R 187 kaḥ
] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 188 sarveṣāṃ] GJPR; sarvaṣāṃ K^{ed.} 191 karaṇaṃ
] GJK^{ed.}; kāraṇaṃ PR 192 ca] JPRK^{ed.}; om. G 192 dharmārthatva°
] GJK^{ed.}; dharmārtha° PR 192 akṛta°] GJPK^{ed.}; akṣara° R 192 °asamavāyi°
] P^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °asamvāyi° GJ, °āsamavāyi P^{a.c.}R 193 °uktaḥ] PRK^{ed.}; °ukteḥ GJ

181 J folio 41r. 188 G folio 44r. 190 P folio 34. 193 J folio 41v. 197
 R folio 28r.

icchāvatkāryasampattyā punar icchāntarodgame
 śivasya hetur vaktavyo yadartham sã navodgatã 31
 200 viśvasyāsatarūpatvaṃ yair vākyaair varṇitaṃ kvacit
 śivoktais tair virodhaḥ syāt sarvasatyatvavādinah 32

prthivyādirūpatayātmānam parikalpya tathāsta iti mate kalpanāvān śivabha-
 tṭarakah prāpnoti. nirvikalpaś ca sa iṣyate, vikalpānām bhinnavastuśūnyatvenā-
 vidyārūpatvāt. atha na savikalpaṃ śivatattvam, api tu sānubhavam, anubhavo hi
 205 nāyathārtho bhavati. evaṃrūpe tasmin kim asāv anubhavati, kim ātmānam uta
 parātmānam api, kim ananubhūtapūrvam utānubhūtam. anubhāvyaṅubhāva-
 kayoś ca bheda evety evaṃ ādipaśyantīviśayoktadūṣaṅāvasaras tadā. viśiṣṭecchā-
 vaśāc cābhīṣṭe yajjagallakṣaṅakāryasampattyā hetubhūtayā icchākāraṅaviratau

32b An illegible letter is deleted in C following its reading of *varṇitām* for *varṇi-
 tam*. 32c G records a deleted syllable following *śivoktai*. T includes the pres-
 ence of a nearly-completed *ka* before *ktais* of *śivoktais*.

31a icchāvāt°]TGJPRK^{ed.}; icchāvah C 31a °sāmpattyā]em.; °sāmpattyā T,
 °sāmpadyā C, °niṣpattyā GJPRK^{ed.} 31b icchāntarodgame]TGJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; uc-
 chā tatodgame C, iccāntarodbhavet P^{a.c.} 31c śivasya hetur vaktavyo]JPRK^{ed.};
 śivasya hetur vakt---ā T, śivahemavaktavyo (hypometric) C, śivasya hetur vak-
 tavyam G 31d sã navodgatã]TGJ; sanadodgataḥ C, sānuvodgatā PR, sã
 navodgamā K^{ed.} 32a asatarūpatvaṃ]GJPRK^{ed.}; satyarūpatvaṃ T, satyarūpa---
 C 32b vākyaair]GJPRK^{ed.}; vākyaair TC 32b varṇitaṃ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; varṇitām
 C 32c tair]TGJPRK^{ed.}; tai C 32c virodhaḥ]GJPRK^{ed.}; virodha TC

204 An imperfection in J obscures the reading of that manuscript at *sānub-
 havam*. 205 P marks its erroneous reading (*urātmānam*) for *uta parātmānam*
 with an “x” mark above *rā*. 206 P marks its reading of *utā°* with an “x” mark
 above the line.

202 kalpanāvān]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; kalpanāvāg P^{a.c.}R 203 nirvikalpaś ca]GPRK^{ed.};
 nirvikalpan tac ca J 204 sānubhavam]GPRK^{ed.}; sānubhava--- J 205
 ayathārtho]JP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; ayatārtho G^{a.c.}, ayathātārtho G^{p.c.}, ayatārtho J^{a.c.}, ahitārtho
 P 205 asāv]JP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; asā GP^{a.c.}R 205 anubhavati]JPRK^{ed.}; sanubhavati
 G 205 uta parātmānam]GJK^{ed.}; urātmānam PR 206 kim]GJK^{ed.}; ki PR
 206 ananubhūtapūrvam]J; anubhūtapūrvam G, anubhūtas PR, ananubhū-
 tam K^{ed.} 206 utānubhūtam]GJK^{ed.}; utānabhūtatvāt PR 206 anubhāvya°
]GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; abhāvya° J^{a.c.} 208 °vaśāc]GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °vaśācch J^{a.c.} 208
 °viratau]JPRK^{ed.}; °virabhau G

203 G folio 44v. 208 J folio 42r.

punaḥ sthitipralayādau paṭādivijñāne vecchāntarodgame ko hetuḥ kaḥ prayo-
 210 jako yat preritasya śivasya pūrvasvabhāvanivṛttāv apūrvasvabhāvāntarodaye
 cecchā navanavā pravartate. sarvavastūnām ca śivaikarūpatve satyatvaṃ syāt,
 evaṃ ca māyendrajālopatmatvaṃ jagataḥ pārameśvarair eva śāstrair yad varṇya-
 ate tad viruddhaṃ syāt.

atrāha

215 **ityākṣeparakṣaṇārtham atra pratividhīyate**

īdṛśāt parakṛtān mahākṣepāt svadarśanasya rakṣaṇārtham asya vākṣepasya
 rakṣaṇārtham nivāraṇārtham atrākṣepe sati svadarśane 'tra vā samarthaṇam
 kriyate.

220 **cidātmano hi sthūlasya sūkṣmasyātha vikāritā 33**
kṣīramāyāprakṛtivad yāvatecchaiva yādṛśī
parasya tādr̥gātmatvam utpadyetātra yogivat 34

33a ityākṣepa°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ityākṣepe C 33a °rakṣaṇārtham] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 rakṣaṇārtham C 33b pratividhīyate] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---vidhīyate C 33c cidāt-
 mano] K^{ed.p.c.}; tadā--- T, ya cātmano C, tadātmano GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 33c hi] CGJPR
 K^{ed.}; --- T 33c sthūlasya] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 33d sūkṣmasya] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 sūkṣmsya C 33d vikāritā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vikāritaḥ C 34a kṣīramāyā°] TGJK^{ed.};
 kṣīramāyā° C, kṣīramāyā PR 34a °prakṛtivad] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °prakṛti C 34b
 yāvatecchaiva] TGJ; vedyāvat echaiva (hypermetric) C, yāvataś caiva PRK^{ed.a.c.};
 tasya cecchaiva K^{ed.p.c.} 34b yādṛśī] TCK^{ed.p.c.}; yāvati GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 34c parasya
] TK^{ed.p.c.}; para---yā C, śivasya GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 34c tādr̥gātmatvam] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 tādr̥tmatvam C 34d utpadyeta] TGJPRK^{ed.}; uptatadyeta (hypermetric) C 34d
 yogivat] TGJPRK^{ed.}; yogivat C

217 P records a gap between the two *akṣaras* of *sati*. 220 P records an "x"
 mark above its reading of °*mayā*° for °*māyā*°.

209 °udgame ko] GJK^{ed.}; °udgamako PR 211 cecchā] GJPK^{ed.}; chachā R
 211 ca] GJPK^{ed.}; *om*. R 211 satyatvaṃ] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; satyatvae J^{a.c.} 212
 pārameśvarair] GJK^{ed.}; parameśvarair PR 212 eva] GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; aiva K^{ed.a.c.}
 216 īdṛśāt] K^{ed.}; edṛśāt GJ, etādṛśāt PR 216 svadarśanasya] GJ^{p.c.}K^{ed.};
 svadarśanāsy P^{a.c.}R 216 rakṣaṇārtham] JPRK^{ed.}; ---kṣaṇārtham G 217
 rakṣaṇārtham nivāraṇārtham] GJK^{ed.}; rakṣaṇānivāraṇārtham PR

217 G folio 45r. G reads *śrīgurave namaḥ* in the middle of the top of the folio.
 219 T folio 5r. 220 R folio 28v.

cidātmanaḥ sthūlatve kṣīrasyeva dadhiniṣpattau jagannirmāṇe vikāritā syāt.
sūkṣmatve 'pi vā māyāprakṛtivat. tat tayor iva yāvataḥ na sthūlo nāpi sūkṣmaḥ
parameśvaraś cidātmā, api tu tataḥ param, sarvato 'pi jaḍasyaiva hi sthaulyādi-
225 pariṇāmayogo na cinmayasya, tasya tu parasya yādṛgātmatvam abhiṣṭam tathā-
vasthānam evotpattir yoginām iva.

tad evāha

**icchayā sarvabhāvatvam anekātmatvam eva ca
nātra svātmavikāreṇa janayed bhāvamaṇḍalam 35
230 tadicchāsāmanantarye tathābhūtātmatā yataḥ**

ubhayor apy atra nirdeśaḥ. yathā yoginām sarvabhāvatvam icchayā-
nekātmatvam vā bhavatītiṣṭam, tathā parameśvarasyāpi mantavyam. na hy
asau yogī svātmano mṛtpiṇḍasyeva śibistūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa

35a sarvabhāvatvam] CGJPRK^{ed.}; sarvabhāvasyatvam (hypermetric) T 35b
anekātmatvam] TGJPRK^{ed.}; anekatmatvam C 35b ca] CGJPRK^{ed.}; vā T 35c
nātra] CGJPRK^{ed.}; na tu T 35c svātmavikāreṇa] TGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; svātmavireṇa
(hypometric) C, svātmavikāre (hypometric) P^{a.c.}R 35d janayed] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.};
--- T, ja---d C, janayeyed P^{a.c.} 35d °maṇḍalam] GJPRK^{ed.}; °pañjaram T,
°parañjaram C 36a °sāmanantarye] TJPRK^{ed.}; °sāyatas tatra C, °sānantarye
(hypometric) G 36b yataḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; mavā C

231 P marks its reading of *icchāyām* with a line under the final *m*. 233 P
records *mṛtpiṇḍasya* without the vertical line in the short -i. This error is marked
by a line under the text in question. 233 Cf. TĀV ad TĀ 10.224cd–225ab:
*yathā kila mṛd ekaiva satī śibikastūpakapiṇḍādyavasthākrameṇa ghaṭasya kāraṇam
iti neyatā piṇḍādy eva kāraṇam iti yuktaṁ kāryātmani tathānurvṛtṭiyabhāvāt tatta-
davasthā tu daṇḍādivat kāraṇam iti yujyate vaktum.* 233 P marks °*stūpa*° with
an “x” mark above the first syllable. 233 The reading of J at *śibikastūpa*° is
added by a later hand with what appears to be the writing of a ball-point pen.

222 vikāritā] GJPR, vikāsītā K^{ed.} 223 °prakṛtivat] K^{ed.}; °prakṛti° GJ, om.
PR 223 tat tayor] PRK^{ed.}; tattvayor GJ 223 yāvataḥ] GJPK^{ed.}; yavatā R
223 na GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; om. J^{a.c.} 224 param] PRK^{ed.}; om. GJ 224 jaḍasya
] GK^{ed.}; parajaḍasya JPR 224 eva] R; iva GJPK^{ed.} 226 iva] PRK^{ed.}; om. GJ
231 icchayā] GJK^{ed.}; icchayām PR 232 °ātmatvam] GJPK^{ed.}; °ātmakatvam
R 233 śibi] em.; śivava GJ^{a.c.}, śibika° J^{p.c.}K^{ed.}, śivaka° PR 233 °stūpa°
] J^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; om. GJ^{a.c.}

226 J folio 42v. 229 P folio 35. 233 G folio 45v.

kumbhakāra iva ghaṭam iva bhāvamaṇḍalaṃ janayati, api tu yasya yādṛśicchā
 235 tatsamanantaram eveṣṭakāryātmābhilāṣātmatayā sthitiḥ, tathā cidātmano 'pi.
 punar āha

yathā na yogino 'stīha nānāsainyaśarīrakaiḥ 36
 vibhāgas tadvad īśasya madhyotkr̥ṣṭanikr̥ṣṭakaiḥ
 bhāvair nāsti vibheditvam athavāmbudhivīcivat 37
 240 tatra vīcivam āpannaṃ na jalaṃ jalam ucyate
 na ca tatrāmburūpasya vīcikāle vināsitā 38
 nīscalatve 'pi hi jalaṃ vīcivte jalam eva tat
 vīcibhis tad viśiṣṭaṃ cet tan naiścalyaviśiṣṭakam 39

37c The diphthong in *bhāvair* is recorded in a faint hand in P and appears to be a later correction. 39a Cf. VBh 110: *jalasyevormayo vahner jvālābhaṅgyaḥ prabhā raveḥ / mamaiva bhairavasyaitā viśvabhaṅgyo vibheditāḥ*. 39c R records a gap between the first and second *akṣaras* of *vīcibhis*. 39c T reads *viśiṣṭaṃ cet* but corrects an illegible reading at *m cet*. 39d J records *calyaviśeṣakam* in the middle of the bottom of the folio, immediately below the text that precedes it.

36c 'stīha] TCGJPK^{ed.}; 'sīha R 36d °śarīrakaiḥ] CGJK^{ed.}; °śarīrakai T, °śarīrakam PR 37a vibhāgas] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vibhagas C 37a tadvad] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadvid C 37b °nikr̥ṣṭakaiḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °nikr̥ṣṭakai C 37c bhāvair] TGJPRK^{ed.}; bhāvai C 37c nāsti] TCGJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; nāstie P^{a.c.} 37c vibheditvam] TK^{ed.p.c.}; bhībheditva C, vibheditvam GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 37d °dhivīcivat] JPRK^{ed.}; °---vat T, °dhivīceta C, °dhivīcikaiḥ G 38a tatra] GJPRK^{ed.}; yatra T, patra C 38b jalaṃ] TCGJPK^{ed.}; jala R 38c na] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ta na (hypermetric) T 38d vīcikāle] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vīcikālye C 39a jalaṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; jalaṃāṃ C 39b vīcivte] TJPRK^{ed.}; vīcivte C, vīcivam G 39c vīcibhis] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vīcibhis C 39c cet] TGJRK^{ed.}; ce CP 39d naiścalya°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; maiścintya° C 39d °viśiṣṭakam] TCK^{ed.p.c.}; °viśeṣakam GJPRK^{ed.a.c.}

235 The *e* in *eva* is very faintly marked in P and is perhaps a later correction.

234 ghaṭam iva] GJRK^{ed.}; ghaṭam adi P^{p.c.}, ghaṭam itādi P^{a.c.} 234 tu] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 235 °kārya°] P^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °kārya° GJ, °kāryāṃ° P^{a.c.} 235 °ātma°] K^{ed.}; om. GJPR 235 °abhilāṣa°] GJPK^{ed.}; °abhilaṣa° R

243 J folio 43r.

yathā na yogino nānāsainyaśārīrakair gajarathaturagapadātīrūpair avas-
 245 thitasyātmavibhāgas tathā parameśvarasya madhyotkr̥ṣṭanikr̥ṣṭakair deva-
 manuṣyatiryagādīrūpair avibhedaḥ sarvaśaktibodhamātrarūpasyaikatvaniyamāt.
 athavātyantaprasiddho 'yaṃ dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ. yathāmbudhes taraṅgānām caikyē 'pi
 vyavahārabhedas tathā śivasya viśvasya ca. tatra hi vyavahāre vīcitāṃ prāptam
 250 jalam na jalam ity ucyate, na ca tatra vīcirūpe jalatā vinaṣṭā. tathā hi niścalatve
 calavīcitve ca jalam eva jalaviśeṣatvād vīceḥ, atha jalam tadvīcitvaviśiṣṭam na
 jalamātram, tad etad astu vīcitāviśiṣṭatve 'pi na kṣatir jalasya tādavasthyāt. vī-
 civīśiṣṭatve jalatābhāvo niścalatvaviśiṣṭatve 'pi jalatā na syāt, evaṃ bhāvarūpatve
 'pi śivatā sthitaiva.

255 **ata eva parecchāto na jaḍatvam avasthitam**
pr̥thivyāditattvagaṇe jaḍatvam cet pratīyate 40
na yathā jaḍatā kvāpi tathāgre suvicāritaiḥ
varṇaiṣyāma evātra na ca sāvayavaḥ kvacit 41
kaścid astīti vakṣyāma etad apy agrataḥ sphuṭam

40a T records the initial *a* of *ata* twice.

40a parecchāto] GJK^{ed.}; parecch--- T, parocātvo C, etadicchāto P^{p.c.}, ecchāto
 (hypometric) P^{a.c.}, cchāto (hypometric) R 40c pr̥thivyāditattvagaṇe] GJPRK^{ed.};
 pr̥thivyādikē tattvagaṇe (hypermetric) T, pr̥thivyādautvatattvagaṇe (hypermetric)
 C 40d pratīyate] TGJPRK^{ed.}; prīyate C 41a yathā] TCK^{ed.p.c.}; tathā
 GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 41b suvicāritaiḥ] TCGJK^{ed.}; svavicāritaiḥ PR 41c varṇaiṣyāma
] TGJK^{ed.}; varṇaṣyāma (hypometric) C, varṇaiṣyāmma P^{p.c.}, varṇaiṣyāmsū P^{a.c.},
 varṇaiṣyāmsa R 41d na] TGJPRK^{ed.}; va C 42a astīti] TC; astīha GJPRK^{ed.}
 42b etad apy] TGJPRK^{ed.}; hetavy C 42b agrataḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; agrata C 42b
 sphuṭam] CGJPRK^{ed.}; sphu--- T

245 ātmavibhāgas] JP^{a.c.} RK^{ed.}; ātmavibhāgaśaḥ G, atmavibhāgas P^{p.c.} 247
 °prasiddho] JPRK^{ed.}; °susiddho G^{p.c.}, °sosiddho G^{a.c.} 247 'yaṃ] GJPK^{ed.}; ya
 R 247 dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ] PRK^{ed.}; dr̥ṣṭaḥ GJ 248 vyavahāre] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; vyavahārp
 P^{a.c.} 248 vīcitāṃ] GJK^{ed.}; vīcitā PR 250 calavīcitve] JK^{ed.}; om. G, ca vīcitve
 PR 250 ca] GK^{ed.}; om. JPR 250 °viśiṣṭam] GJPK^{ed.}; °viśiṣṭa R 251
 kṣatir] JPRK^{ed.}; kṣitir G 251 tādavasthyāt] GJK^{ed.}; tāvadavasthyāt PR 252
 jalatābhāvo] J; jalatvābhāvo GK^{ed.}, om. P, jalabhāvo R 252 niścalatvaviśiṣṭatve
] GJR; om. P, niścalatvaviśiṣṭe K^{ed.} 253 sthitā] GJRK^{ed.}; tathā P

244 R folio 29r. 248 G folio 46r. 255 C folio 7r.

ata eva yogina iva parameśvarasyecchāvaśād eva tathāvasthāne pṛthivyādi-
 260 tattvagaṇe jaḍatā nāsticchāviśeṣarūpatvān na tu pradhānādijaḍopādānatāsyā.
 atha tatredantānirdeśyātārūpā jaḍatā pratīyate. tan na, yathā na kvacid idantānir-
 deśyatte 'pi tattvato jaḍatā tathottaratra suṣṭhu vicāraṇābhīr vākṣyāmaḥ. sarvāt-
 matve 'pi śivātattvasya sāvayavatvaprasaṅgadūṣaṇam apy agre nirākariṣyāmo
 yathā na kaścit kasyām apy avasthāyām sāvayavaḥ syāt. svayaṃ śivātmatāvas-
 265 thāne svayaṃ viśvātmatayāvasthāne ca kim apekṣayā bhogyatā yayā sāvayavat-
 vaṃ syāt.

svicchāto bhāvarūpatve parādhīnā kutaḥ sthitiḥ 42
kṣīravād yadi vocyeta parādhīnaṃ jaḍam bhavet
etayaiva diśā śodhyaṃ śuddhanyūnādīdūṣaṇam 43
 270 **abhagne 'sya svarūpatve śuddhanyūnādikaṃ kutaḥ**
patadgrahādike hemni hematvaṃ mukuṭādike 44

43c There is a pronounced gap between the two marks that indicate the diph-
 thong *ai* of *etayaiva* in T. 44c G corrects the first syllable of *hemni* by rewriting
he in the left margin. 44d P marks *mukuṭādika* with an “x” mark above *ādi*.

42c *svicchāto*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *svicchāto* C 42d *parādhīnā*]TGJPK^{ed.}; *pakā---* C,
parādhīnā R 42d *kutaḥ*]TCGJK^{ed.}; *kuta* PR 42d *sthitiḥ*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *sthitā*
 C 43a *vocyeta*]GPK^{ed.}; *hocyeta* TC, *nocyeta* JR 43b *bhavet*]TGJPRK^{ed.};
bhaveta (hypermetric) C 43d *śuddha°*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *śuddhaṃ* C 43d °nyūnā-
didūṣaṇam]TGJPR^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °nūnādīrūpaṇam C, °nyūnādībhūṣaṇam P^{a.c.} 44a
abhagne]TCGJPR^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; *abhame* P^{a.c.} 44a 'sya svarūpatve]TCK^{ed.p.c.};
svasya rūpatve GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 44b *śuddha°*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *śuddhaṃ* C 44b
 °nyūnādikaṃ]CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 44c *patad°*]GJK^{ed.}; *etad* TC, *etādvasthitam*
 (hypermetric) PR 44c °grahādike]TCGJK^{ed.}; *eva nṛdgrhādike* (hypermetric)
 P, *eva nṛdgrahādike* (hypermetric) R 44c *hemni*]TG^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; *hemnī* C,
vyomni G^{a.c.} 44d *mukuṭādike*]TGJPRK^{ed.}; *mukuṭādhike* C

262 J records *sarvātmate*, but the final *aḥsara* is blotched. 264 G and J
 omit *śivātmatāvasthāne svayaṃ*. 265 J records *kim*, but the initial *aḥsara* is
 blotched. 265 P deletes a reduplication of *gya* in *bhogyatā*.

259 *eva*]GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; *eeva* J^{a.c.} 260 °upādānatā]GJPR; °upādānatā K^{ed.}
 261 *tan na*]GJK^{ed.}; *tatra* PR 261 *idantā°*]JPRK^{ed.}; *adantā°* G 261
 °nirdeśyatte]GJPR^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °nirdeśyāte P^{a.c.} 262 *vicāraṇābhīr*]GJPK^{ed.};
vicāraṇābhīr R 263 'pi]GJ; *om.* PRK^{ed.} 263 *nirākariṣyāmo*]GJK^{ed.}; *kar-*
iṣyāmo PR 264 *apy*]GJK^{ed.}; *om.* PR 264 *avasthāyām*]JPRK^{ed.}; *ivasthāyām*
 G 264 *svayaṃ*]GJPR^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; *svasvayaṃ* P^{a.c.}R

259 J folio 43v. 262 G folio 46v. 264 R folio 29v. 265 P folio 36.

275 **sthitam eva na hemno 'sya kācid asti vibheditā**
caṇḍālasadmago vahnir na vahnir yadi kathyate 45
tad evaṃ syād athocyeta vahneḥ saṃskāracodanā
śāstreṣu varṇitā kasmāt kāryārthaṃ kāryam eva tat 46
na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra tathā tatra vyavasthiteḥ
saṃjñākaraṇamātram tad vyavahārāya kalpitam 47

svecchāvaśād viśvabhāvarūpasya parādhīnā na sthitiḥ api tu svecchāyattaiva.
 viśvarūpatā kṣīrāyattā dadhirūpateva kāraṇaparīṇāmasāpekṣā yadi kathyeta
 280 parādhīno viśvātmā tadā jaḍaḥ syāc cidrūpasyāpekṣānupapatteḥ, yāvatā viśvarū-
 patve cidrūpataiva. anyaiḥ cidrūpatāhānidiśā śuddhāśuddhatvopacayāpacaya-
 vattvādidoṣaḥ parihāryaḥ. svaṃ rūpaṃ yasya sa svarūpas tasya bhāve cidrūpatve

47a C reads *na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra svarūpe tva---patā / parāparādibhedo 'tra* prior
 to *svārūpe tatsvarūpatā / tathā tatra vyavasthitā*. The numbering of the verses in
 C reflects the inclusion of this additional half-verse from this point forward, a
 numbering that is silently modified in the present edition to accord with that of
 the other manuscripts from this point to the end of the chapter. T includes both
 of the two variant readings attested for at ŚD 3.47a: It reads *svārūpe tatsvarūpatā*
 immediately following *na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra parāparādibhedātra*. K^{ed} similarly
 reads *na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra parāparādibhedātra* following *na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra*,
 according to a note in the errata of the edition.

45a hemno] GJPRK^{ed}; homno T, ---mno C 45a 'sya] TGJPRK^{ed}; trasya
 (hypermetric) C 45b kācid] TGJPRK^{ed}; kāci C 45b asti] TGJPK^{ed}; sti C, asvi
 R 45b vibheditā] CG^{a.c.}PRK^{ed}; vibhādītā T, vibhedatā G^{p.c.}J 45c °sadmago
] TGJPRK^{ed}; °veśmago C 45c vahnir] TGJPRK^{ed}; vahni C 45d na vahnir
] TCGJRK^{ed}; om. (hypometric) P 45d yadi] TCK^{ed.p.c.}; iti GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 46a tad
 evaṃ] TK^{ed.p.c.}; tathed evaṃ (hypermetric) C, tad eva GJ, tathaiva PRK^{ed.a.c.} 46b
 vahneḥ] TGJPRK^{ed}; va--- C 46b saṃskāracodanā] CGJPRK^{ed}; saṃ---codanā
 T 47a na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra] TGJPRK^{ed}; svarūpe tatsvarūpatā C 47b
 tatra] TC; tasya GJPRK^{ed}. 47b vyavasthiteḥ] TGJPRK^{ed}; vyavasthitā C 47c
 °karaṇa°] GJPRK^{ed}; °kāraṇa° TC 47d vyavahārāya] G^{p.c.}JK^{ed}; vyava---rāya
 T, vyavahāra (hypometric) C, vyahāvarāya G^{a.c.}, vyavahārāya PR 47d kalpitam
] TGJPRK^{ed}; kalpitā C

278 tu] GJJP^{p.c.}K^{ed}; om. P^{a.c.}R 279 iva] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed}; eva G^{a.c.} 279
 kathyeta] JK^{ed}; kathyete G, kathyate PR 281 anyaiḥ] GJJP^{p.c.}K^{ed}; anyai P^{a.c.},
 anayai R

274 J folio 44r. 279 G folio 47r.

tadavasthe suddhanyūnādidoṣābhāvāt. mukuṭapatadgrahayoḥ suvarṇasāmyena
 suvarṇatvam. tathā hi caṇḍālagrhasṭho 'gnir yadi nāgniḥ syāt tad etad api syāt.
 285 atha vahner yady aśuddhatā na syāt tat tasya kuto mantraiḥ saṃskārayogaḥ
 kāryasaṃpādanārthaṃ śāstre codyeta tasmāt tasyāśuddhatā saṃbhavet.
 naivaṃ kāryam evānuṣṭheyam eva tad vyavahārāya na tu svarūpe vahner
 vibhāgaḥ, svarūpe nijarūpe sthite tu vahnāv upagamyamāne tatsvarūpatā vah-
 nirūpataiva sarvatra. tadvac chivarūpatā jagatas tasya, tathēśvaratanmātrapṛthi-
 290 vyādirūpatayā vyavasthānāt parasthūlasūkṣmatādibhedaḥ. tathā ca sarvatraikyē
 saṃsāravyavahārāya saṃjñākaraṇamātraṃ tat kalpitam bhavati.

**vyavahāro 'py avidyā no tathātveneśvarasthiteḥ
 tenaiva vā tathā klṛptas tathā tadanuvartanam 48
 na tatsvarūpabhedāya śāstraṃ yad vyavahāragam**

48a vyavahāro]TCJPRK^{ed.}; vyavāhāro G 48a avidyā no]GJPRK^{ed.}; avidyāto
 T, avidyā mo C 48b tathātvena]TCJPRK^{ed.}; tathā tena G 48b °sthiteḥ
]GJK^{ed.p.c.}; °icchiteḥ T, °sthitā C, °sthitih PK^{ed.a.c.}, °asthitih R 48c klṛptas
]CK^{ed.}; k<?>ptas T, klyptas GJPR 48d tathā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadā C 48d tadanu-
 vartanam]TGJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; danuvartanam (hypometric) CJ^{a.c.} 49b vyavahāra-
 gam]TCGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; vyavaragam (hypometric) P^{a.c.}R

283 P records an “x” mark above its erroneous reading (*tavasthe*) for *tadavasthe*.
 287 G inserts the syllable *va* of *vyavahārāya* above the line in order to correct
 its reading. 289 A syllable is deleted and replaced with *tra* in *tanmātra*^o in P.

283 tadavasthe]GJK^{ed.}; tavasthe PR 283 suvarṇasāmyena]GPRK^{ed.};
 surṇasāmyena J 284 °grhasṭho]GJPK^{ed.}; °grahasṭho R 285 vahner
]JPRK^{ed.}; vahnē G 286 °saṃpādana°]GJPK^{ed.}; °saṃpādāna° R 286
 codyeta]GJP^{p.c.}R; codyote P^{a.c.}, codyate K^{ed.p.c.}, cocyate K^{ed.a.c.} 287 tad
 vyavahārāya]G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; vyahārāya G^{a.c.} 287 na tu]GJPK^{ed.}; nanu R 288
 vahnāv]GJPK^{ed.}; vahnān R 288 upagamyamāne]GJK^{ed.}; upagamyamāna°
 P^{p.c.}, upagamyamānaṃ P^{a.c.}R 289 °rūpatā]GJK^{ed.}; °rūpavataḥ P^{p.c.}, °rūpataḥ
 P^{a.c.}R 289 īśvara°]GJPR; īśvarasya K^{ed.} 289 tanmātra°]GJPR; tanmātr°
 K^{ed.} 291 saṃsāra°]GJK^{ed.}; saṃsārāya PR 291 °vyavahārāya]GJPK^{ed.};
 °vyavahārāya R 291 saṃjñākaraṇamātraṃ]GJ; saṃjñāmātraṃ PRK^{ed.} 291
 kalpitam]GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; kalpitam P^{a.c.}, kilpitam R

286 J folio 44v. 286 R folio 30r. 291 G folio 47v.

295 saṃsārvavyavahāro 'py avidyā nāma na padārthāntaram bhavati, īsvarasyaiva tathātvena lokayātrātmatayā tathāvasthānāt. śāstram api vā vyavahāragāmisam-
skāropadesakam na śivatattvabhedāya, tenaiveśvareṇa tathāgnisamskārādiḥ
kalpitaḥ, tathā ca tasyānuvartanam anuṣṭhānam kalpitam. tatas tadicchātmakam
etat tad rūpam eva nāśuddhiḃ bhedaḃ vā śivatattvasyopasthāpayati.

300 **hemapiṇḍe hemataiva syāc cen na mukuṭādike 49**
yujyate vaktum eva tad anityatvaḃ ca yat smṛtam
satkṛtau tad vinirṇeyam yā collaṅghanacodanā 50
niyamānupraveśāya śive collaṅghanena kim

bhedaś ca jagadrūpatve yujyeta vaktum, yadi hemapiṇḍa eva hematā syān na
305 tu mukuṭādau. evakāro hemapiṇḍasyānantaram draṣṭavyaḥ. yac ca bhāvānām
nāśitvāt tadātmanaḥ śivatattvasya nāśitvaḃ codyatvena smṛtam tat satkāryavā-
dasamarthanān nirṇeṣyate. yac ca pādalaṅghanaṣṭhīvanādi sarvatrātmani śive

49c hemataiva] GJPRK^{ed.}; hema---aiva T, taiva (hypometric) C 49d syāc
cen na] TCGJK^{ed.}; svacchena P, syacchena R 49d mukuṭādike] CGJPRK^{ed.};
makuṭādike T 50a eva tad] *em.*; eva tad tad (hypermetric) T, etat tad CGJPRK^{ed.}
50b anityatvaḃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; anityaḃ tvaḃ C 50b smṛtam] TK^{ed.p.c.}; sṛtam
C, sthitam GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 50c satkṛtau] TGJPRK^{ed.}; svakṛtau C 50c tad-
vinirṇeyam] TCGJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; tadvinirṇayam P^{a.c.} 50d °codanā] TGJPRK^{ed.};
°codayā C 51a niyama°] TCGJRK^{ed.}; miyama° P 51a °anupraveśāya
] GJPRK^{ed.}; °anupraveśo yaḃ T, °anupraveśāya C 51b collaṅghanena] GJP^{p.c.}
K^{ed.}; collaghane--- T, collaghanena C, collaṅghena (hypometric) P^{a.c.}R

298 The corrected reading of P (*anuvartanam*) reads *anuvartaman* but marks
the need to reverse the order of the inverted syllables in question. 299 J re-
cords *tvasyopasthāpayati* in the middle of the bottom of the page, on an additional
line immediately below the immediately preceding text.

295 avidyā] J^{a.c.}K^{ed.}; avidyāga GJ^{p.c.}, avidyārtho P, avidyārthā R 296
tathātvena] JPRK^{ed.}; tathā tena G 296 lokayātrātmatayā] JPRK^{ed.}; loka-
trayātmatayā G 296 vā] GPRK^{ed.}; *om.* J 296 vyavahāra°] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.};
vyāvahāra° J^{a.c.} 296 °saṃskārādiḥ] GJ^{p.c.}P^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °saṃskārādiḥ J^{a.c.}, °saṃskā-
rādi° P^{a.c.}R 298 kalpitaḥ] JPRK^{ed.}; kalpitiḥ G 298 anuvartanam] GJP^{p.c.}R-
K^{ed.}; anuvartamāna P^{a.c.} 298 anuṣṭhānam] *em.*; anuṣṭānam GJP^{p.c.}R, anuṣṭā-
nām P^{a.c.}, *om.* K^{ed.} 299 etat] GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; etadrūt J^{a.c.} 299 tad] GJ;
om. PRK^{ed.} 304 jagadrūpatve] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; jagadrūpetve P^{a.c.}, jagadrūpetva R
307 °samarthanān] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; °samarthāt P^{a.c.}R 307 °ṣṭhīvanādi] GJPR;
°niṣṭhīvanādi K^{ed.}

299 J folio 45r. 301 P folio 37. 305 G folio 48r.

parihāryatvena coditaṃ tat tadātmakaniyatiśaktikṛtanīyamārūpadharmādhar-
mānupraveśaphalasaṃsāryavahārasaṃpādanāya. vastutaś ca śivatattve tenol-
310 laṅghanena kiṃ duṣayati na kiñcid ity arthaḥ.

evampravartane tasya na nimittasamudgamaḥ 51

yadi svarūpavibhramśāc chāktarūpādikalpanā

tad vaktavyaṃ nimittatvaṃ kimarthaṃ rūpam ujjhati 52

yāvata sarvarūpāṇāṃ tatsvarūpasvarūpitā

315 janana-pariṇāmādirūpatāṃ vinaivaivamavasthānamātralakṣaṇajagatsthiti-
pravartane tasya na nimittatvaṃ codyam apūrvakāryābhāvāt. yadi hi śāntarūpasya
śāktādirūpāntaragrahaṇaṃ śivatattvatyaḅge syāt tat kasyacid arthasyātra nimittatvaṃ
vaktavyaṃ praṣṭavyaṃ kimarthaṃ ayaṃ rūpam ujjhatīti, yāvata śāntarūpatāyāṃ
śivo jagadrūpatayāpi ca śivasvarūpeṇaiva svarūpavattvam.

51c A vertical line beginning from the base of the previous *akṣara* appears to
cross out *ta* of *tasya* in J, though this was apparently not the intention of the
scribe, as the reading is correct. 52a The manuscript of T is damaged at *yadi*
sva^o but is nevertheless legible.

51c pravartane]CGJPK^{ed.}; ---vartate T, pravartate R 51d nimittasamudgamaḥ
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; nimisamudgamaḥ C 52a °vibhramśāc]TJPK^{ed.}; °vibhramśā C,
°vibhramśāc GR 52b °kalpanā]TCGJK^{ed.}; °kalpanāt PR 52c tad vaktavyaṃ
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; tadvad vyakta^o T 52c nimittatvaṃ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; nimittatvaṃ C
52d ujjhati]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ūlatī C 53a °rūpāṇāṃ]TC^{p.c.}GJPK^{ed.}; °rūpāṇāṃ
C^{a.c.} 53b °svarūpitā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; °svarūpatā C

317 G records a double *daṇḍa* following the first syllable of *nimittatva*.

309 śivatattve]GJK^{ed.}; śivatattvajña^o P, śivatattva R 309 tena]GJK^{ed.}; om.
P, na R 315 °pariṇāmādi^o]GJK^{ed.}; °pariṇāmā^o PR 316 °abhāvāt]GJK^{ed.};
°bhāvāt PR 316 hi]JPRK^{ed.}; ha G 318 vaktavyaṃ]GJK^{ed.}; vaktavya PR 318
praṣṭavyaṃ]GJK^{ed.}; sraṣṭavyaṃ PR 318 rūpam]GJRK^{ed.}; rūpam P 318
śāntarūpatāyāṃ]GJ; śāktirūpatayā P^{p.c.}, śāktirūpatayāṃ P^{a.c.} R, śāntirūpatāyāṃ
K^{ed.} 319 śivo]GJR; śive PK^{ed.}

308 R folio 30v. 315 J folio 45v. 318 G folio 48v.

320 śaktitrayasvarūpatvaṃ sarve yasyāsty avasthitam 53
 nimittam kalpyate tatra nimittam tatra kalpyatām
 atathāṭve tathābhāvo yatra syād atha codyate 54
 purā śāntasvarūpatvaṃ paścāt tādr̥gavasthitih
 śānte śivatvaṃ sthūle 'pi śivatvaṃ yatra varṇitam 55
 325 tatra kā śāntatā brūhi śānte kim vastutā na te
 vastutā cet tathābhūtaśaktitrayasaṃgamah 56

icchādīśaktitrayamayacidātmakatvaṃ sarvasyām avasthitau yasyāvasthitam
 asti tatra nimittam kalpyeta, kā kvā vojyate kim kalpyate naiva kalpanīyam ity
 arthaḥ. tatra hi kalpyatām nimittam yatrātadrūpatve tadrūpatodbhavaḥ. athai-
 330 vaṃ codyate pūrvaṃ śāntarūpatvam ajagadrūpatvaṃ paścāj jagadrūpatety apūr-
 vatāyā nimittam vācyam iti. tan na. yatrābhupagame śānte 'pi śivatvaṃ sthūle 'pi

53d P records *asty*, but the writing is blotched; a later hand records the same
 reading in the right margin. 54a T is damaged at *nimittam* but is nevertheless
 legible. 54b T is badly damaged at ŚD 3,54ab, but the manuscript appears to
 record ŚD 3,54b twice. 54c T is damaged at *atathāṭve* but is nevertheless mostly
 legible. 55d T is missing ŚD 3,55d–56a due to damage to the manuscript.

53c śaktitraya°]TGJPRK^{ed.}; śaktitjaya° C^{p.c.}, śaktiya° C^{a.c.} 53c °svarūpatvaṃ
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 53d sarve]em.; sar--- T, rūpaṃ C, sarvaṃ GJPRK^{ed.} 53d
 yasya]CK^{ed.p.c.}; ya--- T, yatra GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 53d asty]CGJPK^{ed.}; --- T, asthi R 53d
 avasthitam]K^{ed.}; ---tam T, saṃsthitam CGJPR 54a kalpyate]CGJPRK^{ed.};
 kal--- T 54c atathāṭve]CGJPRK^{ed.}; atathā--- T 54d codyate]GJPRK^{ed.};
 codya--- T, codyate C 55a purā]CPRK^{ed.}; --- T, parā GJ 55a śāntasvarūpatvaṃ
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 55b paścāt]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---āt T 55c śivatvaṃ]GJPRK^{ed.};
 śivatva--- T, śitvaṃ C 56b śānte]CGJK^{ed.p.c.}; --- T, śakteḥ PRK^{ed.a.c.} 56c cet
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; c---t T 56d °śakti°]TGJPRK^{ed.}; °śa° (hypometric) C

329 The reading of J is smeared at *dbha* of *tadrūpatodbhavaḥ* but is nevertheless
 (barely) legible.

327 sarvasyām]GJK^{ed.}; sarvasyā PR 328 nimittam]JPRK^{ed.}; nimitta G 328
 kalpyeta]GJPP^{c.}RK^{ed.}; kalpyete P^{a.c.} 328 kalpyate]GJ; kalpyeta PRK^{ed.} 328
 naiva]GJK^{ed.}; tatraiva P^{p.c.}, traiva P^{a.c.}R 329 kalpyatām nimittam]GJPK^{ed.};
 kalpyatānimittam R 329 °rūpatve]GJK^{ed.}; °rūpatva° PR 329 athaivaṃ
]GJPK^{ed.}; athaiva R 330 ajagadrūpatvaṃ]GJRK^{ed.}; om. P 330 apūrvatāyā
]PRK^{ed.}; apūrvatāyām GJ 331 tan na]GJRK^{ed.}; tatra P

324 T folio 5v. 330 J folio 46r. 330 R folio 31r.

jaḡadrūpatve śivatvam eva varṇitaṃ tatra śāntatā śivarūpatā kā syāt, brūhy etat.
śāntam api hi tava vastu, vastu ca sattāmayam sattā bhavattā bhavanakartṛtā,
svātantryātmatvaṃ ca kartṛtvaṃ cidrūpasyecchādisāktimata iti sarvaṃ vastu
335 śivaḥ.

340 aṅgārarūpe kiṃ vahnau vahnitā na kriyātmake
jvālādike 'tha sāvasthā niṣkriyājñānarūpiṇī 57
niricchā ca na śakyeta vaktum evaṃ kadācana
asti sthito 'sāv etasyām avasthāyaṃ śivo yadi 58
naiṣā kriyā bhavati kiṃ niricche kiṃ kriyā bhavet
nirjñāne vā tato jñeyaṃ nāśaktiḥ kācana sthitiḥ 59

aṅgārarūpa eva vahnau kiṃ vahnitā na tu jvalanasantapanādikriyāviṣṭe. atha
tatra vahnir eva śivo 'pi tadbhāvabhedāviṣṭo 'pi śiva eva. kriyāvasthāmukhenaitat

57b G and J highlight *na* with a pair of short vertical lines, a convention in the
manuscripts that suggests the need to delete the *akṣara* in question. To delete
the negative particle would result in a hypometrical scan of the *pāda*, however.

57a aṅgārarūpe] GJPRK^{ed.}; aṅgā--- T, agāra (hypometric) C 57a kiṃ] CGJPR-
K^{ed.}; --- T 57a vahnau] GJPRK^{ed.}; --- T, panhau C 57b vahnitā] GJPRK^{ed.};
--- T, vanhi (hypometric) C 57b na] CG^{a.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; --- T, om. G^{p.c.} 57b
kriyātmake] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kriyātmikā C 57c 'tha] CGJPRK^{ed.}; na T 57d
niṣkriyā°] CK^{ed.p.c.}; --- T, na kriyā GJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 57d °rūpiṇī] GJPRK^{ed.}; --- T,
°rūpine C 58a niricchā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; niricchā C 58a ca na] TCGJPR; na ca
K^{ed.} 58b vaktum] CGJPRK^{ed.}; va---u--- T 58b evaṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---vaṃ T
58c sthito] GJPRK^{ed.}; sthitaṃ T, sthi--- C 58c 'sāv] GJPRK^{ed.}; sāv T, ---v C
58c etasyām] CGJPRK^{ed.}; cet tasyām T 59a naiṣā] TCGJPRK^{ed.}; naiṣa P^{p.c.},
naṣa P^{a.c.} 59b niricche] TGJPRK^{ed.}; niriccheḥ C 59c nirjñāne] TGJPRK^{ed.};
nirjñāne C 59c tato] TGJPRK^{ed.}; --- C 59d nāśaktiḥ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---śaktiḥ
T 59d kācana] GJPRK^{ed.}; k---na T, kāmcana C

340 *kiṃ niricche kiṃ kriyā bhavet* is added in the top margin in P by a later
hand.

333 bhavanakartṛtā] GPRK^{ed.}; bhavanam kartṛtā J 334 °ātmatvaṃ] G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.};
°ātmā G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}, °ātma PR, °ātmakaṃ K^{ed.} 342 aṅgāra°] GJRK^{ed.}; śṛṅgāra°
P 342 °santapana°] PRK^{ed.}; °santāpana° GJ 343 eva] GJPRK^{ed.a.c.}; evaṃ
K^{ed.p.c.} 343 tadbhāva°] GPRK^{ed.}; tattadbhāva° J 343 °mukhena] GJPK^{ed.};
°mukhyena R

332 G folio 49r. 338 C folio 7v. 339 P folio 38.

kathitam. atha sakriye śaktisaṃbhavāc chivatāstu śāntatā tu niṣkriyā jñeyajñā-
 345 narahitā kāryākāraṇāc cikīrṣālakṣaṇecchāsūnyā ca tena na śivaḥ, naivaṃ śakyate
 vaktuṃ kadācana sarvadā bhavanakriyāviraḥāt. sthūlakriyāvirahe śāntāvasthā-
 yām api yadi śivaḥ sthito 'bhyupagamyate tad asti sthita ity eṣā bhāvasthānādi-
 rūpā kriyā kiṃ na bhavati, bhavaty eva. kriyā ca kartṛsvarūpabhūtā, kartā ca
 350 atra bubhūṣātiṣṭhāsālakṣaṇecchāsty eva. yāvac ca tathā kartuṃ bhavituṃ sthā-
 tuṃ vā na jānāti tāvat kiṃ kriyā bhavati. bhavatyādi tināntanirdeśaḥ. tasmā
 jñātavyaṃ yad uta necchādisaktirahitā kācana sthitiḥ kasyacit. icchādisaktimattā
 ca śivatā, ghaṭo 'sti himālayo 'sti jagad astīti ca yathā nādhikyaṃ śivatāyāḥ karoti
 tatheśvarapratyabhijñāyāṃ vicāritam.

355 **atha citratvam atrāsti bhāvapuñje na tac chive**
 śivasya tat svarūpatvaṃ vaicitryaṃ yat parasparam 60
 apekṣya bhāvavaicitryaṃ tasya tebhyo vicitratā
 sarvaṃ śivātmakaṃ yadvat kathaniyam ihāgrataḥ 61

60c G records *t sva* twice. 61d T is damaged at *iha* but is nevertheless legible.

60a citratvam]TGJPRK^{ed.}; citraṃ tvam C 60b °puñje]TGJPRK^{ed.}; °pūjye
 C 60b tac]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ta C 60c svarūpatvaṃ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; svarūpa--- C
 61a apekṣya]TCGJK^{ed.}; apekṣa° PR 61c sarvaṃ]TCGJK^{ed.}; sarva° R 61c
 yadvat]TCJPRK^{ed.}; tadvat G 61d kathaniyam]TGJPRK^{ed.}; kathaniya--- C,
 kathaniyaṃm P^{a.c.}R 61d iha]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---ha C

349 J records *svātantryaṃ*, but *ntrya* is written in a blotched hand. 351 The
 first *akṣara* of *kriyā* is covered by a piece of tape in J. 351 The last *akṣara* of
tasmāj is covered by tape in J.

345 °kāraṇāc]J; °karaṇāc GPRK^{ed.} 347 eṣā]GPP^{c.}K^{ed.}; eṣāṃ JP^{a.c.}R 347
 bhāva°]PRK^{ed.}; bhāvā° GJ 348 ca]GJK^{ed.}; om. R 349 cetana eva
]GJK^{ed.}; cetana esve P^{a.c.}, cetanasv eva P^{p.c.}, cetana e R 350 atra]PRK^{ed.};
 anu° GJ 351 na]JPRK^{ed.}; om. G 351 kriyā]GPRK^{ed.}; ---iyā J 351
 °nirdeśaḥ]G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.}PRK^{ed.}; °nirdeśā G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.} 351 tasmāj]GPRK^{ed.}; tasm--- J
 353 'sti]GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; 'ti K^{ed.a.c.} 353 himālayo 'sti]K^{ed.p.c.}; himālayo GJPR,
 himālatho 'sti K^{ed.a.c.} 354 vicāritam]GJPRK^{ed.p.c.}; vicāratam K^{a.c.}

345 J folio 46v. 346 G folio 49v. 351 R folio 31v. 358 J folio 47r.

athātra bhāvānām parasparato vaicitryam dṛṣyate tac chive cidekarūpe ka-
 360 tham sambhavet. tatrāpi śivasyaiva tad vicitrasvarūpatvaṃ bhāvānām yad any-
 onyavaicitryam, teṣāṃ ca ghaṭapaṭādinām vaicitryam apekṣya tasya tebhas
 tadvaśād vicitratā bhāti cidekarūpasyāpi sataḥ. sarvaṃ ca citsvarūpatvena śivāt-
 makam yan nyāyānusāreṇa tathāgrato vakṣyate.

jalāharaṇasaktaś ca ghaṭo yadi na bhāṇyate

365 **ghaṭaḥ kevala evātra tad evaṃvidham ucyatām** 62

yadi cātra jagaty udakāharaṇasakto ghaṭo nocyate 'pi tu kevalas tatkriyāveśa-
 śūnya eva ghaṭaḥ, tad etatsadṛśam eva kevala eva śivo na jagadrūpa ity etad apy
 ucyatām, yāvatā naivaṃ tat sarvadāpi śiva eva.

nānāvādair no virodhaḥ kathaniyam ihāgrataḥ

370 **uktaṃ vā kālapādādāv āgopālāṅganādinā** 63
tad aikyaṃ khetapālo 'pi prāha yā kācana sthitā
śaktiḥ padārthajātasya devadevasya sākhilā 64

63d Cp. with *Sārdhatriśatikālottara* 1.6cd-7ab: *āgopālāṅganā bālā mleccchāḥ
 prakṛtabhāṣiṇaḥ / antarjalagataḥ sattvās te 'pi nityaṃ bruvanti tam.*

62a jalāharaṇa°]GJPRK^{ed.}; jal---haṇa° T, jalagrahaṇa° C 62b ghaṭo]TGJPR-
 K^{ed.}; ghaṭā C 62c ghaṭaḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ghami C 62c kevala]TGJPRK^{ed.};
 ketvala C 62d evaṃvidham]CGJPRK^{ed.}; evaṃvidha T 62d ucyatām
]GJPRK^{ed.}; ucyate T, ucyantam C 63a no]GJPRK^{ed.}; nā TC 63c uk-
 taṃ]TCGPRK^{ed.}; ukte J 63c kālapādādāv]CGJPRK^{ed.}; kālapādānte T 63d
 āgopālāṅganādinā]GJK^{ed.}; āgopālāṅgalādinā T, āgopālāṅganācinā C, āgopālāṅ-
 ganaditā P, āgopālāṅganadinā R 64a khetapālo]CGJPRK^{ed.}; khe---ālo T 64b
 kācana]TGJPRK^{ed.}; kāṃcana C 64b sthitā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; sthitaḥ C 64c
 śaktiḥ]TCGJPRK^{ed.}; śakti P^{a.c.}R 64c padārtha°]CGJPRK^{ed.}; pādārtha° T
 64d devadevasya]TGJPRK^{ed.}; devadeva ca C 64d sākhilā]TCGJPRK^{ed.};
 sākhilā R

366 A piece of tape covers a portion of J at °kriyā°.

363 yan nyāya°]GJPRK^{ed.}; yat yāya° P^{a.c.} 366 udaka°]GJPRK^{ed.}; tadak
 P^{a.c.}R 366 °aharaṇa°]JPRK^{ed.}; °haraṇa° G 366 tu]GJPRK^{ed.}; tvu R
 366 °kriyā°]GPRK^{ed.}; °---iyā° J 367 etatsadṛśam]GJK^{ed.}; etsadṛśam PR
 367 eva kevala eva]GJ; evaṃ kevala eva PRK^{ed.}

359 G folio 50r.

śaktiśaktimatām uktā sarvatraiva hy abheditā
 eko rudra itīyādi śrutāv uktaṃ tathā paraḥ 65
 375 puruṣaḥ sarvam evedam itihāsādiṣūditam
 maheśasyāṣṭamūrtitvaṃ yāvat pārthivamūḍhatā 66
 so 'rodid iti vede 'sti nārthavādo nirarthakaḥ
 vidhyaṅgatvena cet sattā nāsatyasyāṅgatā sthitā 67
 arthavādād api phalaṃ rātrikratuṣu darsitam

380 nānādarśanaīś cāsmiṃ śivādvaite no virodha ity agre kathanīyam. svasid-
 dhānta eva vā śrīkālottarādāv uktaṃ etat

āgopālāṅganā bālā nityam eva bruvanti tam

ityādinā mantrātmaśivarūpatvaṃ jantūnām. guravo 'pi śivaikyam upadiśanti.
 tathā ca khetapālaguruḥ prāha yā kācanetyādi. yataś ca devadevaśaktir eva

66a Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 3.15: *puruṣa evedam sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam / utāmṛtatvasyeśāno yad anenātirohati.* 67b T is written in a manner that suggests it first read *arthavādā* for *arthavādo*.

65a śaktiśaktimatām]TGJPR; śaktiśaktimātor CK^{ed}. 65a uktā]TGJPRK^{ed};
 maktā C 65b sarvatraiva hy]TGJK^{ed}; sarvaṃ va traivaṃ hṛ C, sarvatraivam
 PR 65b abheditā]TGJPRK^{ed}; bheditā C 65c eko]TGJPRK^{ed}; vṛko C 65c
 itīyādi]TGJPRK^{ed}; itityādi C 65d śrutāv]TGJPK^{ed}; śrutā C, śr--tāv R 66a
 sarvam]CK^{ed}; --- T, sarva GJPR 66a idam]TCJPRK^{ed}; idaṃm G 66b
 itihāsādiṣūditam]CGJRK^{ed}; itihāsādidūṣanam T, itihāsādisūditam P 66c
 °mūrtitvaṃ]TGJPRK^{ed}; °mūrtitva C 67a so]TJJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed}; sā C, sa G, se
 P^{a.c.} 67a 'rodid]TJPRK^{ed}; vādīd C, 'rodīdh G 67a vede]CGJPRK^{ed};
 veda T 67c cet]TGJK^{ed}; ce C, ced PR 67c sattā]TGJK^{ed.a.c.}; ---tā C, dattā
 PR, satyā K^{ed.p.c.} 67d aṅgatā]TCGJRK^{ed}; agatā P 67d sthitā]TGJPRK^{ed};
 sthitaḥ C 68a arthavādād]CGJJP^{p.c.} K^{ed}; a---vādād T, arthavādo P^{a.c.} R 68b
 rātrikratuṣu]TCGJRK^{ed}; rātrikṛtuṣu P

382 G inserts a double *daṇḍa* following *bruvanti*.

380 asmiṃ]GJJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed}; asmi P^{a.c.} 380 śivādvaite]JPR; śivādvaita G,
 śaivādvaite K^{ed}. 381 eva vā]GJK^{ed}; evā PR 382 bālā]GJJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed}; bālāṃ
 P^{a.c.} 382 eva]PRK^{ed}; om. GJ 384 °śaktir]GJK^{ed}; °śakter PR

373 R folio 32r. 373 G folio 50v. G reads *śrīgurubhyo namaḥ* in the middle of
 the top of the folio. 374 J folio 47v. 375 P folio 39.

385 padārthaśaktir uktā, śaktiśaktimatoś ca na bhedas tato devadeva eva padārtha ity uktam bhavati. yad idam idam sa eko rudra iti ca rudraikyam. tathā paraḥ pu-
ruṣa evedam sarvam iti coktam vede. purāṇetihāsādiṣu cāṣṭamūrtitvam uktam
maheśvarasya yatrātyantatāmasapārthivatattvarūpeṇa mūḍatāpi svarūpam eva.
so 'rodid iti ca rudraśaktinirvacane 'pi vedenoktam tadaikyam. arthavādo 'yam
390 asatyārtho vidhyanuṣṭhānatātparyād ity etad api na yuktam. arthavādasya yā
vidhyanḡatā satyā sā katham asatyārthasya syāt. svārtham abhidadhāna eva hy
arthavādo bhavati, na ca vede mithyārthatā, rātrikratuṣu cārthavādaprāmāṇye-
naivānuṣṭheyatvāt phalam pradarśitam jaiminīyaiḥ.

bandhamokṣau na bhidyete sarvatraiva śivatvataḥ 68

395

vijñānam idṛk sarvasya kasmān na syād vimohitā

saivaiṣā sā ca samsāro bandhamokṣāv ataḥ sthitau 69

68c Cf. VBh 135: *na me bandho na mokṣo me bhitasayaitā vibhīṣikāḥ / pratibimbam idam buddher jaleṣv iva vivasvataḥ*. Cf. also ŚD 7.87cd: *na me bandho na me mokṣas tau malatvena samsthitau*.

68c bandhamokṣau] GJPRK^{ed.}; bandhamokṣo T, bandhamokṣā C 68c bhidyete] GJRK^{ed.a.c.}; vidyete TCPK^{ed.p.c.} 68d śivatvataḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---vatvataḥ C 69b kasmān] TGJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; tasmān C, kasmāt P^{a.c.} 69b vimohitā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; vimohitaḥ C 69c saivaiṣā] TJPRK^{ed.}; naiveṣā C, saiveṣā G 69d bandhamokṣāv] CGJPRK^{ed.}; bandhamokṣa--- T 69d ataḥ] GJPRK^{ed.}; ---taḥ T, ata C

388 P apparently witnesses the correct reading of *atyanta*^o, but the same is marked with an “x” by a later hand. It is possible to understand the manuscript to read *anaynta*, however, which would explain the editorial mark in question.
391 R records a wide gap between *syāt* and *svārtham*. 392 P marks its erroneous reading of *mithyātā* with an “x” mark above *thyā*.

385 devadeva] JPRK^{ed.}; deva G 385 ity uktam] GJ^{p.c.} PRK^{ed.}; ity uktaṁ J^{a.c.} 387 uktam] JPRK^{ed.}; muktaṁ G 389 so] JPRK^{ed.}; sa G 389 'rodid iti] GJP^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; 'roditi P^{a.c.} R 389 rudra^o] GJP^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; nirudra^o P^{a.c.} R 389 °śakti^o] PK^{ed.}; °śabda^o GJR 389 uktam] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; ukteṁ P^{a.c.} 391 sā] GJK^{ed.}; om. PR 391 svārtham] GJK^{ed.}; sārtham PR 392 ca] PK^{ed.p.c.}; sa GJRK^{ed.a.c.} 392 vede] GJPR; vede 'pi K^{ed.} 392 mithyārthatā] GJK^{ed.}; mithyātā P, mithyātā R 392 rātrikratuṣu] GJ^{p.c.} PRK^{ed.}; nātrikratuṣu J^{a.c.} 393 anuṣṭheyatvāt] GJP^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; anuṣṭhīyatvāt P^{a.c.} R 393 phalam] GJK^{ed.}; phala^o PR 393 jaiminīyaiḥ] P^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; jaimineyaiḥ GJ, jaiminaiyaiḥ P^{a.c.} R

387 G folio 51r. 389 J folio 48r. 395 R folio 32v.

sarvasya śivatattve bandhamokṣābhāvāc chivo 'ham iti sarvasyaiva kim iti
jñānaṃ na bhavatīti. atrāpy ucyate yathā saivaiśā vimohitā, evam

ajñānalakṣaṇā sā ca saṃsāro bandha ucyate

400 iti sthitāv ajñānarūpau bandhamokṣau.

**vibhinnaśivapakṣe tu satye dārḍhyaṃ paratra naḥ
pratītimātram evātra tāvatā bandhamokṣatā 70**

yadā tu sarva eva bhāvāḥ kartṛtvād icchādīśaktiyogāt pratyekaṃ śivarūpā iti
pakṣaḥ, tadā tatra vibhinnaśivapakṣe satye yathāsthitasyārthabhedasya dār-
405 ḍhyaṃ. yadā tv ekaśivatvam eva tattvaṃ tadāsmiṃ pakṣe na dārḍhyaṃ bheda-
sya, apī tu śivābhedapratītimātraṃ mokṣas tadapratītis tu bandha iti tāvatā
pratītimātreṇa, na tu vastvanyathātve bandhamokṣayor bandhamokṣatā.

**nāsatyebuddhitvakhaṇḍanātrāsti kācana
kathanam sarvasāmyāya vivādihananāya ca 71**

70b The erroneous reading in P of *ratra* for *paratra* is marked with an "x"
above *ra*. 70d A mark indicating the absence of a *danḍa* is inserted following
bandhamokṣatā in C.

70a vibhinnaśivapakṣe] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---bhinnaśivapakṣe C 70b dārḍhyaṃ
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; dārḍhyaṃ C 70b paratra] TCGJK^{ed.}; ratra (hypometric) P, ara-
tra R 70d tāvatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tāvatām C 70d bandhamokṣatā] TGJPRK^{ed.};
bandhamokṣatām C 71a nāsatyebuddhitvakhaṇḍanā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; na satye C 71b °khaṇḍanā
] TGJRK^{ed.}; ---ḍanā C, khaṇḍu P 71b atrāsti] TCGJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; nāsasti P^{a.c.}
71d vivādihananāya] GJK^{ed.}; vivā<?>han---ya T, vivādahasāya (hypometric) C,
vivācihananāya PR

403 The reading *bhāvān* is marked with an "x" above *ān* in P. 405 P marks
its erroneous reading of *nṛkṣe* with an "x" above *nṛ*.

397 sarvasya śivatattve] GJ; sarvaśivatattve PR, sarvasya śivatve K^{ed.} 398
jñānaṃ] GJPK^{ed.}; jñāna R 398 na] GJPK^{ed.}; om. R 403 bhāvāḥ] GJK^{ed.};
bhāvān PR 403 śivarūpā] PK^{ed.}; śivarūpa GJR 404 pakṣaḥ] GJRK^{ed.}; om. P
404 °sthitasyārtha°] GJPP^{c.} K^{ed.}; °sthitasyārtha° P^{a.c.} R 405 asmiṃ] GJ; sthi
PR, tasmiṃ K^{ed.} 405 pakṣe] GJK^{ed.}; nṛkṣe PR 405 na] GJRK^{ed.}; om. P
406 śivābheda°] GK^{ed.}; bhedaśivābheda° J, bheda° PR 406 tadapratītis
] PRK^{ed.}; tadapratītis GJ

402 G folio 51v. 404 J folio 48v.

410 na cāpy atra bhedeṣv asatyeṣu satyabuddhyā bhrāntirūpā khaṇḍanāsti vedok-
 tavat, yato bhāvānām sarveṣām eva śivarūpatve sthite bahutvam ekatvaṃ vā. yat
 punaḥ śivatvenaikyasya kathanam tat sarveṣām śivatattvena sāmyāyotkarṣāpa-
 karṣanivāraṇāya, yadi vā ye śivatvaṃ bhāvānām na pratijānata iti tadvivādirā-
 jāyāya.

415 **tathā tathā śivāvasthā svecchātaḥ sa tadātmakaḥ**
tadātmatve nāsti bandhas tadabhāvān na mokṣaṇam 72

bhede 'pi tathā bhedarūpeṇa śivasyāvasthānaṃ svecchāvasāt, sa ca bhedaḥ
 śivātmakaḥ. evaṃ ca bhedasya śivātmakatve nāsti bandhas tadabhāvāt tadapekṣo
 na mokṣo 'pi.

420 **kimarthaṃ guruśāstrādi cet tathā tadavasthiteḥ**
devasya śāstrād bodhena kiṃ prajoyanam eva ca 73
kimarthaṃ bhavatārabdham śāstram bodhāya kasya vā

tathā bhedarūpatayā śivasyaivāvasthiter hetor mokṣābhāvāt kimarthaṃ gu-
 ruśāstrānuṣṭhānādikam. na hi devasya nityaprabuddhasya śāstreṇodbodhanam

72a T records *tathā* at the beginning of ŚD 1.72a in such a manner as to suggest
 it originally read *tatha*.

72a śivāvasthā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; mijāvasthā C 72b svecchātaḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.};
 svecchātaḥ C 72c tadātmatve] TCK^{ed.}; tadātmatvaṃ GJPR 72d tadabhāvān
 na mokṣaṇam] TGJK^{ed.}; tadabhāvān nimokṣaṇam C, tadabhāvānumokṣaṇam
 PR 73a °ādi] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °ādi C 73b tathā] GJK^{ed.}; tadā TCPR 73b
 tadavasthiteḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tadavasthite C 73c śāstrād] TGJPRK^{ed.}; śāstra° C
 73d prajoyanam] CGJPRK^{ed.}; prajoyana--- T 73d eva] CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 74a
 ārabdham] GJPRK^{ed.}; ārabdhbdham T, āradhbaṃ C 74b śāstram bodhāya
] TCGJK^{ed.}; śāstrābodhāya PR

410 ca] JPRK^{ed.}; *om.* G 410 bhrāntirūpā khaṇḍanā] GJRK^{ed.}; bhrāntirū-
 pakhaṇḍanā P 412 śivatvena] GJPR; śivatattvena K^{ed.} 412 tat] GJPK^{ed.}; na
 tat R 413 °apakarṣanivāraṇāya] RK^{ed.}; °apakarṣaṇanivāraṇāya GJ, °apakarṣa-
 nirvāraṇāya P 413 ye] GJK^{ed.}; *om.* PR 413 na] JPK^{ed.}; *om.* GR 413
 iti] K^{ed.}; *om.* GJR, i P 413 tadvivādirājayāya] J; tadvivādirājayāyā
 GR, tadvivādirājayāya P^{p.c.}, °parājayāyā P^{a.c.}, tadvivādirājayāya K^{ed.} 417
 °avasthānaṃ] GJPK^{ed.}; °avasthāna R 417 bhedaḥ] JPRK^{ed.}; bheda° G
 423 hetor] JPRK^{ed.}; heto G 423 kimarthaṃ] GJPK^{ed.}; kimartha R 424
 °anuṣṭhānādikam] GJK^{ed.}; °anuṣṭhānādikam P^{p.c.}, °anuṣṭhānādikam P^{a.c.} R 424
 udbodhanam] GJPK^{ed.}; udbodhana R

411 P folio 40. 416 G folio 52r. 418 J folio 49r. 418 R folio 33r.

425 *saprayojanam. āsatām anyāni śāstrāṇi, tvam eva śivaikyavādi vā kimarthaṃ śāstram ārabdhavān kasya bodhāya.*

sa evetthaṃ svecchayāste tatkartṛtvena bodhyataḥ 74

sa eva buddharūpatve tathā bhavati tatkṣaṇam

sa eva saṃprajāyeta tadanuṣṭhānatatparaḥ 75

430 **phalaṃ vā tadanuṣṭhāne sa eva hi tadā bhavet**

deva evānena prakāreṇa svecchayā niṣprayojanam āste. tad eva darśayati tadasmadādiśāstrakartṛtvena tathā bodhyato bodhyaṃ śiṣyarūpam āpādyāste. tathā tam eva kālaṃ prabuddharūpatve vā sthito bhavati. tathā śāstrānuṣṭhānaparaḥ saṃpadyate. tathārthakāmādiphalarūpatvenāpi sa eva svakāle bhavati.

435 **vāditvaprativāditve kasmāc cet tasya tatsthiteḥ 76**

vyavahārāya vā sarvaṃ vyavahāro na vastugaḥ

77b C corrects the verse number here listed, from ŚD 3.76 to 3.77.

74c *svecchayā*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *svecchayā* C 74d *tatkartṛtvena*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *tatkartutvena* C 74d *bodhyataḥ*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *bodhyatā* C 75a *buddharūpatve*] TGJRK^{ed.}; *buddhirūpatve* C, *buddhirūpatve* P 75b *tathā*] TCGJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; *tathāṃ* P^{a.c.}, *tatha* R 75c *sa*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; --- C 75d *tadanuṣṭhānatatparaḥ*] CGJRK^{ed.}; *tadanuṣṭhāna* T, *tadanuṣṭhānatatphalaḥ* P 76a *tadanuṣṭhāne*] TGJRK^{ed.}; *danuṣṭhāna* (hypometric) C, *tadanuṣṭhāne* PR 76b *tadā*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *tathā* C 76b *bhavet*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *bhavavet* (hypermetric) C 76c *vāditva*°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *vādi*° C 76d *kasmāc*] TGJK^{ed.}; *tasmāc* C, *kasmā* P^{p.c.}, *kasmāś* P^{a.c.}R 76d *cet*] TGJRK^{ed.}; *ce* CP^{a.c.}, *om.* (hypometric) P^{p.c.} 76d *tatsthiteḥ*] T^{p.c.}CGJPRK^{ed.}; *tatsthitaḥ* T^{a.c.} 77a *vyavahārāya*] TCGJK^{ed.}; *vyavahāya* (hypometric) P^{p.c.}R, *vyavarhāya* (hypometric) P^{a.c.} 77a *sarvaṃ*] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *sarva* T 77b *vastugaḥ*] GJPRK^{ed.}; *vastu<?>gaḥ* T, *vasktataḥ* C

432 G inserts a double *danḍa* following *tadasmadādiśāstrakartṛtve*.

425 *vā*] GJK^{ed.}; *va* PR 431 *āste*] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; *āhate* P^{a.c.} 432 *bodhyato*] GJK^{ed.}; *bodhyate* PR 432 *āpādyā*] GJPRK^{ed.a.c.}; *āsādyā* K^{ed.p.c.} 433 *tam*] GJPR; *tasminn* K^{ed.} 433 *kālaṃ*] GJ; *kāle* PRK^{ed.} 433 °*anuṣṭhāna*°] JK^{ed.}; °*anuṣṭhānatat*° G, °*anuṣṭhāna*° PR 434 *api*] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; *asya* P^{a.c.}

432 J folio 49v. 432 G folio 52v. 435 C folio 8r.

svarūpaṃ vastugaṃ vidhi vyavahāro na jātucit 77
tatheśvaravyavasthānād avastvābhāsarūpataḥ

tadaikye darśanabhedābhāvād vāditvaṃ prativāditvaṃ ca kutaḥ, yad uktaṃ
 440 vivādhinanāyēti, tad etad api tasyaiva tathāsthiteḥ. lokavyavahārāya vā sarvaṃ
 śāstravādiप्रतिवādyādi. lokavyavahāras ca tadabhedākhyātimayo na vastugataḥ.
 yat punaḥ svarūpeṇa prakāśate tac chivarūpavastvātmakam eva, vyavahāras tu
 na kadācid vāstavo 'pi tu bhrama eva, avastv apīśvarātmavāstvābhāsarūpeṇa
 tasyāvasthānāt. ata eveśvarapratyabhiññoktanīyā tad avastv api prakāśamānaṃ
 445 cidrūpam eva, kevalaṃ bāhye prakāśanābhāvād avastūcyate.
 tad āha

sarvam ekena rūpeṇa yad vicāryaṃ tathāgrataḥ 78

78a An *akṣara* is deleted following °*avasthā*° in C. 78b The verse number (78) is inserted above the line in C.

77c svarūpaṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; svarūpañ ca T 77c vidhi] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---i---i---
 T 77d vyavahāro] CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---hāro T 78a tatheśvara°] T; tadeśvara°
 CGJPRK^{ed.a.c.}, tad īśvara° K^{ed.p.c.} 78b avastvābhāsarūpataḥ] GJK^{ed.}; eva svāb-
 hāsarūpataḥ T, aveschābhāvarūpataḥ C, avasthābhāsarūpataḥ PR 78d tathā
] TGJPRK^{ed.}; iha C

440 P and R omit *lokavyavahārāya vā sarvaṃ śāstravādiप्रतिवādyādi*. 443
 G and J record *vā* above and slightly to the right of *va* of *avastu*. Apparently, the
 scribe wishes to replace *va* with *vā*. In other words, the manuscripts should be
 understood *post correctionem* to read (erroneously) *vāstv api*. One suspects that
 an underlying reading of *bhrama evāstv api* (with G attesting to a variant reading
 of *krama* for *bhrama*) explains the present variant. 444 Reference is here
 made, perhaps, to ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.5.6: *ābhāsamānair eva arthair vyavahārah, te*
cābhāsātmakāḥ santu kā kṣatiḥ. tat kiṃ bāhyena kāryaṃ tāvatā lokayātrāsamāpteh.
bāhyaś cārthaḥ pramāṇabādhitāḥ sāvayavo viruddhadharmādhyāsāder niravayavaś
ca dikṣatkaḥyogāder bahuśaḥ.

439 vāditvaṃ] K^{ed.}; vāditva° GJPR 440 sarvaṃ] K^{ed.}; sarva° GJ, om. PR
 442 vyavahāras] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; vyavaharas P^{a.c.}R 443 kadācid] PRK^{ed.}; kaścid
 G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}, kācid G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.} 443 bhrama] JPRK^{ed.}; krama G 443 eva] PRK^{ed.};
 va GJ 443 avastv] PK^{ed.}; astv G^{p.c.}J^{p.c.}R, stv G^{a.c.}J^{a.c.} 443 api] GJRK^{ed.};
 athāpi P^{p.c.}, āpi P^{a.c.} 444 eva] GJK^{ed.}; evaṃ P, evaś ca R 444 īśvara°
] GJPK^{ed.}; ra° R 445 prakāśana°] PK^{ed.}; prakāśatā° GJ, prakāśa° R 445
 °abhāvād] GJPK^{ed.}; °bhāvād R

437 T folio 6r. 441 R folio 33v. 444 J folio 50r. 445 G folio 53r.

sarvaṃ vastv avastu ca śivarūpaṃ yatas tathāgre vicāraṇīyam eva.

450 **dharmādharmaiś ca saṃbandhas tathā tacchivasamsthiteḥ
tatphalāphalayogena yuktatā tasya tatsthiteḥ 79**

tayoḥ phalena nyūnatayā vā viparītena phalenāphalena yogaḥ. athavā phalenāyogo 'thavāpy adharmasyāphalenāniṣṭhena phalena yogaḥ, tena hetunā yuktāyuktatā nyāyā śivasya tathāsthiter hetoḥ, sarvathā yad yat pratibhāsate tac cidrūpaśivātmakam eva.

455 **nimittasamavāyādivaicitryāt tadvicitratā
kāraṇasyaikarūpatve na doṣas tritayātmatā 80
na rājājñā samādiṣṭā svayaṃ vā sa nimittakam**

80a J is torn horizontally across the page immediately above ŚD 3.80, though the text is legible excepting the first *akṣara* of ŚD 3.80a.

79a dharmādharmaiś] CGJPRK^{ed.}; dharmo dharmā T 79a saṃbandhas] TGJPRK^{ed.}; saṃbandhas C 79b tacchiva°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tacchiva° C 79b °saṃsthiteḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °saṃsthite C 79c tatphala°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tatphalāt C 79c °aphalayogena] CGJPRK^{ed.}; aphala--- T 79d yuktatā] TCJPRK^{ed.}; yuktatā G 80a nimitta°] TCGPRK^{ed.}; n---mitta° J 80a °samavāyādi°] TK^{ed.}; °samavāyā° (hypometric) C, °samavāyādi° GJPR 80b °vaicitryāt] K^{ed.p.c.}; °vaicitryaṃ TCGJPRK^{ed.a.c.} 80b tadvicitratā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; dicitratā (hypometric) C 80c ekarūpatve] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ekaropatve C 80d °ātmatā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; °ātmanā C 81a rājājñā] CGJPRK^{ed.}; rājā<?>ā T 81a samādiṣṭā] TCGJK^{ed.}; samādiṣṭā PR 81b sa] TGJPRK^{ed.}; na C

451 *athavā phalenāyogo 'tha*° is underlined by a later hand in P. 453 The second *yuktatā* of P's variant reading *yuktatāyuktatā* is highlighted with an "x" mark. 453 A later hand marks the variant reading found in P of *nyāyā* (for *nyāyā*) with a large "x" mark above *yā*.

448 avastu] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; vastu P^{a.c.} 448 vicāraṇīyam] GJK^{ed.}; vicāraṇīm PR 451 nyūnatayā] JK^{ed.}; anyūnatayā G, nyūtayā PR 451 phalenāyogo] GJK^{ed.}; phalenāyoga P, phalenāyogā R 452 aphalena] GJK^{ed.}; phalena PR 453 yuktāyuktatā] GJK^{ed.a.c.}; yuktatā K^{ed.p.c.}, yuktatāyuktatā PR 453 nyāyā] K^{ed.}; nyāyā G, nyāyāc J, nyāyā PR 453 °sthiter] GJK^{ed.}; °sthite PR 453 pratibhāsate] GJRK^{ed.}; pratibhāsane P

samavāyi tadicchāiva tadyogaḥ sahakāraṇam 81
tasyaiva vā trirūpatvaṃ vyapadeśāt tathāvidham

460 śivasyaivaikasya kāraṇatve nimittasamavāyysamavāyitvavaicitryeṇa tasya
vicitratā tritayātmatākhyā na doṣa uktanyāyena, yato na rājājñā samā tulyopa-
diṣṭā, api tu rājājñārūpasāmye 'py anyathā bhedaḥ. tadvat tanturūpeṇa saṃyo-
garūpeṇa ca sa nimittam apy āste. athavā svayaṃ sa tāvan nimittakāraṇam,
tadicchā samavāyikāraṇam, ghaṭādivastunaḥ satteccchānvayāt sa eva cāvayavasam
465 yogaḥ sahakāryasamavāyikāraṇam ity arthaḥ. athavā tasyaikatve 'pi tritvaṃ yath-
oktaprakāraṃ vyapadeśād vyavahārāt sarvabhedavyavahārasyābhedākhyātirū-
patvam.

na pṛthivyādike tasmin kalpanā sampravartate 82

tathātvenaiva klṛptatvāt tadā tat kalpanā bhavet

tad eva tatkalpitaṃ kiṃ satye nāmāstu kalpanā 83

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82b A parallel passage exists in ĪPK 1.5.10: *svāmināś cātmasamsthasya bhāva-
jātasya bhāsanam / asty eva na vinā tasmād icchāmarśaḥ pravartate*. 83b The
folio of J is torn across the entire folio at the point where it records its reading
of ŚD 3.83, but is nevertheless legible. 83c *Tad e* of the hypermetric reading
tad etad eva is underlined in P by a later hand.

81c *tadicchā*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *tadichā* C 81d *tadyogaḥ*] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *ta---*
gaḥ T 81d *sahakāraṇam*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *saprakāśṇam* C 82a *vā trirūpat-*
vaṃ] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *rātrirūpatva* T 82b *vyapadeśāt*] TGPRK^{ed.}; *vyaparesāt* C,
vyavadeśāt J 82c *na*] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *ni* T 82c *tasmin*] TGJPRK^{ed.}; *tadvat* C
83a *tathātvenaiva*] CGJPRK^{ed.}; *tathātvam eva* T 83a *klṛptatvāt*] TGJPRK^{ed.};
gkyaptatvāt C 83b *tadā*] K^{ed.p.c.}; *tada* TGJ, *tava* C, *tad* PRK^{ed.a.c.} 83b *tat*
] TGJK^{ed.p.c.}; *sat*° C, *etat* PRK^{ed.a.c.} 83c *tad eva*] TCGJK^{ed.}; *tad etad eva* (hyper-
metric) PR 83c *tatkalpitaṃ*] TGJPRK^{ed.a.c.}; *tatkālpitaṃ* C, *atatkalpitaṃ* K^{ed.p.c.}
83d *nāmāstu*] GJPRK^{ed.}; *namāstu* T, *nāvaskta* C 83d *kalpanā*] CGJPRK^{ed.};
k---nā T

460 *kāraṇatve*] G^{p.c.}JPRK^{ed.}; *kāraṇasya* G^{a.c.} 460 °*samavāyy*°] JPRK^{ed.};
°*samavāy*° G 460 °*asamavāyitva*°] GJK^{ed.}; °*asamavāyi*° PR 461 *na*
rājājñā] G^{p.c.}JR; *na rājājñā* G^{a.c.}, *rājājñā na* PK^{ed.} 461 *samā*] GJK^{ed.}; *sama*°
PR 462 °*sāmye*] GJK^{ed.}; °*sasye* P^{p.c.}R, °*sasyeṃ* P^{a.c.} 463 *sa*] JPRK^{ed.}; *san*
G 463 *nimitta*°] GJK^{ed.}; *nimita*° R 465 *yathoktaprakāraṃ*] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.};
yathoktaṃ prakāraṃ P^{a.c.}R

460 J folio 50v. 461 G folio 53v. 464 R folio 34r.

na ca pṛthivyādirūpatayā pratiyamāne bhāvajāte śivarūpitā kalpitā bhavati, vastusthityaiva pṛthivyādirūpeṇa vā śivatattvasyaiva kṛptatvāt. atadrūpaṃ tadrūpaṃ yadāvasīyate yathā manorājyādi, tadā tat kalpanā kalpyamānaṃ bhavet. yāvataḥ sākṣāc chiva eva sarvam iti vastusthityā pṛthivyādi śiva eva, śivatvena kiṃ
475 kalpitam bhavati na bhavaty evety arthaḥ. atha satyatas tasminn eva kalpaneti kathyate. tadā vastutas tatra kalpaneti nāmakṛtiḥ.

tad evodāharati

kaṭake 'sti suvarṇatvaṃ kuṇḍale kalpanāsti kim

citravahnāv aśokāḍau kalpanā rājate kvacit 84

kṛptakalpanayor bhedaṃ ye na jānanti naumi tān

480

kaṭake kiṃ suvarṇatvaṃ satyaṃ kuṇḍale tu kalpitam, naivety arthaḥ. citragate vahnau, aśokapuṣpāḍau rakte vahnikalpanā śobhate kvacid avasare pṛthivyādirūpeṇa śivaḥ kṛptaḥ saṃpannaḥ svayaṃ sthita ity arthaḥ. kalpitam punaḥ svayaṃ sa tathā kevalam iṣyate tena rūpeṇeti kṛptasya svayaṃkṛptes tathā saṃ-
485 patteḥ, kalpanāyās ca svayamatathābhūtasya tathā saṃbhāvanāmātrarūpāyā ye śabdārthatve na bhedarūdhās te vandyā ity upahāsaḥ.

84c J records *kā kvedam* above *citravahnāu*.

84c citra°] TGJPRK^{ed.}; citraṃ C 84d kvacit] TGJPRK^{ed.}; kūcit C 85a kṛptakalpanayor] TK^{ed.p.c.}; gklaptakalpanayor° C, kṛptikalpanayor GJ, kṛptikalpanayo PRK^{ed.a.c.} 85b tān] TCJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; tām GP^{a.c.}R

472 G adds the final -t of the ablative ending of *kṛptatva* in the right margin.
474 G and J omit *sarvam iti vastusthityā pṛthivyādi śiva eva*. 482 A later hand marks the erroneous reading of *kvaci* for *kvacit* with an “x” in P. 483 The bottom of the folio of J is torn off and missing from my copy of the manuscript. I thus have no record of J’s reading for °*rūpeṇa śivaḥ kṛptaḥ ... svayamatathābhūtasya tathā saṃbhāvanāmā*°.

472 eva] GJK^{ed.}; evā PR 473 kalpyamānaṃ] GJK^{ed.}; kalpanaṃ P, kalpamānaṃ R 475 bhavaty] GJK^{ed.}; bhavety PR 475 eva] JPRK^{ed.}; aiva G 475 satyatas] GJK^{ed.}; satya PR 476 tadā vastutas] *conj.*; tad avastutas GJ, tad avastu atas PRK^{ed.} 476 nāmakṛtiḥ] PRK^{ed.}; nāpakṛtiḥ GJ 481 kiṃ] GJK^{ed.}; *om.* PR 481 kuṇḍale] GJPK^{ed.}; kuṇḍala R 481 citragate] GJK^{ed.}; cittagate PR 482 vahnau] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; vahnayā P^{a.c.}, vahnayā R 482 kvacid] GJK^{ed.}; kvaci PR 482 avasare] GJK^{ed.}; vasare PR 484 rūpeṇeti] GRK^{ed.}; --- J, rūpeṇe P 484 kṛptasya] GP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; --- J, kliptasya P^{a.c.} 484 svayaṃkṛptes] GRK^{ed.}; --- J, svayaṃkliptes P

473 J folio 51r. 474 G folio 54r. 483 P folio 42. 485 J folio 51v.

śivatattve sānubhave na paśyantyā samānatā 85
yato gāndhikasaugandhyavat paśyann avikalpakah

śivatattve cidātmani viśvanirbhare viśvānubhavarūpe paśyantyā pūrvokta-
 490 dūṣaṇayā na samānatā. yato yathā gāndhiko 'nantagandhadravysaugandhyam
 iyattayānavadhārayann akrameṇa sarvam avadhārayann āste, tathā viśvān bhā-
 vān deśakālakramaśūnyān vācyavācakātmanah paśyann avikalpaḥ śivo bhavati,
 aham ityevampūrṇāhaṃbhāvanaiśāṃ prakāśanāt. ahaṃparāmarśavān apy avi-
 kalpako yathā tathēśvarapratyabhijñāto 'vadhāryam. gāndhikasyaṇyasya ca tu-
 495 lye gandhānām iyattayānubhave gāndhikasya gandhāmodavattayānyasyaiva tu
 tacchūnyasyaiva. anena viśvanirbharatā samarthitā, tāvanmātre 'yaṃ drṣṭāntah.

85c śivatattve] TGJPRK^{ed.}; śitattve C 85c sānubhave] CGJPRK^{ed.}; sānub-
 hāve T 85d na paśyantyā] TGJ; paśyantyā C, paśyantyā na PRK^{ed.} 86a
 gāndhika°] GJPRK^{ed.}; g---ndhika° T, gandhika° C 86b °vat] TCJPRK^{ed.}; °kṛt
 G 86b paśyann] TGJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; paśyanti C, paśyat P^{a.c.} 86b avikalpakah
] GJPRK^{ed.}; akalpanavikalpakah (hypermetric) T, vyavas---itā C

489 A later hand underlines the first syllable of °nirbhare in P. 490 A later
 hand marks the erroneous reading of °dūṣaṇaya in P with an “x” above the final
 syllable. 490 The word °gandha° is added in the right margin of P. 494
 The present perhaps refers to ĪPK 1.6.1: *ahaṃpratyavamarśo yaḥ prakāśātmāpi*
vāgvapuḥ / nāsau vikalpaḥ sa hy ukto dvayākṣepi viniśayaḥ. 495 J first omits
 and then adds (above the line) the following text: °nanubhave gāndhikasya gand-
 hāmodavattayā. 495 G records and then deletes an *avagraha* following its
 variant reading for *anya*, viz.: *pradhānya*.

489 viśvanirbhare] GJK^{ed.}; viśvaṃ nibhare P^{p.c.}, viśvaṃ nirbhare P^{a.c.} R 490
 °dūṣaṇayā] GJK^{ed.}; °dūṣaṇaya PR 490 'nantagandhadravya°] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.};
 'nantadravya° P^{a.c.} 490 °saugandhyam] GJK^{ed.}; °saugandhya R^{p.c.}, °saugan-
 dhyi R^{a.c.} 491 iyattayā] GJK^{ed.}; piyattayā R 491 avadhārayann] GJK^{ed.}; ad-
 hārayann PR 492 paśyann] GJK^{ed.}; paśyaty P 493 °evam°] J; eva GPRK^{ed.}
 493 °bhāvanā] GJ; °bhāvena PRK^{ed.} 493 avikalpako] PRK^{ed.}; avikarmako
 GJ 495 anubhave] K^{ed.}; ananubhave GJ, anubhavo PR 495 anyasyaiva
] K^{ed.}; anyava PR, pradhānyasyaiva GJ 496 viśvanirbharatā] GJK^{ed.}; viś-
 vanirbhatā P^{p.c.} R, viśvanirbhaṃtā P^{a.c.} 496 'yaṃ] GJ^{p.c.} PRK^{ed.}; om. J^{a.c.}

487 R folio 34v. 488 G folio 54v.

satyāni svātmarūpāni paśyato na samānatā 86
 paśyantyātho śivāvasthā kriyāphalasamāptitāḥ
 kriyāyā vātha prārambhe kalpaniyā praśāntatā 87
 astu sāpi na bhedāya yathā tat praviniścitam

500 sādākhyeśvaradaśayor api na paśyantyā samānatā, sarvam aham ityevamāt-
 māvibhedenātmaviśrāntāni satyāny eva vastūni tathā paśyati pramātā. paśyan-
 tyām tu suṣuptāvasthāyām iva bhinnāny eva samsāradaśocitāni bījabhāvenāsate,
 505 suṣuptottīrṇe 'pi paśyantyā avidyāmayāny eva taddarśana iti śeṣaḥ. atha jñāna-
 kriyāprārambhaparyavasānayoḥ praśāntatā nāma śivāvasthā kalpaniyā, sā cec-
 chādīśaktiśūnyarūpā niranubhavā jaḍarūpety ucyate. tan na, yato 'stu sā daśā, na
 tu tadāpi sarvaśaktiviraho yena śivatattvād bhedāya sā syāt, kintu sarvāvasthāsu
 susūkṣmatayecchādīśaktiyoga iti prathamāhnikā eva niścitam.

86c ŚD 3.86cd–87ab is recorded at the top of the page, written upside down, in C. 88b G records the final *akṣara* of the half-verse, along with a double *danḍa*, in the right margin.

86c svātmarūpāni] TCGJK^{ed.}; svāptmarūpāni PR 86d paśyato] TGJPRK^{ed.}; paśyantī C 87a paśyantyātho] GJPRK^{ed.}; paśyantyā ca T, paśyantyātha--- C 87a śivāvasthā] TCGJK^{ed.}; śivo 'vasthā PR 87b °samāptitāḥ] GJK^{ed.}; °samāntitāḥ T, °samānatāḥ C, °samanvitāḥ P, °samaptitāḥ R 88a astu] GJPRK^{ed.}; as--- T, askta C 88a bhedāya] T^{p.c.}GJPRK^{ed.}; bheya T^{a.c.}, bhedena C 88b yathā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; yayaḥṣā (hypermetric) C 88b tat praviniścitam] TCK^{ed.p.c.}; tantuviniścītām G, tantuviniścitam J, °tattvaviniścitam PR, °tattvaṃ viniścitam K^{ed.a.c.}

501 G inserts *daśa* of *sādākhyeśvaradaśayor* into the text by recording the *akṣaras* below the line. 502 The *t* in °*ātma*° is recorded in the left margin of P. 507 G records a single *danḍa* (at the end of a line of text) following *sarvaśakti*.

501 sādākhyā°] GJK^{ed.}; sadākhyā° PR 502 °ātma] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °āma P^{a.c.} 502 tathā] PRK^{ed.}; tadā GJ 502 paśyati] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; paśyanti P^{a.c.}, paśyanti R 503 suṣupta°] GJRK^{ed.}; ṣusupta° P 503 bhinnāny] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; bhītāny P^{a.c.} 504 suṣuptottīrṇe] K^{ed.}; suṣuptottīrṇatve GJ, suṣuptottīrṇo PR 504 avidyā°] GPRK^{ed.}; avidyā° J 505 °prārambhaparyavasānayoḥ] GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °prārambhaḥ. paryavasānayoḥ P^{a.c.} 505 praśāntatā] JPRK^{ed.}; praśāntatā G 505 sā cecchā°] K^{ed.}; sarveccchā° GJPR 506 niranubhavā] GJPK^{ed.}; nirakṣubhāvā R 507 tadāpi] PRK^{ed.}; tad api GJ 508 susūkṣmatayā] PRK^{ed.}; sūkṣmatayā GJ 508 prathamāhnikā] GJP^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; prathamam āhnikā P^{a.c.}R

498 J folio 52r. 501 G folio 55r. 507 R folio 35r.

510 **na ca vāsty antarāle 'tra sā daśā yā hi kevalā 88**
prāk kriyāphalanīṣpatteḥ samanantaram eva yat
prasarpaty aparecchaiva punar anyā tathāvidhā 89
na kadācana tasyāsti kaivalyaṃ śaktiśūnyakam

nāsty api vāntarāle dvitīyakriyāprārambhāt prāg atra sā daśā, yā śāntatā śakti-
 śūnyatālakṣaṇā syāt. yad yasmāt kriyāphalasaṃpatteḥ samanantaram eva prasa-
 515 raty aparecchaiva susphuṭaparasaṃvitkriyārthā, na tu tadā śūnyatā. punar api
 tat-kriyāphalasaṃvāptau tadanantaram evānyā tathāvidhecchaiva pravartate.
 kiṃ bahunā, ubhayathā na kadācana cidrūpasyāntarālakṣaṇaṃ kaivalyaṃ śak-
 tiśūnyakaṃ nāma rūpam asti.

tathā hi

520 **yatrātmānubhāvāniṣṭhā tatrecchā ca na kiṃ bhavet 90**
athānubhavaṃ nāsti jaḍā sā na prasajyate

90d G records and then deletes a negative particle (*na*) following *kim*.

88c ca]TGJPRK^{ed.}; vā C 88c vāsty]TGJK^{ed.}; satyaṃ C, vāsy PR 88c an-
 tarāle]GJPRK^{ed.}; antarāte T, taśāle C 88d hi]TGJPRK^{ed.}; ha C 88d kevalā
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; vekelā C 89a prāk kriyā^o]PRK^{ed.}; prākriyā^o T, prakriyā^o CGJ
 89a^o niṣpatteḥ]TGJPRK^{ed.};^o niṣpatteḥ C 89b samanantaram]CGJPRK^{ed.};
 samataram (hypometric) T 89b yat]TGJPRK^{ed.}; tat C 89c aparecchaiva
]TGJPRK^{ed.}; aparecchaiva C 89d anyā]TGJPRK^{ed.}; āsyā C 89d tathāvidhā
]TCJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; tathā vithā G, tathām vidhā P^{a.c.} 90a kadā]CGJPRK^{ed.}; k---dā T
 90a tasya]GJPRK^{ed.}; kasya T, na tasya (hypermetric) C 90c ātmānubhava^o
]GJPK^{ed.}; anuṣṭhānabhava^o (hypermetric) T, atmānubhava^o C, ātmānubhāva R
 90d tatrecchā]GJPRK^{ed.}; tatrecchā T, tatrecchā C 90d ca]CGJPRK^{ed.}; *om.*
 (hypometric) T 91a anubhavaṃ]TGJPRK^{ed.}; anubhavaṃ (hypometric) C
 91b sā]CGJK^{ed.}; yā T, śā PR 91b prasajyate]TK^{ed.}; pusajyate C, prayujyate
 GJPR

514 P and R omit *prasaraty aparecchaiva susphuṭaparasaṃvitkriyārthā, na tu tadā śūnyatā. punar api tat-kriyāphalasaṃvāptau tadanantaram eva.*

513 api vāntarāle]RK^{ed.}; apy avāntarāle GJ, api cāntarāle P 513 prāg
]GJPP^{c.} K^{ed.}; prāṃg P^{a.c.}, prag R 513 sā daśā]JPRK^{ed.}; sāda G 513 yā
]GJPP^{c.} RK^{ed.}; yāṃ P^{a.c.} 516 anyā]GJK^{ed.}; anya PP^{c.} R, anyam P^{a.c.}

510 J folio 52v. 512 P folio 43. 514 G folio 55v.

yatrātmānubhavyāniṣṭhā viratyabhāvaḥ, tatrānubhavanakriyārthaṃ kim icchākriyā nāsti, na hy anububhūṣāṃ vinānubhavaḥ syāt. athātmano 'nubhavanam nāsti na prakāśata ity arthaḥ, sāvasthā jaḍā na prasajyate, prasajyetaiva. 525 kā kvā yojanīyam. ātmano hy aham iti parāmarśo 'nubhavaḥ, saiva cājaḍatā jaḍavailakṣaṇyadāyiniśvarapratyabhijñoktanīyā.

upalāder jaḍatve 'pi śivatvaṃ te kathaṃ sthitam 91
yathā na tatra jaḍatā tathāgre pravacāryate

atha jaḍatve 'py upalādeḥ śivatvopagamāḥ jaḍatāsañjanam. ko 'yaṃ doṣaḥ, 530 na tv ayam doṣa eva. yathā nopalāder jaḍatā tathāgre samīpa eva prakarṣeṇa vicāryata ity ayam ekaḥ pūrvoktaprakāro vitatyā kathitaḥ.

saphalāyāṃ samāptāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ samanantaram 92
kriyāntarecchāsaṃbhūtau tan nimittam anantatā
yato 'sti śivaśaktinām tās ca nityam avasthitāḥ 93
saranty eva svabhāvena tat saratprakṛtiḥ śivaḥ

535

93c An *akṣara* is deleted following *śivaśaktinām* in C. 93d An *akṣara* is deleted following the first syllable of *nityam* in C.

91c upalāder] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---palāde C 92a yathā] TGJPRK^{ed.}; tathāṃ C 92a na] T^{p.c.}CGJPRK^{ed.}; om. T^{a.c.} 92b pravacāryate] GJPRK^{ed.}; pravivāyyate T, pravacāryato C 92c saphalāyāṃ] GJPRK^{ed.}; sapalāyāṃ T, saphalāyā C 92c samāptāyāṃ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; samā---pāyāṃ C 93a °icchāsaṃbhūtau] TGJPRK^{ed.a.c.}; °ichāsaṃbhūtau C, °icchāsaṃbhūtis K^{ed.p.c.} 93c 'sti] TGJPRK^{ed.}; 'sta C 93d tās] TGJPRK^{ed.}; ---ś C 93d nityam] GJPRK^{ed.}; nitya--- T, ni m C 93d avasthitāḥ] C^{p.c.}GJPRK^{ed.}; ---vasthitāḥ T, iva sthitāḥ C^{a.c.} 94b saratprakṛtiḥ] TGJPRK^{ed.}; saran prakṛti C

522 R records a gap between the first *akṣara* and the final *m* of *kim*. 524 The first *akṣara* of *sāvasthā* is blurred by a blotch of ink in P. 525 J rewrites *cā* of *cājaḍatā* below the same *akṣara*, which is correctly recorded but blurred.

522 °anubhavyasya] GJK^{ed.}; °anubhāvasya PR 522 aniṣṭhā] GJK^{ed.}; niṣṭā PR 522 °kriyārthaṃ] GJRK^{ed.}; °kriyārthe P 524 prakāśata] GJK^{ed.}; prakāśeta PR 524 eva] GJPK^{ed.}; iva R 525 ca] GJRK^{ed.}; vā P 530 na tv ayam] GJPP^{c.}K^{ed.}; na tu yaṃ P^{a.c.}, nanu yaṃ R 531 vitatyā] GJPR; vitatyā K^{ed.}

526 J folio 53r. 529 G folio 56r. 531 R folio 35v.

yatra sthūlāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ saphalāyāṃ samāptāyāṃ, tadanantaram eva saphale kriyāntara icchāsambhavo yāvad aparyavasānam, tatra nimittabhūtānantatā yato 'sti śivaśaktīnām. śivaśaktayaś ca nityam avasthitāḥ saranty eva svabhāvataḥ. tās ca śaktayaḥ prasarantyo yataḥ, tat sarantī prakṛtir yasya sa
540 tathābhūtaḥ śivas tathābhūtalakṣaṇatvāt tasya. yathoktam

anyathā tu svatantrā syāt sṛṣṭis taddharmakatvataḥ (SpKā 35)

iti. iti dvitīyaḥ prakāro vitatyoktaḥ.
athavāha

īśvarasya svatantrasya kenecchā vā 'pi kalpyate 94
vibhāvāmodabāhulyam athavoktā nimittatā

545

kena vāsyecchā vikalpyate syān na syād veti. svātantryaṃ tāvad avaśyaṃbhāv-īśvaratvād eva, tanmayaṃ viśvaṃ tathāvidham eva, ityetāvat tāvat sthitam. athavā svātantrye 'pi viśvātmatāprasaraṇarūpasvavibhavāsvādo 'parisamāpto yasyāsti svabhāvaviśeṣas tasya prāg uktaiva sarvadā viśvarūpatāprasaraṇe nimittatety
550 evam abhinevecchotpāde nimittam nāsti dūṣaṇam.

94d T records *kenecchā* in a manner that suggests it first read *kenacchā*.

94d kena]TGJPRK^{ed.}; tena C 94d icchā]TGJK^{ed.}; i--- C, cchā PR 94d vā 'pi kalpyate]TC; vā vikalpyate GJPRK^{ed.} 95a vibhava°]CPRK^{ed.}; vibhāva° T^{p.c.}GJ, vibh° (hypometric) T^{a.c.} 95a °bāhulyam]TCPRK^{ed.a.c.}; °bāhulyas GJ, °bāhulyasya (hypermetric) K^{ed.p.c.} 95b athavoktā]TGJK^{ed.}; atha loktā C, athavokta PR

539 G, J, P, and R omit *yataḥ, tat saranti*. 540 J is damaged across the line that reads °*lakṣaṇatvāt tasya. yathoktam*, but it is nevertheless legible. 548 P and R omit °*svavibhavāsvādo 'parisamāpto yasyāsti*. 549 P correctly reads *nimittatety*, but one *akṣara (te)* that is blurred by a discoloration on the page is subsequently underlined by a later hand and rewritten in the right margin.

536 yatra]conj.; athavā GJPRK^{ed.} 538 avasthitāḥ]GJK^{ed.}; asthitā P, āsthitā R 538 saranty]GJK^{ed.}; smaranty PR 539 prasarantyo]JPK^{ed.}; prasarantyaḥ GR 541 syāt sṛṣṭis]PRK^{ed.}; syād dṛṣṭis GJ 542 iti]GJ^{p.c.}PRK^{ed.}; itī J^{a.c.} 542 iti]K^{ed.}; om. GJPR 542 uktaḥ]GJ^{p.c.}K^{ed.}; uktā P^{a.c.}; uktāḥ R 546 avaśyaṃbhāvi]GJK^{ed.}; aśyaṃbhāvi PR 547 viśvaṃ]GJPK^{ed.}; om. R 547 ityetāvat]GJK^{ed.}; ityetat P^{p.c.}, ityetāt P^{a.c.}R 550 abhinevecchotpāde]J; abhinevecchotpādane G, abhinevecchodaye PRK^{ed.} 550 nimittam]GJK^{ed.}; nimitta PR 550 nāsti]em.; nāstīti GJPRK^{ed.}

542 J folio 53v. 544 G folio 56v. 545 C folio 8v.

viśvatucchatvavākyaṅāṅam vairāgyādyarthavādinām 95
tātparyeṅa na doṣo 'sti nānācittvaṅm na kalpate

viśvam asatyam budbudopamam iti śivoktair api vākyaṅir na virodhaṅ, yata eṣāṅ vairāgyanirātmatādiprayojanābhidhānavatām ekaśivātmatāsamarthana- 555 paratvena na doṣo 'sti. na ca sarvaśivatve nānācittvaprasaṅgaṅ.
 tathā hi

ekasminn eva dehe tu vibhedāt paramāṅuṅāt 96
ekatvāc chivarūpasya doṣo 'yam bhedaṅvādinām

ekasminn eva dehe yāvantaṅ paramāṅavas tāvantaṅ śivā ity evaṅ paramāṅu- 560 gād api vibhedād vibhedāṅ syād ity ānantiyapratipādanam ity eṣo 'pi na doṣaṅ, ye bahavaṅ paramāṅvādiṅpadārthās ta ekaśivārūpā ity katham bahutvam. na hi śivo ghaṭādirūpo 'pi tu ghaṭādiṅ śivarūpaṅ. tatas cidrūpasya deśakālasvabhā- abhedābhāvān na bhedaṅ. etad iśvarapratyabhijñāyāṅ pradarsitam. yaṅ punar aṅubhedabhāvo ṅrhitas teṣāṅ cāṅūnāṅ svabhāvāc chivatā. sā ca malāvṅtā. tatas 565 teṣāṅ atroktajñānavaśād yaṅ śivatvavyaktis tato bhinnāṅ śivāṅ. te ca dehasthās tanmayatve cāṅūnāṅ dehaparamāṅava eva kim ity śivāṅavo na bhavantīti bhinna- paramāṅuvādo na cittatvasya, tatas teṣāṅ evāyāṅ doṣaṅ.

95c °tucchatva° | TCGJJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; °tucchṅtva° P^{a.c.} 95d vairāgyādyarthavādi- inām | GJPRK^{ed.}; vvāṅanyādyarthavādi- nā--- T, airāgyād arthavāditā C 96a tātparyeṅa | GJPRK^{ed.}; ---ry---na T, tāvat paryeṅa C 96a doṣo 'sti | TGJPRK^{ed.}; mosti C 96b kalpate | TGJPRK^{ed.}; kalpyate C 97b doṣo 'yam | JPRK^{ed.}; deṣo yaṅ T, doṣyaṅ C, doṣaṅ yaṅ G

561 The long vowel (ā) in °ādi° is recorded in the right margin of P. 565 A later hand records and deletes an illegible correction of the second akṣara of deha° in P.

553 °upamam | GJK^{ed.}; °upam PR 554 °abhidhānavatām | GJK^{ed.}; °abhidhā- natām PR 559 śivā | PRK^{ed.}; śiva GJ 560 vibhedāṅ | PRK^{ed.}; vibhedāditya° G, vibhedād J 560 syād | K^{ed.}; om. GJPR 560 ity | GJP^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; dity P^{a.c.} R 561 ye | K^{ed.p.c.}; yato GJK^{ed.a.c.}, yataṅ PR 563 °pratyabhijñāyāṅ | GJPK^{ed.}; °pratyabhijñāyā R 563 punar aṅubhedabhāvo | GJ; paramāṅubhedavādo P, paramāṅubhedavādo R, punar aṅubhedavādo K^{ed.} 565 atroktajñānavaśād | G^{p.c.} PRK^{ed.}; atroktavaṅ jñānavaśād G^{a.c.}, atroktajñānavāṅśād J 565 bhinnāṅ | GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed.}; bhinnā P^{a.c.} 565 dehasthās | GJP^{p.c.} K^{ed.}; dehastās P^{a.c.} R 566 °paramāṅava | JPRK^{ed.}; °paramāṅa G

557 P folio 44. 557 R folio 36r. 559 G folio 57r. 559 J folio 54r.

570 ekādhiṣṭhānato vāpi teṣām api na dūṣaṇam 97
 āntare kṛmicaitanye citratā svāmibhṛtyavat
 tāvad ekacitsvarūpaśivaprasaraṇena vā 98
 pātañjalādīsvareṇa na sāmyam avibhedataḥ
 iha tadvan na vijñeyaṃ tasmāt sarvaṃ sthitaḥ śivaḥ 99

athavā teṣām aṇubhedavādinām nānācittvaṃ na dūṣaṇam, yata ekacidrūpa-
 śivādhiṣṭhitā nānātmāna ekasyaiva nijamāyāprathanād iti yathā śivādvayadar-
 575 śāne. asmābhiḥ savistaram idam apīśvarapratyabhijñāyām eva samarthitam.
 abhedākhyātīś ca tāratamyena bhidyate puryaṣṭakabhogodrekāt. citratā krimyā-
 dicaitanye svāmibhṛtyarūpaśaktāśaktacaitanyadvayātmatvāt. athavā tāvat parimā-
 ṇam anekakrimyādiparyantam ekacitsvarūpasya śivasya yat prasaraṇam, tena.

98c Prior to ŚD 3.98cd, J inserts a mark that (wrongly) suggests the following
 constitutes the beginning of the commentary. 99b T is damaged at *sāmyam*
 but is nevertheless legible. 99d The colophon for C reads: *iti śivādṛṣṭau*
ṣaṭadarśanabhaṅga(em.)o)nāmātṛṭiyam āhnikam. If T had a colophon, it is now
 lost due to damage to the manuscript.

97c ekādhiṣṭhānato]TGJ^Ked.; erādhiṣṭhanato C, ekādhiṣṭhānato PR 97d teṣām
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; teṣā--- T 97d api]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---i T 97d na dūṣaṇam
]CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 98a āntare]GJPRK^{ed.}; --- T, antare C 98a kṛmicaitanye
]CGJK^{ed.}; ---nye T, kṛsicaitanya PR 98b svāmibhṛtyavat]CGJPRK^{ed.}; svā---
 ibh---tyavat T 98c eka°]GJPRK^{ed.}; eva TC 98c °citsvarūpa°]TGJPRK^{ed.};
 citsvarūpaṃ C 98d °śiva°]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---i--- T 99a pātañjalādīsvareṇa
]GRK^{ed.}; pātañjalādīśva---e--- T, pādañjalādīsvareṇa C^{p.c.}, pādañjalidīsvareṇa C^{a.c.},
 pātāñjalādīsvareṇa JP 99b na]CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 99b sāmyam]TGJPRK^{ed.};
 samāpi (hypermetric) C 99b avibhedataḥ]GJPRK^{ed.}; a---ibhedataḥ T, viśeṣa-
 taḥ C 99c tadvan na]CGJPRK^{ed.}; --- T 99c vijñeyaṃ]CGPRK^{ed.}; --- T,
 vijñeyas J 99d tasmāt]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---māt T 99d sthitaḥ]JPRK^{ed.a.c.};
 sthita--- T, sthitiṃ C, sthitaṃ GK^{ed.p.c.} 99d śivaḥ]CGJPRK^{ed.}; ---i--- T

573 The final *m* of *dūṣaṇam* is recorded in the right margin in G.

574 °adhiṣṭhitā]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; °adhiṣṭatā P^{a.c.} 574 °ātmāna GPK^{ed.}; °ātmāna
]JR 574 °darśane]GPRK^{ed.}; °darśano J 575 °pratyabhijñāyām]GJK^{ed.};
 °pratyajñāyām PR 576 °udrekāt]GJK^{ed.}; °udrekāś PR 576 citratā]GJPK^{ed.};
 cintratā R 576 krimyādī°]GJP^{p.c.}RK^{ed.}; krimmyādī° P^{a.c.} 577 parimāṇam
]GPRK^{ed.}; paramāṇam J 578 aneka°]K^{ed.}; anekaṃ GJPR 578 prasaraṇam,
 tena]GJK^{ed.}; prasaraṇato na PR

571 G folio 57v. 574 J folio 54v. 578 R folio 36v.

atra pakṣe puryaṣṭakādharikāreṇa citer udrekāc chivād vibhedas tasyaiva tathā-
 580 rūpatvāt. ata eva māyāśaktivaśāt tathaikatvāprathanād anekatvam, vastutas tv
 abheda iti. pātañjalena puruṣaviśeṣeṣvareṇa, tathā vaiśeṣikādīsthitena na
 sāmīyam tatra bhedābhyupagamāt, iha tv abhedaḥ. tadvad īśvaradarśane na jñe-
 yam. ataḥ sarvam eva bhāvajātaṃ śivātmakam sthitaṃ tathābhāve sarvadūṣaṅ-
 aparihārād iti.

580 G records the final *t* of *tathārūpatvāt* in the right margin. 580 G records
 the final *m* in *anekatvam*, followed by a full stop, in the right margin. 582
 The long *ā* in *bhedābhyupagama* is recorded in the right margin in P. 584
 The colophon of P reads: *śivadr̥ṣṭivṛttau śrīmadutpaladevaviracitāyāṃ ṛṭṭīyam
 āhnikam*. R reads the same. K^{ed}-reads: *iti śrīśivadr̥ṣṭau śrīmadutpaladevapādanir-
 mitāyāṃ ṛṭṭīyam āhnikam*. The colophon of G reads: *śivadr̥ṣṭivṛttau ṛṭṭīyam āh-
 nikam. śrīsvātmane gurave śivāyom namaḥ*. The colophon of J reads: *iti
 śivadr̥ṣṭivṛttau ṛṭṭīyam āhnikam. śrīsvātmane gurave śivāyom namaḥ*.

579 atra pakṣe] PRK^{ed}.; om. GJ 579 °ādharikāreṇa] GJK^{ed}.; °dharikāraṇa°
 PR 581 pātañjalena] GJP^{p.c.} RK^{ed}.; pītañjalena P^{a.c.} 582 °abhyupagamāt,
 iha tv abhedaḥ.] GJK^{ed}.; °abhyupagamāditattvabhedaḥ PR 583 tathābhāve
] J^{p.c.} PRK^{ed}.; thābhāve G, tāthābhāve J^{a.c.}

583 G folio 58r.

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<i>tattvonmeśaprasaraṇe bhavet sambandhabhāgini</i>	2.18cd
<i>tatphalāphalayogena yuktatā tasya tatsthiteḥ</i>	3.79cd
<i>tatra kā śāntatā brūhi śānte kiṃ vastutā na te</i>	3.56ab
<i>tatra cet sūkṣmakalanā sarvatra kalanāgrataḥ</i>	2.14ab
<i>tatra pādavihārādeḥ sphuṭam eva niśiddhatā</i>	3.24cd
<i>tatra mithyāsvarūpaṃ cet sthāpyāgre satyatedr̥ṣam</i>	1.46ab
<i>tatra vā tadupāyatvāt paratvenopacāritā</i>	3.15cd
<i>tatra vicitvam āpannam na jalam jalam ucyate</i>	3.38ab

<i>tatrāpi madhyamā kasya kāryaṃ paśyantyavasthayā</i>	2.38ab
<i>tatsatyatve dvisatyatvam asatyatve na kiñcana</i>	2.69ab
<i>tathā cāha khetapālāḥ śabdaraśer viśeśatām</i>	3.13cd
<i>tathā tathā śivāvasthā svecchātāḥ sa tadātmakāḥ</i>	3.72ab
<i>tathā tathā sthito bhāvair atah sarvaṃ śivātmakam</i>	3.20cd
<i>tathā tadvyapadeśaś ced vyapadeśaḥ śivātmakāḥ</i>	3.2ab
<i>tathā tasya vyavasthānān nānārūpe 'pi satyatā</i>	1.49cd
<i>tathātvenaiva klrptatvāt tadā tat kalpanā bhavet</i>	3.83ab
<i>tathā nānāśarirāṇi bhuvanāni tathā tathā</i>	1.34ab
<i>tathāpi tadvibhedena bhedataḥ tadabhedataḥ</i>	2.49ab
<i>tathāpy avidyayā yogāḥ paśyanty ātmānam eva cet</i>	2.40ab
<i>tathā prabhuh pramodātmā kridaty evaṃ tathā tathā</i>	1.38cd
<i>tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate</i>	1.45ab
<i>tathā mataṅgaṭikāyāṃ vyākhyānigurunoditam</i>	3.14cd
<i>tathā rūpānurūpatvāt prasūteḥ śivarūpataḥ</i>	2.80ab
<i>tathā sāvyavatvaṃ ca parādhinatvam eva ca</i>	3.22cd
<i>tatheccchayā samāviśtas tathā śaktitrayeṇa ca</i>	3.20ab
<i>tatheśvaravyavasthānād avastvābhāsarūpataḥ</i>	3.78ab
<i>tathaivaṃ sampravṛttau tu nimittakalanāpatet</i>	3.25cd
<i>tad akṣaram śabdarūpaṃ sā paśyanti parā hi vāk</i>	2.2cd
<i>tadanyatve tadaikye vā tad aṅgulyagrārūpyā</i>	2.58cd
<i>tadabhāvād devaguruśāstrocchedo bhavet tarām</i>	3.27ab
<i>tadabhyāse phalāvāptiḥ sūksmanantrasvarūpatā</i>	3.10cd
<i>tadātmatve nāsti bandhas tadabhāvān na mokṣanam</i>	3.72cd
<i>tadānīm pratipādyasya kim āyātaṃ svavikṣaṇāt</i>	2.66ab
<i>tadāsthāpravikāso yas tad aunmukhyaṃ pracakṣate</i>	1.15cd
<i>tadicchā tāvatī tāvaj jñānaṃ tāvat kriyā hi sā</i>	1.3cd
<i>tadicchāsāmanantarye tathābhūtātmatā yataḥ</i>	3.36ab
<i>tadupāyāt paratvaṃ ced dipāder apy upāyatā</i>	3.16cd
<i>tad evaṃ praśto devaḥ kadācic chaktimātrake</i>	1.29cd
<i>tad evaṃ syād athocyeta vahneḥ saṃskāracodanā</i>	3.46ab
<i>tad eva tatkalpitaṃ kiṃ satye nāmāstu kalpanā</i>	3.83cd
<i>tad aikyaṃ khetapālo 'pi prāha yā kācana sthitā</i>	3.64ab
<i>tadrūpatvena vā paśyan sthitaḥ sānta iva kvacit</i>	1.42ab
<i>tad vaktavyaṃ nimittatvaṃ kimarthaṃ rūpaṃ ujjhati</i>	3.52cd
<i>tadvad vāgindriyasyāpi na punaḥ sā parā dasā</i>	2.89cd
<i>tadvicārāya rāddhāntaḥ sampraty eṣa vidhiyate</i>	2.12ab
<i>tasmāt samagrākāreṣu sarvāsu pratipattiṣu</i>	3.17ab
<i>tasmāt sarvapadārthānām sāmarasyam avasthitam</i>	1.23cd
<i>tasmād asādhuḥ sādhuḥ syāc chabdavidyāphalapradaḥ</i>	2.71ab
<i>tasmād dhiranyagarbhādiyogasāṅkhyetiḥāsātām</i>	2.16cd
<i>tasyā api sāmarasye vyavasthāvān sthitaḥ śivaḥ</i>	2.87ab
<i>tasyā eva hi saṃyogo buddhyaḥ saṃkalpanātmanā</i>	2.37cd
<i>tasyā evātmadharmatvam iṣṭaṃ na parabodhake</i>	1.28cd
<i>tasyāḥ pūrvāparau bhāgau kalpanīyau purā hi yā</i>	1.19cd
<i>tasyātmatā brahmatā vā vaktuṃ śakyā na sādhubhiḥ</i>	2.13ab
<i>tasyāpi kathitā pañcatattvadiḥśāvidhau kvacit</i>	2.91ab
<i>tasyecchā kāryatām yātā yayā secchaḥ sa jāyate</i>	1.16cd
<i>tasyaiva vā trirūpatvaṃ vyapadeśāt tathāvidham</i>	3.82ab
<i>tātparyeṇa na doṣo 'sti nānācittvaṃ na kalpate</i>	3.96ab
<i>tādrgyañjanasāpekṣā sā na kiñcana jāyate</i>	2.61ab
<i>tāni dṛṣṭvānusṛjati sṛṣṭvā vānuprapaśyati</i>	2.26cd
<i>tāvad ekacitsvarūpaśivaprasaraṇeṇa vā</i>	3.98cd
<i>tāvad yāvat parā kṣāṭhā yāvat paśyaty anantakam</i>	2.4ab
<i>tenaiva vā tathā klrptas tathā tadanuvartanam</i>	3.48cd
<i>dikkālādīlakṣaṇeṇa vyāpakatvaṃ vihanyate</i>	2.73cd

<i>dr̥ṣiḥ sakarmako dhātuḥ kiṃ paśyantīti kathyatām</i>	2.21ab
<i>dr̥śyante 'tra tadicchāto bhāvā bhūyādīyogataḥ</i>	1.45cd
<i>devasya śāstrād bodhena kiṃ prayojanam eva ca</i>	3.73cd
<i>dveṣye pravartate naiva na ca veti vinā citam</i>	1.25cd
<i>dharmādharmaiś ca sambandhas tathā tacchivasamsthiteḥ</i>	3.79ab
<i>dharmādharmau na sambaddhau śivasya na tayoh kṛtiḥ</i>	3.28cd
<i>na kadācana tasyāsti kaivalyaṃ śaktiśūnyakam</i>	3.90ab
<i>na kiñcana gr̥hitam syāt tathānyā samḥṛtakramā</i>	2.49cd
<i>na ca tatrāmburūpasya vicikāle vināsitā</i>	3.38cd
<i>na ca tasya tayā yoga iti ced aparasthitau</i>	1.26cd
<i>na ca na kṣiram ity eṣa vyapadeśo 'sti tatsaṅgam</i>	1.18cd
<i>na ca vāsty antarāle 'tra sā daśā yā hi kevalā</i>	3.88cd
<i>na cānumānam iṣṭam te 'py avasthetyādīdūṣaṅāt</i>	2.33cd
<i>na cāpi pratipādyasya kādācītkapratikṣaṅgam</i>	2.65ab
<i>na cāsti sādhanam kiñcin mṛdādicchām vinā prabhoḥ</i>	1.44cd
<i>na caunmukhyaprasaṅgena śivaḥ sthūlatvabhāk kvacit</i>	1.17cd
<i>na tatsvarūpabhedāya śāstram yad vyavahāragam</i>	3.49ab
<i>na nirvṛtā na caunmukhyaṃ nirvṛtam nāpi nirvṛtiḥ</i>	1.22cd
<i>na param tadavasthāyām vyavasthaisā vyavasthitā</i>	1.5ab
<i>na prthivyādike tasmīn kalpanā sampravartate</i>	3.82cd
<i>na bhūṣaṇe kuṇḍalādau yathā tatra svasaktitaḥ</i>	3.19ab
<i>na yathā jaḍatā kvāpi tathāgre suvicāritaiḥ</i>	3.41ab
<i>na rājājñā samādiṣṭā svayaṃ vā sa nimittakam</i>	3.81ab
<i>na vāca iṣyate tadvat tasmāt sarvaṃ śivātmakam</i>	2.91cd
<i>na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekiṇi</i>	3.2cd
<i>na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte</i>	2.10ab
<i>na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra tathā tatra vyavasthiteḥ</i>	3.47ab
<i>na hi tasyā nimittam vā kāraṇam samavāyi vā</i>	2.39ab
<i>na himasya prthag śaityaṃ nāgner ausṅgaṃ prthag bhavet</i>	3.7ab
<i>nātra svātmavikāreṇa janayed bhāvamaṅḍalam</i>	3.35cd
<i>nānāvam tatprthaktvena tadaikyāt samaśabdātā</i>	2.43cd
<i>nānāvādaiḥ svasiddhāntaiḥ sākam atra virodhitā</i>	3.26ab
<i>nānāvādair no virodhaḥ kathaniyam ihāgrataḥ</i>	3.63ab
<i>nānāvīkārārūpeṇa jaḍataivam avasthitā</i>	3.22ab
<i>nāsatye satyabuddhitvakhaṇḍanātrāsti kācana</i>	3.71ab
<i>nityatve śabdattatvasya vyaṅgyatvaṃ dhvanibhir na ca</i>	2.78cd
<i>nimittam kalpyate tatra nimittam tatra kalpyatām</i>	3.54ab
<i>nimittatve prthaktvaṃ syāt samavāye tadātmatā</i>	2.39cd
<i>nimittasamavāyādīkāraṇeṣu samānatā</i>	3.29cd
<i>nimittasamavāyādīvaicitryāt tadvicitratā</i>	3.80ab
<i>niyamānupraveśāya śive collaṅghanena kim</i>	3.51ab
<i>nīrarthakatvaṃ śāstrasya kāraṇe tannirūpaṇe</i>	3.27cd
<i>niricchā ca na śakyeta vaktum evaṃ kadācana</i>	3.58ab
<i>nirjñāne vā tato jñeyaṃ nāśaktiḥ kācana sthitiḥ</i>	3.59cd
<i>nivāsīni śarirāṇi gr̥hṇāti paramēśvaraḥ</i>	1.37ab
<i>nīscalatve 'pi hi jalam vicitve jalam eva tat</i>	3.39ab
<i>nirūpatā nirvṛtir vā śaktitritayayogitā</i>	1.47ab
<i>naitan na vācaḥ kathitam patīśabdasya varṇitam</i>	3.12cd
<i>naīśā kriyā bhavati kiṃ niriḥche kiṃ kriyā bhavet</i>	3.59ab
<i>nyāyādibhir na tulyatvaṃ tair hi yā prakṛti matih</i>	1.28ab
<i>pañcaprakāraḥkṛtyoktiśivatvān nijakarmaṇe</i>	1.12cd
<i>patadgrahādike hemni hematvaṃ mukuṭādike</i>	3.44cd
<i>padārthatvena bhagavān sarvatraiva tadātmatā</i>	1.41ab
<i>parasya tādr̥gātmatvam utpadyetātra yogivat</i>	3.34cd
<i>parasya śāstrāniṣṭasya svatantrā vā tathāpi sā</i>	2.29cd
<i>parāparādībhedaś ca tatraiva pratipāditaḥ</i>	3.11cd

<i>parāparādibhedo 'tra śraddhadhānair udāhṛtaḥ</i>	1.48cd
<i>paśyantaṃ sā kim ātmānaṃ paśyanti jaḍam eva vā</i>	2.56ab
<i>paśyanti kiṃ śarīre 'ntar bahiḥ sarvatra vā sthitā</i>	2.41cd
<i>paśyanti jāḍyam āyāti lakṣitā tarhi lakṣitā</i>	2.31cd
<i>paśyanti yadi varṇyeta lakṣaṇaṃ tadvilakṣaṇam</i>	2.45ab
<i>paśyanti vā pramāṇena kenāsau pratipādyate</i>	2.61cd
<i>paśyanti hi kriyā tasyā bhāgau pūrvāparau sthitau</i>	2.84ab
<i>paśyanty adṛṣtam ātmānaṃ dṛṣtam vādṛṣṭatā katham</i>	2.55ab
<i>paśyantyāḥ satyarūpāyā asatyair vyaṅgyatā na ca</i>	2.60cd
<i>paśyantyāḥ satyarūpāyās tatsatyatve na darśanam</i>	2.27ab
<i>paśyantyātho śivāvasthā kriyāphalasaṃpattitāḥ</i>	3.87ab
<i>paśyantyā darśanaṃ dṛṣṭe na ca vā hy upapadyate</i>	2.55cd
<i>paśyantyā lakṣitāsau vā na vā yadi na lakṣitā</i>	2.31ab
<i>paśyantyā varṇyamānatve haste grāhyaikātipatet</i>	2.83cd
<i>paśyantyās ced avidyātvaṃ tadbhogaunmukhyayogataḥ</i>	2.70ab
<i>pāñyādīndriyavan naitad brahma vāgīndriyaṃ bhavet</i>	2.17cd
<i>pāñyādeś ced dharādyātmā vāco vāyvatmatā na kim</i>	2.36ab
<i>pātañjalādīśvareṇa na sāmyam avibhedataḥ</i>	3.99ab
<i>piṇḍe vā kaṭikāyāṃ vā kiṃ suvarṇatvam iṣyate</i>	3.18cd
<i>purā śāntasvarūpatvaṃ paścāt tādṛgavasthitih</i>	3.55ab
<i>puruṣaḥ sarvam evedam itihāsādiśūḍitam</i>	3.66ab
<i>prthivyādikalpanayā kalpanāvān śivo bhavet</i>	3.30ab
<i>prthivyādītattvagaṇe jaḍatvaṃ cet pratīyate</i>	3.40cd
<i>pratiḍehaṃ prthak kiṃ sā sarvatraikyena vā sthitā</i>	2.43ab
<i>pratibhā kathitā yā vā sānumānaṃ na tac ca te</i>	2.64cd
<i>pratītimātram evātra tāvatā bandhamokṣatā</i>	3.70cd
<i>pratyakṣasyāgocaratvād anumānaṃ pradūṣitam</i>	2.62ab
<i>pravṛttasya nimittānāṃ apareṣāṃ kva mārgaṇam</i>	1.13ab
<i>prasaren nādabindvādīśapekṣā ced anīsvārī</i>	2.42cd
<i>prasarpaty aparecchaiva punar anyā tathāvidhā</i>	3.89cd
<i>prasūyate svacīdrūpapramukhaṃ pārhivāntakam</i>	1.40cd
<i>praharṣāvedasamaye darasaṃdarśanaḥsane</i>	1.9cd
<i>prāk kriyāphalanīṣpatteḥ samanantaram eva yat</i>	3.89ab
<i>phalam vā tadanuṣṭhāne sa eva hi tadā bhavet</i>	3.76ab
<i>bandhamokṣau na bhidyete sarvatraiva śivatvataḥ</i>	3.68cd
<i>bahirbhāvān visṛjyātau paścāt paśyati sātha kim</i>	2.24cd
<i>biharti rūpam icchātāḥ kadācij jānāśaktitāḥ</i>	1.30ab
<i>bibhrad bibharti rūpāṇi tāvatā vyavahārataḥ</i>	1.33ab
<i>buddhiṃ vinā kathaṃ bodhaḥ sā buddhiḥ prakṛteḥ prajā</i>	1.26ab
<i>bodhasya svātmaniṣṭhasya racanāṃ prati nirvṛtiḥ</i>	1.15ab
<i>brahmatattvaṃ parā kāṣṭhā paramārthas tad eva saḥ</i>	2.5cd
<i>bhavatām aprastutena na kevalam ihoditam</i>	2.72cd
<i>bhavatpakṣe na kiṃ nyāya eṣa āyāti cec chive</i>	2.79cd
<i>bhavaty unmukhitā cittā secchāyāḥ prathamā tuṭiḥ</i>	1.8cd
<i>bhavadbhir eva nāptasyānanubhūtārthavaktṛtā</i>	2.62cd
<i>bhaviṣyatā atra tatrāsya svāṅgair eva vibhāgitā</i>	2.53cd
<i>bhaviṣyantaṃ vartamānaṃ kathaṃ paśyanty anāgatam</i>	2.47cd
<i>bhāge karaṇarūpatvāt pāratantryaṃ jaḍātmatā</i>	2.52cd
<i>bhāvair nāsti vibhedītvam athavāmbudhivivivat</i>	3.37cd
<i>bhedabuddhyanumānāc cel lakṣitā tarhi lakṣitā</i>	2.33ab
<i>bhede hi śaktiḥ kiṃ kāryaṃ karoty uta ca śaktimān</i>	3.5ab
<i>madhyamā kathyate saiva bindunādamarutkramāt</i>	2.6cd
<i>madhyamāder jaḍāyāḥ kiṃ bhogena śabalātmanaḥ</i>	2.70cd
<i>mantrastambhanatāyāṃ hi nāsau vahnīs tadocyate</i>	3.7cd
<i>mantrāñāṃ paraśabdānāṃ uktaṃ vāco na jātucit</i>	3.15ab
<i>maheśasyāṣṭamūrtitvaṃ yāvat pārthivamūḍhatā</i>	3.66cd

<i>māyārūpam itityādiṣaṭtriṃsattattvarūpatām</i>	1.32cd
<i>muñcato 'pi nijāṃ śaktiṃ svāntarīye jñānam āpatet</i>	3.6cd
<i>yata icchatī taj jñātum kartum vā secchayā kriyā</i>	1.19ab
<i>yato gāndhikasaugandhyavat paśyann avikalpakāḥ</i>	3.86ab
<i>yato 'sti śivaśaktinām tās ca nityam avasthitāḥ</i>	3.93cd
<i>yatrātmānubhavanīṣṭhā tatrecchā ca na kiṃ bhavet</i>	3.90cd
<i>yatroparī na hastādi neyam īsvarasamnidhau</i>	3.24ab
<i>yathā kartuḥ kulālāder ghaṭāḥ kārya itidṛśāḥ</i>	2.85ab
<i>yathā na tatra jaḍatā tathāgre pravacāryate</i>	3.92ab
<i>yathā na yogino 'stīha nānāsainyaśarīrakaiḥ</i>	3.36cd
<i>yathā nrpaḥ sārvaḥaumaḥ prabhāvāmodabhāvītaḥ</i>	1.37cd
<i>yathārūpeṇa paśyanti nirvibhāgā kathamā bhavet</i>	2.47ab
<i>yathā sarvapaḍārthānām bhagavacchivarūpatā</i>	2.89ab
<i>yadā tu tasya ciddharmavibhāvāmodajīrmbhāyā</i>	1.7cd
<i>yadi svarūpavibhramśāc chāktarūpādikalpanā</i>	3.52ab
<i>yad ekataraniryāṇe kāryam jātu na jāyate</i>	1.23ab
<i>yady ābhāsān bahirbhūtāms tān sato 'py asato 'pi vā</i>	2.21cd
<i>yady auṣṇyavyatirekatve dṛṣṭānto dāhakaśrayāt</i>	3.8cd
<i>yayā kramāḥ samhṛto vā kim ātmany aparatra vā</i>	2.50cd
<i>yasmāt tair ucyate sadbhīr evaṃ vastupravṛttaye</i>	2.8cd
<i>yasmād anādinidhanaṃ śabdattatvaṃ parā hi vāk</i>	2.83ab
<i>yāni paśyati kiṃ svākyarūpadikkālabhāgaśāḥ</i>	2.46ab
<i>yāvata sarvarūpānām tatsvarūpasvarūpitā</i>	3.53ab
<i>yāvat samagrajñānāgrajñātrsparsāv api</i>	1.5cd
<i>yāvat sthūlam jaḍābhāsam samhatam pārthivam ghanam</i>	1.33cd
<i>yāvan na sūksma ullāsaś citāḥ kāryonmukhaḥ sthitāḥ</i>	2.86cd
<i>yuktyā prakāśīto devas tataḥ śaktidaśā yataḥ</i>	3.1cd
<i>yujyate vaktum eva tad anityatvaṃ ca yat smṛtam</i>	3.50ab
<i>yena sā vā pramāṇena sthāpyate tasya satyatā</i>	2.68cd
<i>yogaśtreṣu sarveṣāṃ devatāsiddhiyogitā</i>	2.16ab
<i>yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpopapattitā</i>	1.44ab
<i>yo hi paśyati paśyantīm sa devaḥ parama mataḥ</i>	2.64ab
<i>rūpakatvaṃ gataṃ hema na śaktyaiva svatantrayā</i>	3.19cd
<i>rūpapasārasato garhitatvam ayuktimat</i>	1.12ab
<i>lakṣyate bodharūpeṇa na tathā caraṇādīkam</i>	2.19cd
<i>vaktavyam eva tasyāpi paśyantīm paśya yā svayam</i>	2.66cd
<i>varṇayisyāma evātra na ca sāvayavaḥ kvacit</i>	3.41cd
<i>varṇamānasamārūḍhā kriyā paśyantiyudāhṛtā</i>	2.20cd
<i>vastutā cet tathābhūtaśaktitritayasamgamāḥ</i>	3.56cd
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